Lewis v. Grounds

Filing 31

ORDER: Defendant Randy Grounds Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 23) is GRANTED as follows: This action is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. All pending motions are MOOT. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 6/30/15.(cmh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PETER A. LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN RANDY GROUNDS,
Defendant.

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Civil Case No. 14-cv-01154-SMY-PMF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Before the Court is defendant Randy Grounds’ motion for summary judgment on the issue
of exhaustion of administrative remedies (Doc. No. 23). Plaintiff Peter Lewis is challenging a
decision to enforce the prison’s grooming policy by cutting his hair on October 24, 2014. Lewis
adheres to the teachings of the Hebrew Israelite religion and maintains a sincere belief that his hair
represents his life and should not be cut or broken. He claims the October 24, 2014, haircut
deprived him of rights protected under the First Amendment’s religious freedom clause and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The motion is based on
evidence suggesting that Lewis filed this action without first exhausting available administrative
remedies. Lewis filed this action on October 24, 2014, the same day his hair was cut. The
motion is opposed (Doc. No. 27).
Summary judgment will be entered if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The facts and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Ault v.
Speicher, 634 F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).

Inmates who are unhappy with aspects of their prison confinement are required to exhaust
available administrative remedies before turning to the Court for a remedy. 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a);
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that must
be pleaded and proved by the defendant. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2008).
The state’s procedural rules establish the contours of the requirement. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 218 (2007). In other words, to exhaust, inmates must filed complaints and appeals in the
place and at the time the prison’s administrative rules require. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d
1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Grievances are intended to give prison administrators an opportunity
to address a concern. They do not need to place individual defendants on notice of an impending
lawsuit. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff first attempted to resolve his concerns
through the prison’s emergency grievance process. He then followed the normal grievance
procedure by resubmitting his grievance to a counselor on October 21, 2014. The counselor
responded on October 30, 2014. Once he received the counselor’s response, Lewis waited for the
law library to open so that he could obtain a photocopy. He forwarded his grievance to the
grievance officer on November 5, 2014. The grievance officer’s recommendation was adopted
by the warden on December 4, 2014. Lewis did not receive the warden’s decision until December
19, 2014. Lewis sent his appeal to the administrative review board (ARB) on December 30, 2014.
Although the appeal went out in the mail the same day, the ARB did not receive the appeal until
January 7, 2015. On January 22, 2015, Sherry Benton rejected the appeal as untimely (Doc. No.
24-3, p. 4). The ARB did not consider Lewis’ appeal on the merits.
Lewis suggests that he is not required to go through any administrative procedure before
initiating litigation for the purpose of seeking judicial relief in the form of a temporary restraining
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order or preliminary injunction. This assertion is not supported by citation to relevant authority,
and the Court is not aware of any such exception to the statutory exhaustion requirement. The
Prison Litigation Reform Act does include some exceptions. For example, the “three strikes”
provision for pauperis status includes an exception for prisoners who are in imminent danger of
serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Yet, Congress did not recognize exceptions when
crafting the exhaustion requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741
(2001)(no futility or inadequacy exception).
Lewis also argues that he acted reasonably and in good faith when he waited until
December 30, 2014, to send his appeal to the ARB. He explains that he wanted to first obtain a
copy from the law librarian. The law librarian was not available to make a copy for Lewis until
December 30, 2014. This position also lacks merit. The Supreme Court has recognized that
exhaustion means proper exhaustion through compliance with the prison’s procedural rules.
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93.
Lewis also argues that his grievances were not processed expeditiously at each level of
decision, deemed a violation of minimum federal standards for inmate grievance procedures. See
28 C.F.R. pt. 40. The minimal federal standards for inmate grievance procedures were adopted
before the Prison Litigation Reform Act because effective. Those standards have no application
to Lewis’ claim for relief, which accrued well after the effective date of the PLRA. See Lewis v.
Washington, 300F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2002)(applying the “substantial compliance” doctrine
only to causes of action accruing before the PLRA’s effective date).
Lewis also argues that his appeal to the ARB should have been accepted as timely. He
notes that the appeal was sent during the peak season for holiday mail. He believes the U.S.
Postal Service was flooded with mail, resulting in an unusual 8-day delivery delay. He also

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suggests that the ARB failed to apply the “mailbox rule” and consider his appeal as “filed” on the
day he put in institutional mail. Because Lewis did not give the ARB an opportunity to consider
whether his late appeal should be excused, the Court will decline to consider these arguments in
the first instance. Even if the Court were to conclude that Lewis’s appeal was timely submitted on
December 30, 2014, it was certainly not resolved before Lewis filed this litigation on October 24,
2014. Dismissal without prejudice is proper in these circumstances. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d
395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004)(exhaustion must precede litigation).
Defendant Randy Grounds’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 23) is GRANTED as
follows. This action is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. All pending motions are MOOT. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED: June 30, 2015
s/
Staci M. Yandle
Staci M. Yandle
U.S. District Judge

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