Jones v. Morris et al

Filing 71

ORDER DENYING Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 50 ). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 12/19/2016. (tfs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DEANGELO M. JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID G. MORRIS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:14 CV 1157 SMY/RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 179.) Plaintiff
Deangelo M. Jones is an inmate with the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendants David
Morris, Alex Jones and James Best are employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections. On
October 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Defendants violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff now proceeds solely on Count 1
which alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for complaining about the conditions of his
confinement. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
From February 9, 2011 to April 9, 2014, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Menard
Correctional Center. (Doc. 51-1 at 10-11.) Defendant Alex Jones served as the assistant warden
at Menard Correctional Center. (Id. at 41.) Defendant James Best served as a lieutenant and
Defendant David Morris also served as correctional officer. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 20 at 1.)
On February 9, 2014, Plaintiff, who was housed in protective custody, sent a letter to
Jeannette Cowan, a caseworker at Menard Correctional Center, to complain that Defendant
Morris and an unspecified lieutenant prevented him from using the telephone. (Doc. 51-1 at 39;

Doc. 68-1 at 47-48.) During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that, on February 19, 2014, Ms.
Cowan approached him to discuss the letter and he told her about the denial of privileges,
including telephone use, access to the commissary and shower time by Defendants Morris and
Best. (Doc. 51-1 at 13-15.) Plaintiff also told Ms. Cowan that he had told Defendant Best about
Defendant Morris, but that Defendant Best refused to address his complaint despite his status as
a lieutenant. (Id. at 19-20.) During this conversation with Best, Morris passed through the room
where the conversation took place, stood in the next room and overheard the conversation. (Id.
at 15.)
At Menard Correctional Center, officers generally announced shower time and unlocked
the cell doors for a short period to allow inmates to open the doors and leave their cells. (Id. at
23-25.) On February 24, 2014, Morris did not provide notice of shower time before unlocking
the cell doors and locked the cell doors before many inmates had the chance to open them. (Id.
at 25-26.) Plaintiff, who was able to open his cell door, complained to several correctional
officers, including Morris, and was told to shut up and to return to his cell. (Id.) An unidentified
correctional officer said, “We done got away with murders; we can do it again,” which Plaintiff
construed as a threat. (Id. at 27.) Several correctional officers, including Morris and Best,
escorted Plaintiff to his cell. Plaintiff refused to leave his cell again that day. (Id. at 27-29.)
Later that day, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Jones – with Defendants Best and Morris
present – regarding the threat and other issues. (Id. at 29-30.) Plaintiff also sent Jones a letter
with his complaints regarding shower time, cell doors and commissary access. (Id.; Doc. 68-1 at
49.) In the letter, he also advised Jones that he was told to sign out of protective custody (and

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presumably to go to general population housing) when he complained. (Id.) Plaintiff also
requested a transfer.1 (Doc. 51-1 at 31; Doc. 68-1 at 49.)
Plaintiff also testified that on February 25, 2014, Morris and other officers made
comments to him, such as, “We will get you.” (Doc. 51-1 at 32-33.) On one occasion, Morris
told another officer that Plaintiff did not like him and the other officer replied, “Fuck him.” (Id.;
Doc. 68-1 at 39.)
On February 26, 2014, Morris told Plaintiff that his cell would be searched. (Doc. 51-1 at
33.) Plaintiff dressed, was cuffed and placed in a shower. (Id. at 33-34.) Morris performed the
search and a few minutes later, told Plaintiff that he found a stinger inside Plaintiff’s cell.2 (Id. at
34-35.) Morris submitted a disciplinary report indicating that a stinger was found in Plaintiff’s
cell and that Plaintiff had threatened him yelling, “You fucking bitch, I’m going to kill you and
rape your wife once I get you, you fucking bitch.” (Doc. 68-1 at 52.) Plaintiff testified that he
did not have a stinger in his cell and further testified that Brandon James, a fellow inmate,
informed him that the officers planted the stinger in Plaintiff’s cell. (Doc. 55-1 at 37.) Plaintiff
also denied that he threatened Morris. (Doc. 68-1 at 55-57.)
On the same day, Plaintiff sent a letter to Jones recounting the search and accusing
Morris and Best of retaliation for his previous letter to Jones. (Doc. 68-1 at 50-51.) Plaintiff
also denied possession of a stinger and that he threatened Defendant Morris. (Id.) He accused
Best and Morris of fabricating the disciplinary report and requested an investigation and a
polygraph test. (Id.) Jones never acted or otherwise responded to Plaintiff’s letters. (Doc. 55-1
at 38, 40-41.)

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At his deposition, Plaintiff clarified that he meant a transfer to another unit at Menard Correctional Center rather
than a transfer to another facility. (Doc. 51-1 at 51-52.)
2
Plaintiff defines a “stinger” as a homemade electrical instrument used to heat water. (Doc. 68-1 at 40.)

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According to the final summary report of the adjustment committee, a hearing was held
on March 4, 2014 on the disciplinary report, which charged misuse of property, intimidation or
threats and insolence. (Doc. 68-1 at 53-54.) In a personal statement submitted to the committee,
Plaintiff denied the disciplinary report and charges and requested an investigation and polygraph
test. (Id. at 55-57.) Inmates Brandon James and Corwyn Brown testified on Plaintiff’s behalf
that he did not threaten or curse Morris. (Id. at 53-54, 60, 65.) The hearing committee found
Plaintiff guilty on all charges and imposed discipline, including six months of segregation. (Id.)
Plaintiff testified that he complained to Best about the disciplinary ticket on March 3,
2014. (Doc. 51-1 at 43-44; Doc. 68-1 at 41.) Best responded by telling Plaintiff to continue
complaining as he had been and by threatening him with segregation. (Id.) On March 4, 2014,
Morris acknowledged to Plaintiff that he knew about his complaints as he walked him to
segregation. (Doc. 51-1 at 47.)
Inmate Brandon James attested to the following by affidavit (Doc. 68-1 at 63). On
February 24, 2014, he overheard Plaintiff informing Jones that he feared for his safety due to his
complaints of mistreatment. (Id.) Jones told Plaintiff to send him a letter. (Id.) Morris and Best
told Plaintiff that if he continued to complain, he would regret it. (Id.) Morris also told Plaintiff,
“We’ll get ya.” (Id.) On February 25, 2014, Morris and other correctional officers harassed
Plaintiff throughout the day and asked him if he was going to chow “so he can get what he has
coming.” (Id.) When Plaintiff did not go to chow, the officers said, “We got you tomorrow.”
(Id.) On February 26, 2014, Morris took Plaintiff to the showers and conducted a search of his
cell. (Id.) James observed Sergeant Schott bring Morris a stinger to plant in Plaintiff’s property.
(Id.)

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DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court “shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” When faced with a motion for summary
judgment, the Court shall “examine the record and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060
(7th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment must be denied “if a material issue of fact exists that would
allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges claims of First Amendment retaliation against Defendants Morris, Best
and Jones. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) he
engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would
likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at
least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Gomez v.
Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012).
A prisoner’s complaints regarding conditions of confinement constitute protected First
Amendment activity. Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2006). Moreover, “false
charges resulting in being placed in segregation [is] conduct that would likely deter a person
from filing another lawsuit.” Dobbey v. Johnson, 2013 WL 5781943, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2013); see
also McCutcheon v. Schnicker, 2016 WL 1068821, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2016); Dolis v. Robert,
2014 WL 7530158, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2014). If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
retaliation, the burden then shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that “[their] conduct was not a
necessary condition of the harm—the harm would have occurred anyway.” Greene v. Doruff,
660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011).

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Defendant Morris
Plaintiff alleges that Morris planted a stinger in his cell and fabricated a disciplinary
report in retaliation for complaints regarding the conditions of confinement. Defendants argue
that Plaintiff lacks evidence that First Amendment activity motivated Morris’ submission of the
disciplinary ticket and that Morris would have submitted the disciplinary ticket even if Plaintiff
had not made the verbal complaints.
“To state a cause of action for retaliatory treatment, a complaint need only allege a
chronology of events from which retaliation may be inferred.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395,
1399 (7th Cir. 1994). Here, Defendants argue that the fact that one event occurred prior to the
alleged retaliatory actions does not prove the first caused or motivated the second. See Sauzek v.
Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F. 3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2000); Babcock v. White, 102 F. 3d 267, 275
(7th Cir. 1996). However, Plaintiff does not rely on timing alone. Plaintiff testified that Morris
overheard Plaintiff’s complaints to Ms. Cowan on February 19, 2014 regarding Morris’
treatment of Plaintiff and to Defendant Jones on February 24, 2014. Plaintiff has also provided
evidence to show that on February 25, 2014, Morris told Plaintiff, “We’ll get ya,” and asked him
if he was going to chow “so he can get what he has coming,” and that correctional officers
implied that Plaintiff would suffer retaliation when he refused to leave his cell.
There is also evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s allegation that, on February 26,
2014, Morris planted contraband in Plaintiff’s cell, submitted a fabricated disciplinary report and
that Plaintiff received six months of segregation as discipline as a result. In sum, the record
contains evidence from which a jury may reasonably conclude that Morris had knowledge of
Plaintiff’s complaints, communicated his intent to retaliate against Plaintiff as a result and took
adverse action against Plaintiff that served no legitimate purpose shortly thereafter.

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Defendants’ argument that Morris would have submitted the disciplinary ticket even if
Plaintiff had not made the verbal complaints also cannot be determined as a matter of law. In
support of the argument, Defendants state, “Plaintiff was housed in a cell without a cellmate
where contraband was located in his property box.” (Doc. 51 at 8.) Although cell searches and
discipline for the possession of contraband may be a matter of course, Defendants’ argument
fails to account for the evidence suggesting that Morris planted the contraband and fabricated a
disciplinary report. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Morris survives summary
judgment.
Defendant Jones
Plaintiff alleges that Jones was aware of Morris’ retaliatory conduct but turned a blind
eye by failing to investigate or resolve his complaints regarding the fabricated disciplinary
report. Defendants argue that supervisor liability is not available in § 1983 actions, that Jones
lacks the requisite personal involvement and that Plaintiff claims only that Jones did not act as
Plaintiff desired.
The principle of vicarious liability is not available in § 1983 cases. Kinslow v. Pullara,
538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). “To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish
that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Gentry
v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). “An official satisfies the personal responsibility
requirement of section 1983 if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at his
direction or with his knowledge and consent.” Id. “That is, he “must know about the conduct
and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Id. Moreover, “[A]n inmate’s letters
to prison administrators may establish a basis for § 1983 liability.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987,
993 (7th Cir. 1996).

Here, the record contains evidence that Plaintiff sent Jones a letter

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informing him about Morris’ retaliatory conduct and that Jones took no action in response.
Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that Jones knew Morris retaliated against Plaintiff and
turned a blind eye. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary with respect to Defendant
Jones is denied.
Defendant Best
Plaintiff has not clearly articulated whether he claims that Defendant Best retaliated
against him based on his complaints or whether he claims that Best turned a blind eye to Morris’
actions. (See Doc. 68 at 12.) In consideration of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will construe
the claim to include both theories. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim is based only Best’s statement to Plaintiff to
“go complain about that like you have been doing,” and argue that verbal harassment alone is
insufficient to support a claim of retaliation. However, Plaintiff’s claim is more detailed than
Defendants suggest. Plaintiff alleges in his Verified Complaint that Best told him to continue
complaining, threatened segregation when Plaintiff complained to him and took no action with
regard to Morris’ retaliatory conduct. (Doc. 1 at 12.) Plaintiff’s testimony indicates that Best
knew about Plaintiff’s prior complaints. (Doc. 68-1 at 50-57, 60, 63.) Furthermore, Brandon
James attested that, two days before the cell search, Best told Plaintiff that if he continued to
complain, “he would regret it.” Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that
Plaintiff’s complaints motivated Best’s decision not to investigate the disciplinary report. The
evidence could also reasonably support a finding that Best knew of Defendant Morris’ retaliatory
conduct and took no action. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment with respect to Defendant Best.
Qualified Immunity

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In support of their motion, Defendants also assert the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity. Generally, government officials are protected from civil liability when performing
discretionary functions under the doctrine of qualified immunity so long as “their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Alvarado v.
Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, in order to evaluate a claim of qualified
immunity, the Court engages in a two-step analysis. First, the Court considers whether a
plaintiff’s claim states a violation of his constitutional rights.

Then, the Court determines

whether those rights were clearly established at the time the violation occurred. Jacobs v. City of
Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2000).
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours “must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Estate of
Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 779 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
739 (2002)). The unlawfulness of a particular official's action must be apparent “in light of the
pre-existing law.”

Id.

A party may demonstrate that a right was clearly established by

presenting a closely analogous case establishing the defendant's conduct was unconstitutional or
by presenting evidence the defendant’s conduct was so patently violative of the constitutional
right that reasonable officials would know without guidance from a court. See Hope, 536 U.S. at
739–40.
Defendants argue that the record does not adequately support Plaintiff’s claims and to
hold otherwise would be a departure from established case law.

The Court disagrees.

Defendants’ arguments fail to address significant portions of the evidentiary record including

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Plaintiff’s testimony that he did not have contraband in his cell, Brandon James’ attestation that
Defendant Morris planted the contraband and the letters sent by Plaintiff to Defendant Jones.
As previously noted, Plaintiff’s claims that Morris and Best retaliated against him for
complaining about his conditions of confinement and that Best and Jones turned a blind eye to
Morris’ retaliatory conduct adequately allege constitutional violations against these defendants.
See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th
Cir. 1996). Moreover, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, a reasonable official would have
understood that Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the
defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 50) is
denied. Count 1 shall proceed to trial against Defendants David Morris, Alex Jones and James
Best. Counsel will be recruited to represent Plaintiff Deangelo Jones at trial.

SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 19, 2016

s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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