Hollins v. Godinez et al

Filing 9

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. DU QUOIN IMPACT INCARCERATION PROGRAM SUPERINTENDENT and JOHN DOE 4 UNKNOWN added. Gladys E Taylor (Assistant Director IDOC), Unknown Party (10 John Does listed as various C/O's, Directors and Assistant Directors of correctional facilities), Ty Bates (Southern Director IDOC) and Salvadore Godinez (Director IDOC) terminated. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 12/22/14. (jsy)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CIJAE HOLLINS, # M45877,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALVADORE GODINEZ,
GLADYS E. TAYLOR, TY BATES,
and UNKNOWN PARTIES,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 14-cv-01306-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Cijae Hollins, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional
Center, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three high-ranking officials 1 at
the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and ten unknown officials 2 at the Du Quoin
Impact Incarceration Program 3 and Dixon Springs Impact Incarceration Program. 4 According to
the complaint, Plaintiff was injured by an officer at Du Quoin in August 2014. After reporting
the incident, he was transferred out of Du Quoin and eventually into the Dixon Springs Impact
1

These IDOC officials include Defendants Salvadore Godinez (director), Gladys Taylor (assistant
director), and Ty Bates (southern director).
2
These ten unknown defendants include various officials at Du Quoin and Dixon Springs. The case
caption in the complaint identifies the Du Quoin officials generically, as follows: (1) John Doe No. 1
(head director); (2) John Doe No. 2 (assistant director); (3) John Doe No. 3 (assistant director); (4) John
Doe No. 4 (correctional officer); and (5) John Doe No. 5 (correctional officer). The case caption
identifies the Dixon Springs officials as follows: (6) John Doe No. 6 (head director); (7) John Doe No. 7
(assistant director); (8) John Doe No. 8 (assistant director); (9) John Doe No. 9 (investigating officer); and
(10) John Doe No. 10 (correctional officer). The Court found these designations to be more confusing
than helpful. The substantive allegations did not refer to many of the unknown defendants using these
designations.
3
Du Quoin Impact Incarceration Program is a satellite facility of Pinckneyville Correctional Center and is
also located in the Southern District.
See https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/Du
QuoinIIP.aspx.
4
Dixon Springs Impact Incarceration Program is a satellite facility of Vienna Correctional Center and is
located in the Southern District. See https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/dixonsprings.aspx.

Page 1 of 20

Incarceration Program. There, Plaintiff claims that staff continued to treat him poorly and issued
him a false disciplinary ticket. Plaintiff now asserts claims against Defendants for violating his
rights under the United States Constitution and other federal laws. Plaintiff seeks monetary
damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. This includes a preliminary and permanent
injunction expunging Plaintiff’s false disciplinary ticket and transferring him to another facility.
Merits Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner
complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to
dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief must

cross

“the line between

possibility and

plausibility.”

Id.

at 557.

Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept
factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts

Page 2 of 20

“should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). Only one of Plaintiff’s claims survives preliminary review under this
standard.
The Complaint
While participating in the Du Quoin Impact Incarceration Program (“Du Quoin”),
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted. On August 29, 2014, an Impact Incarceration Program
(“IIP”) officer 5 entered Plaintiff’s dorm and “announce[d] a sound off” (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Plaintiff responded loudly. When the IIP officer told Plaintiff to quiet down, Plaintiff explained
that he misunderstood the order; he thought he was supposed to use a loud voice. The officer
called Plaintiff a “dipsh*t” (Doc. 1, p. 5). The other inmates laughed.
Another Du Quoin officer, who is identified in the complaint as Defendant John Doe
No. 4, then ordered a group of inmates to stand with their noses and toes against the wall.
When they did so, Defendant Doe No. 4 “walked down the line and with a closed fist punched all
of [the inmates] in the back of [their] heads” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff sustained a “busted” mouth,
which began to bleed. He suffered from a headache and mouth pain. He spit some of this blood
onto the floor.
When Defendant John Doe No. 5 asked Plaintiff if he spit onto the floor, Plaintiff denied
doing so.

He also explained, however, that his mouth was “busted” and bleeding.

5

The complaint does not identify this officer as a defendant or refer to the individual as “John Doe.” It is
therefore not possible for the Court to discern whether Plaintiff intended to sue this individual.
A discussion of possible claims against the officer is set forth below in the subsection entitled “Du Quoin
IIP Officer – August 29th.”

Page 3 of 20

Twice, Defendant Doe No. 5 made Plaintiff go to the restroom and wash his face. Plaintiff was
then forced to “carry a log” as punishment for 20-30 minutes (Doc. 1, p. 6).
On August 30, 2014, Plaintiff asked an unknown first shift officer 6 how to report the
incident. The officer instructed Plaintiff to fill out a request for the counselor. Plaintiff did so.
Soon thereafter, the same officer told Plaintiff to report to the counselor’s office, where an
unknown lieutenant 7 met Plaintiff and took his statement. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff and six
other inmates were transferred out of Du Quoin to Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”).
At Pinckneyville, Plaintiff was examined by a nurse, 8 who took photographs of his
injuries (Doc. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff then provided a statement to an internal affairs officer, 9 who
asked whether Plaintiff would submit to a lie detector test, but one was never conducted.
Instead, the internal affairs officer told Plaintiff, and the other six inmates, that they would not
have to return to Du Quoin. All seven inmates were then escorted to segregation, where they
remained until their transfer to Dixon Springs Impact Incarceration Program (“Dixon Springs”)
on September 2, 2014.

6

The complaint does not identify this first shift officer as a defendant or refer to him as “John Doe.” A
discussion of possible claims against this individual is set forth below in the subsection entitled “Du
Quoin First Shift Officer and Lieutenant – August 30th.”
7
The complaint also does not identify this individual as a defendant, even in generic terms. A discussion
of possible claims against the unknown lieutenant is included in the section entitled “Du Quoin First Shift
Officer and Lieutenant – August 30th.”
8
The complaint does not identify this nurse as a defendant or refer to the individual in generic terms. A
discussion of possible claims against the nurse is set forth below in a subsection entitled “Pinckneyville
Nurse.”
9
The internal affairs officer is not identified as one of the “John Doe” defendants, and it is also not clear
whether Plaintiff intended to sue this individual. A short discussion of possible claims against this
individual is included below in a subsection entitled “Pinckneyville Internal Affairs Officer.”

Page 4 of 20

Plaintiff complains of harassment by unknown officers 10 and inmates at Dixon Springs.
The unknown officers repeatedly told Plaintiff they would make sure that he went to jail.
Despite complying with “all [of] the rules,” Plaintiff alleges that he was “constantly . . . written
demerit cards” (Doc. 1, p. 7). Officers called Plaintiff a “snitch.” He asked Lieutenant Turner 11
for a job, but his request was denied after Lieutenant Turner explained that Plaintiff would not be
at the facility long enough to have a job; Lieutenant Turner then said, “[y]ou[’re] going to jail[.]
I’m going to make sure of it . . . Now get the h*ll out of my face before I slap the f*ck out of
you” (Doc. 1, p. 7).
On an unknown date, a lieutenant called Plaintiff out of the dorm and asked him to retell
his version of the August 2014 incident. An investigator, Defendant John Doe No. 9, joined the
interview. When Plaintiff recounted the events, Defendant Doe No. 9 called Plaintiff a liar and
accused him of influencing the other six inmates. Defendant Doe No. 9 tried to coerce Plaintiff
into changing his story. When Plaintiff refused, Defendant Doe No. 9 wrote a report that
Plaintiff did not consider accurate. Therefore, Plaintiff refused to sign it. Defendant Doe No. 9
and another officer signed the report, saying that Plaintiff “refused” to sign it (Doc. 1, p. 8).
Around September 19, 2014, Plaintiff asked another inmate to quiet down during
physical training, so that the group would not be punished (Doc. 1, p. 9). The other inmate
pushed Plaintiff. An unknown lieutenant pulled the inmate out of line. Defendant John Doe
No. 10 then ordered Plaintiff to stand with his nose and toes against the wall and tell his version
of the events that had transpired.

10

A discussion of possible claims against these individuals is included below in the subsection entitled
“Dixon Springs officers.”
11
A discussion of possible claims against Lieutenant Turner is included below in a subsection entitled
“Lieutenant Turner.”

Page 5 of 20

When Plaintiff did so, Defendant Doe No. 10 yelled at him, saying “I don’t believe you.
[T]hat might have worked at Du Quoin but not here” (Doc. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff was then required
to “carry a log,” and Defendant Doe No. 10 later issued Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket.
Plaintiff alleges that the inmate who shoved Plaintiff was “allowed to write a case note on
[Plaintiff],” which stated that Plaintiff refused to carry a log. Plaintiff alleges that he did not
refuse to carry a log, but simply questioned the lieutenant’s decision not to make both inmates do
so together.
Defendant Doe No. 10 responded to this challenge by yelling in Plaintiff’s face and
“snatching” his hat so hard that he fell onto solid rocks while carrying a heavy log.
Defendant Doe No. 10 then walked Plaintiff to the administration building and told him that he
was going to jail for making false accusations against staff. After pleading his innocence,
Plaintiff “was then giv[en] a yellow jumpsuit and shackled.” Plaintiff now claims that IDOC
officials have a custom or practice of blaming inmates for their own wrongdoings.
Plaintiff generally raises a claim against Defendants for a violation of his “rights under
the constitution and laws of the United States” (Doc. 1, p. 11). The complaint does not mention
any particular constitutional right or law. Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment and monetary
damages.

He specifically requests a preliminary and permanent injunction, requiring

Defendants Godinez, Taylor, and Bates to expunge his disciplinary ticket from his record and
transfer him to a minimum security institution.
Discussion
The allegations in the complaint set forth a chronology of events followed by a general
assertion that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s “rights under the constitution and laws of the
United States” (Doc. 1, p. 11). No specific claims are asserted against anyone. Defendants are

Page 6 of 20

not identified, or referred to in the complaint, with any specificity or consistency. Under these
circumstances, the Court deems it most appropriate to organize its discussion of the allegations
by reference to each individual addressed in the complaint. When reviewing the allegations
against each individual under Section 1915A, the Court finds only one claim, i.e., for excessive
force, that survives preliminary review. The Court will discuss that claim first.
A.

John Doe No. 4
Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim

(Count 1) against Defendant John Doe No. 4 at this time. This defendant is an officer at
Du Quoin, who allegedly ordered Plaintiff and several other inmates to line up with their noses
and toes against the wall before he punched each one of them with a closed fist in the back of the
head. Plaintiff sustained a mouth injury and a headache that caused severe pain.
The intentional use of excessive force by prison guards against an inmate without
penological justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment and is actionable under Section 1983. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34
(2010); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). To state an excessive force claim,
an inmate must show that an assault occurred and that “it was carried out ‘maliciously and
sadistically’ rather than as part of ‘a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.’”
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 40 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)). Although Plaintiff’s
loud “sound-off” and his fellow inmate’s subsequent laughter may have prompted Defendant
Doe No. 4 to take disciplinary action, the complaint suggests that the punishment was excessive.
Plaintiff shall therefore be allowed to proceed with Count 1 against Defendant John Doe No. 4.

Page 7 of 20

B.

IDOC Officials - Godinez, Taylor & Bates
The complaint states no viable claim against the three high-ranking IDOC officials,

including Defendants Godinez, Taylor, and Bates. Section 1983 creates a cause of action based
on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under [Section] 1983, an
individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v.
Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply to actions filed under Section 1983. See, e.g., Kinslow v.
Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008).
The complaint identifies Godinez, Taylor, and Bates as defendants (Doc. 1, pp. 1-2). But
the factual allegations in the complaint do not mention these individuals. Merely invoking the
name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual. See
Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a
defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”). The allegations must suggest that
each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of a constitutional right by describing
the conduct giving rise to a claim against him or her. There is no suggestion of this sort in the
complaint.
And although the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to Section 1983
actions, “[s]upervisory liability will be found . . . if the supervisor, with knowledge of the
subordinate’s conduct, approves of the conduct and the basis for it.” Lanigan v. Village of East
Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1997); Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d
612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). See also Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 615
(7th Cir. 2002) (allegations that an agency’s senior officials were personally responsible for
creating the policies, practices and customs that caused the constitutional deprivations suffice to

Page 8 of 20

demonstrate personal involvement). The complaint generally alleges that there is a “wide spread
custom for IDOC officials and the administration to cover there (sic) officer’s wrong doing[s] . .
. [by] mak[ing] it seem like all inmates are bad and attacking them” (Doc. 1, p. 10). The
complaint sets forth no allegations that explain this general statement; however, and it certainly
draws no coherent connection between a particular custom or practice and the three high-ranking
IDOC officials. It also provides no example of a time when this alleged custom or practice
impacted Plaintiff, resulting in the deprivation of a constitutional right. Without more, the
individual capacity claims against Defendants Godinez, Taylor, and Bates fail.
Further, the complaint states no official capacity claim against these defendants.
Normally, a high-ranking official would remain in the action, in his or her official capacity, in
order to carry out any injunctive relief that is ordered. Even though Plaintiff seeks injunctive
relief (in the form of an order expunging a disciplinary ticket and transferring him to another
facility), as discussed in more detail below, the complaint states no claim in connection with the
disciplinary ticket.
The only surviving claim for excessive force pertains to an incident that occurred at
Du Quoin, where Plaintiff is no longer housed. His request for injunctive relief, in the form of a
transfer, is therefore moot. “[W]hen a prisoner who seeks injunctive relief for a condition
specific to a particular prison is transferred out of that prison, the need for relief, and hence the
prisoner’s claim, become moot.” Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 2004). See also
Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1995). It would only be proper for the Court to
consider injunctive relief if Plaintiff can show a realistic possibility that he would again be
incarcerated at Du Quoin under the conditions described in the complaint. See Maddox v. Love,
655 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2009)).

Page 9 of 20

But the complaint specifically alleges that Plaintiff has received assurances that he will not return
to Du Quoin. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot, and it is appropriate
to dismiss Defendants Godinez, Taylor, and Bates from this action.
C.

John Doe Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 & 8
These defendants are identified generically in the case caption, but they are not

mentioned in the factual allegations at all. The Court must emphasize that “[a] plaintiff cannot
state a claim against a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.” See Collins
v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). More is required.
The complaint frequently refers to unknown individuals. Plaintiff has identified ten
separate “John Doe” defendants in the case caption, presumably to assist in their identification.
But Plaintiff’s failure to refer to these “John Doe” defendants in the body of the complaint only
confuses the pleading. The Court cannot draw a connection between the “John Doe” defendants
in the case caption and the many vague references to unknown officials in the body of the
complaint. Further, having failed to draw any connection between these unknown parties and
specific conduct that violates Plaintiff’s rights, the Court finds that no claim has been stated in
the complaint against Defendants Doe Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 & 8.
D.

John Doe No. 5
No claim has been stated against this defendant either. According to the complaint,

Defendant Doe No. 5 told Plaintiff to wash his mouth twice, after learning that it was bloody.
This defendant also required Plaintiff to “carry a log,” as punishment for spitting blood onto the
floor and denying that he did so. Plaintiff admitted in the complaint that he did, in fact, spit on
the floor and then denied it when asked. The complaint offers no allegations suggesting that the

Page 10 of 20

punishment for this conduct was excessive or unwarranted. Based on these allegations, no claim
has been stated against Defendant Doe No. 5 for excessive force, or anything else.
E.

John Doe No. 9
The complaint also articulates no actionable claim against Defendant Doe No. 9 for

questioning Plaintiff’s veracity when he gave a statement to this officer about the assault, or
indicating that Plaintiff refused to sign the report when he did, in fact, decline to sign it (Doc. 1,
p. 8). The complaint does not explain what claim allegedly arises from this conduct, even in
basic terms. Under the circumstances, these factual allegations are so sketchy that they fail to
provide sufficient notice of Plaintiff’s claim to the Court and to Defendant Doe No. 9. Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). For this reason, Plaintiff cannot proceed with any claim
against this defendant.
F.

John Doe No. 10
The complaint also fails to suggest any claim against Defendant Doe No. 10. This Dixon

Spring officer pulled Plaintiff out of the line and questioned him, after Plaintiff allegedly told
another inmate to quiet down during physical training. Defendant Doe No. 10 ultimately issued
Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket 12 and required him to carry a “carry a log.” Here again, Plaintiff
admitted questioning the officer’s decision, by asking Defendant Doe No. 10 why both inmates
were not required to carry the log together. The officer allegedly responded by pulling on
Plaintiff’s hat so hard that he fell to the ground with a log in tow. He was then punished further
by being “shackled.” The complaint does not mention any injury associated with this incident.
And, what is more, Plaintiff has pleaded himself out of any claim. The only conceivable
claim is an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Doe No. 10. Plaintiff
12

No additional information about this ticket is provided, such as the nature of the rule violation cited in
the ticket, the disciplinary hearing, or the outcome.

Page 11 of 20

admits, however, that he was required to carry a log, after talking to another inmate during
physical training. The complaint goes on to allege that Plaintiff fell to the ground and was later
shackled for questioning the same officer’s decision regarding punishment. Given Plaintiff’s
admission of wrongdoing and the apparent lack of any injury, it appears that the officer was
merely undertaking “a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” when he ordered
Plaintiff to carry a log and later snatched his hat. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)).
Plaintiff shall not be allowed to proceed with a claim against Defendant Doe No. 10.
G.

Du Quoin IIP Officer - August 29th
The complaint states no viable claim against the unknown IIP officer, who told

Plaintiff to quiet down, when he “sounded off” too loudly on August 29, 2014 (Doc. 1, p. 5).
The IIP officer called Plaintiff a “dipsh*t” (Doc. 1, p. 5). It is well-settled that name calling does
not give rise to an actionable federal constitutional claim. See Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d
697, 700 (7th Cir. 1987) (verbal threats and name calling directed at inmate not actionable under
Section 1983); see also McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (Name-calling,
racially derogatory language, and rude behavior do not violate the Eighth Amendment).
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot proceed with a claim against the unknown IIP officer.
H.

Du Quoin First Shift Officer & Lieutenant - August 30th
No claim has been stated against the unknown first shift officer, who provided Plaintiff

with instructions for complaining to a counselor about the assault on August 30, 2014 (Doc. 1,
p. 6). Likewise, no claim has been stated against the lieutenant, who took a statement from
Plaintiff the same day. By all indications, both individuals provided Plaintiff with prompt
instructions that resulted in his immediate removal from Du Quoin, where he was allegedly
subjected to the use of excessive force by an officer. The complaint suggests that Plaintiff was

Page 12 of 20

removed for safety, as opposed to punitive, reasons. Plaintiff does not suggest what claim arises
from this conduct, and the Court will not guess what claim he intended to bring.
I.

Pinckneyville Nurse
The complaint alludes to a nurse, who took photographs of Plaintiff’s injuries at

Pinckneyville on August 30, 2014. No claim has been stated against this nurse, for the denial of
adequate medical care or otherwise.

In fact, beyond mentioning these photographs, the

complaint contains no further allegations against this individual. The complaint simply does not
suggest that the nurse is “personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”
See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Accordingly,
Plaintiff shall not be allowed to proceed with a claim against the Pinckneyville nurse.
J.

Pinckneyville Internal Affairs Officer
The complaint also states no claim against the investigating officer who took Plaintiff’s

statement before transferring him out of Du Quoin. The complaint seems to suggest that Plaintiff
should have been given a lie detector test, simply because this officer asked him if he would be
willing to take one. The same result was reached (and more quickly), however, when the
investigator acted on Plaintiff’s statement by immediately transferring him away from his alleged
perpetrator. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall not be allowed to proceed with a claim against the
Pinckneyville internal affairs officer.
K.

Dixon Springs Officers
The complaint also fails to articulate a claim against the group of unknown Dixon

Springs officers who called Plaintiff a “snitch” and issued him false demerit reports, all while
threatening to make sure he went to jail. The allegations are simply too vague to support a claim
as pleaded. They do not provide enough information about any single incident to put the Court

Page 13 of 20

or a defendant on notice of a claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall not be allowed to proceed with a
claim against these officers.
L.

Lieutenant Turner
The complaint also states no claim against Lieutenant Turner for threatening to “make

sure” that Plaintiff goes to jail after denying him a job. This individual is not named as a
defendant in this action.

Moreover, the complaint asserts no specific claim against this

individual, and the Court cannot find one.
Empty threats, such as Lieutenant Turner’s comment, are not actionable. See Patton v.
Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff has no federally protected right to a job
in prison. See, e.g., Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 485-86 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S.
1150 (1983). Further, the allegations do not set forth a chronology of events that is suggestive of
any other claim against Lieutenant Turner, such as a retaliation claim.
In the prison context, where an inmate is alleging retaliation, the inmate must identify the
reasons for the retaliation, as well as “the act or acts claimed to have constituted retaliation,” so
as to put those charged with the retaliation on notice of the claim(s). Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d
437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff must have engaged in some protected First Amendment
activity (for example, filing a grievance or otherwise complaining about conditions of
confinement), experienced an adverse action that would likely deter such protected activity in the
future, and he must allege that the protected activity was “at least a motivating factor” in the
decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 552 (7th Cir. 2009).
“A complaint states a claim for retaliation when it sets forth ‘a chronology of events from which
retaliation may plausibly be inferred.’” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir.
2000) (citation omitted). The allegations describe no reason for retaliation, no protected activity,

Page 14 of 20

and no retaliatory conduct on the part of Lieutenant Turner. Based on the foregoing discussion,
no claim has been stated against Lieutenant Turner for retaliation, or anything else.
Request for Injunctive Relief
In his request for relief, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction, in the
form of an order expunging a disciplinary ticket and transferring him to another facility. Plaintiff
did not file a separate motion seeking any sort of immediate relief, such as a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. The
Court can find no basis for granting a preliminary or permanent injunction in the complaint
itself. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief shall be denied.
In order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, whether through a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) his underlying case has
some likelihood of success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law exists, and; (3) Plaintiff
will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Woods v. Buss, 496 F.3d 620, 622 (7th Cir.
2007). If those three factors are shown, the district court must then balance the harm to each
party and to the public interest from granting or denying the injunction. Id.; Korte v. Sebelius,
735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013); Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 1999).
Further, the need for an injunction becomes moot “when a prisoner who seeks injunctive
relief for a condition specific to a particular prison is transferred out of that prison. . . .” Lehn v.
Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th
Cir. 1995). The Court should only consider a request for injunctive relief if Plaintiff can show a
realistic possibility that he would again be incarcerated at Du Quoin under similar conditions.
See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664,
668 (7th Cir. 2009)).

Page 15 of 20

None of these requirements are satisfied. Only one of Plaintiff’s claims (Count 1)
survives threshold review, and this claim does not support a request for injunctive relief. In fact,
the claim and the request for injunctive relief appear to be entirely unrelated to one another.
Count 1 is an excessive force claim against Defendant John Doe No. 4, who is an unknown Du
Quoin officer. This officer allegedly struck Plaintiff in the head on August 29, 2014. Plaintiff
was not issued a disciplinary ticket in connection with the assault; the complaint mentions no
disciplinary ticket at Du Quoin. 13 Further, Plaintiff is no longer housed there. He transferred out
of this facility soon after the alleged assault, and he received assurances that he would not return.
In other words, Plaintiff used the grievance procedures available to him at Du Quoin to obtain
quick relief, and the complaint mentions no irreparable harm that he now faces. Based on the
allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff’s requests for expungement of an unidentified disciplinary
ticket and a prison transfer appear to be unrelated to Count 1 and/or moot. Either way, Plaintiff’s
request for injunctive relief is denied without prejudice at this time.
Discovery of John Doe No. 4
Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Count 1 against Defendant John Doe No. 4.
This unknown party must be identified with particularity, however, before service of the
complaint can be made on him.

Where a prisoner’s complaint states specific allegations

describing conduct of individual prison staff members sufficient to raise a constitutional claim,
but the names of those defendants are not known, the prisoner should have the opportunity to
engage in limited discovery in order to ascertain the identity of those defendants.
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). “Depending on the
particular circumstances of the case, the court may assist the plaintiff . . . by allowing the case to
13

The complaint does mention numerous demerit reports and at least one disciplinary ticket that Plaintiff
received at Dixon Springs. No claims related to these reports or ticket(s) survive threshold review.
Therefore, any related request for relief must be denied.

Page 16 of 20

proceed to discovery against high-level administrators with the expectation that they will identify
the officials personally responsible.” Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 95 F.3d 548,
556 (7th Cir. 1996).
In this case, Plaintiff must simply obtain the name of the Du Quoin officer who allegedly
assaulted Plaintiff and six other inmates on August 29, 2014. It appears that Plaintiff can obtain
this information by directing a question (in the form of an interrogatory) to the Superintendent of
the Du Quoin Impact Incarceration Program.

In order to assist in this process, the

Superintendent of the Du Quoin Impact Incarceration Program shall be named as a defendant, in
his or her official capacity only and for the sole purpose of identifying the unknown party. The
United States Magistrate Judge assigned to this case may wish to undertake expedited discovery
aimed at identifying this party. Once identified, Plaintiff must name this individual in a properly
amended complaint that is filed with the Court. The Superintendent shall then file a motion
seeking dismissal from this action.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed two motions to appoint counsel (Docs. 3, 7), which shall be
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for a decision.
Disposition
The Clerk is DIRECTED to add the DU QUOIN IMPACT INCARCERATION
PROGRAM SUPERINTENDENT (official capacity only) as a Defendant, for the sole
purpose of identifying Defendant John Doe No. 4.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that DEFENDANTS GODINEZ, TAYLOR, and BATES
are DISMISSED with prejudice from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.

Page 17 of 20

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT all UNKNOWN PARTIES, except John Doe
No. 4, are DISMISSED without prejudice for the same reason.

All claims against these

Unknown Parties are dismissed without prejudice.
AS TO COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for DEFENDANT DU QUOIN
IMPACT INCARCERATION PROGRAM SUPERINTENDENT (official capacity only):
(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified
by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to
the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps
to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Clerk.
Service shall not be made on the Unknown Defendant, who is referred to in this order as
John Doe No. 4, until such time as Plaintiff has identified this defendant by name in a properly
filed amended complaint. Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the
Court with the names and service addresses for these individuals.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the

Page 18 of 20

Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on
which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails
to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision
on the pending motions to appoint counsel (Docs. 3, 7) and expedited discovery aimed at
identifying Defendant John Doe No. 4.
Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
should all the parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court

Page 19 of 20

and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not independently
investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a
transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay
in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 22, 2014

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

Page 20 of 20