Castro v. USA et al

Filing 72

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, The Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in its entirety (Doc. 65 ) and GRANTS Defendant United States' Motion (Doc. 56 ) for Summary Judgment. As there are no remaining claims, this matter is DIMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 2/15/2017. (jdh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTHONY CASTRO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
USA, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-01331-JPG-RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) (Doc.
65) of Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly with regard to Defendant USA’s Motion (doc. 56) for
Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed an objection (Doc. 68) to the R & R and the defendant filed a
response (Doc. 69) to the Plaintiff’s objection.
The Court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations of the magistrate judge in a report and recommendation. Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(3). The Court must review de novo the portions of the report to which objections are
made. The Court has discretion to conduct a new hearing and may consider the record before the
magistrate judge anew or receive any further evidence deemed necessary. Id. “If no objection or
only partial objection is made, the district court judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear
error.” Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). As objections have been
filed, the Court will review those portions of the R & R de novo.
1. Background.
This matter arises out of an incident which occurred on April 26, 2014, when Plaintiff
was attacked by another inmate. At this time, the only remaining claim is a Federal Tort Claims
Act (“FTCA”) action against the defendant United States of America. Specifically, the plaintiff
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alleges that the government acted negligently in failing to protect the plaintiff from an assault by
the other inmate. The R & R recommends that summary judgment be granted.
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Standard.

Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels
Int’l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). The reviewing court must construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chelios v.
Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Spath, 211 F.3d at 396.
Plaintiff’s objection states that, “the magistrate judge applied the wrong law in analyzing
Castro’s burden of proof necessary to withstand summary judgement and failed to interpret all
reasonable inferences from the facts in Castro’s favor; and because Castro has demonstrated that
a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding the issue of proximate causation that can only
be decided by a jury.” (Doc. 68, pg ). He cites to United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963):
One last point remains. Jailers in some States are not liable to their prisoners. For
example, several States have decided that a warden in charge of a penitentiary, or
a sheriff in charge of a county jail, is immune from suit because he exercises a
quasi-judicial function requiring the use of discretion. Another has decided that
the master of a house of correction has no duty of care toward his prisoners which
would make him liable for his negligence. And there are overtones in these
decisions suggesting that liability is also denied because of the fear that prison
discipline would otherwise be undermined. Such cases should not be persuasive.
Just as we refused to import the ‘casuistries of municipal liability for torts' in
Indian Towing, so we think it improper to limit suits by federal prisoners because
of restrictive state rules of immunity. Whether a discretionary function is involved
is a matter to be decided under 28 U.S.C. s 2680(a), rather than under state rules
relating to political, judicial, quasi-judicial, and ministerial functions. And the
duty of care owed by the Bureau of Prisons to federal prisoners is fixed by 18
U.S.C. s 4042, independent of an inconsistent state rule. Finally, having decided
that discipline in the federal prisons will not be so seriously impaired that all
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recovery should be denied for negligently inflicted injuries, we should not at the
same time make recovery depend upon a State's decision to the contrary. Id. at
164–65.
The quote above sets out that a state cannot limit a FTCA action with rules of immunity
or the presence of a compensation system. Id. at 160, 154. The Muniz Court also makes clear
that the FTCA requires state law to be applied as it would with a “private” individual.
Without more definite indication of the risks of harm from diversity, we conclude
that the prison system will not be disrupted by the application of Connecticut law
in one case and Indiana law in another to decide whether the Government should
be liable to a prisoner for the negligence of its employees. Finally, though the
Government expresses some concern that the nonuniform right to recover will
prejudice prisoners, it nonetheless seems clear that no recovery would prejudice
them even more. Id. at 162.
Based on the above, the plaintiff argues that the R & R was incorrect to rely on Illinois
Court of Claims’ cases as those actions only involve state employee and not “private”
individuals. Instead, the plaintiff argues that Illinois law regarding a “private individual” should
be applied. The Court agrees and under Illinois law, “[i]n order to prevail in an action for
negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty, that defendant breached that
duty, and that defendant's breach was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.” Am. Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Natl. Advert. Co., 594 N.E.2d 313, 318 (Ill. 1992).
“Unless a duty is owed, there is no negligence. Whether a duty exists is a question of law
for the court to decide.” Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Natl. Advert. Co., 594 N.E.2d
313, 318 (Ill. 1992)(internal citation omitted.)

“Among the factors which this court has

considered relevant to the existence of a duty are reasonable foreseeability, the likelihood of
injury, and the extent of the burden placed upon the defendant in guarding against an injury.” Id.
at 318. “‘Foreseeability means that which it is objectively reasonable to expect, not merely what
might conceivably occur.’” Id. at 320, quoting Winnett v. Winnett (1974), 57 Ill.2d 7, 12–13, 310
N.E.2d 1) (emphasis in original.)
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The R & R found that, “the evidence before the Court is insufficient to demonstrate that
Officer Murray was aware or should have been aware that inmate Venzor would assault
Plaintiff.” Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge failed to take, “all reasonable inferences in
favor of Castro” as “Castro has presented evidence that Lieutenant Brooks was not in the N-Unit
at the time of the assault began.” The plaintiff further argues that, “whether Lieutenant Brooks
was present before the attack occurred is a material fact in this case. If he was not, then that
necessarily means no correctional officer was present when the attack occurred; making the
attack more foreseeable.”
However, as the defendant notes, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one
of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a
court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.”

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

In this matter, “video footage

unequivocally establishes that Lt. Brooks entered N-Unit prior to the attack, saw the attack begin
several seconds later, and immediately took action.” (Doc. 69, video manually submitted.)
Therefore, there is no material issue of material fact with regard to whether a correctional
officer was present in N-Unit when the attack occurred and no evidence that the defendant knew,
or could have foreseen, the assault on the plaintiff.
Based on the above, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in its
entirety (Doc. 65) and GRANTS Defendant United States’ Motion (Doc. 56) for Summary
Judgment. As there are no remaining claims, this matter is DIMISSED without prejudice.

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The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 2/15/2017
s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

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