Dunnagan v. Prenzler et al

Filing 92

ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative for a New Trial, or in the Alternative to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Doc. 81 ). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 6/2/2017. (tfs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LINDA DUNNAGAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE MADISON COUNTY
TREASURER’S OFFICE and MADISON
COUNTY, ILLINOIS, an Illinois
Municipality,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-CV-1339-SMY-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
After a three day trial, a jury awarded Plaintiff $450,000 in compensatory damages under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). This matter is now before the Court on
Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative for a New
Trial, or in the Alternative to Alter or Amend the Judgment, brought pursuant to F.R.C.P. 50(b),
59(a) and 59(e) (Doc. 81). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
“If a party has been fully heard on an issue . . . and the court finds that a reasonable jury
would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court
may [grant the motion for judgment as a matter of law].” FRCP 50(a). “No later than 28 days
after the entry of judgment . . . the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter
of law.” FRCP 50(b). When the motion is brought after a jury verdict, the question is not
whether the jury believed the right people, but “whether it was presented with a legally sufficient
amount of evidence from which it could reasonably derive its verdict.” Massey v. Blue CrossBlue Shield of Illinois, 226 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2000). A jury’s verdict will be overturned

only if no rational jury could have found for the plaintiff. Tate v. Exec. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 546
F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2008).
A new trial may be granted under F.R.C.P. 59 if the verdict is against the manifest weight
of the evidence or if a prejudicial error occurred. Romero v. Cincinnati Inc., 171 F.3d 1091,
1096 (7th Cir. 1999). “The district court has the power to get a general sense of the weight of the
evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the comparative strength of the facts put
forth at trial.” Mejia v. Cook Cty., Ill., 650 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2011).
Defendants argue that no reasonable jury could have concluded that Plaintiff was
disabled as defined in the ADA. The ADA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment[.]” “The
definition of disability . . . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the ADA].”
“An individual meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’
if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this
chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” The “regarded as” element
cannot apply to “impairments that are transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is an
impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102.
Defendants presented their motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of
evidence. Plaintiff argued that the jury could reasonably choose to disbelieve the reason given
by the employer for Plaintiff’s termination and instead, conclude that the employer was
dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose, i.e., that he regarded Plaintiff as disabled. The
Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Plaintiff was

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subjected to adverse employment actions as a result of her employer’s perception of her physical
impairments (Doc. 78, p. 112).
The crux of Defendants argument is that Plaintiff’s supervisor, Kurt Prenzler, could not
have regarded Plaintiff as disabled because he did not testify as such. (Doc. 82, p. 10). At trial,
Prenzler testified that he hired and maintained an Assistant Comptroller while simultaneously
eliminating Plaintiff’s position of Comptroller after being “shocked” that Plaintiff was at work
with an IV drip in her arm. There was also evidence presented that Madison County’s Human
Resources Director, Chris Sillery, had expressed concern that Prenzler was trying to “get rid” of
Plaintiff on account of her illness (Doc. 76, p. 42). Taking this evidence into account, the Court
again finds that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Plaintiff was at least
regarded as disabled by her employer. As such, the jury’s verdict in this regard was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence and Defendants’ renewed Rule 50 motion and Rule 59
motion for a new trial will be denied.
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows for post-trial motions to alter or amend a
judgment, including by way of remittitur.” Baier v. Rohr-Mont Motors, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d
1000, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2016). “In deciding Rule 59(e) motions, the Seventh Amendment requires
that the Court ‘accord substantial deference to the jury's assessment’ of damages.” Id.
Defendants request that the Court amend the judgment to exclude Madison County
because “no verdict was rendered against it.” (Doc. 82, p. 13). Immediately preceding trial, the
parties agreed that Madison County would be dismissed for purposes of liability, but remain in
the case for indemnification purposes only. (Doc. 79 p. 15). The jury was instructed that
Madison County Treasurer’s Office was the only defendant and the verdict form reflects a
verdict against only one defendant. (Doc. 58, p. 1). So, while Madison County remains a party,
it is for indemnification purposes only. Therefore, the judgment will be amended as to reflect a

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liability judgment against the Madison County Treasurer’s Office only.
Defendants also request that the jury’s damage award be reduced to comply with the
statutory cap in Section 1981a(b)(3), arguing that Plaintiff was employed by Madison County
Treasurer’s Office and not Madison County. The Court previously found that Defendants had
not properly moved for a reduction of the compensatory damages and had not provided any
evidence to establish the number of employees. (Doc. 74, p. 3). The Court also specifically
ruled that although Plaintiff worked in the Madison County Treasurer’s Office, she was an
employee of Madison County and therefore, the number of employees of Madison County, not
solely the Madison County Treasurer’s Office, should be considered for the purpose of applying
the damage cap. Id.
Defendants have now properly moved for a reduction of the compensatory damages via
application of the statutory cap. In support of their request however, Defendants have submitted
evidence of the number of employees for Madison County Treasurer’s Office, notwithstanding
the Court’s previous ruling that the appropriate metric is the total number of employees for
Madison County. Because Defendants have provided no evidence of the number of employees
of Madison County, their request to reduce the compensatory damage award is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 2, 2017
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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