McCoy v. Edmeister et al

Filing 43

ORDER ADOPTING 36 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: Plaintiff's 37 Objection to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson's Report and Recommendation is OVERRULED, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson's 36 Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED, and Plaintiff's 31 Motion for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief is DENIED. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 01/04/2016. (bak)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHRISTOPHER H. MCCOY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ERIC T. EDMEISTER and JEFFREY S.
WALTON,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-CV-1379-NJR-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of United
States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson (Doc. 36), recommending that Plaintiff
Christopher McCoy’s Urgent Motion for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Doc. 31) be
denied. The Report and Recommendation was entered on October 14, 2015. Plaintiff
Christopher McCoy (“McCoy”) filed a timely objection to the Report and
Recommendation on October 26, 2015 (Doc. 37). Defendant Warden Jeffrey Walton filed
a Response to Plaintiff’s Objection on October 28, 2015 (Doc. 39). McCoy then filed a
Reply on November 4, 2015 (Doc. 41).
McCoy, who is currently an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Marion,
Illinois, has filed a motion that Magistrate Judge Wilkerson has properly construed as a
motion for preliminary injunction, which seeks relief in the form of a “cease (or reverse)
of inmate transfer” (Doc. 31). McCoy explains in his motion that Defendants have filed
paperwork seeking to transfer McCoy from USP Marion to a low-security facility in
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retaliation for McCoy engaging in a constitutionally protected right. McCoy asks the
Court to stay any transfer. Defendant Walton responded to McCoy’s motion indicating
that McCoy became eligible for transfer to a low security facility in July 2015 and, in
accordance with a prescribed policy of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), a transfer was
requested. Defendant Walton urged that there was no retaliatory motive behind the
request for transfer. Defendant Walton also noted that McCoy has a pending habeas
appeal before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The requested transfer was
reviewed and authorized by the Seventh Circuit in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 23(a).
After considering the arguments, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson issued the Report
and Recommendation currently before the Court (Doc. 36). Magistrate Judge Wilkerson
recommends denying McCoy’s motion because the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has “clearly issued a determination on this matter and has authorized Plaintiff’s
transfer.” (Doc. 36, p. 4). Magistrate Judge Wilkerson pointed out that the arguments
McCoy made in his motion are substantially similar to arguments he has already
proffered to the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit considered those augments and
ultimately denied McCoy’s request. Additionally, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson reasoned
that the relief sought in McCoy’s motion is not related to McCoy’s First Amendment
claims that are pending in this lawsuit. 1
Where timely objections are filed, this Court must undertake a de novo review of
Two of Plaintiff’s claims have survived threshold review: (Count 1) First Amendment claim against
Defendant Eric Edmeister for reading and then confiscating Plaintiff’s privileged attorney-client
correspondence and documents; and (Count 2) First Amendment claim against Defendant Warden Jeffrey
Walton for refusing to return Plaintiff’s privileged attorney-client correspondence and documents (See
Doc. 10).

1

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the Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b);
SDIL-LR 73.1(b); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 824 F. Supp. 786, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see
also Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). The Court may accept, reject or
modify the magistrate judge’s recommended decision. Harper, 824 F. Supp. at 788. In
making this determination, the Court must look at all of the evidence contained in the
record and give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objections have
been made. Id., quoting 12 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3076.8, at p. 55 (1st ed. 1973) (1992 Pocket Part).
As noted above, McCoy has leveled an objection to the Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 37). This timely objection requires the Court to undertake a de
novo review of the Report and Recommendation.
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The purpose of such an
injunction is “to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution of
the lawsuit.” Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). In order to obtain a
preliminary injunction, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that: (1) he is likely to
succeed on the merits of his claim; (2) he has no adequate remedy at law; and (3) he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc.
v. Comm’r of Indiana State Dep’t Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012), citing Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589–90 (7th Cir. 2012).

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In the context of prisoner litigation, the scope of the Court’s authority to enter an
injunction is circumscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Westefer v.
Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunctive relief
“must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the
court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to
correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). See also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (noting
the PLRA “enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging
prison conditions: prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority
over the institutions they manage”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
McCoy argues in his Objection, as he did in his original reply brief (Doc. 34), that
he is requesting “to stay a transfer” and that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion is irrelevant to
this case (See Doc. 37). Defendant Walton argues that: (1) the Seventh Circuit has already
approved the BOP’s request to transfer McCoy to a low-security facility; (2) McCoy’s
motion does not encompass the underlying claims so a preliminary injunction is
inappropriate; and (3) even if preliminary injunctive relief was available, McCoy cannot
satisfy his burden to obtain one (Doc. 39). McCoy has filed a Reply, reiterating much of
the same arguments made previously, and requesting a temporary stay of transfer or
protective order, citing to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). That provision, relating
to the general provisions governing discovery, is inapplicable here.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the briefing in this case and finds that McCoy
is not entitled to a preliminary injunction that would stay his transfer to a low-security
facility. Nothing in the record suggests that the decision to request McCoy’s transfer was

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retaliatory or even related to the claims McCoy sets forth in this lawsuit. It appears that
McCoy has become eligible for a low-security facility due to the change in the total time
remaining on his sentence, and the transfer request was made in accordance with BOP
policy (Doc. 39, p. 2). Significantly, as Magistrate Judge Wilkerson and Defendant
Walton have stressed, the Seventh Circuit has already given the BOP authorization to
transfer McCoy to a low-security correctional institution (Doc. 33-4). See FED. R. APP. P.
23(a). McCoy filed a Motion to Reconsider that decision, which the Seventh Circuit
denied on September 9, 2015 (Doc. 33-5; Doc. 33-6). In light of the fact that the Seventh
Circuit has already issued a ruling authorizing transfer, the issue is moot.
Conclusion
Accordingly, McCoy’s Objection (Doc. 37) to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s
Report and Recommendation is OVERRULED, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s Report
and Recommendation (Doc. 36) is ADOPTED, and McCoy’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (Doc. 31) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 4, 2016
_____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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