Eldracher v. Honeywell, Inc.

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, denying 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Honeywell International, Inc. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 5/28/2015. (jdh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAVID ELDRACHER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 14-cv-1414-JPG-DGW

HONEYWELL, INC., d/b/a Honeywell
Performance Materials and Technologies, and
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
d/b/a Honeywell Performance Materials and
Technologies,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by defendant Honeywell International, Inc. d/b/a Honeywell
Performance Materials and Technologies (“Honeywell”) (Doc. 11). Plaintiff David Eldracher
has responded to the motion (Doc. 14), and Honeywell has replied to that response (Doc. 15).
This case arose after Eldracher, an employee of Bowen Engineering Corporation, was
exposed to toxic substances while working as an ironworker at Honeywell’s Metropolis, Illinois,
plant. He has sued for negligence, alleging that the defendants failed to provide adequate safety
equipment or to stop work being performed in an unsafe manner. Eldracher claims that, as a
result, he suffered health problems, has incurred significant medical expenses, and can no longer
work as an ironworker. He is suing for compensatory and punitive damages.
Honeywell asks the Court to dismiss Eldracher’s claims for punitive damages on the
grounds that they are not supported by sufficient factual pleading as required by Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), to support a finding of willful and wanton conduct. Eldracher
argues the facts in his amended complaint are sufficient support a punitive damages award.

The parties’ arguments are misplaced. Rule 12(b)(6) is the avenue to seek dismissal of an
insufficiently stated claim. However, a prayer for punitive damages is not a claim but instead
only a type of remedy available when a plaintiff is successful on a claim. Vincent v. Alden-Park
Strathmoor, Inc., 948 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Ill. 2011). Therefore, Rule 12(b)(6) is inapplicable in this
situation.
To the extent Honeywell actually seeks to strike the prayer for punitive damages under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), see, e.g., Allison v. Dugan, 737 F. Supp. 1043, 1049-50
(N.D. Ind. 1990), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 951 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1992),
that course is not warranted. Under Rule 12(f), upon a motion or upon its own initiative, “[t]he
court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent,
or scandalous matter.” The purpose of the rule is to prevent unnecessary expenditures of time and
money litigating spurious issues. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th
Cir. 2010). Motions to strike are generally disfavored because they are often employed for the
sole purpose of causing delay. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294
(7th Cir. 1989). For this reason, this Court and others have held that a party must show prejudice
to succeed on a motion to strike. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 169 F. Supp. 2d 864,
867 (N.D. Ill. 2001); see also Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir.
1992). The Court should not strike matter from a pleading pursuant to Rule 12(f) “unless the
challenged allegations have no possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the
controversy and may cause some form of significant prejudice to one or more of the parties to the
action.” 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1382 (3d
ed.); accord Anderson, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 867-68. For example, prayers for relief should be

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stricken when they seek relief that is not recoverable as a matter of law. See Delta Consulting
Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1142 (7th Cir. 2009). The burden on a
motion to strike is upon the moving party. See Vakharia v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health
Care Ctrs., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
Here, Honeywell has not carried that burden. Under Illinois law, punitive damages have
some relation and are not logically unconnected to negligence claims. While simple negligence
will not justify an award of punitive damages, willful and wanton conduct does. Jentz v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., 767 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353,
358 (1978)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1472 (2015). “Willful and wanton conduct is found where an
act was done with actual intention or with a conscious disregard or indifference for the
consequences when the known safety of other persons was involved.” Burke v. 12 Rothschild’s
Liquor Mart, Inc., 593 N.E.2d 522, 532 (Ill. 1992) (internal quotations omitted); see Adkins v.
Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 544 N.E.2d 733, 743 (Ill. 1989); Poole v. City of Rolling
Meadows, 656 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Ill. 1995); Jentz, 767 F.3d at 693 (willful and wanton conduct
“entails at least a gross deviation from the standard of care”) (internal quotations omitted).
Proving “conscious disregard or indifference for” others’ safety or a “gross deviation from the
standard of care” essentially requires the same elements as negligence except a more culpable
mental state. Whether the evidence is sufficient to show this heightened state of mind rather than
mere negligence is a question for the jury.
Furthermore, Honeywell has not shown it will be prejudiced from allowing the question of
punitive damages to remain in the Amended Complaint. Because discovery will focus on the
same relevant events regardless of whether those events were the produce of negligence or

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recklessness (or neither), allowing the prospect of punitive damages to remain will not cause any
party to spend its resources litigating spurious matters. Honeywell has not pointed to any other
possible prejudice it might suffer.
Most importantly, it is immaterial whether Eldracher’s pleading seeks punitive damages.
Under federal pleading rules, the Court is permitted to award any warranted relief regardless of
what the plaintiff seeks in his complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) (“Every other final judgment
[other than a default judgment] should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the
party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.”). Thus, even if Eldracher had not alleged
willful and wanton conduct and prayed for punitive damages, the Court could still award that relief
if the evidence warranted it.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Honeywell’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 11).
The Court further construes footnote 1 of Eldracher’s response as a notice of dismissal of
defendant Honeywell, Inc. pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(i) allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action against a defendant without a court order at
any time before the opposing party serves an answer or a motion for summary judgment.
Honeywell, Inc. has not served an answer or motion for summary judgment in this case. Because
Eldracher has an absolute right to dismiss his claims against Honeywell, Inc. at the present time,
the Court finds that those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice and DIRECTS the Clerk of
Court to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case. Honeywell, Inc. is terminated as a
party to this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 28, 2015
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE
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