Norwood v. Godinez et al

Filing 10

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 2/9/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LAMONT NORWOOD, # B-59125,
Plaintiff,
vs.
S.A. GODINEZ,
THOMAS SPILLER,
TERRI BRYANT,
and SUZAN GRISWOLD,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-0035-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Lamont Norwood, an inmate currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”), has filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that Defendants have promulgated a meal plan and schedule at
the prison that have deprived him of adequate nutrition, in violation of his constitutional rights.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner complaints to filter out
nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss any portion of
the Amended Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Procedural History
Plaintiff was previously listed as one of five plaintiffs in an action raising nearly identical
claims, filed by another Pinckneyville inmate on September 24, 2014. Haywood v. Godinez,
Case No. 14-cv-1027-JPG-DGW (S.D. Ill.). Plaintiff was dismissed without prejudice from that
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case on October 22, 2014, however, because he had not signed the complaint. (Haywood v.
Godinez, Doc. 14).
On October 27, 2014, Plaintiff initiated a separate, individual action, which again raised
nearly identical claims. Norwood v. Godinez, Case No. 14-cv-1165-MJR-SCW (S.D. Ill.). The
Court conducted a preliminary review of that complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
referred an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Godinez, Spiller, Bryant, and Griswold
for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s basic need for adequate nutrition to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings. (Norwood v. Godinez, Doc. 10). The next
day, however, Plaintiff filed a document entitled, “Motion to Withdraw Complaint.” (Norwood v.
Godinez, Doc. 11). In the notice of dismissal, Plaintiff asked to withdraw his complaint in its
entirety and stated that no one had forced him to make that decision. Id. The Court advised
Plaintiff that when a plaintiff moves to dismiss an action (or, technically, files a notice of
dismissal) before an opposing party serves an answer or summary judgment motion, dismissal is
effectuated without a Court order, and is without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). See
Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624--25 (7th Cir. 2007) (Rule 41(a) notice
"terminates the case all by itself."). In accordance with Rule 41, the case was dismissed without
prejudice (Norwood v. Godinez, Doc. 17) and judgment was entered (Doc. 18). Three days later,
Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement the complaint (Norwood v. Godinez, Doc. 19), without
making any reference to the motion to withdraw he had filed five days earlier. The motion to
supplement was denied as moot (Norwood v. Godinez, Doc. 20) and Plaintiff filed no other
documents in that case.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on January 12, 2015. (Doc. 1). On January 26, 2015,

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Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) and a Motion for Class Action Certification1
(Doc. 6). In these pleadings, Plaintiff refers to the initial case, Haywood v. Godinez, Case No.
14-cv-1027-JPG-DGW (S.D. Ill.), but he makes no mention of the most recent case he filed and
then voluntarily dismissed, Norwood v. Godinez, Case No. 14-cv-1165-MJR-SCW (S.D. Ill.).
The Court is also aware, after reviewing the court records in Haywood v. Godinez, that Plaintiff
has continued to file documents in that case, even after being dismissed.
The Court reviews this procedural history for three reasons.

First, Plaintiff should

understand that the only pending case in which he is currently a plaintiff is the present action,
Norwood v. Godinez, Case No. 15-cv-0035-JPG (S.D. Ill.). Second, the Court wants to make
sure Plaintiff understands that he is responsible for the filing fee in every case he initiates,
regardless of whether the complaints raise identical issues. For example, when Plaintiff filed his
previous case (14-cv-1165-MJR-SCW), he incurred a filing fee, even though he subsequently
moved to dismiss the case. By initiating the present action, although nearly identical to his
previous case, Plaintiff incurred a second filing fee. If at some point Plaintiff sought and was
granted leave to intervene as a co-plaintiff in Haywood v. Godinez, he would incur a third filing
fee. See Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir.2004) (plaintiffs proceeding under
Prison Litigation Reform Act each have to pay their own filing fee, even if they are proceeding
jointly). Finally, Plaintiff is advised that under Rule 41(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, because Plaintiff has already voluntarily dismissed this action once, a subsequent
notice of dismissal would “operate[] as an adjudication on the merits.”
The First Amended Complaint
According to the First Amended Complaint, Defendants changed the former three-meals1

The plaintiff in Haywood v. Godinez, Case No. 14-cv-1027-JPG-DGW (S.D. Ill.) is also seeking class certification.

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per-day plan at Pinckneyville in September 2013. (Doc. 7, p. 5). Under the current schedule,
inmates are served only two meals each day – a “brunch” at 10:00 a.m., and dinner at 5:15 p.m.
Thus, there is a 17 to 18 hour interval between the dinner meal and brunch on the following day.
In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the food portions are undersized. Plaintiff further asserts that
Defendants Bryant (food services administrator), Spiller (Pinckneyville Warden), Godinez
(Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections – “IDOC”), and Griswold (IDOC Food
Administrator) were involved with either creating the “brunch” meal plan or had approved of its
use in response to complaints. Id. at 5-8. Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Godinez
adopted this meal plan in an effort to save millions of dollars, and that Defendants Bryant and
Spiller have approved serving inadequate food portions, in order to save money. Id.
As a result of the nutritionally inadequate meals and the many hours Plaintiff is forced to
wait to eat between the evening dinner and the next day’s “brunch,” Plaintiff has suffered a
number of health problems. These include dizziness, loss of sleep, failure to comprehend while
performing daily activities like reading, writing, or exercising; headaches, weight loss and loss of
balance. Id.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Godinez and Griswold violated his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection because prisoners in all other IDOC
institutions are still fed three meals per day, while Pinckneyville inmates receive only two
nutritionally inadequate daily meals. Id. at 5 and 8.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks an injunction against Defendant Godinez to halt the “brunch
program” meal plan. He also requests money damages. Id. at 9.

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Discussion
Count 1 – Inadequate Nutrition
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and punishment grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Prison conditions that deprive inmates of basic human needs – food,
medical care, sanitation, or physical safety – may violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 346; see also James v. Milwaukee Cnty., 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992).
The denial of food is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment. Rather, a district
court “must assess the amount and duration of the deprivation.” Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849,
853 (7th Cir. 1999). See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (it would be an
Eighth Amendment violation to deny a prisoner an “identifiable human need such as food”);
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2001) (withholding food from an inmate
can, in some circumstances, satisfy the first Farmer prong); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507
(5th Cir. 1998) (serving inmates only two meals per day may satisfy the Eighth Amendment if
the meals are nutritionally adequate).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the meals served at

Pinckneyville are nutritionally deficient, which would satisfy the objective requirement of an
Eighth Amendment claim. See McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994); see also
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1970); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991).
The Eighth Amendment has a subjective component as well. In order to be found liable,
a prison official must have been deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s health. See, e.g., Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976); DelRaine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1994).

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The deliberate

indifference standard is satisfied if the plaintiff shows that the defendant acted or failed to act
despite the defendant’s knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at
842. An allegation that a supervisory defendant directed or gave knowing consent to the conduct
which caused the constitutional violation is sufficient to plead personal involvement in the
violation, even if the supervisor has not participated directly in the violation. See Chavez v. Ill.
State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 621 (7th Cir. 2001); McPhaul v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Madison Cnty.,
226 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s amended complaint suggests that Defendants
Godinez, Spiller, Bryant, and Griswold had at least this level of involvement in the two-mealper-day policy.
As such, Plaintiff may proceed on his claim for damages under Count 1 against all four of
these Defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiff may also proceed on his claim for
injunctive relief under Count 1 against Defendant Godinez, in his official capacity.
Count 2 – Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff fails to state an equal protection claim against Defendants Godinez and Griswold
for treating Pinckneyville inmates differently from prisoners in other institutions. A “prison
administrative decision may give rise to an equal protection claim only if the plaintiff can
establish that ‘state officials had purposefully and intentionally discriminated against him.’”
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 415 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987)
(citing Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982)).
The gravamen of equal protection lies not in the fact of deprivation of a right but
in the invidious classification of persons aggrieved by the state’s action. A
plaintiff must demonstrate intentional or purposeful discrimination to show an
equal protection violation. Discriminatory purpose, however, implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that a
decisionmaker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected
his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effects
on the identifiable group.
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Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453-54 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d
1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982)).
The complaint does not suggest that the meal plan at Pinckneyville was implemented for
the purpose of singling out that group of inmates with the intent of subjecting them to harmful
treatment. Furthermore, an equal protection claim, even if supported by the factual allegations,
would be redundant to the Eighth Amendment claim in Count 1 and subject to dismissal for that
reason. See Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (dismissing equal protection and
Eighth Amendment claims based on same circumstances as free exercise claim because free
exercise claim “gains nothing by attracting additional constitutional labels”). The equal
protection claim (Count 2) against Defendants Godinez and Griswold shall be dismissed without
prejudice.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) remains PENDING and shall be
REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for further consideration.
Plaintiff’s motion for service of process at government expense (Doc. 4) is unnecessary
and, therefore, DENIED AS MOOT.
Finally, Plaintiff’s motion for class certification (Doc. 6) also remains PENDING and
shall be REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. The motion shall
proceed in accordance with Local Rule 23.1 and the direction of the magistrate judge.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claim for damages against Defendants
GODINEZ, SPILLER, BRYANT, and GRISWOLD on COUNT 1 shall proceed. Plaintiff

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may also proceed on his request for injunctive relief against Defendant GODINEZ, in his
official capacity.
COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
As to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants GODINEZ,
SPILLER, BRYANT, and GRISWOLD: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to
Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 7), and this
Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a
Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk
within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received

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by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings, which shall include a determination on the
pending motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) and motion for class certification (Doc. 6).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for
disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to
such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, even if his application
to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

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cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 9, 2015
s/J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Court

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