Neumann v. Village of Pocahontas, Illinois et al

Filing 60

ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Village of Pocahontas, Illinois, Jane Lantrip, and Michael Lantrip (Doc. 39 ). Plaintiff's claims against Jane Lantrip and the Village of Pocahontas are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Steven Neumann (Doc. 43 ) is DENIED in its entirety. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 4/5/2016. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STEVEN NEUMANN,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
VILLAGE OF POCAHONTAS,
ILLINOIS, MICHAEL LANTRIP, both
individually and in his official capacity,
JANE LANTRIP, both individually and in
her official capacity,
Defendants.

Case No. 15-CV-76 –SMY-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Steven Neumann brings this action against Defendants Michael Lantrip, Jane
Lantrip and the Village of Pocahontas, Illinois, alleging constitutional and state law violations
arising out of the shooting death of Plaintiff’s dog. Pending before the Court is Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) and Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgement
(Doc. 43). The Court has carefully considered the briefs and evidence submitted by the parties.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Steven Neumann owned three pit bull dogs: Ruger, Trixie and Mr. Sniffers
(Doc. 40-1, p. 15). On January 25, 2014, Plaintiff went out of town. He asked his neighbor to
watch the dogs and left them in their fenced pen next to his house. Id.

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Around 10:00 a.m. on January 26, 2014, Adam Evans’ neighbor reported to Evans that
two of Plaintiff’s dogs were loose and running around near Evans’ mother’s home (Doc. 40-10,
pp. 11- 13). Evans recognized Plaintiff’s dogs because he had seen them running loose on
multiple occasions. Id. pp. 11-12. When the dogs ran loose, usually Plaintiff captured them or
the dogs would run back to Plaintiff’s home. Id. On occasion, the animal control officer would
help capture the dogs. Id. According to Plaintiff, his dogs had gotten out of his yard about eight
times over the years (Doc. 40-1, pp. 22-23). Evans investigated and saw two dogs running in
and out of his mother’s garage area. Id. at pp. 15-18.
Evans contacted Gino Feazel, the Pocahontas Chief of Police. Id. at p. 18. Feazel in turn
contacted Michael Lantrip, the Village of Pocahontas’ animal control officer and instructed him
to attend to Plaintiff’s dogs (Doc. 40-2, pp. 74-75). Feazel also contacted the Bond County
Sheriff’s Department and instructed the dispatcher to send officers because “Neumann’s pit bulls
are out and destroying stuff at Adam Evans’ mom’s house. They can be shot because they are
mean” (Doc. 43-6, p. 15). The dispatcher contacted Jared Jolliff, the Bond County deputy on
duty. Id. at p. 17. The dispatcher did not tell Jolliff to shoot Plaintiff’s dogs (Doc. 40-8, p. 33).
Feazel also spoke to Jolliff and warned him that Plaintiff’s dogs were aggressive and
recommended that Jolliff take care in handling the dogs (Doc. 40-8, pp. 10-11). Feazel told
Jolliff that one of Plaintiff’s dogs was suspected of attacking a small dog on another occasion.
Id. at p. 11; see also Doc. 40-1, pp. 27-28.
Lantrip and his wife, Jane, were preparing to go shopping when he received the call from
Feazel (Doc. 40-20, p. 85). As the Lantrips were on their way to get groceries, Michael Lantrip
informed Jane that they would go by and pick up the loose dog, return the dog to its owner and

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then go shopping. Id. at p. 17. Jane Lantrip rarely went with her husband on animal control
jobs. Id.
The Lantrips met Evans at the garage (Doc. 40-20, pp. 87-88).

Michael Lantrip

approached the garage, but could not see the dogs. Id. The garage was a mess. Id. There was
no door in the front. Id. Rather, Evans’ mother utilized tarps to keep people from looking into
the garage. Id. Inside the garage, Lantrip saw boxes everywhere. Id. There was no light in the
garage. Id. at p. 88. Michael Lantrip lifted the side of the tarp and saw one of Plaintiff’s dogs.
Id. at pp. 89-90. The dog seemed skittish and barked a bit. Id. at p. 85. Lantrip described her as
more nervous and scared than anything else. Id. From the truck, Jane Lantrip attempted to coax
the dog out. Id. The dog ran out of the garage and headed back towards Plaintiff’s home. Id. at
pp. 89-90. Believing both dogs had returned to Plaintiff’s home, Michael Lantrip went to
Plaintiff’s house to inform him that his dogs were running around. Id. at p. 91. Plaintiff was not
home, so Lantrip returned to the garage area. Id.
As Evans approached the garage to see if there was any damage, he discovered that
Ruger was still in the garage. Ruger put his front legs down, growled, showed his teeth and the
hair stood on the back of his neck. Id. at p. 92. Lantrip described him as “not as friendly as the
first dog” and “posturing like he wanted to lunge.” Id. at p. 93. Evans described Ruger as
“being aggressive” and “snapping his teeth” (Doc. 40-10, pp. 21, 28). Evans got out of the way
and Lantrip attempted to use the catchpole to capture Ruger. Id. Lantrip asked his wife to call
Feazel to dispatch Bond County to the scene. Id. Feazel informed Jane that County was already
on its way. Id. p. 92. Lantrip continued trying to snare Ruger with the catchpole. Id. at p. 93.
Evans could not see what was going on, but could hear Ruger growling at Lantrip (Doc. 40-10,
p. 27). Unsuccessful, the Lantrips and Evans waited for Jolliff to arrive (Doc. 40-10, p. 28).

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After Lantrip ceased his attempts to snare Ruger, the dog calmed down and retreated to the back
of the garage. Id. at p. 94.
Jolliff arrived at the scene and went to Plaintiff’s house to attempt to make contact with
him (Doc. 40-8, p. 13). Plaintiff’s other loose dog was sitting on the porch and would not allow
Jolliff to approach the house (Doc. 40-8, p. 13). Jolliff believed Plaintiff was home because his
truck was in the driveway. Jolliff sounded his air horn in an effort to get Plaintiff’s attention.
When he did not get a response, Jolliff returned to the garage area.
Jolliff and Michael Lantrip discussed the situation again and Lantrip attempted once more
to snare Ruger with the catchpole (Doc. 40-20, p. 97). Ruger continued to growl and posture like
he was going to lunge. Id. After several unsuccessful attempts, Jolliff told Michael Lantrip that
Ruger was a vicious dog and ordered him to put Ruger down. Id. Evans expressed his opinion
that they could not just leave Ruger in the garage (Doc. 40-10, p. 34). Evans was worried about
his mother or an elderly neighbor getting attacked. Id. Jolliff did not want to use his own
weapons, which were high caliber. Id. at pp. 97-98. Lantrip had brought his .22 rifle. Id. Jolliff
and Michael Lantrip agreed to use the rifle to shoot Ruger. Id. Lantrip walked into the garage,
moved some boxes to get a clean shot and shot Ruger twice in the head. Id. At no time had
Ruger bitten or attempted to bite anyone present. Id. at p. 108.
Jane Lantrip did not witness much of the incident (Doc. 40-19, pp. 23-24). She was on
the other side of the truck or in the truck for the majority of the time. Id. She was not a part of
the discussions regarding shooting Ruger. Id. She never went into the garage. Id. She only saw
the tarps and occasionally saw Michael and Evans jump back when Ruger barked. Id.

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Plaintiff returned home around noon on the day of the incident and, upon learning that
Ruger was loose, began searching for him (Doc. 40-1, pp. 38-39). After searching for Ruger,
Plaintiff called the Sheriff’s Department and learned that Ruger had been shot. Id.
Michael Lantrip trained with the former animal control officer, Brian Handegan (Doc.
40-20, p. 78). Lantrip learned how to use the catchpole with Handegan. Id. He did not have
specific training in the use of force on animals. Id. pp. 64, 67.
DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of
establishing that no material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine
issue must be resolved against the moving party. Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841
(7th Cir. 2004).

Cross-motions for summary judgment do not automatically mean that all questions of
material fact have been resolved.
Cir.2004).

Franklin v. City of Evanston, 384 F.3d 838, 842 (7th

The Court must evaluate each motion independently, making all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party with respect to each motion. Id. at 483. Here, the
parties do not dispute the material facts contained in their respective motions. Accordingly, the
Court will evaluate the merits of both motions.
Fourth Amendment Violation
Both parties move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Michael Lantrip, Jane Lantrip and the Village of Pocahontas for the unlawful seizure of
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Ruger in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Section 1983 does not serve as an independent
source of substantive rights; rather it provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979).
Traditionally, the requirements for relief under § 1983 have been articulated as: (1) a violation of
rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by
conduct of a “person” (4) acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S.Ct. 662, 663, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).
A. Jane Lantrip
Plaintiff asserts that Jane Lantrip, by assisting and participating in the events leading to
Ruger’s death, acted under color of law and violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Defendants counter that Jane Lantrip was not an employee of the Village of Pocahontas and any
claims against her are baseless.
Section 1983 provides citizens a right to bring a private cause of action for relief from a
deprivation of constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 requires, however, that the
underlying constitutional deprivation involve someone acting under color of law.

Fries v.

Helper, 146 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir.1998). The Supreme Court has defined such an action as the
“misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” Luger v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
929, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). A state actor is considered present “when the state
has cloaked the defendants in some degree of authority.” Case v. Milewski, 327 F.3d 564, 567
(7th Cir.2003). Though the requisite state actor is typically a government officer, Ҥ 1983 may

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also be brought to bear on private individuals who exercise government power.” Payton v.
Rush–Presbyterian–St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir.1999).
A private party will be deemed to have acted under “color of state law” when the state
either (1) “effectively directs or controls the actions of the private party such that the state can be
held responsible for the private party's decision”; or (2) “delegates a public function to a private
entity.” Id. Only in these ways can a plaintiff establish the necessary “close nexus between the
state and the private conduct so that the action ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’”
Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir.1996). The Seventh Circuit has found that private
citizens are state actors only when there is a state ordinance or other authorization granting
police powers. See Payton, 184 F.3d at 628 (finding state action where the security guards at
issue were governed by a special police officer ordinance which granted them “the powers of the
regular police patrol at the places for which they are respectively appointed or in the line of duty
for which they are engaged); Wade, 83 F.3d at 903-07; Del's Big Saver Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter
Cook, Inc., 795 F.2d 1344, 1346 (7th Cir.1986) (finding state action where private citizens
physically seized the plaintiff's property pursuant to a court order because the court order gave
the private citizens the power of the Sheriff and therefore they “were in fact if not in form deputy
sheriffs pro tem when they seized [the plaintiff's property]”).
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Jane Lantrip will only survive if he establishes that she
exercised government power during the incident. Here, there is no evidence that the state
effectively directed or controlled the actions of Jane Lantrip such that the state can be held
responsible for her decisions. Nor has the state delegated a public function to Jane Lantrip. The
fact that Jane Lantrip accompanied her husband on the day of the incident does not make her an
arm of the state. See United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1997)

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More importantly, it is undisputed that Jane Lantrip was not involved in Ruger’s death.
Although she attempted to coax the first dog out using treats, she had no interactions with Ruger.
She spent the majority of the incident waiting in her husband’s truck. She did not approach the
shed, did not attempt to capture Ruger and was not involved in either the decision to shoot or
Ruger’s shooting.

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant Jane

Lantrip and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
B. Michael Lantrip
The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. A seizure of property or effects occurs when “there is some
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” Soldal v.
Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). Further, it is wellestablished that destroying an individual’s personal property meaningfully interferes with the
individual’s possessory interest in that property. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 12425, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984).
Plaintiff asserts that summary judgment is warranted because killing Ruger was a clear
violation of the Fourth Amendment and Michael Lantrip’s actions were unreasonable.
Defendants concede that killing Ruger constitutes a recognized seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. See Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2008)(noting that every circuit that
has considered the issue has held that the killing of a companion dog constitutes a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). Defendants contend, however, that summary judgment
in their favor is warranted because Michael Lantrip’s actions were objectively reasonable.
Specifically, Defendants assert that Lantrip took steps to locate Plaintiff and attempted to use

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non-lethal means to capture Ruger.

Defendants argue that Ruger was threatening and the

individuals present were justified in being concerned for their own safety. Defendants further
assert that it was Deputy Jolliff who made the ultimate decision that Ruger should be shot.
Material issues of fact remain regarding whether Michael Lantrip’s actions were
reasonable. Although Ruger growled and raised his cackles when approached, the dog was, by
all accounts, calm and non-threatening when Lantrip backed down on his attempt to capture him.
At no point did Ruger attempt to bite or lunge at anyone present. Additionally, while there is
testimony that Ruger was aggressive, there is no evidence that he had hurt or bitten anyone in the
past.
At the summary judgment stage, it is not the Court's role to weigh the evidence, judge
witness credibility, or determine the truth of a matter. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477
U.S. at 249-50. Instead, the Court must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. See Id. Here, based on the evidence presented, the Court cannot determine, as a
matter of law, whether Michael Lantrip’s shooting of Ruger was reasonable. That is for the jury
to decide.
Defendants next argue that Michael Lantrip is entitled to qualified immunity because the
instruction to kill Ruger came from Deputy Jolliff and Lantrip believed that Jolliff had the
authority to instruct him to shoot Ruger. Qualified immunity shields government officials
performing discretionary functions from civil litigation. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). When determining whether qualified immunity
shields a public official from a § 1983 action, courts undertake a two-prong inquiry. Tolan v.
Cotton, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1865, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014); Borello v. Allison, 446
F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2006). “[U]nder either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of

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fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan, 134 S.Ct. at 1866. Rather, courts
“should define the clearly established right at issue on the basis of the specific context of the
case,” and “must take care not to define a case's context in a manner that imports genuinely
disputed factual propositions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The first prong raises the question as to whether the facts show a violation of a federal
right, here, the Fourth Amendment. Tolan, 134 S.Ct. at 1865. As discussed above, there are
material issues of fact as to whether Lantrip violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. The
second prong asks whether Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were clearly established at the
time of Lantrip’s actions. Id. at 1866. That determination hinges on the salient question of
whether the state of the law gave Lantrip fair warning that his shooting of Ruger was
unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). A
right is clearly established if a “court has upheld the purported right in a case factually similar to
the one under review, or that the alleged misconduct constituted an obvious violation of a
constitutional right.” Wernsing, 423 F.3d at 742. As the Supreme Court has explained: “This is
not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law
the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 739. (citations omitted).
Clearly, Ruger’s killing constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Therefore, Lantrip’s actions were constitutional only if reasonable. The relevant
and material facts upon which a determination can be made as to whether Lantrip’s actions were
reasonable are disputed. As such, the Court cannot conclude that the second prong has or has not
been satisfied without impermissibly treating the genuinely disputed facts as undisputed and,
therefore, cannot conclude that Lantrip is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

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Accordingly, both parties’ motions for summary judgment are denied as to Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claim.
C. The Village of Pocahontas
Both parties also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against the Village of
Pocahontas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well settled that a municipality cannot be held liable
for the actions of individual employees under § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior.
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018,
56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Rather, in order to establish municipal liability under § 1983, the
plaintiff must be able to prove (1) the existence of “an express policy that, when enforced, causes
a constitutional deprivation”; (2) the existence of “a widespread practice that, although not
authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law”; or (3) an act of a “person with final
policymaking authority” that causes a constitutional injury. Roach v. City of Evansville, 111
F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.1997). “Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not
sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was
caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a
municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24, 105 S.Ct.
2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). Additionally, the plaintiff must show a “direct causal link between
a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton, Ohio v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).
Failure to train gives rise to § 1983 liability in limited circumstances. Id. at 387, 109
S.Ct. 1197. Inadequate police training causes § 1983 liability “only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into

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contact.” Id. at 388. Only where the failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by
the municipality can it be liable for such a failure. Id. at 389. In this case, Plaintiff argues that
the Village is liable due to a “widespread practice” of failing to train its animal control officers.
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the Village of Pocahontas provided virtually no training to
any of its animal control officers and failed to provide the equipment necessary to perform the
job.
In order to survive summary judgment on a failure to train claim, Plaintiff “must present
evidence that the need for more or different training was so obvious and so likely to lead to the
violation of constitutional rights that the policymaker’s failure to respond amounts to deliberate
indifference and that the deficiency in training actually caused the violation.

Viilo, 552

F.Supp.2d 826, 843 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391). That a particular
officer is unsatisfactorily trained is not enough to show municipal liability, as factors other than
training could have caused that officer's shortcomings. Id. Nor is it sufficient to show simply
that an injury could have been avoided if an officer had had certain additional training. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has not shown a lack of training sufficient to impose liability on the
Village of Pocahontas under Monell. Lantrip testified that he was familiar with the use of the
catchpole.

Brian Handegan, the previous animal control officer, also testified that he had

adequate training in dealing with dogs.

Plaintiff has not produced any evidence of prior

incidents similar to that alleged nor is there any evidence from which a jury could conclude that
there was a widespread practice or custom of shooting loose dogs based on one unfortunate
isolated incident. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of the Village of
Pocahontas and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s Monell claim.

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State Law Claims
Plaintiff also asserts a conversion claim and violations of the Humane Care for Animals
Act, 510 ILCS 70/1 et seq. against Defendants Michael and Jane Lantrip. Defendants move for
summary judgment on the basis that the claims against Jane Lantrip are frivolous because she
had no involvement in the death of Ruger. Defendants further contend that Michael Lantrip is
entitled to immunity on Plaintiff’s state law claims. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment
against the Lantrips asserting that both violated the Act by shooting Ruger.
A. Jane Lantrip
Plaintiff’s state law claims against Jane Lantrip fail as a matter of law. Again, the
undisputed facts are that Jane Lantrip was not involved in Ruger’s death. There is no evidence
that Jane Lantrip attempted to dominate or control Ruger. As stated previously, for the majority
of the incident, she remained in the truck. She had no part in the decision to shoot or the
shooting of Ruger. Thus, Plaintiff cannot succeed on a conversion claim which requires “an
intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel.” Martel Enters. v. City of Chi., 584
N.E.2d 157, 159 (1991). Likewise, Plaintiff’s claim under the Humane Care of Animals Act,
which requires a showing of the intent to commit an act that causes a companion animal to suffer
serious injury or death, fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, Jane Lantrip is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims.
B. Michael Lantrip
Defendants contend that Michael Lantrip is entitled to immunity under the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/2-202 on Plaintiff’s state law claims. Section 2–202 immunizes
public employees from liability in the course of execution or enforcement of the law, unless their
acts constitute willful and wanton conduct. “Willful and wanton conduct” is defined as “a course

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of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional,
shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property.”
745 ILCS 10/1–210. Whether Lantrip’s actions can be characterized as “willful and wanton” is
“ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and should rarely be ruled upon as a matter of law.”
See Mostafa v. City of Hickory Hills, 677 N.E.2d 1312, 1319 (1997).
Although Defendants assert that Lantrip acted reasonably at every step, again, that is an
issue to be determined by the jury. Here, the evidence does not overwhelmingly favor the
Defendants such that a judgment for the Plaintiff could not stand. Accordingly, Defendants’
motion is denied as to immunity under Section 2-202.
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity under Section 2-201,
which immunizes policy making employees from ‘an injury resulting from his act or omission in
determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.” 745
ILCS 10/2–201; Harinek v. 161 N. Clark St. Ltd. P'ship, 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (1998).
Pursuant to the statute, an employee may be granted immunity if he holds either a position
involving the determination of policy or a position involving the exercise of discretion. Harinek,
692 N.E.2d at 1181.
Immunity will not attach unless the plaintiff's injury results from an act performed or
omitted by the employee in determining policy and in exercising discretion. Id. Thus, the
employee's position may be one which involves either determining policy or exercising
discretion, but the act or omission must be both a determination of policy and an exercise of
discretion. Id. Here, there is no evidence that Lantrip was a policy maker and the decision to
shoot Ruger was not a policy choice. Accordingly, Section 2-201 does not afford a defense. As

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Michael Lantrip is not immune from Plaintiff’s state law claims, the Court will address each
claim in turn.
Under Illinois law, a claim for conversion requires that the plaintiff show “(1) a right to
the property; (2) an absolute and unconditional right to the immediate possession of the property;
(3) a demand for possession; and (4) that the defendant wrongfully and without authorization
assumed control, dominion, or ownership over the property.” Van Diest Supply Co. v. Shelby
County State Bank, 425 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.2005) (citing Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill.2d
109, 234 Ill.Dec. 455, 703 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ill.1998)). The defining element of conversion is the
extent of interference with the owner's property rights. In re StarLink Corn Products Liab.
Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2002)(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A).
In Thurman v. Gordon, the district court denied summary judgment to an officer who
shot the plaintiff’s dog. Thurman, 2010 WL 5369088, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2010). As is true
in this case, the officer argued that he could not be held liable for conversion because he acted
reasonably in putting down an animal that posed an imminent threat of death or great bodily
harm to himself or others.
In denying summary judgment, the court held that because the reasonableness of the
defendant’s actions was a question of fact for a jury, the conversion claim could not be decided
as a matter of law. Id; Kay v. Cty. of Cook, Illinois, 2006 WL 2509721, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29,
2006) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s state law
conversion claim for the shooting death of the plaintiff’s dogs because of genuine issues of
material fact regarding whether the defendant’s actions were unauthorized or wrongful).
Similarly, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Michael Lantrip’s actions

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were unauthorized or wrongful. Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s conversion claim is denied.
Next, Defendants assert that the Humane Care for Animal Act does not give Plaintiff a
right to recovery. Plaintiff counters that the evidence establishes a violation of the Act. The Act
provides that “[n]o person may intentionally commit an act that causes a companion animal to
suffer serious injury or death.” 510 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/3.02(a). The Act further provides for
civil liability of violators of the statute: “any person who has a right of ownership in an animal
that is subjected to an act of aggravated cruelty under Section 3.02 ... may bring a civil action to
recover the damages sustained by that owner.” See 510 ILCS 70/16.3.
Defendants argue that no reported case has ever held that the Act extends to a claim
against an animal control officer who, in the course of his employment, shoots a threatening dog.
Defendants further assert that the “clear intent of the statute is to provide a civil remedy for
people who have been victimized by criminal acts’ and that “it is not intended to regulate the
conduct of animal control officers.” However, Defendants cite no case law or statutory support
for these assertions.
The statute defines person broadly and even includes the State of Illinois or any
municipal corporation. Nothing in the statute exempts animal control officers. The purpose of
the Act is to allow for recovery in cases of aggravated cruelty, torture, or an animal killed in bad
faith when seized or impounded. Based on a plain reading of the statute, the Court finds that
whether or not Michael Lantrip violated the Act is a question of fact for the jury to determine.
Accordingly, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on this issue are denied.

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Punitive Damages
Finally, Defendants assert that, even if Michael Lantrip’s actions were unreasonable,
punitive damages are not warranted in this case. A jury may award punitive damages in a § 1983
action “when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when
it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Alexander
v. City of Milwaukee, 474 F.3d 437, 453 (7th Cir.2007). Whether Lantrip’s conduct meets the
standard to support an award of punitive damages is a question of fact for the jury. Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion is denied as to the issue of punitive damages.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as
to Plaintiff’s claims against Jane Lantrip and the Village of Pocahontas. Plaintiff’s claims
against Jane Lantrip and the Village of Pocahontas are DISMISSED with prejudice.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims against Michael
Lantrip. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 5, 2016
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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