Neumann v. Village of Pocahontas, Illinois et al

Filing 63

ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part MOTION in Limine filed by Steven Neumann (Doc. 54 ) and GRANTING in part and DENYING in part First MOTION in Limine filed by Village of Pocahontas, Illinois, Jane Lantrip, Michael Lantrip (Doc. 55 ). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 4/6/2016. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STEVEN NEUMANN,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
VILLAGE OF POCAHONTAS,
ILLINOIS, MICHAEL LANTRIP, both
individually and in his official capacity,
JANE LANTRIP, both individually and in
her official capacity,
Defendants.

Case No. 15-CV-76 –SMY-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Pending before the Court are the motions in limine filed by Plaintiff Steven
Neumann (Doc. 54) and Defendant Michael Lantrip (Doc. 55). The motions were also
addressed by the Court during the Final Pretrial Conference on April 6, 2016.
The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow the trial court to rule on the relevance and
admissibility of evidence before it is offered at trial. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41,
n.4 (1984)(“although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in
limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent
authority to manage the course of trials”). It serves to “aid the trial process by enabling the
court to rule in advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues
that are definitely set for trial, without lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the trial.”
Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 566 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136,
141 (2nd Cir. 1996).

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Motions in limine also may save the parties time, effort, and cost in preparing and
presenting their cases.

Pivot Point Intern., Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 932 F. Supp.

220, 222 (N.D.Ill. 1996). Often, however, the better practice is to wait until trial to rule on
objections, particularly when admissibility substantially depends upon facts which may be
developed there.

Jonasson v. Lutheran Child and Family Services, 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th

Cir. 1997).
The movant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is inadmissible on any
relevant ground, “for any purpose.” Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 67, 69
(N.D.Ill. 1994).

The court may deny a motion in limine when it “lacks the necessary

specificity with respect to the evidence to be excluded.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh v. L.E. Myers Co. Group, 937 F. Supp. 276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Moreover,
the court may alter an in limine ruling based on developments at trial or sound judicial
discretion. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. “Denial of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all
evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at trial.”

Hawthorne Partners v.

AT&T Tech., Inc., 831 F. Supp.1398, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Denial only means that the court
cannot decide admissibility outside the context of trial. Plair, 864 F. Supp. at 69.
A court may reserve judgment until trial, so that the motion in limine is placed “in an
appropriate factual context.” Nat'l Union, 937 F. Supp. at 287. Stated another way, motion
in limine rulings are “subject to change when the case unfolds” at trial. Luce, 469 U.S. at
41. Indeed, “even if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise
of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.” Id. The Court should exclude
evidence on a motion in limine “only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all
potential grounds.” Jonasson, 115 F.3d at 440.

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With these principles in mind, the Court rules as follows.
Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine:
•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 1 – Plaintiff moves to bar any evidence concerning the
alleged behavior of Ruger running at large prior to the episode in question that occurred
on January 26, 2014, including any testimony or documentary evidence concerning
allegations or assertions that Ruger ran at large, acted in any threatening manner, or
otherwise misbehaved prior to that date. In general, the reasonableness of a defendant’s
conduct in a § 1983 claim is based on his or her knowledge at the time of the event. As
Defendant Michael Lantrip had no knowledge of Ruger prior to this incident, any
testimony regarding Ruger’s prior behavior is irrelevant. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion
is GRANTED.

•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 2 – Plaintiff moves to bar the testimony of the persons
identified in Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(3) Pre-Trial Disclosure (Doc. 50), as potential
witnesses “as the need arises”, including Fred Clayton, Michele Links, Cory Schaffer,
Sandra Ergle, James Adams, Jason Rakers, Leonard Moss, David Goodall, Vanessa
Maroon, October Weiss, Kay Schaffer, Allie Hunter, and James Clayton. Any evidence
of Ruger’s behavior prior to January 26, 2014, is irrelevant to the issues in this case.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.

•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 3 – Plaintiff moves to bar any reports, introduced in
written form or discussed in testimony, of any police agency, including the Bond County
Sheriff’s Office and the Pocahontas Police Department, concerning any past police
involvement with or concerning Ruger, including but not limited to any reports or
testimony on those issues of or by Pocahontas Police Chief Gino Feasel. Plaintiff’s
motion is GRANTED.

•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 4 – Plaintiff moves to bar any testimony or documentary
evidence concerning Plaintiff’s past record of criminal charges, including the outcomes
of such charges, and specifically including a past conviction concerning marijuana.
Although Plaintiff’s felony conviction would be admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(a) for impeachment purposes, the Court finds that, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, the probative value of Plaintiff’s prior conviction is substantially
outweighed by the potential prejudicial effect. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is
GRANTED.

•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 5 – Plaintiff moves to bar any proposed introduction of
reports or witness statements obtained by Defendants’ insurance investigator after the
January 26, 2014, incident. Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.

•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 6 – Plaintiff moves to bar the introduction by Defendants
of photographs purporting to show the garage at which Plaintiff’s dog was shot and killed
on January 26, 2014. Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 7 – Plaintiff moves to bar the testimony of Adam Evans
concerning any alleged previous encounter or encounters with Plaintiff’s dog Ruger.
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Adam’s prior encounters with Ruger are irrelevant to the issues in this case. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.
•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 8 – Plaintiff moves to bar any witnesses from referring to
Plaintiff’s dog Ruger as being “vicious” or “dangerous”. Plaintiff’s motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Any general testimony from witnesses
regarding Ruger’s reputation or prior incidents is inadmissible and irrelevant. However,
Defendant Lantrip may testify regarding his personal observations of Ruger’s behavior
on the day of the incident.

•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 9 – Plaintiff moves to bar Defendants from offering as
direct evidence the written statements of Deputy Jolliff, Michael Lantrip, Jane Lantrip or
Adam Evans or any other of its identified witnesses. Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED as
to any statements made by Jane Lantrip and Adam Evans. The Court RESERVES ruling
on any statements made by Deputy Jolliff and Michael Lantrip subject to proper
foundation at trial.

•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 10 – Plaintiff moves to bar Defendants from offering any
testimony from any of Defendants’ proposed witnesses that Plaintiff on occasion kept
Ruger chained up in the front of Plaintiff’s residence. Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 11 – Plaintiff moves to bar the introduction of any
evidence that Plaintiff confronted Defendant Michael Lantrip after Lantrip killed Ruger
on January 26, 2014, and to bar the introduction of any evidence concerning any
Facebook or other social media postings by Plaintiff or others. Any such evidence is
irrelevant to the issues in this case. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.

•

Plaintiff’s Motion in limine No. 12 – Plaintiff moves to bar any testimony not disclosed
by any of Defendants’ discovery responses or disclosed during the deposition testimony
of any witnesses in this case. To the extent the motion seeks to bar any evidence or
witnesses who were previously undisclosed, the motion is GRANTED. However, to the
extent the motion seeks to bar any undisclosed testimony, the motion is DENIED.

Defendant’s Motions in Limine:
•

Defendant’s Motion in limine No. 1 – Defendant moves to bar Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s
Counsel from using any remarks, statements, questions, answers, inference, innuendos or
testimony of any nature which might infer to the jury whether or not insurance existed
which provides coverage for the accident alleged in plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant’s
motion is unopposed and is, therefore, GRANTED.

•

Defendant’s Motion in limine No. 2 – Defendant moves to bar evidence that following
the incident in question, Defendant Michael Lantrip began equipping himself with pepper
spray and a whistle. Any evidence of subsequent remedial measures is irrelevant and
immaterial to the issues in this case. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

•

Defendant’s Motion in limine No. 3 – Defendant moves to bar Brian Handegan from
testifying regarding his interactions with Ruger on prior occasions. Defendant’s motion
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is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Handegan’s prior personal experiences
with Ruger are irrelevant to the issues in this case. However, Handegan may testify,
based on his experience, regarding the general subject matter of capturing stray dogs.
•

Defendant’s motion in limine No. 4 – Defendant moves to bar evidence of veterinarian
bills and/or records incurred prior to this incident as well as cremation expenses.
Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

•

Defendant’s motion in limine No. 5 – Defendant moves to bar reference to the Illinois’
Peace Officer Firearm Training Act, 50 ILCS 710/0.01et seq. The motion is
RESERVED subject to an offer of proof at trial.

•

Defendant’s Motion in limine No. 6 – Defendant moves to bar references to Defendant
Michael Lantrip’s practice of taking stray animals. The motion is unopposed and is,
therefore, GRANTED.

•

Defendant’s Motion in limine No. 7 – Defendant moves to bar evidence or references that
current Pocahontas Mayor Karen Heilig’s dogs at some unknown time were running at
large and had to be captured. The motion is GRANTED.

•

Defendant’s Motion in limine No. 8 – Defendant moves to bar accusations regarding an
incident where Defendant Michael Lantrip’s dog was at large and/or bit someone. The
motion is GRANTED.

•

Defendant’s Motion in limine No. 9 – Defendant moves to bar Plaintiff from testifying
that he sought emotional counseling as a result of this incident. The motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 6, 2016
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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