Neumann v. Village of Pocahontas, Illinois et al

Filing 68

ORDER DENYING Motion for Reconsideration filed by Steven Neumann (Doc. 65 ). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 4/13/2016. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STEVEN NEUMANN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
VILLAGE OF POCAHONTAS,
ILLINOIS, MICHAEL LANTRIP, both
individually and in his official capacity,
JANE LANTRIP, both individually and in
her official capacity,
Defendants.

Case No. 15-CV-76 –SMY-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Steven Neumann brings this action against Defendants Michael Lantrip, Jane
Lantrip and the Village of Pocahontas, Illinois, alleging constitutional and state law violations
arising out of the shooting death of Plaintiff’s dog.

On April 5, 2016, the Court granted

summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s claims against Jane Lantrip and the
Village of Pocahontas (Doc. 60). Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 65) in which Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Village of Pocahontas as to Count II of Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED.
Standard of Review
Under Rule 59(e), the Court may alter or amend its judgment if the movant “clearly
establish[es] (1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly
discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment.” Blue v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 698

1

F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir.2012) (quoting Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th
Cir.2006)). The rule “enables the court to correct its own errors and thus avoid unnecessary
appellate procedures.” Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir.1996). A proper motion
to reconsider does more than take umbrage and restate the arguments that were initially rejected
during the summary judgment phase. County of McHenry v. Ins. Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813,
819 (7th Cir. 2006).
Rule 60(b) permits relief from a judgment for a number of reasons including mistake or
“any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
However, in contrast to Rule 59(e), legal error is not an appropriate ground for relief under Rule
60(b). Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff asserts that in granting summary judgment in favor of the Village of Pocahontas,
the Court overlooked Plaintiff’s alternative argument that the Village was liable under Monell v.
Department of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d
611 (1978) because “the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policy making
authority” (Doc. 65, p. 2). In other words, Plaintiff contends that the Court committed legal error
in granting summary judgment in favor of the Village. Therefore, the Court will exclusively
apply the Rule 59(e) standard to the present motion.
Discussion
It is well settled that a municipality cannot be held liable for the actions of individual
employees under § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
Rather, in order to establish municipal liability under § 1983, the plaintiff must be able to prove
(1) the existence of “an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation”;
(2) the existence of “a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or

2

express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage
with the force of law”; or (3) an act of a “person with final policymaking authority” that causes a
constitutional injury. Roach v. City of Evansville, 111 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.1997). The
plaintiff must show a “direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197,
103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).
Here, Plaintiff asserts the Court ignored his alternative theory of municipal liability – that
Plaintiff suffered a constitutional injury caused by a person with final policymaking authority.
Plaintiff’s theory is based on the actions and statements of Pocahontas Police Chief Gino Feazel.
In support of this contention, Plaintiff cites to various facts in the record which he argues
“…raise a sufficient indicia that the shooting of Ruger was the result of a specific direction made
by the Village employee with policy making authority over the subject matter, and specifically
that the shooting was directly authorized and ordered by Feazel, acting in his capacity as chief of
police for the Village of Pocahontas” (Doc. 65). Those facts include the following: On the date
of the incident, when Feazel contacted the Bond County Sheriff’s Office dispatcher to have
Jolliff dispatched to Pocahontas, he specifically informed the dispatcher that “Neumann’s
pitbulls are out and destroying stuff at Adam Evans’ mom house. They can be shot because they
are mean.” Feazel also spoke directly by telephone with both Lantrip and Jolliff. Jollif admits
that Feazel informed him that Plaintiff’s dogs were vicious and that he should be prepared to
protect himself. At the scene, Jolliff suggested that Lantrip shoot Ruger and Lantrip did so. Id.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned facts, the evidence in the record, as a whole, is
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of a direct causal link between
Plaintiff’s injury and Feazel’s actions. There is no evidence that Feazel’s statements to the

3

dispatcher were ever communicated to either Jolliff or Lantrip.

Jolliff testified that the

dispatcher never told him that he could shoot Plaintiff’s dogs (Doc. 40-8, pp. 11-12, p. 29). The
dispatcher did not recall relaying Feazel’s message to Jolliff (Doc. 44-6, p. 23, p. 25). Further,
there is no evidence that the dispatcher spoke to Lantrip or that Feazel ordered Lantrip to shoot
Plaintiff’s dogs (see Doc. 40-20).
Upon review of the record, the Court remains persuaded that its ruling granting summary
judgment to the Village of Pocahontas was correct. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 13, 2016
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

4