Jordan v. Sherrod et al
Filing
92
ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING IN PART, AND FINDING MOOT IN PART 80 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Lt Eovaldi, Anthony D McAllister, Lyndol Qualls, C. Sherrod. Signed by Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson on 9/28/2017. (nms)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JIMMIE JORDAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER SHERROD, FRANK
EOVALDI, LYNDAL QUALLS, and
ANTHONY D. MCALLISTER,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:15-cv-97-DGW
ORDER
WILKERSON, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Frank Eovaldi, Anthony McAllister, Lyndal Qualls, and Christopher Sherrod (Doc.
80). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART
AND FOUND MOOT IN PART.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jimmie Jordan, a former inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), brings this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional
rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center (“Shawnee”).
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed on October 1, 2015 (Doc. 26) is the operative complaint
in this matter. In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff set forth claims of excessive force,
failure to intervene, and deliberate indifference against a number of correctional officers and
supervisory correctional officials. Following dismissal of a number of defendants, Plaintiff is
now proceeding in this action on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Correctional
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Officer Christopher Sherrod, Sergeant Frank Eovaldi, and Lieutenant Lyndal Qualls, an Eighth
Amendment failure to intervene claim against Command Officer Anthony McAllister, Sherrod,
Qualls, and Eovaldi, and a claim against McAllister, Qualls, and Eovaldi arising from their role as
supervisors in condoning, directing, or turning a blind eye to the conduct of others who subjected
Plaintiff to excessive force.
Defendants Eovaldi, McAllister, Qualls, and Sherrod filed a partial motion for summary
judgment that is now before the Court. Insofar as Defendants seek summary judgment on what
they describe as Plaintiff’s indemnification claim, said argument is DENIED as there is no
particular claim pending pursuant to the State Indemnification Act, 5 ILCS § 350/2 (rather, as
indicated by Plaintiff, the Indemnification Act’s provisions will only be relevant should a
judgment be entered against Defendants). Also, Defendant McAllister’s request for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is MOOT in light of the Court’s July 19, 2017
dismissal of said claim. Accordingly, the only remaining arguments for summary judgment
before the Court are brought by Defendants McAllister, Qualls, and Eovaldi on their claim that
they condoned, directed, or turned a blind eye to the conduct of others in their role as supervisors.
Plaintiff timely responded to Defendants’ motion as directed by the Court in its July 19, 2017
Order. Said response was filed to supplement the arguments made by Plaintiff in his motion to
strike and subsequent reply.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jimmie Jordan was an inmate at Shawnee Correctional Center (“Shawnee”) at all
times relevant to his complaint (Deposition of Jimmie Jordan, Doc. 81-1, pp. 5-6). On April 23,
2014, Plaintiff was in his cell at Shawnee when the Southern Region Tactical Team executed a
shakedown in Plaintiff’s housing unit (Id. at pp. 7-10). Around the time Defendant Correctional
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Officer Sherrod, a member of the Tactical Team, arrived in Plaintiff’s unit, Plaintiff flushed the
toilet in his cell (Doc. 81-1, pp. 7-8; see McAllister Incident Report, Doc. 90-2). At his
deposition, Plaintiff testified that Defendant Sherrod ran into Plaintiff’s cell and pressed his baton
into Plaintiff’s face (Doc. 81-1, p. 8). Defendant Sherrod asked Plaintiff what he flushed, to
which Plaintiff indicated he did not have any contraband and nothing was going on (Id. at pp. 8,
16). Plaintiff was then strip searched and taken out of his cell (Id. at pp. 17-18). Defendants
Eovaldi, Qualls, and McAllister were present after Plaintiff was taken out of his cell (see Doc.
90-2). Plaintiff testified that the Defendant Officers began beating and kicking him (Doc. 81-1, p.
24). More specifically, one or more of the Defendant Officers beat Plaintiff, who was still
handcuffed, kicking him in the knees, groin, and back (Id.). The beating caused Plaintiff to
briefly lose consciousness (Id. at p. 25).
Subsequently, the Defendant Officers picked Plaintiff up and escorted him to the
segregation unit (Id. at p. 26). While Plaintiff was being carried to segregation, the Defendant
Officers caused Plaintiff’s head to hit a door (Id. at p. 28). Plaintiff, who suffers from epilepsy,
then suffered a seizure (Id. at pp. 28, 56). Shortly thereafter, while in segregation, Plaintiff was
seen by a doctor and the prison wardens who determined Plaintiff should be sent to a hospital (Id.
at pp. 35-36). Plaintiff was then taken to Heartland Regional Medical Center where he underwent
a CT scan that revealed two rib fractures (Doc. 81-1, pp. 38-43; Doc. 90-4, p. 5).
Defendants have no recollection of the above-mentioned beating and did not provide any
testimony regarding the use of excessive force.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
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law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); See also:
Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005);
Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc., v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th
Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in
genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the
moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); See also, Lawrence v.
Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law where the non-moving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has stated that summary
judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it
has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.” Steen v. Myers et. al, 486
F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859
(7th Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted)).
DISCUSSION
1. Supervisory Liability
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim premised on the theory of
supervisory liability arguing that Plaintiff is attempting to bring forth a respondeat superior claim
that is not applicable to § 1983 actions. Defendants further argue that any such claim is
duplicative of Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim. Plaintiff disagrees, citing the Seventh Circuit
Pattern Jury Instructions. In particular, Plaintiff cites Pattern Instructions 7.16 and 7.17, noting
that said Instructions provide separate elements to establish an Eighth Amendment failure to
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intervene claim and a supervisory liability claim.
Although the Court acknowledges that a failure to intervene claim and a supervisory
liability claim have distinct elements, it finds that in this instance Plaintiff’s failure to intervene
claim necessarily subsumes any claim for supervisory liability. Both claims find their genesis in
the Eighth Amendment and both require personal involvement of a defendant. Plaintiff seems to
assert that his claim premised on “Supervisory Liability” is distinct from his failure to protect
claim because the former relates specifically to a supervisor’s authority and the latter can be set
forth against any individual defendant, but this distinction is without merit. The Court notes that
Defendants have not moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim.
To establish a claim for failure to protect against a prison official, a plaintiff needs to show:
(1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and, (2) that
prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. Id. In order to establish the first
element, a plaintiff must show not only that he experienced, or was exposed to, a serious harm, but
also that there was a substantial risk beforehand that serious harm might actually occur. Brown v.
Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005). The second element, the subjective element, requires an
inquiry into a defendant prison official’s state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. A prison
official may be held liable only if he knows an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and
“disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. Here, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants, including “Supervisory Defendants” Qualls, Eovaldi, and McAllister
failed to intervene and/or used excessive force against him during an assault that occurred on April
23, 2014. That these “Supervisory Defendants” knew of and condoned said assault is clearly
understood to be an element of Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim and to allow a separate claim for
supervisory liability would be duplicative and could potentially result in double recovery for the
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same actions. Accordingly, Defendants Qualls, Eovaldi, and McAllister are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claim of supervisory liability.
2. Qualified Immunity
Defendants’ argument concerning qualified immunity only addresses Plaintiff’s claim for
state indemnification, excessive force against Defendant McAllister, and the supervisory liability
claim. Accordingly, said argument is moot in light of the Court’s findings set forth above.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Frank Eovaldi, Anthony McAllister, Lyndal Qualls, and Christopher Sherrod (Doc. 80) is
GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART AND FOUND MOOT IN PART.
For
clarification, the Court delineates the claims that remain pending as follows:
Count One:
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants Sherrod,
Eovaldi, and Qualls;
Count Two:
Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim against Defendants
McAllister, Sherrod, Qualls, and Eovaldi.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 28, 2017
DONALD G. WILKERSON
United States Magistrate Judge
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