Styles v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of defendant. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 1/8/2016. (jmt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GEORGE STYLES,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-106-CJP 1

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
PROUD, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff George Styles, represented by
counsel, seeks judicial review of the final agency decision denying his application
for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423.
Procedural History
Mr. Styles applied for benefits in October 2011, alleging disability beginning
on July 14, 2011. (Tr. 11). After holding an evidentiary hearing, ALJ Patricia
Witkowski Supergan denied the application on October 30, 2013. (Tr. 11-20).
The Appeals Council denied review, and the decision of the ALJ became the final
agency decision. (Tr. 1). Administrative remedies have been exhausted and a
timely complaint was filed in this Court.
This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 12.

1

Page 1 of 22

Issues Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raises the following points:
1.

The ALJ erred in assigning no weight to the opinion of Physician’s
Assistant Micah Oakley.

2.

The ALJ failed to give good reasons for her assessment of plaintiff’s
credibility.
Applicable Legal Standards

To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the
applicable statutes. 2 For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A).
A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(3).

“Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing

significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for pay or profit. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to
2

The statutes and regulations pertaining to Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) are found at 42
U.S.C. § 423, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 404.

Page 2 of 22

determine whether a claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has explained this process as follows:
The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity. The second step evaluates whether an
alleged physical or mental impairment is severe, medically
determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third step
compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are considered
conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals one of the
listed impairments, then the applicant is considered disabled; if the
impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the
evaluation continues. The fourth step assesses an applicant's residual
functional capacity (RFC) and ability to engage in past relevant work. If
an applicant can engage in past relevant work, he is not disabled. The
fifth step assesses the applicant's RFC, as well as his age, education,
and work experience to determine whether the applicant can engage in
other work. If the applicant can engage in other work, he is not
disabled.
Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is
presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or combination
of impairments that is serious; (3) whether the impairments meet or equal one of
the listed impairments acknowledged to be conclusively disabling; (4) whether the
claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of
performing any work within the economy, given his or her age, education and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 512-513 (7th
Cir. 2009); Schroeter v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1992).
If the answer at steps one and two is “yes,” the claimant will automatically be
found disabled if he or she suffers from a listed impairment, determined at step
three. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment at step three, and cannot
Page 3 of 22

perform his or her past work (step four), the burden shifts to the Commissioner at
step five to show that the claimant can perform some other job. Rhoderick v.
Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Zurawski v. Halter, 245
F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (Under the five-step evaluation, an “affirmative
answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the
claimant is disabled…. If a claimant reaches step 5, the burden shifts to the ALJ to
establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national
economy.”).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the decision
is supported by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made. It is
important to recognize that the scope of review is limited. “The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must
determine not whether Mr. Styles was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but
whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether
any errors of law were made. See, Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 977-78 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995)).
The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

In reviewing for “substantial

evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken into consideration, but this
Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility,
Page 4 of 22

or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d
1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1997). However, while judicial review is deferential, it is not
abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See,
Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Supergan followed the five-step analytical framework described above.
She determined that Mr. Styles had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged onset date and that he was insured for DIB through December 31,
2014.

She found that plaintiff had severe impairments of degenerative joint

disease and degenerative disc disease. The ALJ further determined that these
impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment.
The ALJ found that Mr. Styles had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform work at the light exertional level, with some physical limitations. Based
on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not able to
do his past work, but he was not disabled because he was able to do other jobs
which exist in significant numbers in the regional and national economies.
The Evidentiary Record
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in
formulating this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record
is directed to the points raised by plaintiff.
1.

Agency Forms

Page 5 of 22

Plaintiff was born in 1964 and was 47 years old on the alleged date of onset.
(Tr. 174). He was 5’8” tall and weighed 175 pounds. He said he was unable to
work because of a herniated disc and “massive degeneration” in his low back and a
back injury. (Tr. 177).
Plaintiff received a GED in 1992.

(Tr. 177).

He had worked as a

maintenance man, a carpenter, and a security guard. (Tr. 192).
In a Function Report submitted in November 2011, Mr. Styles said that he
could not stand or sit for a long time, could not pick up or carry anything of weight,
and could not bend or squat. He said that he fed and watered his chickens, did
some housework and some cooking. He attended his son’s ball games, but could
not sit long and always had to be up and down. He had hobbies of fishing, hiking
and gardening, but could no longer hike as he could not walk one-fourth of a mile,
and could not garden, pull weeds, hoe, or get down to harvest. He used a walking
stick while walking in the yard. (Tr. 200-208).
2.

Evidentiary Hearing

Mr. Styles was represented by an attorney at the evidentiary hearing on
October 10, 2013. (Tr. 28).
Plaintiff testified that he hurt his back a week before the alleged onset of
disability. He was lifting a heavy sprayer off his truck, and something snapped in
his back and leg.

(Tr. 32).

Mr. Styles had not done any farming after that

incident. He lived in a ranch house on 19 acres of land with his wife and 16 year
old son. He had a small vegetable garden, but family members did the planting.
Page 6 of 22

They had about 14 free-range chickens. Plaintiff sometimes collected the eggs.
He did some light housework. His son cut the grass. (Tr. 33-34).
Mr. Styles’ wife owns a laundromat.

She had a contract for deed

arrangement. Plaintiff signed the contract along with his wife. (Tr. 44).
about 24 miles from their house.

It is

Sometimes, plaintiff watches the laundromat

for his wife. He goes and sits there or walks around and helps people get soap or
dryer sheets. He testified that he did not lift anything there. Four times a week,
his daughter drops her 2 and a half year old daughter there, and plaintiff picks her
up and babysits her. (Tr. 35-37).
Plaintiff testified that he had pain in his left shoulder and neck. He said he
could “barely” use his left arm at all and that he had lost “all the muscle tone in it.”
He said that he had constant pain in his neck, and daily headaches. He also had
some pain in his low back and hip, but it had gotten better since he hurt his back in
2011. He had not used a cane recently because he had not walked long distances.
Walking around Wal-Mart caused him pain in his hips and running down his leg.
When he is at home, he lays down three or four times a day. (Tr. 40-43).
At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was taking only ibuprofen, Aleve or
Tylenol. He had taken Hydrocodone and Flexeril in the past, but stopped because
he had stomach problems. (Tr. 41-42).
A vocational expert (VE) also testified.

The ALJ asked her a series of

hypothetical questions. The first one corresponded to the ultimate RFC findings,
that is, a person of plaintiff’s age and educational background who could do light
Page 7 of 22

work, limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs and no climbing of
ladders, ropes or scaffolds. He could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch
and crawl, frequently reach in all directions, occasionally reach overhead,
frequently handle and finger, and constantly feel with both upper extremities. He
could tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold, wetness, humidity and hazards
such as moving machinery and unprotected heights. The VE testified that this
person could not do plaintiff’s past relevant work, but he could do other jobs such
as lamp tester, bench assembler and sorter. (Tr. 46-48).
4.

Medical Records

Mr. Styles went to the emergency room on July 14, 2011, complaining of
back pain. X-rays showed moderate to severe degenerative facet and disc disease
in the lumbar spine. (Tr. 264-267).
Plaintiff was seen at Logan Primary Care for back pain on July 21, 2011. On
exam, there was tenderness over the lumbosacral musculature radiating to the
medial gluteal muscle. Straight leg raising was negative. The assessment was
acute back pain. An MRI was recommended. (Tr. 283-284).
A lumbosacral MRI was done on July 28, 2011. Plaintiff has four classic
lumbar vertebrae, and a transitional T-12 vertebra. This study showed minimal
disc bulge at L1-2, small disc bulge at L2-3 and L3-4, and large disc bulge at L4-S1,
along with multi-level central canal stenosis and foraminal stenosis.

(Tr.

307-308).
Plaintiff returned to Logan Primary Care on August 10, 2011, complaining of
Page 8 of 22

back pain radiating down his posterior right thigh.

Straight leg raising was

positive on the right. He was referred to a neurosurgeon. (Tr. 280-282).
Mr. Styles was seen at Trinity Neuroscience Institute two times in November
2011. On the second visit, Dr. Taveau noted that he had degenerative disc disease
and a large L5-S1 herniation.
heel-and-toe-walk.

His gait was non-antalgic and he was able to

He had no muscle spasm and no tenderness in the

paraspinous area. Straight leg raising was negative. He had no sensory loss or
motor weakness. The doctor discussed surgery with him, and plaintiff said he did
not wish to proceed with surgery. He was referred to an orthopedist for hamstring
symptoms. (Tr. 315-320).
Dr. Michael Davis, an orthopedic specialist, saw plaintiff on four visits
between November 23, 2011, and April 9, 2012.

He diagnosed a grade 2

hamstring tear on the right. Dr. Davis gave him a steroid injection and prescribed
physical therapy. The doctor did not recommend surgery for his hamstring, and
referred him back to Trinity Neuroscience for his back pain. (Tr. 338-342).
Plaintiff continued to be seen at Logan Primary Care. In December 2011, he
had no vertebral tenderness to palpation, but he was tender over the lumbosacral
musculature. His gait was normal. He had tenderness in the right thigh that
radiated to the posterior knee.

He was prescribed Flexeril.

(Tr. 361-361).

Plaintiff returned in March 2012, complaining of worse back pain. On exam, he
had tenderness in the right lumbar paraspinal musculature in to the buttock, and
straight leg raising was positive on the right.
Page 9 of 22

A cane was prescribed.

(Tr.

356-357). In April 2012, he again had tenderness over the lumbosacral spinal
musculature, but straight leg raising was negative. Strength was 4/5 in the right
leg. He was using a cane. (Tr. 350-352).
Mr. Styles was seen in the Family Health Care Clinic at Franklin Hospital on
May 9, 2012, for a rash on his arms, possibly poison ivy, after having been in the
woods with his son. (Tr. 417-418).
In July 2012, plaintiff was seen by APN Jill Cash at Logan Primary Care.
Among other things, he complained of left shoulder pain for two months. He had
decreased range of motion of the left arm/shoulder reaching behind his back and
head. (Tr. 533-534). X-rays of the left shoulder showed moderate osteoarthritis
of the acromioclavicular joint. (Tr. 530).
Mr. Styles was seen again at Logan Primary Care on July 26, 2012, by PA
Micah Oakley. This was his first visit with PA Oakley. 3 Plaintiff said that he had
pain radiating from his left shoulder into his neck and he was getting headaches.
He wanted a form filled out for “disability.” The exam notes are brief. Under
“musculoskeletal,” PA Oakley noted that he walked with a cane and had pain with
range of motion loss. He also noted that he had filled out the disability form with
the patient present. (Tr. 531-532).
An MRI of plaintiff’s left shoulder was done on July 31, 2012. This study

Plaintiff’s brief states that Mr. Styles “established care” with PA Oakley on July 11, 2012. See,
Doc. 14, pp. 3-4. However, the medical records indicate that Mr. Styles was seen by APN Jill Cash
on that date. The office note was co-signed by Jeffrey Parks, M.D. There is no indication that PA
Oakley saw Mr. Styles on July 11, 2012. See, Tr. 533-534.
3

Page 10 of 22

showed

marked

rotator

cuff

tendinosis

with

tears,

glenohumeral

joint

osteoarthrosis, marked hypertrophic degenerative changes of the glenohumeral
joint, and joint effusion. (Tr. 526-527).
An MRI of the cervical spine done on August 6, 2012, showed disc bulges at
multiple levels with some spinal canal stenosis and foraminal narrowing. (Tr.
524-525).
Brett Miller, M.D., an orthopedist, saw plaintiff for neck pain radiating into
his left shoulder on August 27, 2012. He noted limited range of motion of the
neck, but good range of motion of the left shoulder. There was no muscle atrophy
in the left arm. He diagnosed cervical spine radiculopathy and a partial thickness
or possible full thickness rotator cuff tear. He recommended that plaintiff have his
neck taken care of before he considered surgical intervention on his shoulder. (Tr.
404-405).
PA Oakley saw plaintiff on August 31, 2012. On exam, he noted that plaintiff
had a full range of motion of the spine and extremities, his strength was full
throughout, and he had good muscle tone with no muscle atrophy. He added
Neurontin to the medications that plaintiff was already taking. (Tr. 522-523).
Plaintiff saw Dr. Jones at Trinity Neuroscience on September 26, 2012. On
exam, he had no sensory loss and no motor weakness. Balance and gait were
intact. Fine motor skills were normal. He was neurologically intact. He had
“severe pain” with cervical range of motion.

Dr. Jones noted that he had

degenerative disc disease from C2 to T2 and stenosis worse from C3 to C6.
Page 11 of 22

However, there was no indication for surgery. (Tr. 481-483).
On October 1, 2012, plaintiff told PA Oakley that his neck and shoulder pain
was not any better. On exam, he again noted that plaintiff had a full range of
motion of the spine and extremities, his strength was full throughout, and he had
good muscle tone with no muscle atrophy.

The dosage of Neurontin was

increased. (Tr. 521-522).
Mr. Styles then returned to Dr. Miller in November, 2012, for his left
shoulder.
shoulder.”

Dr. Miller observed that he was “not terribly tender about that left
He had weakness with abduction and external rotation, but no

instability and range of motion was “fine.”

The impression was cervical

radiculopathy with secondary left shoulder problems; no frank full-thickness
rotator cuff tear was identified. Plaintiff told Dr. Miller that he was doing “fairly
well” on pain medication and Flexeril prescribed by his family doctor. The doctor
prescribed some physical therapy and told him to return as needed.

(Tr.

401-402).
Mr. Styles was seen at Logan Primary Care several times in October and
November 2012 for abdominal pain.

(Tr. 508-519).

He then cancelled two

appointments in January 2013. (Tr. 506-507).
Plaintiff saw PA Oakley on February 7, 2013. He reported that he thought
his abdominal pain was caused by his medications, so he had stopped taking them.
He said he had not taken Vicodin for a month. On exam, his abdomen was soft
and nontender. His neck was supple. There was no cyanosis, clubbing or edema
Page 12 of 22

of the extremities. PA Oakley did not note any restriction of range of motion,
muscle spasm or muscle atrophy. He prescribed Zantac, Vicodin, and Flexeril,
along with Metformin (oral medication used to treat diabetes) and Lipitor. PA
Oakley also noted that they would need “ameritox and narc contract.” 4

(Tr.

503-505).
A urine sample was collected on February 7, 2013, and the Ameritox report
was issued on February 12, 2013. Mr. Styles tested positive for hydrocodone with
acetaminophen, i.e., Vicodin, and marihuana metabolites. A handwritten note on
the report, dated February 14, 2013, states that he “failed” and “send letter.” (Tr.
543-546). The records do not contain a copy of a letter to plaintiff about the test
results. Plaintiff cancelled an appointment with PA Oakley on March 7, 2013.
(Tr. 502).
Mr. Styles went to the Family Healthcare Clinic at Franklin Hospital on
March 12, 2013. He stated that he had suffered from abdominal pain for some
time and he wanted to know if it was caused by Lopid, a cholesterol-lowering
medicine that had been prescribed by PA Oakley. Plaintiff was wearing a neck
support. Physical exam was normal. He was advised to consult with “Dr. Oakley”
regarding Lopid.
There is no indication that Mr. Styles returned to PA Oakley or Logan
Primary Care for further treatment.
Ameritox is a company which provides “urine drug testing services to help physicians assess
medication adherence of patients on chronic opioid therapy.” http://www.ameritox.com, visited on
January 6, 2016.

4

Page 13 of 22

5.

PA Oakley’s Opinion

On July 26, 2012, PA Oakley completed a form entitled “Medical Source
Statement of Ability To Do Work-Related Activities (Physical).” According to the
office note that same date, plaintiff brought this form in to the office to be filled out,
and PA Oakley filled out the form in plaintiff’s presence. See, Tr. 531-532.
PA Oakley indicated that plaintiff could occasionally lift less than 10 pounds,
but he was unable to frequently lift any amount of weight. He could stand or walk
less than 2 hours total in a work day and had to use a cane to walk. He could not
sit for more than 15 minutes without substantial pain. He could never do postural
activities such as balancing or kneeling. He could only occasionally reach, handle,
finger and feel. (Tr. 390-393).
Analysis
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in analyzing PA Oakley’s opinion.
Plaintiff points out that the ALJ erroneously referred to Micah Oakley as “Dr.
Oakley.”

Oakley is a physician’s assistant, and not a doctor.

However, it is

difficult to see how this mistake could have prejudiced plaintiff.
As a physician’s assistant, Mr. Oakley is not an “acceptable medical source.”
20 C.F.R. §404.1513(a).

Therefore, his report does not constitute a “medical

opinion.” See, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(a)(2) (“Medical opinions are statements from
physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources. . . .)”
Because PA Oakley is not an acceptable medical source, he is not

Page 14 of 22

considered to be a treating source; his opinion is not considered to be a “medical
opinion” and is not entitled to any special weight under §404.1527(c).

SSR

06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2. This does not mean, however, that the ALJ may
simply ignore the opinions of a medical source such as PA Oakley. The ALJ is
required to consider “all relevant evidence” and may, as appropriate, consider the
factors set forth in §404.1527(c) in the process of weighing the opinions of
nonacceptable medical sources. SSR 06-3p, at * 4-5.
It is apparent that ALJ Supergan applied the §404.1527(c) factors in
deciding how much weight to give to PA Oakley’s opinion.

She noted that PA

Oakley’s opinion was inconsistent with the other medical evidence in the record,
was not supported by his own clinical findings, and was based on plaintiff’s
subjective complaints. See, Tr. 18.
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s conclusion that PA Oakley’s opinion was
inconsistent with the rest of the medical evidence by pointing out that X-rays and
MRI studies showed “significant abnormalities.” See. Doc. 14, p. 8. However, he
cannot point to any such study that was ignored or overlooked by the ALJ. On the
contrary, she acknowledged the results of the studies. She also noted, correctly,
that, despite the MRI findings, many of the physical exams showed minimal
abnormal findings. For example, although plaintiff had ongoing tenderness over
the lumbar spinal musculature, straight leg raising was negative in April 2012. A
September 2012 exam at Trinity Neuroscience resulted in normal physical and
neurological findings; he had normal gait, sensation, motor strength and
Page 15 of 22

coordination. And, despite the findings on the shoulder and neck MRI studies, in
November 2012, Dr. Miller’s exam showed normal range of motion of the shoulder
with only mild tenderness, and Mr. Styles reported that he was functioning fairly
well on pain medication and Flexeril.
summaries of the doctors’ findings.

See, Tr. 15-16.

These are accurate

Plaintiff’s argument that the specialists’

examinations provide objective support for PA Oakley’s opinion is not supported by
the record.
Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s conclusion that PA Oakley’s opinion
is not supported by his own clinical findings. His argument is based on a mistaken
reading of the record. Plaintiff argues that PA Oakley’s examination on July 11,
2012, showed restricted motion of the shoulder. See, Doc. 14, p. 10. However,
PA Oakley did not see Mr. Styles on July 11, 2012. Plaintiff was seen on the date
by APN Jill Cash. (Tr. 533-534). There is no indication in the record or in PA
Oakley’s report that he reviewed or relied upon the notes of any other practitioner
in completing his report of July 26, 2012.
A careful review of the records of Logan Primary Care establishes that PA
Oakley saw Mr. Styles for the first time on July 26, 2012, the same day on which he
filled out the disability form.

The office notes for that date include only one

abnormal finding: under “musculoskeletal,” PA Oakley noted “pain with rom lss,
ambulates with cane.” (Tr. 531). There is no explanation of where the range of
motion loss was detected, or the severity of the loss.
provides scant support for PA Oakley’s opinion.
Page 16 of 22

This single office note

As support for his opinion about plaintiff’s limitations in reaching, handling,
fingering and feeling, PA Oakley wrote in his report, “pain [with] ROM UE’s & LE’s
[upper and lower extremities] leads to increased imbalance & pain in back.” See,
Tr. 392. PA Oakley cited no clinical or medical findings specific to plaintiff’s ability
to use his hands for handling, fingering and feeling. Therefore, this note provides
no support for his opinion as to plaintiff’s manipulative limitations. And, while PA
Oakley did observe that Mr. Styles used a cane on the date of his first exam, Mr.
Styles does not claim that he needs to use a cane on an ongoing basis. Later exams
showed he had a normal gait, and he testified at the hearing that he no longer used
a cane. Further, PA Oakley’s later exams showed generally normal findings. See,
Tr. 503-505, 521-523.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the ALJ had no basis for saying that PA Oakley’s
report was based on sympathy and on plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

Here

again, plaintiff incorrectly argues that PA Oakley saw plaintiff on July 11, 2012,
when he did not. Plaintiff also argues that PA Oakley’s opinion was not based on
subjective complaints because objective test such as X-rays and MRI studies
showed abnormalities. This argument misses the mark. PA Oakley did not say in
his report that he relied on the results of any such studies, and, moreover, some of
the studies had not yet been performed on the date of PA Oakley’s report. As PA
Oakley did not cite to any objective evidence beyond his vague reference to pain with
range of motion, the ALJ was entitled to conclude that he relied on plaintiff’s
subjective complaints.

Further, PA Oakley explicitly stated that he relied on
Page 17 of 22

plaintiff’s subjective statement regarding his lifting restrictions.

He wrote that

plaintiff could only pick up his grandkids for about 30 seconds and then has to put
them down because of pain radiating down his right leg. (Tr. 390). An ALJ may
reject an opinion that is based on a claimant’s subjective complaints. Filus v.
Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012). Since PA Oakley relied on plaintiff’s
subjective complaints in assessing very restrictive limitations, it is not erroneous to
describe his opinion as “sympathetic.”
It is clear that the ALJ considered the §1527(c) factors in assessing PA
Oakley’s opinion.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the ALJ erred in his

consideration. His first point is denied.
Plaintiff’s next attacks the ALJ’s credibility analysis.
The Court must use an “extremely deferential” standard in reviewing an
ALJ’s credibility finding. Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2013).
The Court cannot reweigh the facts or reconsider the evidence, and can upset the
ALJ’s finding only if it is “patently wrong.” Ibid. Social Security regulations and
Seventh Circuit cases “taken together, require an ALJ to articulate specific reasons
for discounting a claimant's testimony as being less than credible, and preclude an
ALJ from ‘merely ignoring’ the testimony or relying solely on a conflict between the
objective medical evidence and the claimant's testimony as a basis for a negative
credibility finding.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746-747 (7th Cir. 2005),
and cases cited therein.
SSR 96-7p requires the ALJ to consider a number of factors in assessing the
Page 18 of 22

claimant’s credibility, including the objective medical evidence, the claimant’s daily
activities, medication for the relief of pain, and “any other factors concerning the
individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.”
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3. While plaintiff’s claims cannot be rejected
solely because they are not supported by objective evidence, 20 C.F.R.
§404.1529(c)(2),

the

ALJ

may

take

that

fact

into

consideration,

since

“discrepancies between objective evidence and self-reports may suggest symptom
exaggeration.” Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008).
Here, ALJ Supergan gave a number of reasons for her adverse credibility
finding. She pointed out that the medical records do not support plaintiff’s claim
that he is totally disabled. For instance, although he claimed to have cramping in
both hands and said he could not grab anything with his left hand, physical exams
consistently

showed

normal

neurological

exam,

reflexes,

sensation

and

coordination, and he never reported these symptoms to his healthcare providers.
She also noted that his daily activities contradicted his testimony. He rolled his
own cigarettes, gathered eggs and used a cellphone, which undermined his claims
as to his manipulative limitations.

She noted contradictions in his various

statements. She also noted that he played some role in his wife’s business, and
that he admitted at the hearing that he used marihuana but denied drug use to his
healthcare providers. He was unable to explain the doctor’s note that said he
contracted poison ivy while out in the woods with his son. See, Tr. 17. She also
noted, albeit in a different section of her decision, that the results of the February
Page 19 of 22

2013 drug test contradicted his statements to his healthcare provider. See, Tr. 13.
Ignoring most of the ALJ’s reasons, plaintiff advances only two specific
criticisms of the ALJ’s credibility analysis. He argues that the ALJ cherry-picked
the medical evidence in concluding that the evidence did not support his claim of
total disability. However, he points to no specific evidence that was ignored by the
ALJ.

He again cites to the X-ray and MRI results, but those results were

acknowledged by the ALJ and those studies do not, in themselves, establish that
plaintiff is disabled. Further, while she acknowledged that plaintiff had abnormal
findings on some exams, such as positive straight leg raising and limited range of
motion, she correctly pointed out that he had normal findings on other exams.
Plaintiff accuses the ALJ of cherry-picking the medical evidence, but his own
argument is based on cherry-picking in that he fails to acknowledge the many
exams that resulted in mild or completely benign findings.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erroneously equated his limited daily
activities with an ability to work full-time. It is true that the Seventh Circuit has
cautioned ALJs about equating ability to engage in some daily activities with an
ability to work full-time because daily activities allow for flexible scheduling and
assistance from others, and do not require a minimum standard of performance.
See, Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1126 (7th Cir. 2014), and cases cited therein.
Here, however, the ALJ did not equate Mr. Styles’ daily activities with an ability to
work full-time.

Rather, she correctly noted that his ability to engage in some

specific activities contradicted his allegations as to the extent of his limitations.
Page 20 of 22

An ALJ is required to consider, among other factors, a claimant’s daily
activities in determining whether he is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(a), SSR
96-7p, at *3. While it may be error to equate limited daily activities with the ability
to work full-time, it is not error to consider daily activities; in fact, is proper for an
ALJ to consider a conflict between the plaintiff’s claims about what he can do and
the evidence as to his activities. See, Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 369 (7th Cir.
2013).
In sum, none of plaintiff’s arguments are persuasive. His arguments are
nothing more than an invitation to the Court to reweight the evidence. Even if
reasonable minds could differ as to whether Mr. Styles was disabled at the relevant
time, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence,
and the Court cannot make its own credibility determination or substitute its
judgment for that of the ALJ in reviewing for substantial evidence. Shideler v.
Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th
Cir. 2008). ALJ Supergan's decision is supported by substantial evidence, and so
must be affirmed.
Conclusion
After careful review of the record as a whole, the Court is convinced that ALJ
Supergan committed no errors of law, and that her findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying George Styles’ application for disability benefits is AFFIRMED.

Page 21 of 22

The clerk of court shall enter judgment in favor of defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE:

January 8, 2016.

s/ Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Page 22 of 22