Bentz v. Lindenberg et al

Filing 60

ORDER ADOPTING Report and Recommendations 50 . Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction 9 and Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for TRO 18 are DENIED. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 07/29/15. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAVID ROBERT BENTZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD LINDENBERG et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-CV-121-NJR- DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of United
States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson entered on June 22, 2015 (Doc. 50).
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson recommends that the undersigned deny Plaintiff’s Motion
for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 9) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 18). Plaintiff filed a timely objection on
July 1, 2015 (Doc. 53). For the reasons set forth below, this Court adopts Magistrate
Judge Wilkerson’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety.
Background
On February 5, 2015, Plaintiff David Robert Bentz, an inmate currently housed at
the Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brought this action alleging deprivations
of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff claims
that Defendants Donald Lindenberg and Virgil Smith have continually harassed,

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threatened, and assaulted him since November 2013. On March 9, 2015, and again on
March 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed motions seeking a preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order compelling Defendants to be reassigned to another cell house and
forbidden from further threatening Plaintiff (see Docs. 9 and 18).
On April 20, 2015, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson held an evidentiary hearing.
Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson issued the
Report and Recommendation (Doc. 50) currently before the Court. Plaintiff filed a
timely objection (Doc. 53).
Conclusions of the Report and Recommendation
The Report and Recommendation accurately states the nature of the evidence
presented by both sides, as well as the applicable law. Based upon the evidence before
the Court, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson found that Plaintiff was not entitled to a
temporary restraining order. Regarding the preliminary injunction, Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson found that Plaintiff’s allegations and his testimony at the hearing did not
reveal any incident or specific threat supporting the necessity of a preliminary
injunction.
Discussion
The undersigned must undertake a de novo review of the Report and
Recommendation because a timely objection was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); FED.
R. CIV. P. 72(b); SDIL-LR 73.1(b); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 824 F. Supp. 786, 788
(N.D. Ill. 1993); see also Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). De novo
review requires the district judge to “give fresh consideration to those issues to which
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specific objections have been made” and make a decision “based on an independent
review of the evidence and arguments without giving any presumptive weight to the
magistrate judge’s conclusion.” Harper, 824 F.Supp. at 788 (citing 12 Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3076.8, at p. 55 (1st ed. 1973) (1992 Pocket
Part)); Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court “may accept,
reject or modify the magistrate judge’s recommended decision.” Harper, 824 F. Supp. at
788.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), however, where neither timely nor specific

objections to the Report and Recommendation are made, this Court need not conduct a
de novo review of the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985).
Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The purpose of such an
injunction is to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution of
the lawsuit.” Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). In order to obtain a
preliminary injunction, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that: (1) he is likely to
succeed on the merits of his claim; (2) he has no adequate remedy at law; and (3) he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Planned Parenthood of Indiana,
Inc. v. Comm’r of Indiana State Dep’t Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012), citing Am.
Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589–90 (7th Cir. 2012).

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In the context of prisoner litigation, the scope of the Court’s authority to enter an
injunction is circumscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Westefer v.
Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunction relief
“must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the
court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to
correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (noting
the PLRA “enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging
prison conditions: prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary
authority over the institutions they manage”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not raised any new arguments in his Objection.

Rather,

Plaintiff reiterates the same allegations raised in his previous pleadings and at the April
20, 2015, hearing. Plaintiff’s assertions were carefully considered by Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson in his Report and Recommendation.

The undersigned agrees with the

conclusions reached by Magistrate Judge Wilkerson and sees no need to discuss, in any
additional detail, the bases for those conclusions. The essential point is that Plaintiff has
failed to set forth any evidence establishing that he faces in imminent, irreparable harm
due to the actions of the named Defendants.
After thoroughly reviewing the record before it, the Court finds that the factual
findings and analysis in the Report and Recommendation are both thorough and
accurate.

Again, it is well-established that preliminary injunctions are an

“extraordinary and drastic remedy” requiring the movant to demonstrate its
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justification by a clear showing. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. The Court agrees with
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s analysis that Plaintiff has failed to reach his threshold
burden for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to reject Magistrate
Judge Wilkerson’s recommendation.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 50). Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (Doc. 9) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 18) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 29, 2015
s/ Nancy J. Rosenstengel____
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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