Malik v. Caldwell et al

Filing 1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER severing case number 15-84-SMY. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 2/6/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROBERT MALIK,
No. K64407,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM RANKIN, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-00084-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Robert Malik, an inmate currently housed in Big Muddy River Correctional
Center within this judicial district, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
deprivations of his constitutional rights. He contends he has been denied proper medical care for
multiple medical ailments since December 2011, when he entered the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), continuing to the present. The allegations pertain to five different prisons
and fourteen defendants. By order dated January 29, 2014, a separate motion for a temporary
restraining order was denied, while ruling on a companion motion for preliminary injunction was
deferred.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening.– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.– On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims
or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility. Id. at 557.

At this juncture, the factual

allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2).
Moreover, “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. 8(d)(1). The complaint is
111 pages long 1, and it is accompanied by three volumes of documentary support, measuring 4”
thick. Nevertheless, undue length alone ordinarily does not justify the dismissal of an otherwise
valid complaint. Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2011). “Fat in a complaint
can be ignored, confusion or ambiguity dealt with by means other than dismissal.” Bennett v.
Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998). Consequently, the voluminous documentary support
will be ignored, as it is not organized in a meaningful way relative to the complaint. The Court

1

It appears that pages 7-8 of the complaint were not transmitted to the Clerk of Court, which is
Plaintiff’s responsibility.

cannot be expected to comb though voluminous “group exhibits” in search of specific documents
that support a given proposition.
The complaint is drafted in the style of a diary and is summarized as follows. In
discussing the viability of the complaint, citations will be to both the pages as numbered by
Plaintiff, and to the page numbers in the electronic Court record.
Upon conviction and transfer to the custody of the IDOC, Plaintiff was sent to Stateville
Correctional Center in the Northern District of Illinois on December 6, 2011. Plaintiff disclosed
his medical history, which included having bullet fragments in his right ankle since 2009. He
immediately sought medical care for pain, elevated blood pressure, headaches, stomach pain,
sweaty palms, an irregular feeling in his bladder, and right ankle pain. Before being afforded
any treatment, Plaintiff was transferred to East Moline Correctional Center in the Central District
of Illinois. No claims are asserted relative to Plaintiff’s time at Stateville, and none of the
defendants worked at Stateville.
Upon arrival at East Moline, Plaintiff was sought medical attention for his ailments,
particularly his gastrointestinal and ankle issues.

A physician opined that Plaintiff was

exaggerating his concerns, but noted that Plaintiff could have a hernia or infection. Plaintiff
developed severe constipation, hemorrhoids and abdominal pain, and he had blood in his stool,
so he sought further treatment in March 2012. After only verbal questioning, the doctor told
Plaintiff he would be fine and no treatment was offered. Plaintiff’s condition worsened during
the following six months, but he was not afforded any treatment; rather, he was repeatedly told
he was fine. In mid-September 2012 emergency treatment was sought. Plaintiff’s bladder had to
be catheterized, and he was diagnosed with a bladder infection. The doctor asked Plaintiff when
he was getting out of prison and then prescribed an ineffective medication. Even after filing

administrative grievances, Plaintiff did not receive any effective treatment. A nurse described
Plaintiff’s condition as “chronic” and “serious,” and further opined that the doctor may not have
afforded proper treatment.
In February 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to Jacksonville Correctional Center in the
Central District of Illinois. Again, he immediately and repeatedly sought effective medical
treatment. His mother, brother and sister even began writing and calling prison officials and the
corporation that provides medical services for the IDOC—all to no avail. Plaintiff’s ailments
worsened. His left testicle swelled to the size of tennis ball, and puss began oozing from the scar
over the bullet fragments in his ankle. Again, medical personnel asked when Plaintiff would be
released from prison, as though that dictated treatment decisions.
treatment was offered.

No efficacious medical

Instead, Plaintiff was evaluated by a psychologist who diagnosed

Plaintiff as having an adjustment disorder with anxiety, and could not rule out anxiety
somatization (mental illness causing real physical symptoms, often leading to a vicious cycle of
concern and dissatisfaction with a lack of medical treatment, and escalating anxiety (see
www.webmd.com/mental-health/somatoform-disorders)).
In December 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to Vandalia Correctional Center in the
Southern District of Illinois.

Plaintiff sought immediate treatment for his ailments.

The

physician who initially examined Plaintiff at Vandalia was rude and rushed, and he tossed
Plaintiff out of the health care unit. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s ankle was x-rayed two days later.
Upon follow-up, the physician said he had spoken with the physician at Jacksonville. Again,
Plaintiff was not offered any treatment for his ailments. According to Plaintiff, even correctional
officers noticed swelling and discoloration in his ankle, which was not acknowledged by medical
personnel.

In January 2014, Plaintiff went on a hunger strike in order to secure proper diagnosis and
treatment, and the return of a confiscated electronic device. The warden told Plaintiff to file
grievances. The warden also said he would speak to the prison doctor, but thought it was not
likely to do any good because “they” did not want to spend any money to treat Plaintiff. Other
correctional officers expressed a similar view that Plaintiff would not receive proper medical
treatment until he was released from prison. As the hunger strike stretch on, Plaintiff was placed
in an isolation cell and shackled to the bed, which only exacerbated Plaintiff’s ankle injury.
(When the hunger strike ended is unclear).
In February 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to Big Muddy River Correctional Center in
the Southern District of Illinois. He immediately sought medical care. The nurse who examined
Plaintiff upon intake noted edema and possible infection in Plaintiff’s right ankle, caused by the
bullet fragments. Plaintiff went unseen by a physician, and the warden walked off when Plaintiff
attempted to explain his need for help. A nurse did prescribe ibuprofen, which was ineffective.
Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance, but his situation was not considered an emergency and he
consequently received a disciplinary report—which he thinks was designed to intimidate him
into giving up his quest for proper diagnosis and treatment.
Plaintiff was finally seen by a doctor in March 2014, and blood work was ordered.
Plaintiff perceived that the doctor was attempting a cover-up, so he filed a grievance. The doctor
failed to see Plaintiff in a week, as promised. Although a nurse explained that the doctor was
running behind schedule, Plaintiff filed another grievance. The doctor eventually informed
Plaintiff that the blood work was all normal and that there was no infection. Acetaminophen was
prescribed, but was ineffective. Another grievance was filed.

In April 2014, over Plaintiff’s objection, physical therapy was prescribed for Plaintiff’s
ankle pain.

The therapist thought that massage would relieve the golf ball-sized cyst on

Plaintiff’s ankle, but it only caused pain and opened the scar so that puss was oozing out.
Eventually, physical therapy was discontinued and an ultrasound was ordered.
Plaintiff’s leg—from the knee to the ankle—was scanned, as well as his groin and
testicles. The ultrasound examination did not reveal any problems. Plaintiff asserts that the
wrong tests are being run.
Plaintiff brings suit against 14 named defendants: Wexford Health Sources, Inc.; seven
medical professionals, and six prison administrators. He contends the defendants have been
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. A
preliminary injunction is requested: examination and treatment by a neutral outside specialist.
Compensatory and punitive damages are also sought.
Discussion
The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from being
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. See also Berry v.

Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 2010).

Prison officials can violate the Eighth

Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct
demonstrates “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it can be a
condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain if not treated. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010).

Thus, at this early

juncture Plaintiff’s purported medical ailments appear sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth
Amendment.
Proving deliberate indifference requires more than a showing of negligent or even grossly
negligent behavior, the equivalent of criminal recklessness must ultimately be proved. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-37 (1994). Case law illustrates that when medical care is at issue, a
defendant’s skill level and ability to act are relevant to liability.
As a general matter, a prison official may be liable “only if he knows that inmates face a
substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to
abate it.” Id. at 847. Of particular relevance to this case, depending upon the circumstances, the
refusal to secure a second opinion or expert opinion can violate the Eighth Amendment. See
Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 411-12 (7th Cir. 2014). However, because personal involvement
is required for liability to attach (see Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir.
2005)), the respondeat superior doctrine—supervisor liability—is not applicable to Section 1983
actions. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). For example, a warden
cannot face liability merely because he is the chief administrative officer of the prison. Wardens
and top level administrators are “entitled to relegate to the prison’s medical staff the provision of
good medical care.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009).
Relative to medical professionals, erroneous treatment constituting a substantial departure
from accepted medical judgment, practice, or standards may constitute deliberate indifference.
See Gayton, 593 F.3d at 623; Jones v. Simek, 193 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1999). Physicians’
treatment decisions are given deference, “unless no minimally competent professional would
have so responded under similar circumstances.” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th
Cir.2008); see Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 682 (7th Cir. 2008). Mere disagreement with

a physician’s chosen course of an inmate’s medical treatment does not amount to deliberate
indifference. See Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591(7th Cir. 1996); Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352
F.3d 328, 331(7th Cir. 2003); Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896,898 (7th Cir.2001) (Courts will
not takes sides in disagreements about medical personnel’s judgments or techniques). However,
“nurses may generally defer to instructions given by physicians, ‘but that deference may not be
blind or unthinking, particularly if it is apparent that the physician's order will likely harm the
patient.’” Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1075 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 443 (7th Cir. 2010)). A corporate healthcare provider—like
Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.—cannot be held liable for its employees’ constitutional
violations simply because it is the employer. See Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746
F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014); Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 2013) (no
respondeat superior liability for private corporation). However, the corporation can be liable if
the plaintiff’s harm is caused by its unconstitutional policy or practice. See Shields, 746 F.3d at
796; Woodward v. Correctional Medical Services of Illinois, Inc., 368 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2004).
Despite the prolix complaint, questions abound regarding the role of each named
defendant. In any event, the complaint appears to offer a sufficient basis for alleging deliberate
indifference by each of the 13 individual defendants—medical professionals and prison
administrators, alike. The allegations against Wexford Health Sources, Inc., are a bit sketchy.
References to Wexford are sprinkled throughout the complaint.

Plaintiff’s family

notified Wexford of the treatment issues (see Doc. 1, p. 19/Complt., p. 21). At least one of
Plaintiff’s treating physicians is alleged to be employed by Wexford (see Doc. 1, p. 16/Complt.,
p. 18), and the medical staff is generally characterized as working for Wexford (see Doc. 1-1, p.
34/Complt., p. 66). There are allegations indicating that individual doctors and others were

concerned with when Plaintiff would be released from prison, and remarks speculating that the
cost of treatment was a motivating factor in treatment decisions (see Doc. 1-1, pp. 2527/Complt., pp. 57-59; Doc. 1-2, pp. 25,

36/Complt., pp. 97, 108). Although Wexford’s

approval was required for certain tests (see Doc. 1-2, p. 37/Complt., p. 109), Wexford approved
ultrasound testing (see Doc. 1, p. 34/Complt., p. 36), and there is no allegation that Wexford
disapproved any test or treatment. Instead, treatment decisions are all laid at the feet of the
defendant medical personnel and prison administrators. There is also no actual allegation of a
Wexford policy or practice that treatment decisions should be made based on cost, rather than
sound medical judgment. Only vague, speculative remarks about cost are described in the
complaint and none are actually linked to Wexford. Nor is there an allegation of a conspiracy
between medical staff and their employer, Wexford.

Thus, under the Twombly pleading

standard, there is an inadequate basis in the amended complaint to state a colorable Eighth
Amendment claim against Wexford Health Sources, Inc. Wexford, therefore, will be dismissed
without prejudice.
Severance and Venue
The fact that the complaint states colorable Eighth Amendment claims against 13 of the
14 named defendants does not end the analysis. Plaintiff himself recognizes two glaring issues:
(1) the complaint presents claims stemming from how he was treated (or not treated) at multiple
institutions, not all within the Southern District of Illinois where this Court is located; and (2) a
two-year statute of limitations is applicable to his claims, some of which occurred as long as
three years ago. He has filed a “Motion to Consolidate Jurisdiction in Southern District of
Illinois” (Doc. 4). Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 4) will be denied for the reasons that follow.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18 generally permits a party to join “as many claims as it
has against an opposing party.” FED.R.CIV.P. 18(a). “Thus multiple claims against a single
party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B
against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). With that said, Rule
20 permits multiple defendants to be joined in a single action if: “(A) any right to relief is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of
law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” FED.R.CIV.P. 20(a)(2)(A), (B).
In George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit emphasized that
unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits, “not only to prevent the
sort of morass” produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits “but also to ensure that prisoners
pay the required filing fees” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Id. at 607,
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), (g)). “Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in
different suits[.]” George, 507 F.3d at 607. Otherwise, prisoners easily could sidestep the
requirements of the PLRA, in particular the provisions regarding filing fees.

See id.

Accordingly, severance is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 as long as the
two resulting claims are “discrete and separate.” Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008, 1016
(7th Cir. 2000); see also George, 507 F.3d at 607. In other words, one claim must be capable of
resolution despite the outcome of the other claim. Id.; see also Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs. of
Indiana, Inc., 451 F.3d 424, 442 (7th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff Malik has described chronic, evolving ailments. All claims regarding deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs are based upon the Eighth Amendment. However, the
treatment issues span three years and involve personnel at four different prisons. Thus, some,

but not all key facts will be the same relative to each defendant, or at least for the treatment
afforded at each institution. As previously discussed, no conspiracy has been pleaded. The
claims appear to be capable of resolution independently.

Plaintiff now asserts that after

complaining at the first institution the second denied him treatment in retaliation, and so on down
the line. However, no retaliation claim is asserted in the complaint and, even if there were, the
retaliation claims could each be decided independently.
The Court does not perceive a risk of inconsistent verdicts if claims and defendants are
severed based upon where the events occurred. By severing the claims rather than dismissing
them, Plaintiff is not prejudiced relative to the statute of limitations. See Vinson v. Vermilion
County, Ill., 2015 WL 343673, __ F.3d __, (7th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015).

The complaint shall be

severed into four separate cases:
Case 1:

While Plaintiff was housed at East Moline Correctional Center
between December 19, 2011, and February 13, 2013, Defendants
William Rankin and Tod Van Wolvelaere were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment (Doc. 1, pp. 8-16/Complt., pp. 10-18);

Case 2:

While Plaintiff was housed at Jacksonville Correctional Center
between February 19 and December 13, 2013, Defendants Marvin
Reed, Eli Goodman, Becky Sudbrink and Nurse Warning were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 1, p. 16/Complt., p. 18—Doc. 1-1, p.
22/Complt., p. 54);

Case 3:

While Plaintiff was housed at Vandalia Correctional Center
between December 13, 2013, and February 6, 2014, Defendants
Reynal Caldwell, Warden Luth, Warden Moss and Dr. Larson
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 1-1, p. 22/Complt., p.
54—Doc. 1-1, p. 31/Complt., p. 63); and

Case 4:

While Plaintiff was housed at Big Muddy River Correctional
Center between February 6, 2014, to the present, Defendants
Deborah J. Isaacs, J. Savkobs and Zachary Roeckeman were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 1-1, p. 31/Complt., p. 63—Doc. 1-2,
p. 38/Complt., p. 110).

Cases 1 and 2 stem from events at institutions located within the Central District of
Illinois, and Cases 3 and 4 pertain to events at institutions located in the Southern District of
Illinois. Consequently, the appropriate venue for each case must be considered. Any civil action
may be brought “in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district is located, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) if there is no district in which an action may
otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is
subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
It can reasonably be assumed that the defendants working at each institution reside within
the judicial district where the institution is located and where the relevant activity occurred.
Therefore, the Court finds that the federal judicial district for the Central District of Illinois is the
proper venue for the hearing and determination of Cases 1 and 2, and the Southern District of
Illinois is the proper venue for determination of Cases 3 and 4. Accordingly, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b), § 1404(a), Cases 1 and 2 will be transferred to the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois. Transfer will not occur for 21 days for reasons detailed below.
Cases 3 and 4 shall remain in the Southern District of Illinois.
Filing Fees
As the Court of Appeals emphasized in George v. Smith, 507 F.3d at 607, a prisonerplaintiff cannot avoid paying filing fees by improperly joining claims, rather than filing separate

cases. A plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for an action is incurred at the time an action
is filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Therefore, Plaintiff remains responsible for the filing fee in this original case (which shall pertain
to Case 4) (see Doc. 10 granting Plaintiff pauper status). Although three additional actions will
be opened (regarding Cases 1, 2 and 3, respectively), Plaintiff will be given 21 days in all four
cases to state in writing whether he desires to proceed with that particular case, or to move for
the voluntary dismissal of that case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A).
The transfers to the Central District of Illinois will not occur until this Court has received notice
of how Plaintiff elects to proceed. Also, no filing fee will be assessed on any case that is
voluntarily dismissed (except for this original case). If any of the three new cases is voluntarily
dismissed, no filing fee will be assessed in that particular case. If Plaintiff elects to proceed with
any of the three new cases, he must simultaneously file in that particular case a new motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or pay the filing fee in full at that time. 2
Pending Motions
As already explained, “Case 4” regarding the claims arising at Big Muddy River
Correctional Center, where Plaintiff is currently incarcerated, shall proceed in this case, Southern
District of Illinois Case No. 15-cv-00084-SMY. In light of the pending motion for preliminary
injunction (Doc. 2), service of summons and the complaint will be ordered to commence
immediately, even though Plaintiff has yet to confirm that he desires to proceed with this
2

Plaintiff should note that the filing fees for multiple cases cumulate. See Newlin v. Helman, 123
F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025 (7th Cir. 2000); Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, when a prison
sweeps an inmate’s trust fund account each month to collect payments toward filing fees, a
prisoner who files one suit must remit 20% of his monthly income to the Clerk of the Court until
his fees have been paid; a prisoner who files a second suit or an appeal must remit 40%; and so
on. Newlin, 123 F.3d at 436. "Five suits or appeals mean that the prisoner's entire monthly
income must be turned over to the court until the fees have been paid." Id.

particular case. This case, along with the pending motion for preliminary junction (Doc. 2) and
motion for counsel (Doc. 6), will be referred to a magistrate judge. The Court will wait until
after the 21-day deadline to proceed on any of the other three cases.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, Defendant WEXFORD
HEATH SOURCES, INC., is DISMISSED without prejudice from this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s overarching Eighth Amendment claim
regarding his medical care shall otherwise PROCEED, but is hereby SEVERED into the
following separate cases. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate Jurisdiction (Doc. 4) is
DENIED.
Case 1:

While Plaintiff was housed at East Moline Correctional Center
between December 19, 2011, and February 13, 2013, Defendants
William Rankin and Tod Van Wolvelaere were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment (Doc. 1, pp. 8-16/Complt., pp. 10-18);

Case 2:

While Plaintiff was housed at Jacksonville Correctional Center
between February 19 and December 13, 2013, Defendants Marvin
Reed, Eli Goodman, Becky Sudbrink and Nurse Warning were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 1, p. 16/Complt., p. 18—Doc. 1-1, p.
22/Complt., p. 54);

Case 3:

While Plaintiff was housed at Vandalia Correctional Center
between December 13, 2013, and February 6, 2014, Defendants
Reynal Caldwell, Warden Luth, Warden Moss and Dr. Larson
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 1-1, p. 22/Complt., p.
54—Doc. 1-1, p. 31/Complt., p. 63); and

Case 4:

While Plaintiff was housed at Big Muddy River Correctional
Center between February 6, 2014, to the present, Defendants
Deborah J. Isaacs, J. Savkobs and Zachary Roeckeman were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 1-1, p. 31/Complt., p. 63—Doc. 1-2,
p. 38/Complt., p. 110).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to open what have
been designated as “Cases 1, 2 and 3” as new cases, with random judge assignments. The four
cases shall be opened and shall proceed as follows:
●

“Case 4,” regarding the events occurring at Big Muddy River Correctional
Center, shall remain in this present action, Case No. 15-cv-00084-SMY.
Only the defendants to “Case 4” shall remain defendants in this case; all
others shall be terminated from this particular case.

●

What has been referred to as “Case 3,” regarding the events at Vandalia
Correctional Center, will be opened as a new case and shall remain in the
Southern District of Illinois. A district judge will be randomly assigned.
The Court will await for Plaintiff’s filing regarding whether he wants to
proceed with “Case 3” before proceeding with a referral order and service
of the summons and complaint. No motions filed relative to the original
case will be incorporated into “Case 3;” therefore, for example, if Plaintiff
seeks recruitment of counsel in “Case 3,” he must file a motion in that
case.

●

If Plaintiff timely notifies this Court that he desires to proceed with either
“Case 1” regarding events occurring at East Moline Correctional Center,
or “Case 2” regarding events at Jacksonville Correctional Center, then
transfer to the Central District of Illinois will proceed by separate order.
Those cases will not proceed until after the deadline for Plaintiff to alert
this Court to how he wants to proceed with each of those cases. No
motions filed relative to the original case (Southern District of Illinois
Case No. 15-cv-00084-SMY) will be incorporated into “Case 1” or “Case
2;” therefore, for example, if Plaintiff seeks recruitment of counsel in
“Case 1” and “Case 2,” he must file a motion in each of those cases.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before March 2, 2015, in each of the four
individual cases, Plaintiff shall state in a writing whether he desires to proceed, or he shall move
for the voluntary dismissal of that case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A).
The transfers of “Cases 1 and 2” to the Central District of Illinois will not occur until this Court
has received notice of how Plaintiff elects to proceed. Also, no filing fee will be assessed on any
case that is voluntarily dismissed (except for this original case). If any of the three new cases is
voluntarily dismissed, no filing fee will be assessed in that particular case. If Plaintiff elects to

proceed with any of the three new cases, he must simultaneously file in that particular case a new
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or pay the filing fee in full at that time. Failure to
comply with this directive in any one of the four cases will result in the dismissal of that case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to “Case 4”/Case No. 15-cv-00084SMY only:
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants DEBORAH J. ISAACS, J. SAVKOBS
and ZACHARY ROECKEMAN: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.

If a Defendant fails to sign

and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date
the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that
Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to
the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a

true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants DEBORAH J. ISAACS, J. SAVKOBS and ZACHARY ROECKEMAN
are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the complaint insofar as it
pertains to the claims against them and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action, Case No. 15-cv-00084-SMY, is
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier for further pre-trial
proceedings, including prompt handling of Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 2),
consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for counsel (Doc. 6). It will be left to Judge Frazier to
determine if an amended complaint should be filed that would eliminate what is now
superfluous.
Further, this entire case (Case No. 15-cv-00084-SMY) shall be REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all
parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.

See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a

stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 6, 2015

s/ STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge