Crowder v. Larson et al

Filing 5

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 3/17/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DARYL M. CROWDER, # K-88903,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNIS LARSON, SHERRY BENTON,
DEBORAH J. ISAACS, S. A. GODINEZ,
ZACKARY S. ROECHEMAN,
JEREMY C. MILLER,
and DR. V. SHAH,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-00170-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff

Daryl

Crowder,

an

inmate

who

is

currently

incarcerated

at

Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
the deprivation of his constitutional rights at Big Muddy River Correctional Center
(“Big Muddy”) and Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”).

In the complaint,

Plaintiff claims that he suffered permanent injuries from three falls that could have been avoided
if officials at Big Muddy and Pinckneyville had issued him a low bunk and lower level permit
when he first requested one (Doc. 1, pp. 5-9). He also claims that Big Muddy officials retaliated
against him for pursuing legal claims in connection with these injuries, by issuing him a false
disciplinary ticket for fighting and transferring him to Pinckneyville. Plaintiff now sues four
Big Muddy officials,1 two Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) officials,2 and one

1

These defendants include Zackary Roecheman (warden), Dennis Larson (doctor), Deborah Isaacs
(nurse), and Jeremy Miller (corrections officer).
2
The defendants include S.A. Godinez (director) and Sherry Benton (administrative review board
official).

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Pinckneyville official3 for violating his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and Illinois law. He seeks monetary damages and a prison transfer (Doc. 1, p. 10).
Merits Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner
complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss
any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief

must

cross

“the

line

between

possibility

and

plausibility.”

Id.

at

557.

Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept
factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s

claim.

Brooks

v.

Ross,

578

F.3d

574,

581

(7th

Cir.

2009).

Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a
cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth
3

This defendant includes V. Shah (doctor).

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Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The complaint survives preliminary review
under this standard.
The Complaint
In April 2013, Plaintiff asked Doctor Larson, a physician at Big Muddy, to issue him a
permit for a low bunk and for placement on the prison’s lower level (Doc. 1, p. 5). At the time,
Plaintiff was fifty-one years old and a heart attack survivor. He was also taking medication that
caused dizziness and muscle spasms. Doctor Larson did not issue the permit.
As a result, Plaintiff suffered three serious falls. The first two occurred on April 9th and
13th, 2013. Plaintiff fell from his upper bunk. He allegedly experienced “severe and extreme
pain and aggravation of a[n] injury that happen[ed two] years prior” (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6). Then, on
November 26, 2013, Plaintiff fell down six stairs, injuring his back and neck. He underwent
“several painful and life threatening surgical procedures” (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7).
Plaintiff claims that these falls, and the resulting injuries, could have been avoided if the
permit was issued when he originally requested it.

However, it was only after sustaining

permanent injuries from these falls that Doctor Larson and Nurse Isaac agreed to issue Plaintiff a
low bunk and lower level permit, along with crutches and a wheelchair (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Several IDOC officials, including Salvador Godinez, learned of Plaintiff’s efforts to
retain legal counsel and pursue claims against them for these injuries. In concert with Sherry
Benton, he denied Plaintiff proper medical care in a therapeutic environment (Doc. 1, p. 7).
In retaliation, Plaintiff was allegedly forced to share a cell with an aggressive inmate who
attempted to fight him.

Plaintiff was issued a false disciplinary ticket for fighting by

Officer Miller (Doc. 1, p. 8). He claims that he was only defending himself. Following an

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allegedly unfair disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff was transferred to Pinckneyville. Big Muddy’s
warden, Zachary Roecheman, authorized the transfer.
Plaintiff’s low bunk and lower level permit did not follow him.

Doctor Shah, a

Pinckneyville physician, refused to re-issue the permit. Plaintiff went on a hunger strike for four
days, from November 24-28, 2014, and received the permit thereafter.
Plaintiff now sues Defendants Larson, Isaacs, Benton, Godinez, Roecheman, Miller and
Shah for violating his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and Illinois law
(Doc. 1, p. 9). He seeks monetary damages and a prison transfer (Doc. 1, p. 10).
Discussion
The Court finds it convenient to divide the complaint into five counts. The organization
of these claims into five counts should not be construed as an opinion regarding the merits of any
particular claim. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and
orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
Count 1:

Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment
when they denied his request for a low bunk and lower level
permit;

Count 2:

Defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to equal protection of the
law under the Fourteenth Amendment by denying his request
for a low bunk permit when prison policy called for the
issuance of such permits to prisoners fitting his profile;

Count 3:

Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for seeking legal
representation in violation of the First Amendment by placing
him in a cell with an aggressive cellmate, issuing him a false
disciplinary ticket, and transferring him to another prison;

Count 4:

Defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing him a false
disciplinary ticket, holding an unfair hearing, and punishing
him with a prison transfer;

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Count 5:

Defendants violated Illinois law.

Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Counts 1 and 2 against Defendants Larson and
Isaacs. However, all other claims against all other defendants shall be dismissed for the reasons
discussed herein.
Count 1 – Medical Needs Claim
The complaint articulates a viable deliberate indifference to medical needs claim
(Count 1)

against

Defendants

Larson

and

Isaacs,

but

no

other

defendants.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from cruel and
unusual punishment. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court
has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);

see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2006) (per curiam). To state a claim, a prisoner must
show that the: (1) medical condition was objectively serious; and (2) state officials acted with
deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s health or safety, which is a subjective standard.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845
(7th Cir. 2001).
The Seventh Circuit has held that a medical need is “serious” where it has either “been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” or where the need is “so obvious that even a
lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Gutierrez v. Peters,
111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). Deliberate indifference is established when prison officials
“know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health” by being “‘aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’” and “‘draw[ing] the

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inference.’” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
834).
The complaint does not suggest that anyone, other than Defendants Larson and Isaacs,
displayed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s need for a low bunk permit. Section 1983 creates
a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under
[Section] 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional
deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted). As a result, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to actions filed under
Section 1983. See, e.g., Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). Although the
doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to Section 1983 actions; “[s]upervisory liability
will be found . . . if the supervisor, with knowledge of the subordinate’s conduct, approves of the
conduct and the basis for it.” Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 477 (7th
Cir. 1997); Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). The complaint
includes no allegations suggesting that Defendants Godinez, Roecheman, Benton,4 or Miller
were involved in the decision to deny Plaintiff’s low bunk and lower level permit.
The allegations against Defendant Shah are insufficient to establish a claim against him.
Although this defendant initially denied Plaintiff’s request for a low bunk permit, he later issued
one. The complaint does not indicate how much time passed, or the circumstances giving rise to
the initial denial of the permit request. Without more, the deliberate indifference to medical
needs claim against Defendant Shah fails.

4

The allegations against Defendants Benton and Godinez for acting in concert to deprive Plaintiff of
medical care constitute conclusory assertions that are unsupported by any other allegations against them
in the complaint. As such, they fall short of stating a claim against Plaintiff.

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In summary, Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Count 1 against Defendants
Larson and Isaacs.

However, this claim shall be dismissed without prejudice against all

remaining defendants.
Count 2 – Class-of-One Equal Protection
Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with a class-of-one equal protection claim (Count 2)
against Defendants Larson and Isaacs at this early stage. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause protects individuals from governmental discrimination. Swanson v. Chetek,
719 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2013). Typically, an equal protection claim involves discrimination
by race, national origin or sex. However, “the Clause also prohibits the singling out of a person
for different treatment for no rational reason.” Id. To state a class-of-one equal protection claim,
an individual “must allege that he was ‘intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” Id. (quoting Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants Larson and
Isaacs failed to issue him a permit pursuant to the policy authorizing a low bunk and lower level
permit for individuals fitting his profile cannot be dismissed at this early stage, where the
complaint alleges that this decision was based on animus. However, no allegations suggest that
any other defendants were personally involved in making this decision to discriminate against
Plaintiff, or in creating the policy. Therefore, Count 2 shall proceed against Defendants Larson
and Isaacs, and it shall be dismissed without prejudice against Defendants Godinez, Roecheman,
Benton, Miller, and Shah.
Count 3 – Retaliation
The complaint fails to state a retaliation claim (Count 3) against any defendants.
According to the allegations, Defendants responded to news of Plaintiff’s pursuit of legal claims

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against them by placing an aggressive inmate in his cell, issuing Plaintiff a false disciplinary
ticket, and ultimately transferring him to another prison. However, the complaint draws no
connection between any particular defendant’s knowledge of the legal claims and their
participation in retaliatory conduct.
The Seventh Circuit has explained retaliation claims in this context as follows:
[N]ot every claim of retaliation by a disciplined prisoner, who either has had
contact with, or has filed a lawsuit against prison officials, will state a cause of
action for retaliatory treatment. Rather, the prisoner must allege a chronology of
events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred. Murphy v. Lane, 833
F.2d 106, 108-09 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff's complaint “set forth a
chronology of events from which retaliatory animus on the part of defendants
could arguably be inferred” sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss). See also
Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that “alleging merely
the ultimate fact of retaliation is insufficient”). Barring such a chronology,
dismissal may be appropriate in cases alleging retaliatory discipline.
See Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988). The chronology of events set forth in
the complaint is not clear. For example, the allegations do not indicate when prison officials
learned of the lawsuit and when the acts of retaliation occurred. It is therefore not clear whether
these events are, in any way, connected, retaliatory, or merely coincidental.
Further, the complaint does not include sufficient allegations to suggest that any
particular defendant had knowledge of the lawsuit and also personally participated in retaliatory
acts directed toward Plaintiff. See Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir.
2005) (citations omitted) (“[T]o be liable under [Section] 1983, an individual defendant must
have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”).
Under the circumstances, Count 3 must be dismissed against all defendants, and this
dismissal shall be without prejudice.

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Count 4 – Procedural Due Process
The complaint also fails to state a procedural due process claim (Count 4) against
defendants based on the alleged issuance of a false disciplinary ticket, unfair disciplinary
hearing, and prison transfer. “[D]ue process safeguards associated with prison disciplinary
proceedings are sufficient to guard against potential abuses[, and a] hearing before a presumably
impartial Adjustment Committee terminates an officer’s possible liability for the filing of an
allegedly false disciplinary report.” Hadley v. Peters, 841 F. Supp. 850, 856 (C.D. Ill. 1994),
aff’d, 70 F.3d 117 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). An inmate facing disciplinary charges
must be given: (1) advance written notice of the charges against him; (2) the opportunity to
appear before an impartial hearing body to contest the charges; (3) the opportunity to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense (if prison safety allows and subject to
the discretion of correctional officers); and (4) a written statement summarizing the reasons for
the discipline imposed. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974); Cain v. Lane, 857
F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1988). In addition, the decision of the adjustment committee must be
supported by “some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395 (7th Cir. 1994). In other words,
courts must determine whether the decision of the hearing board has some factual basis. Webb v.
Anderson, 224 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000). Even a meager amount of supporting evidence is
sufficient. Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007).
The complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing was not impartial.
However, no factual allegations are offered in support of this bald assertion. Without factual
support, no claim is stated because the allegations fail to satisfy the pleading standards set forth
in Twombly. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

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In addition, no due process claim arises from Plaintiff’s transfer to another prison.
For the due process clause to be applicable in this situation, there must be a protected liberty
interest that is being infringed upon.

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S 215, 223-24 (1976).

However, not every action that carries with it negative consequences creates a liberty interest for
inmates. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1976). The Seventh Circuit has stated, relying
on Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976), that inmates do not possess a liberty or property
interest in their prison classifications. DeTomaso v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir.
1992). No such claim is supported in Plaintiff’s case.
Based on the foregoing discussion, Count 4 shall also be dismissed without prejudice
against all of the defendants.
Count 5 – Illinois State Claims
No claim is stated in the complaint under Illinois law. The complaint merely alludes to
such claims, without defining what the claims are or who they are against. The complaint fails to
satisfy basic pleading standards under Twombly and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
Accordingly, Count 5 shall be dismissed without prejudice against all of the defendants.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 3, 4, and 5 are DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Defendants BENTON, GODINEZ, ROECHEMAN,
MILLER, and SHAH are DISMISSED without prejudice from this action.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that as to COUNTS 1 and 2, the Clerk of Court shall
prepare for Defendants LARSON and ISAACS: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to
Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is

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DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant,
and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.

Further, this entire matter shall be

REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule

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72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 17, 2015
s/J. Phil Gilbert
U.S. District Judge

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