Hempstead v. Spiller et al

Filing 103

ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 87 , 93 ) are GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor Defendants Jeff Miller, Jeff Roelandt, Sarah Fa rris, Marcia Hill, Ladonna Long, Angel Rector and Vipin Shah and against Plaintiff Calvin Hempstead. As no claims remain before the Court, all pending motions are DENIED as MOOT and all settings herein are CANCELED. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 7/13/17. (rah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CALVIN HEMPSTEAD,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFF MILLER,
JEFF ROELANDT,
SARAH FARRIS,
MARCIA HILL,
LADONNA LONG,
ANGEL RECTOR,
and VIPIN SHAH,
Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-cv-00278-MJR-RJD

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
On March 11, 2015, Plaintiff Calvin Hempstead, a former inmate with the Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC), filed this civil rights lawsuit asserting that his
Eighth Amendment rights were violated while he was at Pinckneyville Correctional
Center (“Pinckneyville”).

In February 2014, prison officials transferred Hempstead

from Vienna Correctional Center (“Vienna”) to Pinckneyville.

Upon arriving at

Pinckneyville, Hempstead states that he was placed in an unsanitary cell in the prison’s
disciplinary segregation unit and that he developed a rash on his scalp. Hempstead
alleges that various employees of the Pinckneyville Health Care Unit failed to provide
adequate medical treatment for the condition.

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On July 7, 2015, Hempstead filed an amended complaint (Doc. 33). In Count I of
the amended complaint, he asserts an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claim against IDOC employees Jeff Miller and Jeff Roelandt for knowingly placing him
in the filthy cell in the prison’s segregation unit. In Count II, Hempstead asserts an
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Sarah
Farris, Marcia Hill, Ladonna Long, Angel Rector and Vipin Shah for failing to provide
adequate medical treatment for his scalp condition. Farris, Hill, Long, Rector and Shah
work in the Pinckneyville Health Care Unit and are employed by Wexford Health
Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), a corporation that provides healthcare services to IDOC
inmates.
Defendants now seek summary judgment. (Docs. 87 and 93). Hempstead did
not respond to the motions for summary judgment, though he was notified of the
potential consequences of failing to do so. See Doc. 89; Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281,
285 (7th Cir. 1992) (pro se litigants “entitled to notice of the consequences of failing to
respond to a summary judgment motion”).

Hempstead was also notified that

pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c), the failure to file a response to a motion “may, in the
Court’s discretion, be considered an admission of the merits of the motion.” For the
following reasons, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are granted.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Calvin Hempstead was an inmate with IDOC from August 27, 2013,

through September 4, 2015. (Affidavit of Chalene Hale, Doc. 88-1, p. 1). On February 6,

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2014, Hempstead was transferred from Vienna to Pinckneyville for disciplinary reasons
after he assaulted an IDOC staff member at Vienna. Id. Upon arriving at Pinckneyville,
prison officials placed Hempstead in cell B-74 in the facility’s segregation unit. Id. at p.
2. Hempstead resided in cell B-74 until February 23, 2014, when he was transferred to
segregation cell A-69. Id. at p. 2. Hempstead remained in cell A-69 until he was
transferred out of segregation on May 13, 2014. Id. at p. 2. After a few more stays in the
Pinckneyville segregation unit in late 2014 and early 2015, Hempstead was released
from IDOC custody in September 2015. Id. at p. 2.
Upon arriving at Pinckneyville, Hempstead was examined in the facility’s Health
Care Unit at 10:00 a.m. on February 6, 2014. (Doc. 94-2, p. 19). Hempstead’s medical
records state that he was wearing a brace on his right hand because he had suffered a
fracture in the fourth metacarpal bone (the bone in the hand connected to the ring
finger). Id. at pp. 19-20. After a few examinations for the hand issue in February and
March 2014, Hempstead was examined for a scalp condition for the first time on May
30, 2014. (Doc. 94-3, p. 6). Defendant Sarah Farris, L.P.N., examined Hempstead on that
date and observed a rash on Hempstead’s scalp. Id. Hempstead told Nurse Farris that
the rash developed approximately three weeks prior and that it was the first time he
had experienced such a rash. Id. Nurse Farris diagnosed Hempstead as having either
dermatitis or tinea. Id. After consulting with Defendant Dr. Vipin Shah, Nurse Farris
prescribed Hempstead hydrocortisone cream and selsun lotion. Id. After the May 30,
2014, examination, Nurse Farris did not provide any additional treatment for
Hempstead’s scalp condition. (Farris Affidavit, Doc. 94-8, p. 2).
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Hempstead’s medical records indicate that he was next examined in the Health
Care Unit on July 21, 2014.

(Doc. 94-3, p. 7).

Defendant Ladonna Long, L.P.N.,

examined Hempstead for complaints of knee and hand pain. There is no mention in the
record of the visit that the two discussed Hempstead’s scalp condition.

Id.

Hempstead’s next medical appointment was scheduled for July 30, 2014. Id. at p. 8.
However, the notes of Defendant Marcia Hill from that date state that Hempstead
“became very angry” when he was informed that he would be required to provide a copay and that he refused treatment. Id. at p. 8.
Hempstead returned to the Health Care Unit on August 8, 2014, for complaints
of knee pain. (Doc. 94-3, p. 9). The examining nurse referred Hempstead for a follow up
appointment, and on August 12, 2014, Defendant Angel Rector, P.A., examined
Hempstead. Id. at p. 10. Rector and Hempstead discussed his knee and hand issues,
but there is no indication that they discussed the rash. Id. at p. 10. On August 14, 2014,
Nurse Long examined Hempstead for the rash issue. (Doc. 94-3, p. 11). Hempstead
told Nurse Long that he had an itchy rash all over the top of his head, and he suspected
that the rash was caused by his unsanitary cell. Id. Hempstead was also upset that he
was being seen by a nurse and not a doctor. Id. Long referred Hempstead for a followup examination, and on August 18, 2014, Defendant Rector again examined Hempstead.
Id. at p. 12. P.A. Rector noted that Hempstead’s scalp condition was stable but there
were a few dark patches near the rash.

Id. at p. 12.

At the conclusion of the

examination, P.A. Rector referred Hempstead to be seen by Dr. Shah. Id. at p. 12.

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Dr. Shah examined Hempstead on August 22, 2014. Id. at p. 13. Dr. Shaw
diagnosed Hempstead as having “tinea versicolor” and prescribed a selenium sulfate
shampoo. Id. at p. 13. According to Dr. Shah’s declaration attached to his motion for
summary judgment, tinea versicolor “is a fungal infection of the skin and is caused by a
type of yeast that naturally lives on human skin.” (Doc. 94-9, p. 2). The condition is not
contagious, but “acidic bleach from the growing yeast causes areas of skin to be a
different color than the surrounding skin[.]” Id. Dr. Shah also states in his declaration
that “[t]here was no epidemic of ring worm at Pinckneyville Correctional Center in
2014.” Id. at p. 3.

After the August 22, 2014, examination, there is no record of

Hempstead making any further complaints about his scalp condition.
In addition to the healthcare Defendants, Hempstead asserts claims against
IDOC correctional officers Jeff Miller and Jeff Roelandt.

Attached to the IDOC

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment are affidavits from Miller and Roelandt.
Miller states in his affidavit that he has been a Correctional Officer at Pinckneyville
since 1996. From February through May 2014, he was assigned to work in
Pinckneyville’s segregation unit. (Doc 88-3, p. 1). On February 6, 2014, Miller received
notice from the Pinckneyville placement officer that Hempstead was to be assigned to a
cell in the segregation unit.

Id. at p. 2.

Miller states that he did not observe

Hempstead’s cell to be contaminated, nor did he knowingly provide Hempstead with
contaminated bedding. Id. at p. 2. Inmate workers clean the cells prior to having a new
inmate assigned. Id. at p. 2. Furthermore, Hempstead never notified Miller that the cell
was contaminated or unfit for human habitation. Id. at pp. 2-3.
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Jeff Roelandt states in his affidavit that he has been a Correctional Officer at
Pinckneyville since 2013. (Doc. 88-4, p. 1). Roelandt was also assigned to work in the
Pinckneyville segregation unit from February through May 2014. Id. Roelandt has
never been the placement officer at Pinckneyville, and he did not personally assign
Hempstead to the cell. Id. Inmate workers deliver mattresses and bed linens to the
inmates in the segregation unit. Id. Roelandt states in his affidavit that he did not
knowingly provide Hempstead with contaminated bedding, nor did he knowingly
place Hempstead in a cell contaminated with fungus or bodily fluids. Id. at p. 2.
II.

ANALYSIS
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, “the court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” When faced
with a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine the record in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in
their favor. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). At this point in the
litigation “[t]he court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence
of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.”

Id.

Summary judgment shall be denied “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

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A. IDOC Defendants Jeff Miller and Jeff Roelandt
In Count I of the amended complaint, Hempstead asserts that Miller and
Roelandt violated his Eighth Amendment rights by placing him in an unsanitary,
contaminated cell that caused him to become physically ill. Prisoners have an Eighth
Amendment right to “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care[.]” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). An Eighth Amendment violation occurs when a
prisoner is subject to an objectively serious deprivation and the defendant prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s situation.

Id. at 834.

The

Supreme Court observed in Hudson v. McMillan that “extreme deprivations are required
to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim … [and] only those deprivations
denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form
the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
(1992) (internal cite and quote omitted).
Here, Miller states in his affidavit that he did not observe Hempstead’s
segregation cell to be unfit for human habitation, nor did he knowingly provide
Hempstead with contaminated bedding. Miller also states that inmate workers clean
the segregation cells before a new inmate is placed in a cell.

Additionally, Miller

observed the interior of the cell and determined that it did not appear to have any
physical characteristics that were different than any other cell in segregation at
Pinckneyville in February 2014. Defendant Roelandt states in his affidavit that he did
not knowingly provide Hempstead with contaminated bedding or a contaminated cell.
Moreover, both Miller and Roelandt state in their affidavits that they did not personally
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assign Hempstead to the specific segregation cells. Because Hempstead did not file a
response in opposition to the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, there is no
evidence countering Miller and Roelandt’s assertions. The Court will therefore consider
the facts presented in Miller and Roelandt’s affidavits undisputed for the purposes of
summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The affidavits state that the segregation
cells are regularly cleaned by inmate workers and that the two IDOC defendants did
not knowingly place Hempstead in a contaminated cell. When these assertions are
deemed undisputed, no reasonable jury could find that Miller and Roelandt were
deliberately indifferent to Hempstead’s conditions of confinement. As such, Miller and
Roelandt are entitled to summary judgment.
B. Wexford Defendants Sarah Farris, Marcia Hill, Ladonna Long, Angel Rector
and Vipin Shah
In Count II of the amended complaint, Hempstead asserts an Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Wexford Defendants
Farris, Hill, Long, Rector and Shah. To establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs claim, the plaintiff must show: (1) that he suffered
from a serious medical need; and (2) that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
it. Harper v. Santos, 847 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976)). Not all medical conditions qualify as “serious.” A serious medical need
is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's attention.”
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Lack of treatment for lesser

conditions, such as sniffles or a mild headache, will not implicate the Eighth
Amendment. Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
In addition to demonstrating that the medical condition was objectively serious,
the plaintiff must also show that the defendants demonstrated “deliberate indifference”
to the condition. “Deliberate indifference” is a state of mind where the prison official
defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This is a higher level of wrongdoing than ordinary negligence,
akin to criminal recklessness. Id. at 836. A plaintiff does not need to show that “he was
literally ignored” to establish an Eighth Amendment claim. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843,
858 (7th Cir. 2011). Deliberate indifference may be established by evidence that the
defendant chose a “blatantly inappropriate” course of treatment or one that
unnecessarily prolonged pain. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2016).
As previously noted, Hempstead did not file a response in opposition to the
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. As such, there is no affidavit countering
the assertions of Farris, Hill, Long, Rector and Shah. The Court will therefore consider
the facts presented in the declarations of the Wexford Defendants undisputed for the
purposes of summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Assuming that Hempstead’s
scalp rash was a serious condition, the record does not present evidence that could lead
a reasonable juror to conclude that the Wexford Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to Hempstead’s scalp condition.
After arriving at Pinckneyville, the record shows that Hempstead first
complained of his scalp condition on May 30, 2014, and he promptly was prescribed a
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cream to treat it. The record does not indicate that the condition was discussed with the
Wexford Defendants again until August 2014.

When Hempstead complained to

Defendant Long about the condition on August 14, 2014, he was referred to Defendant
Rector. Defendant Rector examined Hempstead on August 18, 2014, and recommended
that he be seen by Dr. Shah, who examined Hempstead on August 22, 2014. Dr. Shah
treated Hempstead’s condition at that time by giving him a selenium sulfate shampoo.
Hempstead did not seek treatment for his scalp condition again after that appointment.
(Docs. 94-3, 94-7, 94-8, 94-9, 94-10 and 94-11).
Although Hempstead arguably suffered from a serious medical need, no
reasonable juror could find that any Wexford Defendant was deliberately indifferent to
his condition. Hempstead was provided with multiple prescriptions to treat his rash,
and he was referred to see a physician when he complained that the initial treatment
was ineffective. After receiving the second treatment, Hempstead did not seek any
further treatment from Defendants.

No reasonable juror could conclude that

Defendants chose a blatantly inappropriate course of treatment, prolonged Plaintiff’s
pain, or were otherwise deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. As such, the
Wexford Defendants’ motion for summary judgment shall be granted.
III.

CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Docs. 87,

93) are GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor Defendants Jeff
Miller, Jeff Roelandt, Sarah Farris, Marcia Hill, Ladonna Long, Angel Rector and Vipin

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Shah and against Plaintiff Calvin Hempstead. As no claims remain before the Court, all
pending motions are DENIED as MOOT and all settings herein are CANCELED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 13, 2017

s/ Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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