Hoskins v. Bowles et al

Filing 128

ORDER DENYING Motion in Limine 7 (Doc. 120 ). An order on the remaining Motions in Limine will be entered separately. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 1/31/2018. (bps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBERT HOSKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DUSTIN BOWLES, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:15-CV-280-SMY-RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Number 7 (Doc. 120) which
the Court took under advisement at the Final Pretrial Conference on January 24, 2018.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Number 7 requests “an adverse instruction to the jury requiring the
jury to presume that the grievance recounted the details of the assault and was intercepted by the
guards and/or destroyed.” (Doc. 120 at 7). Alternatively, Plaintiff requests a “spoliation charge”
permitting, but not requiring, the jury to make that presumption. (Id.). As set forth below, the
motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff Robert Hoskins, an IDOC inmate, filed this § 1983 action on March 12, 2015
against various prison officials at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. (Doc. 1). 1 On June 19,
2014, Hoskins was involved in a physical altercation with a fellow inmate in the Pinckneyville
mess hall.

After the altercation, Hoskins was in the process of being transferred to the

segregation unit when he was allegedly beaten by Defendants Chad Adams and Greg James.
Hoskins alleges that on July 20, 2014, he filed an emergency grievance detailing the assault (the
“Emergency Grievance”).
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All factual allegations are drawn from the Complaint, unless otherwise noted.

Over the next several days, Hoskins was allegedly issued falsified disciplinary charges
due, at least in part, to his filing of the Emergency Grievance. He alleges that Hartman, Hill and
Bowles each spoke to him regarding the Emergency Grievance. As a result of the disciplinary
charges, Hoskins was punished with additional time in segregation, the revocation of privileges
and good time credits, and was transferred from Pinckneyville to Menard Correctional Center..
In their Answer, Defendants claim lack of sufficient knowledge as to whether the
Emergency Grievance was filed or not. (Doc. 21 at 7). Hartman, a correctional counselor, states
that he did speak to Hoskins in his cell and gave him grievance forms. Defendants deny that that
the disciplinary charges were false or that they had anything to do with a grievance.
Hoskins’ “Cumulative Counseling Summary,” an IDOC form that lists inmates’
interactions with counselors, states that on June 20, 2014, at 9:28 A.M., Correctional Counselor
Mark L. Hartman spoke to Hoskins at his cell in the segregation unit. (Doc. 1 at 9). Hartman’s
notes from the interaction state: “Seg. contact. DCA form initiated. States he fears staff will
harm him. Internal Affairs notified. Given grievances.” (Id.).
The Emergency Grievance was not produced by Defendants in discovery. Plaintiff filed
a Motion to Compel, requesting that the Court either order a search to find it or impose sanctions
in the form of a Rule 37 spoliation instruction. (Doc. 115). Plaintiff cites to the “Given
grievances” language in the Cumulative Counseling Summary and contrasts it with notations on
other dates which read “asked for grievance- given,” as support for the existence of the
Emergency Grievance. (Doc. 1 at 9). (“When read in conjunction, it appears that Mr. Hoskins
did give a grievance to Mr. Hartman on the date in question.”) (Doc. 115 at 2). It should be
noted that these other entries appear to have been made by a different correctional officer, Cliff
W. Vanzandt.

(Doc. 1 at 9).

Further, Defendants claim that they have no record of the

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Emergency Grievance ever being filed. (Doc. 116). Magistrate Judge Reona M. Daly denied the
motion, finding that “it would be an exercise in futility to order counsel for Defendants to again
look for said grievance. The Court further finds that the issue of spoliation is better suited for a
pre-trial motion in limine.” (Doc. 117).
Plaintiff again requests either an adverse-inference instruction or a spoliation instruction
regarding the alleged failure to produce or preserve the Emergency Grievance.

A court’s

authority to sanction a party for spoliation of evidence is both inherent and statutory. Chambers
v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50–51 (1991); Barnhill v. United States, 11 F.3d 1360, 1368 (7th
Cir. 1993). If spoliation of evidence violates a court order or affects the court's discovery
schedule, sanctions may be imposed under Rule 37. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); Chambers, 501
U.S. at 50–51. The court's inherent authority is a power which is necessary “to fashion an
appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process,” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–
45. This authority “is based on the Court's power to manage and ensure the expeditious
resolution of cases on their dockets and is not limited to discovery violations.” Larson v. Bank
One Corp., No. 00 C 2100, 2005 WL 4652509, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2005).
Plaintiff first asks for an adverse-inference instruction “requiring the jury to presume that
the grievance recounted the details of the assault and was intercepted by the guards and/or
destroyed.” (Doc 120 at 7). In order to merit an adverse-inference instruction, Plaintiff must
demonstrate (a) that the document contained information adverse to Defendants’ case, and (b)
that Defendants “intentionally destroyed the documents in bad faith.”

Norman-Nunnery v.

Madison Area Tech. College, 625 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Everett v. Cook
County, 655 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2011). “Bad faith” in this context means that the evidence at
issue was “destroyed for the purpose of hiding adverse information.” Norman-Nunnery at 428.

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Alternatively, Plaintiff requests a permissive spoliation instruction “which does not
require a showing of bad faith,” presumably based on a theory that Defendants had a duty to
preserve the Emergency Grievance and failed to do so. “A party has a duty to preserve evidence
over which it has control and reasonably knows or could foresee would be material to a potential
legal action.” Bryant v. Gardner, 587 F. Supp. 2d 951, 967–68 (N.D. Ill. 2008). As to the issue
of “control,” “a party need not have actual possession of the documents to be deemed in control
of them; rather the test is whether the party has a legal right to obtain them.” Dexia Credit Local
v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 542 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (citing In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 76
F.R.D. 420, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1977))
Here, there is no evidence establishing that the Emergency Grievance was ever filed to
merit either of the requested sanctions. Plaintiff alleges that he submitted it to Defendant
Hartman and discussed it with several other defendants. Defendant Hartman denies getting a
grievance from Hoskins, and the other defendants deny that the alleged conversations involved
the Emergency Grievance. The only support for Plaintiff’s position is Counsel’s interpretation of
the wording in different counseling-log entries submitted by different staff members.

But

Counsel’s interpretation is insufficient to meet the requirements for an adverse-inference
instruction. First, there is the implied condition that the document or object which is missing
existed in the first place. This is an issue of significant dispute and a matter for the jury.
Second, the document must have been intentionally intercepted or destroyed. Plaintiff provides
no evidence to suggest that the inability to find the Emergency Grievance, if it was filed, is due
to the intentional acts of any of the defendants. Finally, Plaintiff presents no evidence that the
destruction, if any, was for the purpose of concealing adverse information. An adverse-inference
instruction is a significant sanction for a court to impose, and it is inappropriate on the facts as

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developed thus far.
Plaintiff’s alternative request for a permissive instruction for failure to preserve the
Emergency Grievance is similarly inappropriate.

It also requires an assumption that the

Emergency Grievance was filed before it was lost or destroyed. Again, this assumption is not
justified based on the evidence in the record.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine 7 is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 31, 2018

s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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