Hoffmann v. Hertz et al

Filing 62

ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint (Doc. 56). The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to file the amended complaint. The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants Tom Schmidt, Tim Walker Blake Sellers, Robert Hallenbeck, Drew Beckley, and Craig Reichart: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 3/8/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAVID HOFFMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT HERTZ,
GARY BOST,
SERGEANT DOVER,
DON MCNAUGHTON,
SHERIFF LAKIN,
NURSE MARTY,
NURSE VALLERY, and
NURSE ALLYSIA,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15–cv–00289–MJR–SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
A.

INTRODUCTION

On March 16, 2015, while a pretrial detainee at Madison County Jail in
Edwardsville, Illinois, David Hoffmann filed suit in this Court seeking damages for
alleged violations of his federally-secured constitutional rights. In his pro se complaint
filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Hoffman (Plaintiff) complained of the conditions of his
confinement at the jail. Specifically, he alleged there were a series of at least six sewage
leaks from August 16, 2014 and December 27, 2014, which subjected him to inhumane
conditions including “raw sewage waste approximately 6-inches or more” and that he
was denied access to clean drinking water during these leaks (Doc. 1, pp. 6-10.)
1

Plaintiff had named the county sheriff, the jail superintendent, and various jail
officials/employees as Defendants.

On threshold review of Plaintiff’s complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (see Doc. 20), the undersigned found that Plaintiff had
stated two cognizable claims:
•

Count I - against Defendants in their individual capacity for exposing
Plaintiff to raw sewage, and denying Plaintiff clean drinking water, and

•

Count II - against Defendant Lakin (the Madison County Sheriff) in his
official capacity concerning the conditions at the jail.
The Court denied Plaintiff’s pre-screening requests to amend his complaint, due

to the fact that he attempted to make piecemeal additions to his complaint and did not
respond to an order directing him to submit one complaint containing all of his claims
(see Doc. 15). After threshold screening, on November 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed another
motion to amend his complaint. No response to this motion has been filed by any
Defendant, and the time to do so has lapsed. For the following reasons, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to amend complaint (Doc. 56). The Court now screens the
amended complaint pursuant to § 1915A.
B.

ANALYSIS OF MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

A plaintiff may amend his complaint by leave of court. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
A court should grant leave to amend when justice so requires. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
Here, Defendants have not objected to the proposed amendment. Additionally, the
proposed amendment seeks to factually develop and clarify Plaintiff’s existing claims.
Plaintiff alleges that the deficient conditions of confinement continued after he filed his
2

original complaint and that the sewer backed up several more times. Plaintiff also
alleges that his personal toilet did not function for a ten-day period as a result of the
deficient plumbing and that the jail developed black mold as a result of the frequent
back-ups. Plaintiff also attempts to add a deliberate indifference claim for injuries he
claims are related to the sewer back-up. Plaintiff no longer is confined at Madison
County Jail, but because all of the claims mentioned above stem from the same
situation, i.e., the plumbing defect at the Madison County Jail, and because Defendants
have not asserted any prejudice, the Court finds that the interests of justice warrant
permitting Plaintiff to amend his complaint.

The Clerk of Court is therefore

DIRECTED to file Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint.
That does not end the matter. When an amended complaint is filed, the prior
pleading is withdrawn and the amended pleading controls. Johnson v. Dossey, 515
F.3d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 2008). The Court is required to conduct a prompt, fresh threshold
screening under § 1915A, which provides that the court shall review, before docketing if
feasible or as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
C.

THRESHOLD SCREENING OF AMENDED COMPLAINT

On threshold review under § 1915A(b), the court must identify cognizable claims
and dismiss any parts of the complaint that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim
on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant.

3

Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that he was subjected to inhumane
conditions at the Madison County Jail.
1.

Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution obligates prison
officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, including adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care for inmates. 1 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994); Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009). To establish an Eighth
Amendment violation in the conditions of confinement context, a plaintiff must satisfy
both an objective factor (i.e., that he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation) and a
subjective factor (i.e., that the defendant subjectively acted with deliberate indifference
to the plaintiff’s condition of confinement). Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir.
2008); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
With respect to the objective factor, the plaintiff is required to offer proof of the
potential harm and the likelihood that such injury to health will actually be caused by
the condition of confinement. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36. And the court is required to
assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be “so grave

Pretrial detainees’ conditions of confinement claims are grounded
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but courts look
to Eighth Amendment caselaw, “given that the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment … are at least as broad as those that the Eighth
Amendment affords to convicted prisoners.” Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr.
Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012), citing Brown v. Budz,
398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005).
4
1

that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwilling to such a
risk.” Id. With respect to the subjective factor, the defendant must have known of the
substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to address it. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008), citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
The Court previously found that Plaintiff had stated a conditions of confinement
claim based on his allegations that he was exposed to raw sewage and deprived of fresh
water. Plaintiff’s amended complaint omits any reference to sewer back-ups that, per
the original complaint, occurred on September 4, 2014 and October 24, 2014. Therefore,
Count I longer states any claims for events that may have happened on those two days.
Additionally, Count I was originally directed against all Defendants, including the three
nurse Defendants -- Marty, Vallery, and Allysia. The amended complaint does not
allege that the nurses were deliberately indifferent to the sewer back-ups or the
detainees’ lack of water. Because this allegation is no longer present in the amended
complaint, Count I against the nurses (Defendants Marty, Vallery, and Allysia) is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
Plaintiff now alleges that there was a sewer back-up in mid-June 2014, and one
on June 14, 2015. He has also stated a claim against additional defendants. Count I now
states a conditions of confinement claim for exposure to raw sewage and deprivation of
fresh water against Defendants Schmidt, Bost, Hertz, Sellers, Walker, Dover,
McNaughton, Reichart, Beckley, and Hallenbeck for incidents that occurred on an
5

unspecified day in mid-June 2014, on August 16, 2014, on September 6, 2014, on
September 17, 2014, on December 27, 2014, and on June 14, 2015.
Count II of the original complaint stated a claim against Lakin (the Madison
County Sheriff) in his official capacity. The amended complaint makes no mention of
Lakin anywhere in the body/text. Likewise, Plaintiff lists Miller as a Defendant but
includes no allegations against him. Merely invoking the name of a defendant is not
sufficient to state a claim against that individual. Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334
(7th Cir. 1998). Lakin and Miller merit dismissal on this basis.
Additionally, to the extent that Count II was a “Monell” claim, the amended
complaint does not come close to articulating facts which could support such a claim.
Units of local government are responsible only for their policies, not misconduct by
their misbehaving workers. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.
2007), quoting Fairley v. Fermaint, 482 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2007). To maintain a § 1983
claim against a defendant like a county sheriff in his official capacity — in essence, to
maintain a claim against the county itself—a plaintiff must demonstrate that an official
policy or custom of the county was the cause of his constitutional injury. Holmes v.
Sheahan, 930 F.2d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1991), citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). So, in the case at bar, Plaintiff must establish
that his constitutional violations were caused by a policy or custom of the jail (not just
the actions of the sheriff or other county employees). See Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617,
638 (7th Cir. 2014).
6

A plaintiff can hold a municipality liable under § 1983 by showing deliberate
action that is attributable to the municipality itself in one of three ways: (1) an express
municipal policy; (2) a widespread though unwritten custom or practice; or (3) a
decision by a municipal agent with final policymaking authority. Milestone v. City on
Monroe, Wisconsin, 665 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2011). In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged
that any of the named individual Defendants were acting pursuant to an official policy
or a widespread practice or custom. Therefore, Count II must be dismissed at this time,
as there are no facts to support such a claim against Defendant Lakin in the amended
complaint. Defendants Lakin and Miller are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint also alleges that there was mold in the cell block
and that Defendant Reichart knew about it and refused to clean it. The existence of
toxic mold could be the basis of a viable conditions of confinement claim. At the
pleading stage, nothing more is required. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant
Reichart for the mold in the cell block will proceed as the new Count II.
Plaintiff now alleges that the toilet in his cell did not work for a ten-day period
between July 4, 2015 and July 14, 2015. He alleges that Defendants Beckley, Hallenbeck,
Schmidt, Hill, Bost, and Dover were deliberately indifferent to this condition. Facilities
to wash and use the toilet are among the “minimal civilized measures of life’s
necessities.” Jaros v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012),
citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Deprivation of access to the toilet
states a claim at this stage in the proceeding. Count III will be permitted to proceed.
7

2.

Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and
unusual punishments” if they display deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious
medical needs. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2005), quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A prisoner is entitled to reasonable measures to meet a
substantial risk of serious harm — not to demand specific care. Forbes v. Edgar, 112
F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
To prevail, a prisoner who brings an Eighth Amendment challenge of
constitutionally-deficient medical care must satisfy a two-part test. Arnett v. Webster,
658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011). The first prong that must be satisfied is whether the
prisoner has shown he has an objectively serious medical need. Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750.
Accord Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be
serious; rather, it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d
610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). Accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (violating
the Eighth Amendment requires “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm.”) (internal quotation marks omitted; emph. added).

Only if the

objective prong is satisfied is it necessary to analyze the subjective prong, which focuses
on whether a defendant’s state of mind was sufficiently culpable. Greeno, 414 F.3d at
652–53.

8

Plaintiff’s amended complaint presents a claim against Defendants Marty,
Vallery, and Allysia, 2 or more accurately, two of the three, for deliberate indifference.
The allegations supporting this claim are quite thin, but they pass muster at the
pleading stage. Plaintiff could potentially develop facts that show that his diarrhea was
a serious medical condition, and the failure to provide medication or refer plaintiff to
the doctor constituted deliberate indifference on the part of the nurses. Plaintiff shall
file a notice of voluntary dismissal when he identifies through discovery which two
nurses he saw on December 29, 2014.
As to Defendant Dr. Blankenship, the only allegation as to him is that he “is in
charge.” As noted above, there is no respondeat superior liability in § 1983. Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

Plaintiff cannot proceed against

Blankenship on this basis. Defendant Blankenship is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Plaintiff also now alleges that the nurses “acted in a very unprofessional manner,
laughing and humiliating Plaintiff and other detainees if this was some kind of joking
matter.” Unprofessional conduct is not a claim on which relief can be granted. See, e.g.,
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1375 (7th Cir. 1997); Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 602
(7th Cir. 1992).

Plaintiff does not state a claim against any of the nurses on these

grounds. But, as explained above, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims for medical

Plaintiff’s amended complaint corrects the spelling of the three
nurses’ names to “Martha Major,” Allysia Rushing,” and “Valleri Bassets.”
9
2

treatment rendered on December 29, 2014 against Marty, Vallery, and Allysia will
proceed as Count IV at this time.
3.

Other Defendants

Other than the Defendants discussed above, Plaintiff also discusses Hill, Court,
Coleman, and Hare in the body of his complaint but does not list those individuals as
defendants in the caption. As previously noted in the threshold order, the Court cannot
treat individuals as defendants where they are not listed in the caption of the case. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 10 (title of complaint must “name all the parties”); Myles v. United
States, 416 F.3d

551, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that an individual must be

“specified in the caption” to be considered a party under Rule 10). Therefore, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has stated no claims against these individuals.
D.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to file an amended complaint (Doc. 56).
The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to file the amended complaint. The amended
complaint will proceed on four claims/counts:
Count I: a conditions of confinement claim for exposure to raw sewage and
deprivation of fresh water against Defendants Schmidt, Bost, Hertz, Sellers,
Walker, Dover, McNaughton, Reichart, Beckley, and Hallenbeck for incidents
that occurred on an unspecified day in mid-June 2014, August 16, 2014,
September 6, 2014, September 17, 2014, December 27, 2014, and June 14, 2015;
Count II: a conditions of confinement claim regarding mold in the cellblock
against Defendant Reichart;
Count III: a conditions of confinement claim regarding the plumbing issues in
Plaintiff’s individual cell from July 4 to July 14, 2015 against Defendants Beckley,
Hallenbeck, Schmidt, Hill, Bost, and Dover; and
10

Count IV: a deliberate indifference claim to serious medical needs against
Defendants Marty, Allysia, and Vallery.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to correct the misspellings on the docket and
change the following Defendants’ names -- “Marty” to “Martha Major,” “Allysia” to
“Allysia Rushing,” and “Vallery” to “Valleri Bassets.”
Plaintiff’s original claim against Marty, Allysia, and Vallery for deliberate
indifference to the sewer breakdowns and the lack of fresh water is DISMISSED
without prejudice. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Lakin in his official capacity is
also DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Miller is
DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Blankenship is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants “Tom Schmidt,” “Tim Walker”
“Blake Sellers,” “Robert Hallenbeck,” “Drew Beckley,” and “Craig Reichart”: (1) Form 5
(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy
of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver
of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms
were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that
Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal
service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
11

With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address
provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current
work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information
shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting
service.

Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk.

Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants Bost, Dover, Lakin, and McNaughton have filed a motion to dismiss
as their responsive pleading (Doc. 43). As the Court has granted Plaintiff’s motion to
amend the complaint, that motion is now MOOT. Defendant Hertz filed his own
motion to dismiss (Doc. 46), which is also now MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 8, 2016.
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Michael J. Reagan
United States District Judge

12