Owens v. Younker et al

Filing 11

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for non-compliance with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file his amended complaint on or before May 26, 2015. Should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint within the allotted time, dismissal will become with prejudice. (Amended Pleadings due by 5/26/2015). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 4/20/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RANDELL L. OWENS, #K89586,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
BOBBI JO YOUNKER, JOEY HARRIS, )
JOE L. PETROKOVICH, FRED UFERT, )
OTTIS STEWARD, BRUCE RAUNER,
)
LISA MADIGAN, LEO P. SCHMITZ,
)
CASEY CARPENTER, JOHN LAKIN,
)
THOMAS B. GIBBONS, ERIC HOLDER, )
and ALAN J. DUNSTAN,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 15-cv-00299-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Randell L. Owens, who is currently confined at Taylorville Correctional Center
(“Taylorville”) for failing to register as a violent sex offender, brings this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review. As explained
in greater detail below, Plaintiff’s complaint violates the pleading requirements of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, the complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice
and with leave to amend.
The Complaint
The allegations in the complaint are rambling and far from clear. From what the Court
can discern, Plaintiff failed to timely register as a sex offender in Wood County, Illinois,
allegedly through no fault of his own (Doc. 1, p. 5). He was arrested for unlawful failure to
register on February 4, 2013, and detained at the Madison County Jail until March 18, 2013.

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Plaintiff was subsequently convicted for the offense. He is currently serving a four year term of
confinement at Taylorville (Doc. 1, p. 2).
Although it is far from clear, the complaint seems to broadly challenge the
constitutionality of the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”), 735 ILCS 150/1,
et seq., and its federal counterpart, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2251, et seq. More specifically, Plaintiff challenges its implementation
and enforcement in Wood County, Illinois, among other jurisdictions. He alleges that the Wood
County sex offender registry was operated in a manner that created barriers to his timely
registration. The complaint identifies three barriers: (1) the registration office was only open for
a period of twelve hours on Fridays (Doc. 1, p. 11); (2) Plaintiff may (or may not) have been
required to produce proof of his residency through a third party (Doc. 1, p. 7); and Officer Bobbi
Jo Younker delayed Plaintiff’s registration for reasons not stated in the complaint (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Plaintiff now sues the United States Department of Justice, the State of Illinois, and the
above-listed thirteen defendants for numerous violations of state and federal law. The claims in
the complaint include, but are not limited to, entrapment, false arrest, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, aggravated harassment, constructive fraud, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, willful neglect, emotional distress, alienation of affection, cruel and unusual
punishment, invidious discrimination, denial of due process, denial of equal protection,
violations of Illinois SORA, and violations of Sex Offender Apprehension Grants under
42 U.S.C. § 3997(ee), 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (g, 5-2), 42 U.S.C. § 9511, etc. He also brings claims
under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 1, p. 12).
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, including $10 million in punitive damages (Doc. 1, p. 15).

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Legal Standard
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to provide “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and also “a demand
for the relief sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). Additionally, Rule 8(d) requires that each allegation
within the complaint “must be simple, concise, and direct.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1).

The allegations in the complaint must “actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by
providing

allegations

that

raise

a

right

to

relief

above

a

speculative

level.”

Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). At the same
time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed.
See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Discussion
Plaintiff’s complaint is by no means a model of clarity. In fact, the allegations stray far
afield of the pleading standards set forth in Rule 8(a). The purpose of this rule is to ensure that
the defendants have “fair notice of the claims against them and the grounds supporting those
claims.”

See Lawrence v. Secretary of State, 467 Fed. Appx. 523, 524 (7th Cir. 2012)

(citing Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2011)). As it is written, this Court and the
defendants have no way to assess Plaintiff’s complaint or to determine whether the pleading
states any legitimate claims.
The complaint offers neither a short nor a plain statement of Plaintiff’s claims, as
required by Rule 8. With regard to its length, the complaint is divided into nine counts against
more than thirteen defendants. Standing alone, the number of counts and length of the complaint
do not justify dismissal under Rule 8(a). Nygren, 658 F.3d at 797 (“[U]ndue length alone
ordinarily does not justify the dismissal of an otherwise valid complaint.”); Davis v. Ruby Foods,

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Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001) ([D]ismissal is inappropriate “merely because of the
presence of superfluous matter.”). To be clear, the Court is not dismissing the complaint on the
basis of its length.
Other problems abound. For example, the allegations are virtually incomprehensible.
Rather than offering basic factual allegations in support of clearly identified claims, the
complaint offers incoherent factual allegations buried amidst long lists of legal claims (some of
which appear to be contrived and others of which are not cognizable under Section 1983).
By way of example, the allegations offered in support of “Count VIIII” (sic) are below:
That Defendant’s have caused upon this Plaintiff et al. . . . , V/A ‘citations’ set
forth in Count VIII above in a uniform concerted and co-complicit manner
regarding Breach of Contract and fiduciary trust set forth in 42 USC § 3797 (ee) –
3996(ss) – 3796(g5) – 2 and 42 USC § 9511, together with corresponding State
and Federal S.O.R.A. Title I of July 2006, Act P.L. 109-248. . . . , by its lack of
oversight, enforcement, due diligence with respect of audit, collection, and its
deliberate indifference, and total disregard that had said ‘mandated state and local
monitoring of funding, Registrations etc. etc. etc. been in compliance, the
egregious conspiratorial defects, unilatterally engaged in by Wood River Police
Dep’t, the Illinois State Police, specific custodial defendant agents in captioned
matter above of Plaintiff-Defendants, and the Office of the U.S. Attorney General
ex rel. Eric Holder, that caused the false arrest, subject of detainer, arrest, subject
or prosecution, loss of liberty, alienation of affection, malicious prosecution, cruel
and unusual punishment, violation of due process, equal protection, and
aggravated harassment, physical, metal, emotional stress, that through both U.S.
and State Attorney Generals direct notorious lack of uniformity in oversight, and
enforcement of both funding, management, distribution of “mandated” funds with
deliberate indifference to both Plaintiff and those protected persons it’s direct
malfeasance of office by Defendants and a collateral attack on the entire sex
offender registration acts of both Federal and State enactments, that likewise
violates Seperation of Powers. When in fact, the “provider” of Funding – is also
the Prosecutor of Violations of the SORA, regarding activity surrounding purpose
of statute, that in fact violates implicitly and explicitly constructively,
extrinsically and collaterally the Single Subject Rule of enactment of entire
SORA 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. and its Federal counterparts Title I P.L. 109-248
(HR 4472) July 27, 2006, 120 Stat 587. 42 USC § 16901 et seq and 18 USC §
2250 et seq. . . . That makes “Ripe for Review” and repeal of statutory “shemes”
that is against both U.S. and State Constitutions respectfully – and without
“Review.” This Plaintiff will continue to suffer irreparable harm in a “punitive”

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matter against these characters acting under color of law and against State and
Federally Protected Due Process, Equal Protection and Liberty heretofore.
(Doc. 1, pp. 13-14).

These allegations are not only meandering, but they are also wildly

incoherent. Plaintiff sets forth equally deficient allegations in support of the other eight “counts”
in his complaint.
Based on the absence of coherent allegations offered in support of Plaintiff’s claims, the
Court deems it appropriate to dismiss the complaint.

The Seventh Circuit has held that

“unintelligibility is certainly a legitimate reason” for dismissing a complaint. Nygren, 658 F.3d
at 798.

The instant complaint consists of the same “vague, confusing, and conclusory

articulation” of claims and “general ‘kitchen sink’ approach to pleading the case” that resulted in
the dismissal of the second amended complaint at issue in Nygren. 658 F.3d at 798.
Further, despite naming thirteen defendants in the case caption, the allegations rarely
identify any particular defendant in connection with specific conduct. Instead, Plaintiff lists
multiple legal claims in connection with different groups of defendants. This style of pleading
does not provide sufficient notice of the claims against each defendant. Plaintiff must indicate
who specifically did what to violate his rights. Without a clear statement of the facts giving rise
to Plaintiff’s claims against each defendant, the Court cannot analyze whether any particular
defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional or other rights.

Further, the defendants cannot

answer or defend against the claims.
In addition, the grammatical and syntactical errors in the pleading are too numerous to
add or address with specificity. The best example of them is set forth above in the direct quote
taken from “Count VIIII.”

Standing alone, these errors provide insufficient grounds for

dismissing the complaint. However, when considered in the context of the numerous other

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deficiencies, the grammatical and syntactical errors simply provide one more reason why
Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed.
Under the circumstances, the complaint shall be dismissed for failure to comply with
Rule 8(a). Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If a complaint’s length
and lack of clarity make it unintelligible, dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) is permitted.”);
Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch. Serv., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir. 1994). However, the
dismissal shall be without prejudice, and Plaintiff shall be granted leave to file an amended
complaint to address the many deficiencies discussed herein.
First Amended Complaint
Should Plaintiff wish to further pursue his claims in this action, he is INSTRUCTED to
file an amended complaint with this Court within 35 days of the date of this order (on or before
May 26, 2015). Failure to follow the Court’s instructions for doing so will result in dismissal of
this action with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Section 1915A and/or for failure to
comply with an order of this Court. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
When filing his amended pleading, Plaintiff should label the pleading “First Amended
Complaint.” He should also use this case number. He should indicate whether he is bringing the
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or some other law. Plaintiff should be careful to include
sufficient facts to demonstrate that each defendant listed in the complaint violated his rights—
constitutional or otherwise. And he should refer to the constitutional or statutory ground(s) for
relief. The amended complaint must include a coherent statement of the facts supporting each
claim, in chronological order if at all possible. Plaintiff should avoid extraneous information,
references to unsupported causes of action, long lists of undeveloped legal claims, and large
exhibits.

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Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion for service of process at government expense (Doc. 4) is hereby
DENIED as MOOT. It was not necessary for Plaintiff to file this motion. If his amended
complaint survives Section 1915A review against any defendant, the Court will order service of
process on that defendant.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without
prejudice for non-compliance with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff is
GRANTED leave to file his amended complaint on or before May 26, 2015. Should Plaintiff
fail to file an amended complaint within the allotted time, dismissal will become with prejudice.
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997);
Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994). Further, a “strike” may be assessed. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Should Plaintiff decide to file an amended complaint, it is strongly recommended that he
use the forms designed for use in this District for such actions. The amended complaint shall
present each claim in a separate count, and each count shall specify, by name, each defendant
alleged to be liable under the count, as well as the actions alleged to have been taken by that
Defendant. Plaintiff should attempt to include the facts of his case in chronological order,
inserting Defendants’ names where necessary to identify the actors. Plaintiff should refrain from
filing unnecessary exhibits. Plaintiff should include only related claims in his new complaint.
Claims found to be unrelated will be severed into new cases, new case numbers will be assigned,
and additional filing fees will be assessed. To enable Plaintiff to comply with this order, the
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.

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Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall not count as one of his allotted “strikes”
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the
original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n. 1
(7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original complaint.
Thus, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any previous
pleading, and Plaintiff must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the
First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint is also subject to review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was
incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable,
regardless of whether Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1);
Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 20, 2015
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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