Vargas v. Illinois Department of Corrections et al
Filing
58
ORDER GRANTING 47 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Harold W Schuler. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Schuler are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Defendant Schuler as a party to this action. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 8/3/2017. (mlp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JUAN VARGAS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHARLES CONRAD and HAROLD W.
SCHULER,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:15-CV-303-NJR-DGW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Harold W. Schuler’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 47). For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Juan Vargas, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), brings this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his
constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Big Muddy River
Correctional Center (“Big Muddy”). Specifically, Vargas asserts he was sexually
assaulted by Defendant Charles Conrad, a prison official supervising the dietary
department. After he reported the assault, Vargas alleges, Defendant Lt. Harold Schuler
attempted to cover it up. Vargas’s complaint was screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A,
and he was allowed to proceed on the following claims:
Count 1:
Defendant Conrad sexually assaulted Plaintiff in violation of the
Eighth Amendment;
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Count 2:
Defendant Schuler was deliberately indifferent when he covered up
Conrad’s assault on Plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
and
Count 3:
Defendant Schuler retaliated against Plaintiff for reporting Conrad’s
sexual assault in violation of the First Amendment.
Defendant Schuler filed a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law on
November 21, 2016 (Doc. 47). Along with his motion for summary judgment, Defendant
Schuler filed a Notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 informing Vargas
of the contents of Rule 56 and notifying him of the perils of failing to respond within the
proper thirty-day timeframe (Doc. 49). Defendant’s Notice specifically advised Vargas
that his failure to file a response by the deadline may, in the Court’s discretion, be
considered an admission of the merits of the motion pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c) (Id.).
Despite receiving adequate notice, Vargas failed to file a response. The Court deems
Vargas’s failure to respond to be an admission as to the merits of Defendant Schuler’s
motion. See SDIL-LR 7.1(c).
BACKGROUND
In light of Vargas’s failure to file a response to Defendant Schuler’s motion, the
following pertinent facts are not in dispute. The Court construes these facts and the
inferences drawn from them in favor of the non-movant to determine whether summary
judgment is appropriate in this case. Smith on Behalf of Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426
(7th Cir. 1997); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
Vargas’s claims in this matter concern incidents that occurred while he was
incarcerated at Big Muddy. Vargas worked in the dietary department at Big Muddy
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during a period of time in 2013 and then again from February 2014 to April 2014 (Juan
Vargas Deposition, Doc. 48-1, pp. 4, 7). During this time, Vargas asserts he was sexually
assaulted by his supervisor, Defendant Charles Conrad, who touched and caressed his
genital area on a number of occasions (Id. at p. 8). Defendant Conrad resigned from his
position at Big Muddy in May 2014 (Doc. 48-2).
On July 24, 2014, Vargas called the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) hotline
and advised the operator of the issues he was having with Conrad (Doc. 48-1, p. 11). On
July 25, 2014, Vargas was interviewed by Defendant Schuler, a lieutenant serving in the
Investigations Unit at Big Muddy, regarding Vargas’s PREA call (Id.; Affidavit of Harold
Schuler, Doc. 48-2, ¶ 11; see Doc. 48-2, pp. 9-11). Vargas explained to Defendant Schuler
that Conrad had sexually assaulted him, but indicated he could not provide specific
dates or names of any witnesses to corroborate his allegations (Doc. 48-1, pp. 15-16).
Vargas testified that he requested an interpreter, but no interpreter was provided (Id. at
pp. 11, 17). Defendant Schuler indicates that although there was no interpreter at this
interview, he could understand Vargas’s claims against Conrad (Doc. 48-2, ¶ 13). Upon
completion of the interview, Defendant Schuler escorted Vargas to Mental Health
Services (Doc. 48-1, p. 18; Doc. 48-2, ¶ 16).
Following his interview of Vargas, Defendant Schuler interviewed two
correctional food supervisors whom Vargas said he told about the sexual assaults;
however, these individuals did not recall Vargas making any such reports (Doc. 48-2, ¶
17). Schuler was unable to interview Conrad since he had retired (following another
sexual assault investigation conducted by Schuler that led to various charges, including
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Custodial Sexual Misconduct) (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 9-10). As a result, Defendant Schuler was
unable to substantiate Vargas’s allegations during the course of his investigation.
Soon thereafter, on or about August 10, 2014, Vargas called the PREA hotline
again (Doc. 48-1, p. 19). During this call Vargas did not report any sexual assault; rather,
Vargas asked to see a psychologist (Id. at p. 11). Following this call, on August 11, 2014,
Defendant Schuler referred Vargas to the Mental Health Unit (Doc. 48-2, ¶ 21).
Defendant Schuler also issued Vargas a disciplinary ticket charging him with “310
Abuse of Privileges” for his inappropriate use of the PREA hotline (Doc. 48-1, pp. 11).
Notably, the PREA hotline is not intended to address previously reported PREA
incidents or requests for mental health services, as Big Muddy has separate internal
procedures for such requests (Doc. 48-2, ¶ 23). The August 13, 2014 disciplinary ticket
was heard by the Adjustment Committee on August 18, 2014. Vargas was found guilty
of abuse of privileges and disciplined with three months of “C Grade,” three months’
commissary restriction, and three months’ gym/yard restriction (Doc. 48-1, p. 20; see
Doc. 48-2, pp. 12-16).
On August 28, 2014, Vargas obtained approval from a correctional officer and
went to the Big Muddy gym (Doc. 48-1, p. 22). Soon thereafter, Defendant Schuler saw
Vargas and issued a ticket for “307 Unauthorized Movement” and “310 Abuse of
Privileges” (Doc. 48-1, p. 22; Doc. 48-2, ¶ 32). Defendant Schuler issued this ticket as he
was never told by any Big Muddy employee that Vargas had been given permission to
be in the gym (despite his C Grade status related to the August 13, 2014 ticket) or that
Vargas had not received the discipline summary informing him of his C Grade status
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and gym restriction (Doc. 48-2, ¶ 33). The August 28, 2014 disciplinary ticket was later
expunged because Vargas had not yet received his final discipline summary related to
his August 13, 2014 ticket at the time the subsequent ticket was issued (Id. at ¶ 34; see
Doc. 48-2, pp. 30-31).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate “that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986); see also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603,
607 (7th Cir. 2005); Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc., v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc.,
409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that
no material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue
must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160
(1970); see also Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004).
A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the non-moving
party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with
respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “[A] complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has stated that
summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must
show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of
events.” Steen v. Myers et. al, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau
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Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted)).
DISCUSSION
Defendant Schuler asserts he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because he
was not deliberately indifferent to a known risk of harm to Vargas and he did not issue
any disciplinary reports in retaliation for Vargas reporting the alleged sexual assault.
A.
Count Two – Deliberate Indifference in Covering up the Alleged Assault
It is well settled that although the Constitution does not mandate comfortable
prisons, it does not permit inhumane ones. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quotation omitted)). As such, the
Seventh Circuit holds that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions
under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
(citation omitted). In order to prevail on such a claim, two requirements must be met. Id.
“First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official’s
act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Id. (citations omitted). Second, a prison official “must have a sufficiently
culpable state of mind,” mainly “deliberate indifference.” Id.
Here, Vargas alleges that Defendant Schuler failed to adequately investigate his
complaints against Conrad and issued him disciplinary tickets instead—effectively
“covering up” Vargas’s allegations. At his deposition, Vargas testified he believed
Defendant Schuler was covering up for Conrad only because Vargas asked Defendant
Schuler for help, but did not receive it (Doc. 48-1, p. 19). Significantly, however, by the
time Vargas called the PREA hotline, Conrad was no longer employed at Big Muddy.
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Accordingly, Defendant Schuler was not in a position to ameliorate or redress the
alleged constitutional violation. Furthermore, there is evidence in the record that Schuler
did investigate the allegations, but found no corroboration. And, after Defendant
Schuler interviewed Vargas about the alleged assault, he escorted Vargas to Mental
Health Services. Even construing these undisputed facts in favor of the non-movant,
Vargas has failed to demonstrate how Defendant Schuler was deliberately indifferent to
the deprivation of any constitutional right. Accordingly, Defendant Schuler is entitled to
summary judgment on Count Two.
B.
Count Three – Retaliation
Defendant Schuler also seeks summary judgment on Count Three of Vargas’s
complaint, which alleges that Defendant Schuler retaliated against Vargas for reporting
Conrad’s sexual assault, in violation of the First Amendment.
A prison official who takes action in retaliation for a prisoner’s exercise of a
constitutional right violates the Constitution. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir.
2000). The Seventh Circuit has articulated that for a plaintiff to prevail on a First
Amendment retaliation claim, he must show: (1) he engaged in activity protected by the
First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First
Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was “at least a
motivating factor” in the defendant’s decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v.
Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th
Cir. 2008)) (other citations omitted).
At the summary judgment stage, the Seventh Circuit has held that the burden of
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proving causation is split between the parties. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 965 (7th
Cir. 2012). Initially, in order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must produce
evidence that his speech was at least a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to
take retaliatory action. Id. Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the causal
inference raised by the plaintiff’s evidence. Id.
Defendant Schuler asserts that Vargas’s retaliation claim must fail because the
evidence does not support a finding that Vargas suffered a deprivation likely to deter
First Amendment activity or that Vargas’s First Amendment activity was a “motivating
factor” in Schuler’s decision to issue the August 2014 disciplinary tickets. The Court
finds Defendant Schuler’s latter argument most compelling.
In order to establish a prima facie case at this stage, the evidence must be sufficient
to show that Vargas’s complaints about Defendant Conrad motivated Defendant
Schuler’s writing of the August 2014 disciplinary tickets. Vargas may meet his burden by
presenting either direct or circumstantial evidence. Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 965. Direct
evidence is evidence which will prove a particular fact without reliance upon inference
or presumption, while circumstantial evidence is evidence from which a trier of fact may
infer that retaliation occurred, including suspicious timing or ambiguous oral or written
statements. Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Here, the only evidence in the record to support Vargas’s prima facie case is
circumstantial and based solely on the timing of events and Vargas’s own claims. The
Seventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff’s reliance on suspicious timing to establish a
prima facie retaliation claim will “rarely be sufficient in and of itself to create a triable
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issue.” Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citations omitted). Moreover, “mere speculation or conjecture will not defeat a
summary judgment motion.” Rockwell Automation, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, PA, 544 F.3d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 2008).
The record is simply devoid of sufficient evidence to establish that Defendant
Schuler had a retaliatory animus in issuing the relevant disciplinary reports. Defendant
Schuler has provided undisputed evidence that he issued the disciplinary reports
because Vargas improperly used the PREA hotline and because Vargas was in an area in
which he was not permitted to be. Thus, the Court finds that Defendant Schuler’s actions
were not motivated by retaliation. See Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584, 588 (7th Cir.
2013); see also Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008). Defendant Schuler is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count Three.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Harold W. Schuler’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 47) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Schuler are
DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Defendant
Schuler as a party to this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 3, 2017
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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