Hill v. Unknown Party

Filing 4

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 4/22/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAMAL HILL, #M27660,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNKNOWN PARTY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:15-cv-00345-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jamal Hill is currently incarcerated at the Shawnee Correctional Center in
Vienna, Illinois. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Proceeding pro se, Hill has filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, who the Court has dubbed an
Unknown Party in the caption because Hill does not yet know his name. (Id.) Hill claims that
the Chairman failed to provide him with a fair parole revocation hearing prior to the revocation
of eight months of good time, as Hill was not permitted to “present documentary evidence” or
“get witness testimony” at the hearing. (Id. at 7.) Hill further alleges that the revocation of his
parole has exposed Hill to “discriminatory policies” and unsanitary conditions at Shawnee. (Id.
at 7-8.) Hill seeks only monetary damages – specifically “compensatory damages in the amount
of $100,000” and “punitive damages in the amount of $50,000.” (Id. at 9.)
This matter is now before the Court for a preliminary review of Hill’s complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court shall review a “complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
government entity.” During this preliminary review under § 1915A, the court “shall identify

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cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if the complaint “is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or if it “seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
It is unclear whether Hill is bringing a claim against the Chairman in his official or
individual capacity. The gist of Hill’s complaint is that the Chairman deprived Hill of a fair
revocation hearing when the Chairman did not allow Hill to present evidence at the hearing, and
Hill seeks monetary damages, including punitive damages, against the Chairman for that
conduct. (Doc. 1 at 7-9.) While Hill vaguely references discriminatory prison policies in his
complaint, he only alleges incidental exposure to those policies due to the failure of the
Chairman to provide him with a fair parole hearing, which contributed to Hill’s re-incarceration.
Moreover, Hill does not suggest that the Chairman carried out those prison policies, and he does
not seek any injunctive relief. Given Hill’s allegations and his request for punitive damages, the
Court will construe Hill’s claim as one against the Chairman in his individual capacity. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the plaintiff alleges tortious
conduct of an individual acting under color of state law, the defendant has been sued in her
individual capacity.”); Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that a
“request for punitive damages suggests an intent to sue the officers in their individual
capacities”); Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1373 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling that a suit for
punitive damages that focused on a defendant’s actions should be classified as an individual suit,
as there was no policy identified by the plaintiff that was “carried out by” the defendant).
Hill’s individual capacity claim against the Chairman for damages must be dismissed on
absolute immunity grounds. Prisoner review board members enjoy absolute immunity from
damages suits concerning decisions “to grant, deny, or revoke parole.” Walrath v. United States,
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35 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 1994). Moreover, board members are entitled to absolute immunity
for activities that are “inexorably connected with the execution of parole revocation procedures
and are analogous to judicial action,” Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177, 1182 (7th Cir. 1984),
meaning that “not only the actual decision to revoke parole” is protected by immunity, but also
those activities by board members “that are part and parcel of the decision process,” Thompson v.
Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 1989). The activities Hill targets in this case – namely the
Chairman’s decision to stop Hill from presenting documentary evidence or offering witness
testimony – fall squarely within the types of activities safeguarded by absolute immunity. See
Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1445 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he board members merit absolute
immunity for their failure to provide [the prisoner] with an opportunity to present evidence and
witnesses.”). Due to the Chairman’s absolute immunity, Hill’s individual capacity claim against
the Chairman is dismissed with prejudice. See Koorsen v. Dolehanty, 401 F. App’x 119, 120
(7th Cir. 2010) (dismissal on absolute immunity grounds is “with prejudice”).
One closing note is in order concerning some wandering allegations in Hill’s complaint
regarding the conditions at Shawnee. Hill alleges that, due to the Chairman’s decision to revoke
his parole, he “is being subjected to discriminatory policies, practices, and rules” at Shawnee
“with the intentions and purposes of treating black prisoners different than white prisoners.”
(Doc. 1 at 7.) He also states that he is being subjected to “backed up sewer drains in living
areas” and is being “denied basic cleaning tools and supplies from officials to sanitize his living
quarters.” (Id. at 8.) Hill only names the Chairman in his complaint, and the only link he alleges
between the Chairman and these policies and conditions is that the Chairman did not allow Hill
to present evidence or witnesses at his revocation hearing, which led to his current confinement.
(See id. at 7.) As the Court explained above, the Chairman is immune from suit for parole
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revocation decisions. Concerning other parties who might be involved in these prison-related
allegations, Hill does not name any other officials at Shawnee in his complaint. While Hill
cannot amend his complaint in this case to bring an action against Shawnee officials concerning
the policies or conditions at the prison,1 the dismissal of this suit against the Chairman does not
preclude Hill from bringing a separate action against officials at Shawnee concerning prison
policies or conditions. The Court expresses no view as to the merits of such a suit.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint is
DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This
dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 2) is
DENIED as moot in light of the Court’s instant order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the CLERK is directed to close this case.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred
at the time the action was filed; thus, the full filing fee remains due and payable. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1998). Payment will be collected
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that, if he wishes to appeal the dismissal of this case, he
may file a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R.
1

While plaintiffs may bring multiple claims against a single party in one suit, plaintiffs may not
bring unrelated claims against different defendants in the same suit: those unrelated claims
“belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass that [multiple claim, multiple
defendant suits] produce[], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees.” George
v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Here, any claim against prison officials linked to
policies or conditions at Shawnee would be unrelated to the instant claim against the Chairman
concerning the Chairman’s conduct at Hill’s revocation hearing. See id. (“[C]laim A against
Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.”).
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APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues
Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to
appeal, he will be liable for the appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See
FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th
Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d
464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, Plaintiff may
also incur another “strike.” A timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 22, 2015
s/J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Judge

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