Cotton v. Walters et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, The Court GRANTS Walter's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33 ) and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 2/27/2017. (jdh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LEONARD C. COTTON, SR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WALTERS,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:15-cv-364-JPG-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
defendant Correctional Officer Walters,1 on November 16, 2016 (Doc. 33). For the reasons set
forth below, the Motion is GRANTED.
INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 2015, plaintiff Leonard C. Cotton, Sr., filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
alleging that his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee
at the St. Clair County Jail (Doc. 1). Cotton alleged that Walter, a correctional officer, used
excessive force when he trapped Cotton’s arm and wrist in the bars of his cell door causing pain
and injury.2 Walter timely filed a motion for summary judgment along with a notice pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 informing Cotton of the contents of Rule 56 and his obligation
to file a response by the deadline. Cotton failed to file a response by the December 1, 2016,

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The defendant’s full and proper name is Eric Walter.

Cotton made other allegations related to the conditions of his confinement. Those claims were
severed from this suit and are currently proceeding in a separate suit, Cotton v. Watson,
3:15-cv-477-JPG-DGW (Doc. 7).
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deadline. The Court deems the failure to file a response to be an admission of the merits of the
motion.
BACKGROUND
The undisputed evidence reveals that on February 5, 2015, Cotton’s arm and wrist (along
with his cellmate, Waddell Savage) were caught in the bars of his cell door while Walter was
operating the system that mechanically opened and closed the cell doors. The incident happened
in the morning when the inmates in Cotton’s cell block were directed to exit their cells in order to
go down to the dayroom in order to collect their breakfast trays. There is no evidence that Walter
intentionally or even recklessly operated the cell door in order to cause injury to Cotton.
On February 5, 2015, Cotton was housed in cell 3 of cellblock H (Doc. 33-2, pp. 20, 21).
Around 6:30 or 6:45 a.m., Walter came through the cell block and told the inmates to go down to
the day room for breakfast as was the routine (Id. at 21-22). At the time, Cotton was asleep and
did not hear Walter (Id. at 22). A short time later, however, Cotton’s cellmate Savage told him
that it was breakfast time. Cotton jumped up, grabbed some hygiene products, and he and Savage
attempted to exit their cell (Id.). Before Savage, who was ahead of him, cleared the door,
however, the door closed and trapped him (Id. at 23). Cotton yelled for the door to be opened and
Walter yelled back that he was trying to open up the doors but that the system is old and it takes
some time (Id. at 24). Walter also told Cotton to try and push the bars in the door back as it might
help it open (Id. at 25). Cotton and Savage attempted to push the bars in order to open the door
(Id.). The bars jerked, causing injury to Cotton’s left arm and then suddenly opened, trapping
Cotton’s right wrist (Id.). Cotton then yelled for the doors to close to release his wrist; 45 seconds
to a minute later the doors closed and he was able to pull his wrist out (Id.). Cotton received
medical care almost immediately thereafter (Id.).
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Cotton believes that Walter may have delayed in opening the doors because he was having
a “bad day” even though he had “always been a good guy” (Id. p. 26). And Cotton has observed
other officers open the doors while they were part-way through the process of closing within
seconds (Id. p. 27). Cotton further believes that Walter’s actions were malicious based on a
“selfish-type of grin on his face, like a really, really smirk like” when he asked Cotton whether he
needed to see a nurse (Id.). Finally, there is some evidence that Cotton and Walter used foul
language during this incident.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);
Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005);
Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th
Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in
genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the
moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); Lawrence v. Kenosha
County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law where the non-moving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element
of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “[A]
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has stated that summary
judgment is “the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it
has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.” Steen v. Myers, 486
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F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859
(7th Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted)).
“The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ on prisoners.” Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837
(7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)). Generally, whether or not
Cotton was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident does not affect the analysis of his
excessive force claim. See Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). However, the
Supreme Court recently set forth a standard for pretrial detainees that is somewhat at odds with
previous Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472
(2015) (discussing the excessive force claim of a pretrial detainee); see Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook
County, 828 F.3d 541, 554 n. 31 (7th Cir. 2016). The Supreme Court held a pretrial detainee
pursuing an excessive force claim brought pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment need “only show that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was
objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. The Court juxtaposed this standard
with that used in Eighth Amendment cases, where liability is premised on force that “was applied
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” – implicating a subjective standard. Id. at 2475
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
This distinction, however, is of minimal importance in this matter because there has been
no showing that Walter’s actions were anything more than negligent. Cotton’s own deposition
testimony reveals that Walter did not intend to harm him (indeed any actions were an attempt to
prevent further harm to another inmate) or that he recklessly caused any harm. Rather, the
evidence only reveals, at the very most, that he was negligent in ensuring that the doorways were
clear before he closed the doors. Id. at 2472 (indicating “as we have stated, liability for
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negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process”
(quotation marks, emphasis, and citation omitted)). That Walter may not have opened the door
with sufficient alacrity or that he may have had a smirk on his face after the incident does not make
his conduct anything more than negligent. There has simply been no showing of any excessive
force and no showing of a constitutional violation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Court GRANTS Walter’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 33) and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 27, 2017
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

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