Willaimson v. S.A. Gear Company, Inc. et al

Filing 116

ORDER DENYING Motion to Strike 35 Amended Complaint and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Nationwide and Multi-State Class Allegations (Doc. 42 ). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 1/23/2017. (mah).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STEVE WILLIAMSON and
RHONDA CHRISTINE LEMASTER, On
Behalf of Themselves and All Others
Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
S.A. GEAR COMPANY, INC.,
AUTOZONE, INC.,
AUTOZONE PARTS, INC., and
AUTOZONE STORES, INC.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-CV-365-SMY-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Steve Williamson and Rhonda Christine LeMaster (“Plaintiffs”), filed this
proposed class action against Defendants S.A. Gear Company, Inc., Autozone, Inc., Autozone
Parts, Inc., and Autozone Stores, Inc. (“Defendants”) alleging that Defendants manufactured,
distributed, advertised and/or sold defective timing chain tensioners (“the Part”) (Doc. 35).
Defendants move to dismiss and strike Plaintiffs’ nationwide and multi-state allegations
asserting that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs’ class claims cannot be certified because the claims
would have to be litigated under the different consumer, fraud and warranty laws of 30 states
(Doc. 42). Plaintiffs filed a response (Doc. 51).
Defendants contend that this Court should strike the class allegations related to Plaintiffs’
ICFA and breach of warranty claims because the variety of consumer rights – based on 30
different state consumer protection schemes – are far too numerous to litigate in a single case and

would make this case too complex and unmanageable. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ motion
is premature.
Under FRCP 23(a), class certification is not warranted unless the named plaintiff satisfies
four requirements: (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of
representation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). However, whether a plaintiff has fulfilled Rule 23 class
action requirements is not an appropriate inquiry at the motion to dismiss and/or motion to strike
stage because class determinations generally involve considerations that are enmeshed in the
factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action. See, e.g., Mednick v. Precor,
Inc., 2014 WL 6474915, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Boatwright v. Walgreen Co., 2011 WL
843898, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Howard v. Renal Life Link, Inc., 2010 WL 4483323, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. 2010); Holtzman v. Caplice, 2008 WL 2168762, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (challenge to
numerosity best left for class certification motion); Walker v. County of Cook, 2006 WL
2161829, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (issues regarding commonality and typicality as required under
Rule 23 were prematurely raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
The cases relied upon by Defendants in support of their motion were decided at the class
certification stage, not in consideration of motions to dismiss and/or strike. In re Aqua Dots
Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288
F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 673 (7th Cir.
2001); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Dex–Cool Products Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 305, 308 (S.D. Ill.
2007). Further, as the Seventh Circuit has noted, “choice-of-law issues in nationwide class
actions are rarely so uncomplicated that one can delineate clear winning and losing arguments at
an early stage in litigation.” Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 750 (7th Cir.

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2006). Accordingly, the Court will defer consideration of the impact of variations in state law
until the class-certification stage. Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 23, 2017
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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