Crayton v. Duncan et al

Filing 10

ORDER DISMISSING CASE without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his three allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 11/9/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DATAVIA CRAYTON, # R-56663,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
RANDY STEVENSON,
)
JOHN DOE (Field Services, First Shift)
)
and JANE DOE (Field Services, First Shift), )
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 15-cv-399-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court for review of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc.
9), filed on May 22, 2015. Plaintiff timely filed his pleading in compliance with this Court’s
order dismissing the original complaint and granting him leave to amend (Doc. 8). The Court
concludes, however, that the amended complaint still fails to state a cognizable claim for
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiff is serving a ten-year sentence on a sexual assault conviction, and he is confined
at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”). He was scheduled to be released on parole on
December 24, 2015. But instead of being released, Plaintiff continued to be held in prison
because he did not have an approved parole site that complied with the conditions of his release.
Plaintiff lays the blame for his continued imprisonment on Defendants, who failed to obtain a
suitable parole location for him and disapproved the site applied for by Plaintiff. According to
the

website

of

the

Illinois

Department

of

Page 1 of 6

Corrections,

Inmate

Search

page,

http://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/Pages/InmateSearch.aspx (Last visited Nov. 6, 2015),
Plaintiff is still in custody at Lawrence.
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint includes some additional facts and asserts claims
against Defendant Randy Stevenson (the Field Services Supervisor) and two Unknown
Defendants (John Doe and Jane Doe) who are Field Services employees. Plaintiff contacted Field
Services six months before his projected parole date to request that they find him a halfway
house for his post-release residence (Doc. 9, pp. 6, 9). He was told that Field Services would put
in a request for his placement closer to his release date. Plaintiff made several follow-up
inquiries that generated similar responses. One reply stated that Field Services would not “put
[him] in for a place” until three days prior to his release date. Id.
On December 24, 2015, Plaintiff was told he had no approved parole site, and, as a result,
his parole conditions were violated, and he would remain in prison. Plaintiff himself located a
halfway house (the Oxford House) that would accept him, but Field Services refused to approve
that site. The reason for the disapproval was that the Oxford House had internet access, and one
of Plaintiff’s parole conditions is that he “shall have no access to the internet without the
approval of a parole officer.” Id. He includes a copy of a response to his “Offender Request,”
dated March 12, 2015, which states, “You cannot parole to Oxford House – Waukegan. All their
properties have computer/internet.” (Doc. 9, p. 10). The form is signed “Field Svcs.”
Plaintiff argues that Defendants “failed to look at what [his] stipulations of [his] parole
really are,” and denied his proposed halfway house “without justification.” Id. He states that the
Parole Board member who conducted his last parole revocation hearing could not understand
why Plaintiff’s site was denied. He asserts that Defendants’ actions displayed deliberate
indifference to the fact that Plaintiff would be incarcerated longer than is required. As relief,

Page 2 of 6

Plaintiff asks the Court to “move IDOC to approve [him] to go to the Oxford House in
Waukegan, IL, or find another place for [him] to parole to immediately” (Doc. 9, p. 8)
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Just as with the original complaint, § 1915A requires the Court to review the amended
complaint and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant.
In reviewing the original complaint, the Court identified the following potential claims
that could arise from Plaintiff’s factual scenario:
Count 1 - Defendants subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment
contrary to the Eighth Amendment, by failing to obtain an approved housing site
so he could be released on his expected parole date; and
Count 2 - Defendants deprived Plaintiff of a liberty interest without due process,
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, when they failed to find him an
approved parole site.
(Doc. 8, p. 4). The Eighth Amendment claim (Count 1) was dismissed without prejudice, and it
is this claim that Plaintiff reasserts in the First Amended Complaint. The Fourteenth Amendment
claim (Count 2) was dismissed with prejudice.
Dismissal of Count 1 – First Amended Complaint
As this Court noted in discussing Plaintiff’s original complaint, the Eighth Amendment
encompasses a claim that prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, held an inmate
beyond the term of his incarceration without penological justification. See Armato v. Grounds,
766 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2001)).
The undersigned further observed that the “turnaround practice” which resulted in Plaintiff being
“paroled” on December 24, 2014, only to be immediately returned to prison for lack of an
approved parole site, satisfies the objective portion of an Eighth Amendment claim (See Doc. 8,

Page 3 of 6

pp. 5-6).
The original complaint did not, however, indicate that any Defendant had the required
mental state of deliberate indifference to the risk that Plaintiff’s incarceration would be
improperly extended past his parole date. “Deliberate indifference requires more than
negligence, rather the defendant ‘must meet essentially a criminal recklessness standard, that is,
ignoring a known risk.’ ” Armato, 766 F.3d at 721 (quoting McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 48081 (7th Cir. 2013)) (other internal quotation and citation omitted). Plaintiff’s original complaint
simply alleged that Defendants failed to find him a halfway house to which he could be paroled,
and it did not include any facts to suggest that Defendants ignored the risk that Plaintiff might
not be released from prison when he became eligible for parole.
The First Amended Complaint adds the factual allegations that Defendants knew about
Plaintiff’s proposed halfway house, but rejected that location “without justification.” But the
complaint also sets forth the very reason why Defendants denied approval for the Oxford House–
internet access was available there, and Plaintiff’s parole conditions would be violated if he were
to access the internet without his parole officer’s permission. As discussed in this Court’s
previous order, the IDOC is prohibited from releasing a prisoner from its custody until all
conditions of his/her supervised release are satisfied, including a proper and approved residence.
Despite what Plaintiff may believe, the availability of internet access provides an obvious
“penological justification” for Defendants to deny approval for the Oxford House as Plaintiff’s
parole residence. See Armato, 766 F.3d at 721. This decision does not demonstrate deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s situation.
Other than the specific example of the Oxford House disapproval, Plaintiff provides no
further factual support for a deliberate indifference claim beyond what he offered in the original

Page 4 of 6

complaint. Plaintiff’s remaining factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint include that
he contacted Defendants on several occasions; he was told that they were aware of his need, they
would submit his halfway house request closer to his release date, and they would let him know
when a place became available. There is no indication that Defendants did not do as they said
they would. Whatever efforts Defendants made to find a parole site for Plaintiff did not succeed.
The Court is left to speculate as to whether Defendants made a reasonable attempt to find
Plaintiff a suitable halfway house (which would defeat a deliberate indifference claim) or
deliberately failed to take appropriate steps to do so. Such rank speculation is not enough to state
a viable claim that Defendants purposely or recklessly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
It is unfortunate that no suitable housing has been found for Plaintiff to assist in his return
to society under the conditions imposed by the Prisoner Review Board. Many other inmates
serving sentences for sex offenses have faced, and continue to face, the same situation–as
discussed in Murdock v. Walker, No. 08-C-1142, 2014 WL 916992 (N.D. Ill. March 10, 2014).
The Murdock court opined: “The Plaintiffs are caught in a system that requires the intervention
of the Illinois legislature, not this Court.” Murdock, at *4, *15. This Court shares that concern.
This problem, at least in Plaintiff’s case, however, does not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation.
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim in Count 1 shall be dismissed once more, without
prejudice. Further, the entire action shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, this action is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Page 5 of 6

Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his three allotted “strikes”
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this
action was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due
and payable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, his notice of appeal must be filed with this
Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for leave
to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See
FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00
appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181
F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another “strike.”
A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the
30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than
twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be
extended.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 9, 2015

__________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

Page 6 of 6