Smith v. Illinois Department of Corrections et al

Filing 8

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 5/11/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PRENTISS SMITH, # R-29484,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ILLINOIS DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS,
TY BATES, SUZANN BAILEY,
THOMAS SPILLER, DOCTOR SHAH,
SALVADOR GODINEZ,
and PINCKNEYVILLE
CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-00409-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff

Prentiss

Smith,

an

inmate

who

is

currently

incarcerated

at

Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings this action pro se for alleged violations of his
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff claims that Pinckneyville’s “two-meal-per-day”
policy and the high content of soy in his diet violate his rights under the Eighth Amendment,
Fourteenth Amendment, and ADA. In connection with these claims, Plaintiff sues the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), Salvador Godinez (IDOC director), Ty Bates
(IDOC deputy director), Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”), Thomas Spiller
(Pinckneyville warden), Suzann Bailey (Pinckneyville food services administrator), and
Doctor Shah for monetary damages.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner

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complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to
dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). As discussed in more detail below, the
complaint survives preliminary review under Section 1915A.
The Complaint
Plaintiff brings two sets of claims in his complaint. The first arises from Pinckneyville’s
“two-meal-per-day” policy. The second arises from the soy diet that Plaintiff has received since
2012. Each set of claims is separately addressed below.
“Two-Meal-Per-Day” Policy
According to the complaint, Pinckneyville offers its inmates no breakfast (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Inmates are instead served brunch from 10:00-10:30 a.m. and dinner from 4:00-4:30 p.m. daily.
Plaintiff is required to go without food for up to eighteen hours at a time. As a result, he suffers
from severe stomach pain (including hunger pains), erratic weight fluctuations, and headaches.
Plaintiff maintains that the two meals are nutritionally inadequate. Together, they total
less than 1,800 calories. Plaintiff has two options. He can either wait for his next meal or
supplement his diet with food from the commissary.

However, his access to the prison’s

commissary has been restricted since February 26, 2015, when he was placed in segregation.
Plaintiff alleges that the decision to eliminate breakfast was, in part, punitive.
Pinckneyville is a disciplinary prison, and it is also the only prison within the IDOC that serves
no breakfast. But he also alleges that the policy reflects a conspiracy by “high ranking officials .
. . [to] line their pockets with money” by forcing prisoners to purchase food in the prison’s
commissary (Doc. 1, p. 7).

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In addition to writing his grievance counselor, Plaintiff directed complaints to
Defendants Bailey, Spiller, Bates, and Godinez. No one responded.
Plaintiff now sues Defendants IDOC, Godinez, Bates, Pinckneyville, Spiller, and Bailey
for violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and ADA.
He also brings a conspiracy claim against them.
Soy Diet
Plaintiff also claims that the soy diet he has received since 2012 has caused him to suffer
adverse health consequences (Doc. 1, p. 7). According to the complaint, more than ninety
percent of the IDOC’s prison diet consists of soy products. Plaintiff alleges that diets high in soy
are associated with negative health consequences that include an increased risk of cancer,
diabetes, heart disease, and pancreatic disorders. Plaintiff claims that the soy diet has caused him
to suffer from severe constipation, severe gas, pain and weakness, poor circulation in his
extremities, and depression (Doc. 1, p. 8). Defendant Shah refused to issue Plaintiff a soy-free
diet, in response to his complaints about these symptoms. He instead recommended that Plaintiff
purchase food from the commissary.

Plaintiff’s grievances addressing this issue were not

returned to him.
In connection with the soy diet, Plaintiff now sues Defendants IDOC, Godinez, Bates,
Pinckneyville, Spiller, Bailey, and Shah for violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment.
Based on the allegations, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro se complaint into
the following six claims, which correspond to those set forth above. The parties and the Court
will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a

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judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion
regarding their merit.
Count 1:

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants IDOC, Godinez,
Bates, Pinckneyville, Spiller, and Bailey for deliberate indifference
to Plaintiff’s need for adequate food to meet his nutritional needs;

Count 2:

ADA claim against Defendants IDOC, Godinez, Bates,
Pinckneyville, Spiller, and Bailey for depriving Plaintiff of a
nutritionally adequate diet;

Count 3:

Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants IDOC, Godinez,
Bates, Pinckneyville, Spiller, and Bailey for ignoring Plaintiff’s
grievances regarding the “two-meal-per-day” policy;

Count 4:

Conspiracy claim against Defendants IDOC, Godinez, Bates,
Pinckneyville, Spiller, and Bailey for attempting to “line their
pockets” by adopting and instituting a “two-meal-per-day” policy
at Pinckneyville;

Count 5:

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants IDOC, Godinez,
Bates, Pinckneyville, Spiller, Bailey, and Shah for deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s serious physical symptoms caused by his
adverse reaction to a soy diet; and

Count 6:

Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants IDOC, Godinez,
Bates, Pinckneyville, Spiller, Bailey, and Shah for ignoring
Plaintiff’s grievances regarding his adverse reaction to the soy diet.

Counts 1 and 5 shall receive further review against those defendants who are identified
below in connection with each claim. However, all remaining claims, including Counts 2, 3, 4,
and 6, shall be dismissed.
Discussion
Count 1 – Deliberate Indifference to Nutritional Needs
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and punishment grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,

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428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Prison conditions that deprive inmates of basic human needs – food,
medical care, sanitation, or physical safety – may violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 346; see also James v. Milwaukee Cnty., 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992).
Claims under the Eighth Amendment have both an objective and subjective component.
McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302
(1991). The objective conditions must have resulted in an unquestioned and serious deprivation
of basic human needs or deprived the inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; accord Jamison-Bey v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1048

(7th Cir. 1989); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416 (7th Cir. 1987).
The subjective component of unconstitutional punishment focuses on the state of mind of
the defendant. Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298;
see also McNeil, 16 F.3d at 124.

In conditions of confinement cases, this is deliberate

indifference to inmate health or safety. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994);
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); DelRaine v. Williford,
32 F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1994). The deliberate indifference standard is satisfied if the
plaintiff shows that the prison official acted or failed to act despite the official’s knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm from the conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. A failure of
prison officials to act in such circumstances suggests that the officials actually want the prisoner
to suffer harm. Jackson, 955 F.2d at 22. It is well-settled that mere negligence is not enough.
See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986).
As for the objective component of this claim, the severe stomach pain, erratic weight
fluctuations, and headaches that Plaintiff suffers as a result of the “two-meal-per-day” policy
suggest a deprivation of adequate nutrition that may implicate the Eighth Amendment.

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Turning to the subjective component of his claim, Plaintiff directed complaints about the “twomeal-per-day” policy to the following individuals: Defendants Bailey, Spiller, Bates, and
Godinez. At this early stage of the case, the allegations are sufficient to indicate that these
individuals had knowledge of the harmful effects of the “two-meal-per-day” policy on Plaintiff
and took no steps to address his suffering.

Accordingly, Plaintiff may proceed with his

deliberate indifference claim in Count 1 against Defendants Bailey, Spiller, Bates, and Godinez.
However, Count 1 shall be dismissed without prejudice against all remaining defendants.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus,
“to be liable under [Section] 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated in a
constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005)
(citations omitted). As a result, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to actions
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008).
The complaint does not suggest that any other defendants personally participated in the
deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the claim shall be dismissed against
them for lack of personal involvement in this alleged deprivation, without prejudice. Count 1
shall be dismissed against Defendant Shah without prejudice.
Count 1 shall also be dismissed against Defendants IDOC and Pinckneyville with
prejudice. Plaintiff cannot maintain any claim for money damages against the IDOC, because it
is a state government agency. The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under [Section] 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.
2001) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money damages);
Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (state Department of Corrections

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is immune from suit by virtue of Eleventh Amendment). And because Pinckneyville is a
division of the IDOC, it is also not a “person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, and is
not subject to a Section 1983 suit. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
In summary, Count 1 shall proceed against Defendants Bailey, Spiller, Bates, and
Godinez. However, this claim shall be dismissed against Defendant Shah without prejudice and
against Defendants IDOC and Pinckneyville with prejudice.
Count 2 – ADA
The complaint articulates no viable ADA claim against any of the defendants.
The complaint includes a bare allegation that the “two-meal-per-day” policy violates the ADA.
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability . . . be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “In order to
make out a prima facie case of discrimination under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, 1
29 U.S.C. §§ 794-94e, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he suffers from a disability as defined in the
statutes; (2) that he is qualified to participate in the program in question; and (3) that he was
either excluded from participating in or denied the benefit of that program based on his
disability. Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). The complaint does
not include allegations suggesting that Plaintiff should be considered a disabled individual.
But even if it did, the complaint fails to suggest that any action taken by Defendants was
connected to a disability, let alone constituted discrimination on account of a disability.
Accordingly, the complaint supports no claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, and
Count 2 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
1

A court should analyze a disability-related claim under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
See Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2012); Jaros v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d
667 (7th Cir. 2012).
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be granted.
Counts 3 & 6 – Due Process
The complaint articulates no viable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against
Defendants. It is not clear why the complaint refers to the Fourteenth Amendment, with regard
to the “two-meal-per-day” policy claim or the soy diet claim. To the extent that Counts 3 and 6
arise from Defendants’ failure to respond to Plaintiff’s grievances, however, both claims fail.
Prison grievance procedures are not constitutionally mandated and thus do not implicate
the Due Process Clause per se. As such, the alleged mishandling of grievances “by persons who
otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v.
Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772
n. 3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan,
81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). Put differently, the fact that Defendants may have ignored
Plaintiff’s grievances does not give rise to a due process claim against them, even at this early
stage. Accordingly, Counts 3 and 6 fail and shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 4 - Conspiracy
The complaint fails to articulate a viable conspiracy claim against Defendants for
allegedly implementing the “two-meal-per-day” policy at Pinckneyville in order to make money
by forcing inmates to purchase commissary food. Conspiracy is not an independent basis of
liability in Section 1983 actions. See Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008);
Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 2000). “There is no constitutional
violation in conspiring to cover up an action which does not itself violate the Constitution.”
Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 1996).

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The complaint alleges that the purpose of the “conspiracy” is to force inmates to purchase
food at the commissary. In other words, this scheme, according to Plaintiff, is aimed at taking
prisoners’ money. However, Plaintiff did not allege that his money was taken without due
process of law. Even if the complaint so alleged, there is no cognizable civil rights claim if the
state provides an adequate legal remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984)
(availability of damages remedy in state claims court is an adequate, post-deprivation remedy).
The Seventh Circuit has found that Illinois provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy in an
action for damages in the Illinois Court of Claims. Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 513
(7th Cir. 1999); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1993); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/8 (1995). Because this state remedy is available, Plaintiff cannot maintain a constitutional
claim for any deprivation of his money as a result of the Pinckneyville “two-meal-per-day”
policy. Where there is no underlying constitutional claim for this “deprivation,” there is likewise
no viable civil rights claim for a “conspiracy” to deprive inmates of their funds.
For these reasons, Count 4 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 5 – Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Adverse Reaction to Soy Foods
As discussed in relation to Count 1 above, an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim has both an objective and a subjective component. Plaintiff describes several objectively
serious physical symptoms, which allegedly resulted from his consumption of a soy diet,
including severe stomach pain, constipation, pain and weakness, poor circulation in his
extremities, and depression (Doc. 1, p. 8).
According to the complaint, Plaintiff only brought these symptoms to the attention of
Defendant Shah, who refused to treat the symptoms. At this stage, Plaintiff may proceed with

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Count 5 against Defendant Shah for deliberate indifference to the health problems that he
attributes to the soy foods.
defendants,

including

However, this claim shall be dismissed against all remaining

Defendants

IDOC

and

Pinckneyville

with

prejudice

and

Defendants Godinez, Spiller, Bates, and Bailey with prejudice.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3), which shall be referred to
United States Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier for a decision.
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for service of process (Doc. 4), which is hereby
GRANTED in part, with respect to Defendants GODINEZ, SPILLER, BATES, BAILEY,
and SHAH, and DENIED in part, with respect to all other defendants.
Disposition
IT IS ORDERED that COUNTS 2 and 4 are DISMISSED without prejudice from this
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. COUNTS 3 and 6 are
DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS and PINCKNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER are DISMISSED
without prejudice.
With respect to COUNTS 1 and 5, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for DEFENDANTS
GODINEZ, SPILLER, BATES, BAILEY, and SHAH: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum
and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant
fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days

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from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service
on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal
service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Philip M. Frazier for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on Plaintiff’s
motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3). Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to
United States Magistrate Judge Frazier for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and
28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs

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under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 11, 2015
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
U.S. District Judge

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