Gray v. Hamilton

Filing 10

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 5/12/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TERRY GRAY, #N-74628,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OFFICER HAMILTON,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15-cv-00421-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Terry Gray, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at Graham Correctional
Center (“Graham”), brings this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) for violations
of his Eighth Amendment rights at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”).
Plaintiff claims that Officer Hamilton, a Pinckneyville official, responded to his repeated
requests for hot water in his cell with excessive force (Doc. 1, p. 6).

As a result,

Plaintiff sustained a shoulder injury that required surgery and now interferes with his dialysis
shunt. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief (Doc. 1, p. 7).
This case is before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner
complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to
dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). After carefully considering the allegations, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint survives preliminary review under this standard.

Page 1 of 9

The Complaint
While Plaintiff was housed in Cell 68 at Pinckneyville in October 2011, the hot water in
his cell stopped working. He informed Officer Hamilton about the problem and explained that
his multiple requests to restore access to it had been ignored. As Plaintiff spoke, he stuck his
arm out of the cell’s chuckhole in a nonthreatening manner.
In response, Officer Hamilton grabbed Plaintiff’s arm with both hands. He put his foot
against the door and “pulled and twisted [Plaintiff’s] arm,” until he tore the tissue in
Plaintiff’s shoulder. Plaintiff screamed in pain. Hearing him, several other inmates yelled at
Officer Hamilton until he let go. Plaintiff was unable to use his arm for “quite some time”
(Doc. 1, p. 6).
After Plaintiff transferred to Graham, he received an ultrasound on his arm as part of his
dialysis treatment.

During the procedure, the medical technician observed the injury to

Plaintiff’s shoulder and told him that it was “messed up” for reasons unrelated to the dialysis.
Plaintiff’s doctor agreed that the injury was serious and required surgical repair.
Plaintiff underwent surgery in September of 2013 and now claims that the injury complicates his
dialysis treatments. Plaintiff sues Officer Hamilton for monetary damages (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Discussion
The complaint invokes no constitutional or statutory basis for relief. The Court will
therefore divide the complaint into three claims for purposes of this discussion. All three claims
arise under the Eighth Amendment, as follows:
Count 1:

Defendant Hamilton subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement by denying him access to hot water
in his cell in October 2011, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment;

Page 2 of 9

Count 2:

Defendant Hamilton responded to Plaintiff’s request for hot
water with excessive force, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment; and

Count 3:

Defendant Hamilton exhibited deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these claims should not
be construed as an opinion regarding their merit.
As discussed in more detail below, Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Counts 2
and 3. However, Count 1 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
Count 1 – Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff’s claim that Cell 68 lacked hot water arises under the Eighth Amendment, which
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)). The Eighth Amendment has provided a means of
improving prison conditions that were constitutionally unacceptable.

See, e.g., Robinson,

370 U.S. at 666; Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994). Jail officials violate the
Eighth Amendment when they show deliberate indifference to adverse conditions that deny
“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” including “adequate sanitation and personal
hygiene items.” Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citation omitted)); Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d
650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012).

Page 3 of 9

In order to prevail on a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy the
objective and subjective components applicable to all Eighth Amendment claims. See McNeil v.
Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 302 (1991).

The objective analysis turns on whether the conditions “exceeded

contemporary bounds of decency of a mature, civilized society.” Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d
1574, 1579 (7th Cir. 1994). The condition must result in unquestioned and serious deprivations
of basic human needs or deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Even if certain conditions are not individually
serious enough to work constitutional violations, the Seventh Circuit has observed that
“conditions of confinement may violate the Constitution in combination when they have a
‘mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need.’”
Budd, 711 F.3d at 842 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304). See also Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493;
Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 1995).
A claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement must also satisfy a subjective
standard. To do so, the complaint must suggest that a particular prison official had a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. The relevant state of mind is deliberate
indifference to inmate health or safety; the official must be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he also must draw the
inference. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. 837; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976); Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff complains about a single condition—his lack of access to hot water in Cell 68.
An exhibit filed with the complaint indicates that Plaintiff was housed in this cell from October
7-8, 2011 (Doc. 1, p. 8). Therefore, the deprivation lasted for approximately 24-48 hours. To be

Page 4 of 9

clear, Plaintiff does not claim that he was deprived of all water access, or that his access to water
was limited in any way. He also does not complain of negative health consequences associated
with this alleged deprivation.
The Court finds that this single short-term deprivation fails to support a claim for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The situations in which a lack of water might
support an Eighth Amendment claim include the absolute deprivation of water, deprivations of
longer duration, or the deprivation of water in combination with other deplorable conditions.
See, e.g., Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924-25 (reversing summary judgment where
prisoner was held for six days without sanitation items in cell contaminated with human waste
and in which sink and toilet did not work). See also Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139-40
(7th Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment where prisoner denied cleaning supplies and
confined for three days to cell that was smeared with human waste and lacked running water)).
The complaint does not present such circumstances. Accordingly, Count 1 shall be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state any claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 2 – Excessive Force
The complaint supports an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Hamilton for the
unauthorized use of excessive force. The intentional use of excessive force by prison guards
against an inmate without penological justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment and is actionable under Section 1983. See Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34 (2010); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). To state an excessive
force claim, an inmate must show that an assault occurred, and that “it was carried out
‘maliciously and sadistically’ rather than as part of ‘a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline.’” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 40 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)).

Page 5 of 9

The allegations in the complaint suggest that Defendant Hamilton used excessive force against
Plaintiff in October 2011 and caused injuries that have had lingering effects on Plaintiff’s health.
Accordingly, Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Count 2 at this time.
Count 3 – Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
The Court will also allow Plaintiff to proceed with an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference to medical needs claim against Defendant Hamilton. Relevant to Plaintiff’s claim,
the Supreme Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners” may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2006) (per curiam). To state a
claim, “[t]he plaintiff must show that (1) the medical condition was objectively serious, and
(2) the state officials acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs, which is a
subjective standard.” Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2000).
A serious medical need is one that is obvious to a lay person or one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373
(7th Cir. 1997). According to the allegations, Plaintiff’s shoulder injury was diagnosed by a
physician as requiring surgery. The complaint suggests that Plaintiff had a serious medical need.
To establish deliberate indifference, Plaintiff “must demonstrate that prison officials
acted with a “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653
(7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). Officials must “know of and disregard an
excessive risk to inmate health” by being “‘aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’” and “‘draw[ing] the inference.’”
Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Plaintiff is not required to establish

Page 6 of 9

that the officials “intended or desired the harm that transpired,” but to instead show that they
“knew of a substantial risk of harm . . . and disregarded it.” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653.
The allegations suggest that Defendant Hamilton knew that he injured Plaintiff.
Even after Plaintiff screamed in agony, he continued to pull and twist Plaintiff’s arm until he
could no longer use it (Doc. 1, p. 6). Whether Plaintiff’s need for immediate medical treatment
was obvious or not is unclear. But the allegations suggest that Defendant Hamilton caused the
injury and therefore had an obligation to help Plaintiff secure adequate medical treatment.
He did not.

At this early stage, the Court finds that the complaint supports an

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against Defendant Hamilton.
Count 3 survives preliminary review.
In summary, Counts 2 and 3 shall receive further review, and Count 1 shall be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (Doc. 3) shall be referred to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further consideration.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 is DISMISSED without prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to COUNTS 2 and 3, the Clerk of Court shall
prepare for Defendant HAMILTON: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return

Page 7 of 9

the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms
were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the
Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the
Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on
which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails
to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on the motion to
appoint counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge
for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the
parties consent to such a referral.

Page 8 of 9

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court
and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not independently
investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a
transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay
in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 12, 2015
s/J. Phil Gilbert
U.S. District Judge

Page 9 of 9