Rozumek v. Air & Liquid Systems, Inc et al

Filing 133

ORDER. The Court GRANTS Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 43) and DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims against Union Carbide without prejudice. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 7/1/15. (ajr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DENNIS ROZUMEK,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 15-cv-441-SMY-SCW

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Union Carbide Corporation’s (“Union
Carbide) Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc.
43). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion.
Plaintiff alleges he was exposed to and inhaled, ingested or otherwise absorbed large amounts
of asbestos fibers from products manufactured, sold, distributed, installed or promoted by Union
Carbide. Union Carbide filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2) arguing this Court lacks personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction exists because Union Carbide has conducted business
“continually and regularly within [Illinois]” (Doc. 104, p. 3). In support, Plaintiff alleges Union
Carbide has been registered to do business in Illinois since 1942. Plaintiff further alleges that Union
Carbide is a wholly owned subsidiary of Dow Chemical Corporation which has 8 factory and office
locations in Illinois, runs an Innovation Center at the University of Illinois, and contributed money
and volunteers to restoration efforts in Illinois.
Here, because no material facts are in dispute, the Court may rule on Defendant’s motion
absent an evidentiary hearing. See Hyatt Int’l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 712-13 (7th Cir. 2002).
Where a court rules on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion on paper, the plaintiff “need only make out a prima
facie case of personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 713.

In diversity cases, a district court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who is subject
to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Illinois’ long-arm statute allows the exercise of jurisdiction to the full
extent permitted under the Due Process Clause. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir.
2010). Accordingly, a district court sitting in Illinois must inquire whether the “defendant has certain
minimum contact with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014)
(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011)). Personal
jurisdiction may be either specific or general. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 701-03.
Specific jurisdiction arises where an out-of-state “defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his
activities at residents of the forum, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984), and
the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to those activities’ Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985). Here, Plaintiff’s alleged injuries do not arise out of or relate to Union
Carbide’s contacts with Illinois. As such, this Court lacks specific personal jurisdiction.
General jurisdiction arises over a foreign corporation “when their affiliations with the State
are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal
place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.” Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 760
(quoting Brilmayer et al, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Texas L. Rev. 721, 735 (1988)).
A foreign corporation, however, may be “at home in the forum State” where its “continuous
corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit.”
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)); see also Perkins v. Benguiet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (general jurisdiction appropriate in Ohio over Philippine
corporation where the company’s affairs were overseen in Ohio during the war).
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In this case, Plaintiff does not contend that Union Carbide is incorporated or maintains its
principal place of business in Illinois. Further, Plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts to establish that
Union Carbide’s affiliation with Illinois is “so continuous and systematic as to render” it at home in
Illinois. Plaintiff merely asserts that Johnson Controls, Inc. has a presence in Illinois including its
registration to transact business and Dow Chemical Corporation’s offices and activities in the state.
The Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that the mere presence of a defendant in the forum
does not subject it to all-purpose jurisdiction in that forum. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 752, 762
(finding no general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where subsidiary, whose actions were
assumed attributable to the corporation, had multiple facilities and a regional office in the forum
state).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Union Carbide’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant
to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 43) and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims
against Union Carbide without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 1, 2015

s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
DISTRICT JUDGE

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