Craddock v. State of Illinois et al

Filing 8

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Menard Correctional Center Warden added, and IDOC and State of Illinois terminated. ORDER REFERRING 3 MOTION for Recruitment of Counsel filed by Jermaine Craddock. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 6/17/2015. (jsy)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JERMAINE CRADDOCK, # R69423,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF ILLINOIS, IDOC,
OFFICER SAMUEL STAR,
OFFICER BUMP,
and JOHN DOE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-00564-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jermaine Craddock, who is currently incarcerated at Illinois River Correctional
Center, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of his Eighth Amendment
rights at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”).

According to the complaint, Plaintiff’s

cellmate attempted to murder him on June 24, 2013 (Doc. 1, p. 4). The two inmates were housed
together for eight days prior to the incident. Plaintiff noticed a dramatic decline in his cellmate’s
mental health during the seven days preceding the attack.

He made statements that were

“uncalled for and at times inflammatory” (Doc. 1, p. 4). He also tried to provoke Plaintiff by
kicking the underside of his bunk bed, among other things.
Plaintiff reported his observations to Menard officials, including Officers Star, Bump,
and Doe (an unknown guard) (Doc. 1, p. 5). He repeatedly asked them to move him from the
cell or place him in protective custody. Plaintiff submitted these requests verbally and in
writing. He even made these requests in the presence of his cellmate. Each time, the officers
told Plaintiff that they would follow up with him but never did.

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At 2:00 a.m. on June 24, 2013, Plaintiff was awakened as his cellmate “stabbed and
slashed” him with a homemade weapon (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5). At the time of the assault, Plaintiff
was sleeping on the top bunk (Doc. 1, p. 4). He suffered multiple injuries and received medical
treatment for the injuries later the same day. Medical records filed with the complaint reveal that
his injuries include a stab wound to the right knee (Doc. 1-1, p. 3).
Following this incident, Plaintiff was placed in protective custody and eventually
transferred to another prison (Doc. 1, p. 5). Before his transfer, Plaintiff was targeted for
subsequent attacks by other inmates at Menard. He attributes these attacks to the June 24th
incident (Id.; Doc. 1-1, p. 7).
Plaintiff now sues the State of Illinois, the Illinois Department of Corrections, Officer
Star, Officer Bump, and Officer Doe for failing to protect him, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment (Doc. 1, p. 6). He seeks monetary relief.
Merits Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
The complaint is now subject to preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
Section 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner complaints to filter out
nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss any portion of
the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The complaint survives preliminary review under this standard.
Discussion
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from cruel
and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. See also Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d
435, 439 (7th Cir. 2010). Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have an obligation to

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protect prisoners from one another. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Zarnes v.
Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1995). Officials incur liability for the breach of that duty
when they exhibit deliberate indifference to a risk of serious harm to a prisoner’s health or
safety. Id. at 828. Put differently, Plaintiff must show that each defendant knew of a substantial
risk of injury to Plaintiff but nevertheless failed to take reasonable steps to protect him from that
harm.

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Med. Serv., 675 F.3d 650, 669 (7th Cir. 2012);

Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2007); Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601, 605
(7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff names five defendants in connection with this claim, i.e., the State of Illinois, the
Illinois Department of Corrections, Officer Star, Officer Bump, and Officer Doe. He sues all
five defendants in their individual and official capacities. 1 He seeks only monetary damages.
Plaintiff’s official capacity claims fail in their entirety. Normally, defendants are named
in their official capacities when a plaintiff is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See, e.g.,
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Here, injunctive and declaratory relief are not
an issue. Plaintiff did not request either form of relief in the complaint. Further, he is no longer
incarcerated at Menard, where he was attacked, so any request for injunctive relief related to the
conditions of his confinement would be moot. Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir.
2004) (“[W]hen a prisoner who seeks injunctive relief for a condition specific to a particular
prison is transferred out of that prison, the need for relief, and hence the prisoner’s claim,
become moot.”). See also Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1995).
1

The Court reached this conclusion only after reviewing Plaintiff’s request for relief, in which he
explicitly states that he is bringing an “official-capacity suit against the defendants mentioned in this
complaint, in the amount of $50,000 dollars in compensatory damages and $150,000 dollars in punitive
damages” and is also bringing a “failure-to-protect claim against the guards of ‘Menard CC’ for their
violation of his ‘Eighth Amendment’ right[s] by allowing him to get hurt” (Doc. 1, p. 6). From this (and
absent any other indication in the complaint), the Court discerned that Plaintiff is suing the defendants in
their individual and official capacities.

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What is more, Plaintiff cannot proceed with a claim for monetary damages against any of
the defendants in their official capacities. When a plaintiff seeks monetary damages against a
state official, he must bring the suit against the official in his or her individual capacity. This is
because a suit for money damages against a defendant in his or her official capacity is really a
suit for money damages against the state and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987).
The law on this point is clear. Section 1983 creates a federal remedy against any
“person” who, under color of state law, deprives “any citizen of the United States . . . of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Planned Parenthood of
Indiana, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under [Section] 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in
federal court for money damages. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001). This
same principle applies to the Illinois Department of Corrections because it is an arm of the state.
Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995); Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr., 931
F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 219, 220 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1990)
(same).
Even though Plaintiff named Officer Star, Officer Bump, and Officer Doe as defendants,
his official capacity claims against them fare no better. To be held liable for money damages, a
defendant must be “personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police,
251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). There is no supervisory liability in a Section 1983 action.

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With that said, the complaint articulates viable individual capacity claims against
Officer Star, Officer Bump, and Officer Doe. According to the allegations, Plaintiff specifically
informed each of these defendants that he was in danger and needed to be separated from his
cellmate or placed in protective custody (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5). He repeatedly submitted requests for
protection to the defendants, verbally and in writing, during the week leading up to his attack.
Each defendant told Plaintiff that they would follow up with him but failed to do so. These
allegations support an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim (Count 1) against Officer Star,
Officer Bump, and Officer Doe.

Accordingly, Count 1 against each of these individual

defendants shall receive further review.
Identification of Unknown Defendant
Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Count 1 against Defendant John Doe, the
unidentified guard who allegedly failed to protect him from the inmate attack on June 24, 2013.
This party must be identified with particularity, however, before service of the complaint can be
made on him. Where a prisoner’s complaint states specific allegations describing conduct of an
individual prison staff member sufficient to raise a constitutional claim against him, but the name
of that defendant is not known, the prisoner should have the opportunity to engage in limited
discovery to ascertain the identity of the individual. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, Menard’s warden shall be added in his or her
official capacity for the sole purpose of responding to discovery aimed at identifying
Defendant Doe. Guidelines for discovery will be set by the United States Magistrate Judge.
Once the name of Defendant Doe is discovered, Plaintiff shall file a motion to substitute the
newly identified defendant in place of the generic designations for this individual in the case
caption and throughout the complaint.

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Pending Motion
Plaintiff has filed a motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3), which shall be
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for a decision.
Disposition
The CLERK is DIRECTED to ADD the MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
WARDEN, in his or her official capacity only, as a party to this action in CM/ECF.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants STATE OF ILLINOIS and ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS are DISMISSED with prejudice from this action for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and all OFFICIAL CAPACITY claims
against Defendants STAR, BUMP, and DOE are DISMISSED with prejudice for the same
reason.
AS TO COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for DEFENDANT MENARD’S
WARDEN (in his or her official capacity only) and DEFENDANTS STAR and BUMP
(in their individual capacities only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant,
and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service shall not be made on Defendant John Doe until such time as Plaintiff has
identified this defendant by name in a properly filed motion to substitute the newly identified

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defendant in place of the generic designations for this individual in the case caption and
throughout the complaint. Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide
the Court with the name and service address for this individual.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on Plaintiff’s
motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) and discovery aimed at identifying Defendant John
Doe.

Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge

Wilkerson for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all
parties consent to such a referral.

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If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 17, 2015

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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