Watford v. Ellis et al

Filing 24

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's COUNT 3 is SEVERED into a new case. (3) The Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. 2).IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that attorney LANE MATTHEWS of Brown & Crouppen, P.C., St. Louis, Missouri, is ASSIGNED to represent Plaintiff Marlon L. Watford in this civil rights case (consisting of Count 3). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 5/25/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARLON L. WATFORD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OFFICER ELLIS,
BRAD BRAMLET,
TONYA KNUST,
LACY REAM,
OFFICER WOOLEY,
OFFICER NEW,
SERGEANT RICHARDS,
RICHARD HARRINGTON,
JENNY CLENDENIN,
KIMBERLY BUTLER,
JOHN DOE 1,
JOHN DOE 2, and
JOHN R. BALDWIN,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:15-cv-00567-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Marlon L. Watford’s second amended complaint filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Watford is currently housed at the Stateville Northern Reception
and Classification Center in Joliet, Illinois. The acts complained of occurred while he was
imprisoned at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). Watford alleges violations of the Eighth
Amendment, First Amendment, and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq. He seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (See Doc.
23.)

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Watford originally filed his complaint on May 14, 2015. (Doc. 1.) On June 16, 2015,
however, this Court dismissed the complaint with leave to file an amended complaint that
complied with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 5.) Watford’s first amended
complaint (Doc. 14), filed on October 5, 2015, also violated Rule 8, the Court having found that
its repetitive legal conclusions and citations to the Quran, as well as its immense length, rendered
it too unwieldy to review and give proper notice to defendants. (Doc. 15.) The Court granted
Watford leave to file a second amended complaint, and also appointed attorney Lane Matthews
to represent him during this threshold period. (Id.) On March 28, 2016, Watford timely filed his
second amended complaint. (Doc. 23.)
This matter is now before the Court for a review of the second amended complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court shall review a “complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
government entity.” During the § 1915A review, the court “shall identify cognizable claims or
dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or if it “seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune.”
Background
Watford’s complaint concerns conditions at Menard which he alleges substantially
burdened his practice of the Islamic faith. Watford informs the Court that, pursuant to his faith,
“his body is a gift from his Lord to hold in trust during this life.” (Doc. 23 at 2.) Accordingly, he
is obligated to maintain cleanliness and “radiant looking skin, especially when he approaches his
Lord in prayer.” (Id.) Satisfaction of this religious tenant, however, was imperiled when
Defendant Warden Richard Harrington ordered the commissary to cease selling baby powder,

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cocoa nut hair grease, petroleum jelly, and “Ban” brand deodorant, pursuant to requests made by
Defendant Correctional Officers Richards, New, and Wooley. (Id.) Without these products,
Watford was unable to maintain cleanliness, in violation of his religious faith. (Id.)
Watford also claims that prison officials have substantially burdened his practice of the
Islamic faith by financially oppressing him. (See id. at 3-6.) He claims that a tenant of the Islamic
faith is the requirement that one remain free from financial oppression. (Id. at 4.) Defendant
Harrington instituted several policies that Watford alleges financially oppressed him: the price of
individual copies in the law library was increased from five cents to ten cents; prisoners were
prohibited from spending more than $75 (later $100) in the commissary at any one visit; and
prisoners in segregation for more than 30 days are now required to ship their personal items
home. (Id. at 5.) In addition, Harrington financially oppressed Watford “by maintaining a $10
stipend even when the cost of copies was increased by 100%.” (Id.)
Lastly, Watford’s constitutional and statutory rights were violated when Defendant
Correctional Officer Ellis prohibited Watford from using the law library bathroom. (Id. at 6-7.)
Watford alleges that he suffers from irritable bowel syndrome and Helicobacter pylori (or H.
pylori) and so is forced to use restroom facilities frequently. (Id. at 7.) Despite this fact, Ellis did
not allow Watford to use the library restroom one day, and Defendant Correctional Officers
Bramlet, Knust, and Ream, all present at the time, failed to intervene on his behalf. (Id.) Watford
claims that the actions of defendants caused him to violate his religious obligation to maintain
his body and keep it free from strains. (Id.)
As a result of the above-mentioned actions by the defendants Watford has developed and
re-developed H. pylori, chronic stomach inflammation, and irritable bowel syndrome, among
other injuries. (See id. at 3.)

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Discussion
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the
action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.

Count 1:

Wooley, New, Richards, Harrington, and Butler violated the First
Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and RLUIPA when they caused
the commissary to cease selling baby powder, cocoa nut hair
grease, petroleum jelly, and “Ban” brand deodorant.

Count 2:

Bramlet, Knust, Clendin, Harrington, Butler, Baldwin, John Doe 1,
and John Doe 2 violated the First Amendment, Eighth
Amendment, and RLUIPA when a number of financially
oppressive policies were instituted.

Count 3:

Ellis, Bramlet, Knust, and Ream violated the First Amendment,
Eighth Amendment, and RLUIPA when Watford was prohibited
from using the bathroom in the law library.

Watford shall proceed with his claims under Count 1 against Wooley, New, Richards,
Harrington, and Butler. He shall also proceed with his claims under Count 2 against Harrington,
Butler, and Baldwin. As for the other defendants named in Count 2— Bramlet, Knust, Clendin,
John Doe 1, and John Doe 2—Watford has not alleged that they actually violated his
constitutional and statutory rights. Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal
liability and predicated upon fault; therefore, “to be liable under § 1983, the individual defendant
must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park,
430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because
Watford has not alleged that Bramlet, Knust, Clendin, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 did anything
personally to violate his constitutional or statutory rights, they shall be dismissed without

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prejudice.
Because Ellis, Bramlet, Knust, and Ream—the only defendants listed under Count 3—
are dismissed from Count 2 (and not listed in Count 1), Count 3 violates the rules of joinder.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 permits multiple defendants to be joined in a single action if:

(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A)–(B). “Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim
A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.”
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 authorizes severance when multiple claims are
“discrete and separate.” Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000); see also
George, 507 F.3d at 607. This occurs when one or more claims are capable of resolution despite
the outcome of the other claims. Id.; see also Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs. of Indiana, Inc., 451
F.3d 424, 442 (7th Cir. 2006). In George, the Seventh Circuit opined that unrelated claims
against separate defendants belong in separate lawsuits, “not only to prevent the sort of morass”
produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits, “but also to ensure that prisoners pay the
required filing fees” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Id. at 607.
Here, Counts 1 and 2 both seek relief against Butler and Harrington and so do not violate
Rule 20. However, Count 3 does not share any defendants in common with Counts 1 and 2 once
Ellis, Bramlet, Knust, and Ream are dismissed from Count 2. Simply put, Count 3 alleges a
“different charge[] against different prison officials,” Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 846

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(7th Cir. 2013), and so violates Rule 20. Therefore, consistent with the George decision and Rule
21, Watford shall be allowed to proceed with Counts 1 and 2 in this action against Defendants
Wooley, New, Richards, Harrington, Butler, and Baldwin. Count 3 against Defendants Ellis,
Bramlet, Knust, and Ream shall be severed into a separate case.
One last note is in order. While Watford will be permitted to pursue his RLUIPA claims,
he shall only be able to do so to the extent that he seeks injunctive relief against Defendants
Butler (Menard’s warden) and Baldwin (Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections).
RLUIPA applies to state and local governments and to those acting under color of state law. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(4). It offers broad protection to institutionalized persons by prohibiting
substantial burdens on their religious exercise. Id. § 2000cc–3(g). This protection extends to “any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Id.
§ 2000cc–5(7)(A). However, RLUIPA does not provide a cause of action for money damages
against officials in their individual capacity, see Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 886–89 (7th Cir.
2009), or official capacity, see Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285-86 (2011). Therefore,
Watford may not pursue a claim for money damages against any defendants under RLUIPA.
Instead, the Court will allow him to proceed with a request for injunctive relief against
Defendants Butler and Baldwin, whom he has already named in their official capacities for this
purpose.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s COUNT 3 is SEVERED into a new case.
The new case presents the following claims, which are subject to preliminary review under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A:

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Defendants Ellis, Bramlet, Knust, and Ream violated the First Amendment,
Eighth Amendment, and RLUIPA when Watford was prohibited from using
the bathroom in the law library.
In the new case, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file the following documents:
(1)

This Memorandum and Order; and

(2)

The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 23)

(3)

The Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. 2) .

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that attorney LANE MATTHEWS of Brown &
Crouppen, P.C., St. Louis, Missouri, is ASSIGNED to represent Plaintiff Marlon L. Watford in
this civil rights case (consisting of Count 3). On or before June 24, 2016, assigned counsel shall
enter his/her appearance in this case. Attorney Lane Matthews is free to share responsibilities
with an associate who is also admitted to practice in this district court. Assigned counsel,
however, shall make first contact with Plaintiff, explaining that an associate may also be working
on the case. Plaintiff should wait for his attorney to contact him in order to allow counsel an
opportunity to review the court file.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that the Court will not accept any filings from him individually
while he is represented by counsel, except a pleading that asks that he be allowed to have counsel
withdraw from representation. If counsel is allowed to withdraw at the request of Plaintiff, there
is no guarantee the Court will appoint other counsel to represent Plaintiff.
Plaintiff will be responsible for an additional $350.00 filing fee in this new case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the only claims remaining in this action are
Counts 1 and 2 against Wooley, New, Richards, Harrington, Butler (in her official
capacity), and Baldwin (in his official capacity). This case shall now be captioned as: Marlon
L. Watford, Plaintiff vs. Officer Wooley, Officer New, Sergeant Richards, Richard
Harrington, Kimberly Butler, and John R. Baldwin, Defendants.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall PROCEED against WOOLEY,
NEW, RICHARDS, HARRINGTON, and BUTLER (in her official capacity).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2 shall PROCEED against
HARRINGTON, BUTLER (in her official capacity), and BALDWIN (in his official
capacity). BRAMLET, KNUST, CLENDIN, JOHN DOE 1, and JOHN DOE 2 are
TERMINATED from this action.
IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants WOOLEY,
NEW, RICHARDS, HARRINGTON, BUTLER, and BALDWIN: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a
Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of
Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this
Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a
Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk
within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or,
if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the
address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the
court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.

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Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for
disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to
such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted in this action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

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independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 25, 2016
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
United State District Court

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