Woods v. Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Filing 34

ORDER granting 17 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim: The retaliation claim is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The racial harassment claim is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Further, in light of this ruling, SIUs motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33) is DENIED as MOOT. This matter closes the case and the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 9/7/2016. (dsw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Anthony T. Woods,

Plaintiff,

vs.

No. 3:15-cv-597-DRH-SCW

Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Defendant.

ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on defendant Southern Illinois University’s
(“SIU”) motion to dismiss plaintiff Anthony T. Woods’ complaint for failure to
state a claim (Doc. 17, Doc. 18). Mr. Woods has responded (Doc. 27). Based on
the record and the following, the motion is GRANTED.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Complaint
On May 29, 2015, Mr. Woods filed a pro se Employment Discrimination
Complaint against SIU. The Court construes Mr. Woods’ complaint as attempting

to assert two Title VII claims against SIU – one for racial harassment and one for
retaliation.
Mr. Woods attached the following to his complaint: (1) a letter from Linda
McCabe Smith, Ph.D., SIU’s Associate Chancellor for Institutional Diversity, which
sets out Plaintiff’s allegations of harassment and the results of SIU’s internal
investigation into those allegations, (2) his EEOC Charge, and (3) his EEOC Intake
Questionnaire, in which his Letter of Concern is included.
B. EEOC Filings
Mr. Woods’ Intake Questionnaire was signed on June 13, 2014 and
stamped as received by the EEOC on June 16, 2014. In his Intake Questionnaire,
Mr. Woods checked the box indicating he had been discriminated against by SIU
because of his race. He did not mark the additional box indicating that he was
alleging unlawful retaliation.
The Letter of Concern attached to Mr. Woods Intake Questionnaire relays,
in relevant part, the following:
On November 17, 2013, during a lunch break, Mr. Woods, Randy [a
white co-worker], Eric [Shuler] [a white sub-foreman], and Lamont
[an African American co-worker) were engaged in a conversation
regarding the type of language that is allowed and/or is offensive.
During the conversation, Randy used the term “nigger” twice.
Incidents occurring in April and May 2014 involving sub-foreman
Eric Shuler and another individual identified only as “Travis” that
Mr. Woods considered offensive, including: removing Mr. Woods’
earplugs, calling him names like “dip shit” and “stink bait”, hitting
him with a rolled up newspaper, and making a joke about Mr.
Woods’ using marijuana.

Alleged unfair treatment by sub-foreman Eric Shuler and an
individual identified only as “Ben” regarding clocking in late and
inconsistent statements regarding a clocking in late “grace period.”
On May 20, 2014, Mr. Woods alleges the following occurred:
I told Shawn that I’m going to start writing everything
down (that happens at work) after hearing him say that
he does that same thing. Then once we were back in the
chemical room he called me a “Bitch” in which I replied
that if he thinks I’m bitch then I’m better at showing
him.
On May 22, 2014, Mr. Woods alleges the following occurred:
Kevin tried to get me to say “Cracker” as if it’s okay with
him, he then asked [sub-foreman Eric Shuler] to come
by in which [sub-foreman Eric Shuler] stated that it
would be okay to say depending on who you are. He goes
on to say that Anthony can use the “N” word but that he
can’t use the ‘n’ word.
Mr. Woods further alleges that, as of June 6, 2014, the following is
true:
[W]ork has been hostile beyond belief since I spoke with
Darrell (the union representative). 1 After speaking with
Darrell at approximately 0100, Ben came into the locker
room and asked me if I called Darrell or not for the
reason why he showed up. I told Ben I did not call
Darrell as that is the truth I did not call him. I text
Darrell, but I thought that bosses are not supposed to
ask employees that question. I’ve called in several days
since the incidents due to my health not being where it
needs to be right now. Even as a disabled veteran I’m
dealing with health concerns that are being compounded
by the situation at work. I feel as though I’m being
discriminated against and harassed at my job. I’ve been
ridiculed and made fun of for being a vegan which is
part of my religion. I’ve been insulted by being called
several offensive words and one of the words
discriminates against my race. I really hope and pray
1

Although not stated in the Intake Questionnaire, the Charge indicates that Mr. Woods contacted
his union representative on May 20, 2014.

that through all that I’m having to deal with that
someone can help me put an end to this situation. I
understand that no one at work has to speak to me and
that’s fine but when you keep hearing snitch this, pig
that and rat this – it becomes difficult to even want to
show up to work. But as Ben stated, “I don’t care if you
quit, he said this after stating that the employees don’t
come to him first so he can help then he doesn’t care.
OK, so what if you are not comfortable talking to him
and decide to go directly to the union after having talks
with Eric, Travis and Ben about things that have been
going on at work.
On August 15, 2014, Mr. Woods filed a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”)
against SIU with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
stating as follows:
I was hired by the above named employer on November 10, 2013 as
a Building Service Worker. My immediate supervisor is Eric Shuler,
Sub Foreman, white.
On November 17, 2013 during lunch break, Eric Shuler, Sub
Foreman, white, Randy (LNU), Building Service Worker, white,
Lamont (LNU),Building Service Worker, black, and myself, were
having a conversation relative to comments/words that may be
considered offensive. Randy then stated that he could call me a
“nigger” because he has a black friend that he is allowed to call
“nigger” and his friend is allowed to call him “cracker.” I was shocked
to hear this comment and shook my head and told Randy that I was
uncomfortable with what he said, yet Eric Shuler, Sub Foreman,
white, said nothing and laughed. Later on that same day while in the
bathroom, Randy again made reference to him calling his friend a
“nigger.” I did not make an internal complaint of discrimination at
that time because I was still a probationary employee. However, on
May 20, 2014 I complained of the racial slurs to Dornell (LNU),
Union Rep, who subsequently referred me to the Associate
Chancellor for Institutional Diversity, to whom I made a complaint on
June 11, 2014. After making the complaint I was told that an
investigation would be conducted but to date I have been given no
results.

I believe that I have been discriminated against due to my race, black,
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
In his Charge, Plaintiff marked the box indicating that he had been
discriminated against because of his race, but did not mark the box for a
retaliation claim.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint, not its merits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910
F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and
draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor.
AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair
notice of a claim's basis but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Scope – Retaliation Claim
Mr. Woods’ Complaint states as follows: “Once I made a mention that on or
around May 20th, 2014 I would report unfavorable treatment the harassment
started. It went on until basically my Dr. recommended that I take time off. Dr.
statements go back to approx. 11/27/2013 which is approx. 10 days after the
above incident [referring to the November 17, 2013 incidents].” The Court
construes this allegation as an attempt to assert a Title VII claim for retaliation.
A plaintiff in a Title VII case “may bring only those claims that were
included in his EEOC charge or that are like or reasonably related to the
allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.” Swearingen–El v.
Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 602 F.3d 852, 864 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The purpose of the limitation is to ensure that employers have
“some warning of the conduct about which the employee is aggrieved, and it
affords the agency and the employer an opportunity to attempt conciliation
without resort to the court.” Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th
Cir. 1992).
Here, the Charge filed with the EEOC contains no mention of retaliation.
Mr. Woods did not check the box for retaliation and the factual allegations in the
Charge do not contain any assertions related to retaliation. Rather, the Charge
addresses only the claim of racial harassment. Under settled precedent, the racial
harassment allegations in the Charge are not like or reasonably related to the

retaliation claim in this litigation. See Swearingen–El v. Cook County Sheriff's
Dep't, 602 F.3d 852, 864–65 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Normally, retaliation and
discrimination charges are not considered like or reasonably related to one
another.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co.,
859 F.2d 534, 545 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[Plaintiff's] retaliation claim injects an
entirely new theory of liability into the case alleging unlawful activity of a much
different nature than the age discrimination alleged in the charge.”).
This, however, does not end the Court’s inquiry. Mr. Woods’ Intake
Questionnaire contains factual assertions that arguably indicate Mr. Woods was
interested in pursuing a retaliation claim. Specifically, in his Letter of Concern,
Mr. Woods details work-place harassment in relation to communicating with his
union representative about racial harassment. Accordingly, if the Court can
consider the allegations in Mr. Woods’ Intake Questionnaire and Letter of
Concern, Mr. Woods’ retaliation claim might be saved.
As a general matter, intake forms and questionnaires are insufficient to
satisfy the charge-filing requirement. See Novitsky v. American Consulting
Engineers, L.L. C., 196 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Under the statute,
however, it is the charge rather than the questionnaire that matters. Only the
charge is sent to the employer, and therefore only the charge can affect the
process of conciliation.”). In Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389,
128 S.Ct. 1147, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008), the Supreme Court relaxed this
requirement, holding that an intake form may be construed as a “charge” where

the intake form contains sufficient detail and can reasonably be construed as a
request by the employee for agency action. Id. at 405, 128 S.Ct. 1147.
There is, however, an important distinction between Holowecki and the
instant case. In Holowecki, the plaintiff filed an intake questionnaire and a
supplemental affidavit before filing her lawsuit. See id. at 394, 406, 128 S.Ct.
1147. She did not file a formal charge until after her complaint had been filed. Id.
In the instant case, the plaintiff filed an Intake Questionnaire (along with a Letter
of Concern) and then, approximately two months later, filed a timely formal
charge, all before commencing this lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit has implied – but
not held – that this distinction is significant. See Wojtanek v. Pactiv LLC, 492
Fed.Appx. 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“Although the Supreme Court
has held [in Holowecki ] that in some circumstances even an intake questionnaire
can constitute a charge of discrimination, ... the Court has not addressed the
situation where the plaintiff has signed a formal charge of discrimination that
narrows the allegations presented to agency officials.”) (emphasis added). See
also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1089 (7th Cir. 2008) (decided 3
months after Holowecki) (rejecting contention that defendant was on notice of the
plaintiff’s charge where defendant was named in questionnaire but not in
subsequently filed charge and stating “[a]ssertions in the questionnaire, without
more, are not enough to put the [defendant] on notice that it was being charged.”)
Although not controlling, the Tenth Circuit and the Third Circuit have both
concluded that a claim listed in an intake questionnaire is not exhausted where a
subsequently filed, timely charge does not include that claim. Barzanty v. Verizon

PA, Inc., 361 Fed.Appx. 411, 415 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff cannot be allowed to
transfer the allegations mentioned only in the questionnaire to the charge itself.
Not only would this be circumventing the role of the [EEOC], but it would be
prejudicial to the employer.”); Green v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat. Ass'n, 501
Fed.Appx. 727, 731 (10th Cir. 2012) (agreeing with Barzanty and stating “it
would defeat the statutory scheme to find exhaustion where an employee includes
a claim in the intake questionnaire, but then omits it in a timely subsequent
formal charge that forms the basis for the administrative proceedings”).
Considering the Seventh Circuit’s post-Holowecki decisions and the
reasoning in Green and Barzanty (which the Court finds persuasive), the Court
concludes claims in Mr. Woods’ Intake Questionnaire and Letter of Concern
cannot be transferred to his timely, subsequently filed Charge. To do so under the
circumstances of this case would prejudice SIU and would circumvent the role of
the EEOC. 2
Since Mr. Woods’ retaliation claim does not set forth the same conduct
alleged in his Charge or sufficiently grow from the allegations set forth in the
Charge, the retaliation claim is not reasonably related to the Discrimination
Charge. Therefore, SIU’s motion to dismiss the retaliation claim is GRANTED.
A dismissal for failure to bring an employment discrimination claim in an
EEOC charge is grounded in failure to exhaust. See Teal v. Potter, 559 F.3d 687,
2

Seventh Circuit jurisprudence indicates that some additional factors may warrant looking
beyond the face of the charge. For instance, inequitable conduct on the part of the EEOC might
justify considering allegations included in a questionnaire but not in a charge. See Novitsky v.
American Consulting Engineers, L.L.C., 196 F.3d 699, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1999). Such conduct is
not alleged in the instant case.

693 (7th Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit has explained that a dismissal for failure
to exhaust should be without prejudice. See e.g., Greene v. Meese, 875 F.2d 639,
643 (7th Cir.1989). Accordingly, the instant dismissal is without prejudice. That
said, given the time that has passed, there may be no practical difference between
a dismissal with prejudice and a dismissal without prejudice of Mr. Woods’
unexhausted retaliation claim.
B. Racial Harassment
To state a valid claim for racial harassment under Title VII, a plaintiff must
establish the following: (1) He was harassed because of his race; (2) his work
environment was objectively and subjectively offensive; (3) the conduct of which
he complains was severe or pervasive; and (4) some basis for employer liability.
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d 133 S. Ct.
2434 (2013). To determine whether conduct meets the third element, the Court
must look to the totality of the circumstances, including “the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance.” Russell v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Illinois
at Chicago, 243 F.3d 336, 343 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smith v. Sheahan, 189
F.3d 529, 533–34 (7th Cir.1999)). “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and
isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Further, occasional or sporadic
racial slurs or epithets will not alone support a harassment claim under Title VII.
North v. Madison Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens–Developmental Centers
Corp., 844 F.2d 401, 409 (7th Cir. 1988).
SIU argues the plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate (1) the plaintiff was not
harassed because of his race; (2) the allegedly wrongful conduct does not meet
the severe or pervasive standard; and (3) there is no basis for employer liability.
Mr. Woods’ Complaint includes three paragraphs in support of his claim.
The first paragraph repeats the allegations contained in his Charge relating to two
conversations occurring on November 17, 2013 involving use of the word “nigger.”
In the first conversation, Mr. Woods and other employees were engaged in a
conversation

regarding

terms

that

are

considered

offensive. During

the

conversation, a white co-worker (Randy) used the term “nigger” twice. The second
conversation occurred later in the day when Mr. Woods and Randy were alone in
the bathroom. At this time, Randy proceeded to explain why he thought it was
okay for him to use the term “nigger.” The second paragraph claims he was
harassed after mentioning, on May 20, 2014, he was going to report “unfavorable
treatment.” The third paragraph states that discrimination based on race and any
form of harassment is illegal, concluding that supporting facts are contained in
SIU’s findings of its own investigation which is attached to the complaint (“SIU’s
Letter”).
A majority of the conduct described in SIU’s Letter amounts to race-neutral
horseplay, teasing, and/or verbal abuse between coworkers. There is nothing

inherently racial about the incidents and they do not indicate that Mr. Woods was
harassed because of his race. Indeed, the actions could have been (and according
to Mr. Woods’ allegations, in some instances actually were) directed at other
employees regardless of skin color.
Setting aside the racially-neutral conduct, Mr. Woods’ racial harassment
claim is premised only on his allegation that on two days (November 17, 2013 and
May 22, 2014) the term “nigger” was used in his presence. Although the alleged
conduct was certainly insensitive and offensive, it is insufficient to state a claim
for racial harassment under Title VII.
First the offensive word was used in Mr. Woods’ presence on two days
nearly six months apart. See Ford v. Minteq Shapes & Servs., Inc., 587 F.3d 845,
848 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Title VII is not ... a general civility code and will not find
liability based on the sporadic use of abusive language.”) (internal quotations and
citation omitted); Sanders v. Village of Dixmoor, Ill., 178 F.3d 869, 869-70 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff’s supervisor’s statement, “N……, you’re
suspended,” was insufficient on its own to establish racial harassment actionable
under Title VII); North v. Madison Area Ass’n for Retarded CitizensDevelopmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d 401, 409 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[O]ccasional or
sporadic uses of racial slurs or epithets will not in and of themselves support an
actionable claim of racial harassment under Title VII.”). Second, the term was
never directed at Mr. Woods. Rather, the term was used while co-workers were
voluntarily engaged in conversations regarding words that are considered

offensive. See Smith v. Nw. Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding
that the plaintiff could not establish an objectively hostile work environment
based on one incident where a white coworker referred to two other coworkers as
“black motherf……” and other incidents, which the plaintiff subsequently learned
about, where the white coworker used the word “n…….” to describe other
coworkers); Logan v. Kautex Textron N. Am., 259 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting that a negative statement by the plaintiff’s coworker about interracial
dating “made in the context of random office banter” and not directed at the
plaintiff was insufficient evidence of racial discrimination). Third, the word was
used by Mr. Woods’ co-worker and not by a supervisor. See Rodgers, 12 F.3d at
675 (“[A] supervisor’s use of the term impacts the work environment far more
severely than use by co-equals.”).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, while the alleged conduct may
indicate the presence of racially insensitive co-workers, it is not sufficiently severe
or pervasive. Accordingly it does not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of a racial
harassment claim under Title VII. 3 Therefore, the Court GRANTS SIU’s motion to
dismiss with prejudice the racial harassment claim for failure to state a claim.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The
retaliation claim

is

dismissed

without

prejudice

for

failure

to

exhaust

administrative remedies. The racial harassment claim is dismissed with prejudice

3

This finding negates any need to assess whether Mr. Woods claim sufficiently alleges employer
liability.

for failure to state a claim. Further, in light of this ruling, SIU’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 33) is DENIED as MOOT. This matter closes the case
and the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 7th day of September, 2016.

Judge Herndon
2016.09.07
14:30:09 -05'00'
United States District Judge