Buchanan v. Frank et al

Filing 12

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 7/15/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
FREDERICK BUCHANAN, #R-60531,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MAC-SHANE FRANK,
JEFFREY J. HOCH,
and CAROL A. McBRIDE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15-cv-00629-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff Frederick Buchanan’s
amended complaint 1 (Doc. 8). Plaintiff, an inmate at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”),
brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 8) against three officials at
Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”).

He claims that these officials used

excessive force against him on July 30, 2014, and transferred him to Menard following an unfair
disciplinary hearing on false disciplinary charges on July 31, 2014 (Doc. 8, p. 3). Plaintiff now
sues Defendants Mac-Shane Frank (lieutenant), Jeffrey Hoch (adjustment committee
chairperson), and Carol McBride (adjustment committee member) for violating his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights at Pinckneyville. He seeks monetary damages (Doc. 8-2, pp. 2-3).

1

Plaintiff filed an unsigned complaint (Doc. 1) on June 8, 2015. The Court entered an Order (Doc. 6)
striking the pleading the following day. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Plaintiff was required to file a properly
signed amended complaint on or before July 9, 2015. The amended complaint (Doc. 8) complies with the
Court’s Order (Doc. 6) and is now ripe for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Page 1 of 14

Amended Complaint
On July 30, 2014, Officer Hastings, 2 a Pinckneyville correctional officer, informed
Plaintiff that he would soon be sent to segregation (Doc. 8, p. 3). At the time, Plaintiff was
housed in Pinckneyville’s general population. He was given no reason for the decision.
Within minutes, Defendant Frank, a Pinckneyville lieutenant, appeared at Plaintiff’s cell
and told him to pack his property in preparation for the move (Doc. 8, pp. 3-4). Plaintiff was
aware of a “vile and notorious history” of assaults targeting black and Latino inmates 3 at
Pinckneyville, so he requested an escort to segregation by the “orange crush” tactical team
“for safety and security reasons” (Id.). Defendant Frank denied Plaintiff’s request and ordered
him to “[e]ither cuff up now or get sprayed” (Doc. 8, p. 4). Plaintiff complied with the order.
Even so, Defendant Frank sprayed Plaintiff in the face with pepper spray. As Plaintiff
stumbled backward in search of the sink, Defendant Frank and Officer Hastings prevented him
from rinsing his face by slamming him onto the bottom bunk. The officers then cuffed Plaintiff
so tightly that he lost circulation in his hands. In a “controlled state of rage,” Defendant Frank
proceeded to beat Plaintiff while he was handcuffed, pounding his body and throwing him
against the walls and cell fixtures (Doc. 8, pp. 4, 6).
After removing Plaintiff from the cell, Defendant Frank, Officer Hastings, and several
unknown officers led Plaintiff toward Pinckneyville’s health care unit. As they did so, the
officers used a “tactical arm-wrenching maneuver” that forced Plaintiff’s cuffed arms upward
2

Neither Officer Hastings nor the unidentified officers who escorted Plaintiff to segregation are named as
defendants in this action, either in the case caption or in the list of defendants. Therefore, the Court will
not treat these individuals as parties. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10 (title of complaint must “name all the
parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (for an individual to be considered
a party under Rule 10, he must be “specif[ied] in the caption”).
3
Although the amended complaint alludes to race as being a motivating factor for some prisoner assaults
at Pinckneyville, Plaintiff does not go on to claim that race motivated the use of excessive force against
him on July 30, 2014. The amended complaint also mentions no race-based claim against any particular
defendant.
Page 2 of 14

and his head downward, causing extreme pain in his arms, back, and neck. The officers also
threw Plaintiff against walls, dragged him down stairs, and slammed his face into three doors
before exiting Housing Unit 3 (Doc. 8, p. 7). Plaintiff remained quiet during this incident
because he feared for his life.
Outside of the R-3 Cell House, Defendant Frank slammed Plaintiff onto the concrete
ground (Doc. 8, p. 8). Plaintiff sustained a shoulder and forearm injury, in the process of turning
his body to avoid a head injury. Plaintiff was then “yanked” up off the ground and taken to the
health care unit. When Plaintiff attempted to lift his head, Defendant Frank slammed Plaintiff
onto the floor and used a closed fist to hit him in the back, neck, head, and shoulders. Defendant
Frank and several other unknown officers then escorted Plaintiff to a sink and held his face under
the water “as if to taunt or drown” him, while saying, “Got enough water mother*cker?” (Doc. 8,
p. 9). This went on for several minutes.
After Plaintiff was assessed by medical staff, he was taken to a shower (Doc. 8, p. 10).
There, Defendant Frank continued to beat Plaintiff, who eventually fell to the floor and broke his
left thumb. When he asked for medical attention, Defendant Frank applied pressure to his
thumb, causing more pain. Plaintiff’s requests for medical attention were otherwise ignored.
Plaintiff learned the reason for his transfer after he was placed in segregation (Doc. 8-1,
p. 7). He received a disciplinary ticket accusing him of sexual misconduct in connection with a
female officer. This charge was ultimately dismissed. But Plaintiff was also charged with
attempted staff assault, intimidation and/or threats, insolence, and disobeying a direct order
(Doc. 8-1, p. 4; Doc. 8-3, p. 7). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Frank issued this ticket in an
effort to cover up his use of excessive force against Plaintiff.

Page 3 of 14

On July 31, 2014, Plaintiff attended a disciplinary hearing before Pinckneyville’s
adjustment committee, which included Defendant Hoch and McBride. They denied his request
to call witnesses, refused to grant him a continuance, and disregarded all exonerating evidence
(Doc. 8-1, p. 4; Doc. 8-2, p. 1). He was ultimately found guilty of all disciplinary charges,
except the sexual misconduct charge. Plaintiff was punished with a disciplinary transfer to
Menard, a 1-year term in segregation, a 6-month term of no contact visits, a 3-month revocation
of his good conduct credits, and demotion to C-grade status (Doc. 8-1, p. 9; Doc. 8-3, p. 8).
Following his transfer to Menard on July 31, 2014, Plaintiff was placed in segregation in
Menard’s North II Cell House (Doc. 8-1, p. 1). He immediately submitted a request for medical
treatment for a suspected broken thumb. Plaintiff was not called to the health care unit until
August 12, 2014. He was not diagnosed with a left metacarpal fracture until August 18, 2014,
when he was referred to an outside orthopedic clinic. Plaintiff was placed in a hand and arm
cast, prescribed pain medication, and put on a medical hold (Doc. 8-1, p. 2). Once back in
Menard’s health care unit, Plaintiff was placed in a cold cell without any clothing, personal
property, or mattress. 4
Plaintiff now sues Defendants Frank, Hoch, and McBride. According to the amended
complaint, Defendant Frank used excessive force against him, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, and denied him medical treatment for the injuries he sustained as a result.
Defendants Hoch and McBride violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law
by conducting an unfair disciplinary hearing on false disciplinary charges that were leveled
against him by Defendant Frank and another officer. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for these
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations.
4

The amended complaint names no defendants and sets forth no claims in connection with the events that
transpired at Menard, following Plaintiff’s transfer there on July 31, 2014.
Page 4 of 14

Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the amended complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen
prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is
required to dismiss any portion of the amended complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a
defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a
complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual
allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts
“should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). After carefully considering the allegations, the Court finds that the
amended complaint survives preliminary review under Section 1915A.

Page 5 of 14

Discussion
To facilitate the orderly management of future proceedings in this case, and in
accordance with the objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 10(b), the Court
deems it appropriate to reorganize the claims in Plaintiff’s pro se amended complaint as set forth
below. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
Count 1:

Defendant Frank used excessive force against Plaintiff, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, when transferring him to segregation on July 30,
2014;

Count 2:

Defendant Frank denied Plaintiff adequate medical treatment for
the injuries he sustained on July 30, 2014, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment; and

Count 3:

Defendants Hoch and McBride deprived Plaintiff of a protected
liberty interest without due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, when they found him guilty of false
disciplinary charges following an unfair disciplinary hearing and
punished him with a disciplinary transfer, placement in
segregation, loss of good conduct credit, demotion to C-grade
status, and loss of contact visits.

Count 1 – Excessive Force
Plaintiff sues Defendant Frank for using excessive force against him on July 30, 2014
(Count 1). On that date, Defendant Frank allegedly sprayed Plaintiff with pepper spray, cuffed
him too tightly, and repeatedly beat him while transferring him from Pinckneyville’s general
population to segregation.

At the time, Plaintiff was allegedly complying with Defendant

Frank’s orders. He sustained multiple injuries, including a broken finger, as result. These
allegations support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Frank.
The Eighth Amendment forbids the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain upon
prisoners. The intentional use of excessive force by prison guards against an inmate without
Page 6 of 14

penological justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2000).
It has long been recognized that the “core requirement” of an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim is that the defendant “used force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,
but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890
(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). See also Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 757 (7th Cir. 2010).
Factors that guide the Court’s analysis of whether an officer’s use of excessive force was
legitimate or malicious are the need for an application of force, the amount of force used, the
threat an officer reasonably perceived, the effort made to temper the severity of the force used,
and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Hendrickson,
589 F.3d at 890; Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). The amended complaint
describes numerous examples of excessive force allegedly used by Defendant Frank on
July 30, 2014, all of which warrant further review. Count 1 shall therefore proceed against
Defendant Frank. 5
Count 2 – Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Plaintiff shall also be allowed to proceed with an Eighth Amendment denial of medical
care claim (Count 2) against Defendant Frank. To state a claim, the amended complaint must
allege that the Defendant Frank exhibited deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s serious

5

Count 1 is considered dismissed without prejudice against Defendants Hoch and McBride. These two
defendants are not mentioned in connection with the excessive force claim. Section 1983 creates a cause
of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under [Section] 1983, an
individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village
of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The doctrine of respondeat superior
does not apply. See, e.g., Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). Given the lack of
allegations in the complaint suggesting that Defendants Hoch and McBride were personally involved in
the use of excessive force against Plaintiff, Count 1 cannot proceed against either one of them.
Page 7 of 14

medical needs. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2006) (per curiam). This claim
involves a two-part inquiry: (1) Plaintiff must first show that his condition “was objectively
serious;” and (2) Plaintiff must demonstrate that “state officials acted with deliberate
indifference” to that condition. Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2000).
For screening purposes, Plaintiff has alleged the existence of one or more objectively
serious medical conditions, in connection with Defendant Frank’s use of excessive force against
him on July 30, 2014. A medical condition is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1373. Factors that
suggest the presence of a serious medical condition include “the existence of an injury that a
reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the
presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the
existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Id. at 1364. The injuries that Plaintiff sustained on
July 30, 2014, including a broken metacarpal, injured shoulder, injured forearm, etc., are
suggestive of serious medical conditions.
To establish deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must demonstrate that prison officials
“kn[e]w of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health” by being “‘aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]’” and
“‘draw[ing] the inference.’”

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Plaintiff is not required to establish that
the officials “intended or desired the harm that transpired,” but to instead show that they “knew
of a substantial risk of harm . . . and disregarded it.” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. The allegations in

Page 8 of 14

the amended complaint state a plausible deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Frank,
who disregarded Plaintiff’s explicit requests for medical attention following the events that
occurred on July 30, 2014. As a result, Plaintiff did not receive a medical appointment for nearly
two weeks or treatment for nearly three weeks—and only after he was transferred to Menard.
See, e.g., Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A delay in treating non-lifethreatening but painful conditions may constitute deliberate indifference if the delay exacerbated
the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.”). Under the circumstances, Count 2
shall receive further review. 6
Count 3 – Deprivation of Liberty Without Due Process
Plaintiff cannot proceed with his due process claim (Count 3) at this time. This claim
arises from Plaintiff’s allegedly unfair disciplinary hearing that following the issuance of a false
disciplinary ticket on July 30, 2014. The ticket charged Plaintiff with sexual misconduct, staff
assault, intimidation or threats, insolence, and disobeying a direct order, followed by an allegedly
unfair disciplinary hearing on July 31, 2014 (Doc. 8-3, p. 7). With the exception of the sexual
misconduct charge, Plaintiff was found guilty of all rule violations at a disciplinary hearing on
July 31, 2014. The sexual misconduct charge was “deleted.” Plaintiff was punished with one
year of C-grade, one year of segregation, three months of revoked good conduct credit, six
months of contact visit restrictions, and a transfer to Menard (Doc. 8-3, p. 8). The amended
complaint does not describe Plaintiff’s efforts to appeal the adjustment committee’s decision.
Nevertheless, he seeks monetary damages to compensate him for a violation of his due process
rights.

6

Count 2 is considered dismissed without prejudice against Defendants Hoch and McBride, for the same
reasons that Count 1 is considered dismissed against these same defendants.
Page 9 of 14

Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1994), a prisoner cannot bring a civil
rights claim for money damages based on an allegedly unconstitutional disciplinary action that
includes the revocation of good conduct credit, unless the disciplinary “conviction” is overturned
or expunged. For purposes of Heck, a disciplinary action is equivalent to a conviction and
sentence.
[I]n order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a
conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable
under § 1983.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (emphasis in original). See also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649
(1997) (Heck bar means that a plaintiff has no claim to pursue so long as the punishment
imposed remains in force); Moore v. Mahone, 652 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2011); Gilbert v.
Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 2008).
In other words, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim challenging the disciplinary action taken
against him because a judgment in his favor would “necessarily imply” that the disciplinary
action is invalid. His civil rights claim ripens only when the disciplinary decision is reversed or
otherwise invalidated. See Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303, 306-07 (7th Cir. 2006).
The deletion of the sexual misconduct charge does not satisfy this pre-condition. After
all, Plaintiff was not punished for sexual misconduct because the charge was deleted. Plaintiff is
challenging the entire disciplinary decision, based on his claim that he is innocent of all rule
violations (and never should have been punished in the first place). Under the circumstances,
Plaintiff’s claim ripens when the entire disciplinary decision on all charges is invalidated.

Page 10 of 14

And by all indications, the disciplinary decision rendered by Defendants Hoch and
McBride on July 31, 2014, remains in full force and effect. Therefore, Plaintiff’s due process
claim as it relates to the ticket issued on July 30, 2015, is Heck-barred and must be dismissed.
However, the dismissal shall be without prejudice to Plaintiff raising this claim, should he wish
to do so, if and when the decision is overturned. See Olive v. Wright, Case No. 07-1031, 2007
WL 1832106, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 25, 2007) (Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants issued false
disciplinary ticket in retaliation could not proceed because deciding the claim would require the
Court to determine whether his disciplinary ticket was “invalid and based on improper
motivation.”); West v. Shah, Case No. 11-cv-3271, 2011 WL 3924164, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 7,
2011) (Plaintiff’s claim regarding false disciplinary ticket could not stand because it implies that
his good time credit should be restored).
Plaintiff may be able to challenge the disciplinary decision in a federal habeas corpus
case, after presenting all of his claims to the Illinois courts. This includes appealing any adverse
decision to the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court. The Illinois courts have
recognized mandamus as an appropriate remedy to compel prison officials to award sentence
credit to a prisoner. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14–101 et seq.; Turner-El v. West, 811 N.E.2d
728, 733 (Ill. App. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Franzen, 417 N.E.2d 242, 247, aff’d on reh’g,
420 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. 1981)). Again, if Plaintiff successfully challenges the disciplinary
actions that resulted in the loss of good conduct credits, he may then refile this civil rights claim
seeking money damages.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed two motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docs. 2, 10),
which shall be addressed in a separate Order of the Court.

Page 11 of 14

Plaintiff has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 9), which shall be
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for a decision.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 3 in the amended complaint (Doc. 8) is
DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Further, COUNTS 1 and 2 are DISMISSED without prejudice against Defendants Hoch and
McBride for the same reason.
AS TO COUNTS 1 and 2, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for DEFENDANT FRANK:
(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
amended complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons
(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to
pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the

Page 12 of 14

Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on
which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails
to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
amended complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision
on Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 9).
Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
should all the parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of
whether his applications to proceed in forma pauperis (Docs. 2, 10) are granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court

Page 13 of 14

and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not independently
investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a
transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay
in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 15, 2015

__________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

Page 14 of 14