Suarez v. Harrington et al
Filing
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should Plaintiff wish to proceed with this case, Plaintiff shall file his First Amended Complaint on or before August 11, 2015. (Amended Pleadings due by 8/11/2015). Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 7/7/2015. (tjk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MIGUEL A. SUAREZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD HARRINGTON,
TIMOTHY R. VEATH,
DAVID T. JOHNSON, and
REBECCA A. COWAN,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:15-cv-00637-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Miguel Suarez is currently incarcerated at the Menard Correctional Center in
Menard, Illinois, but was previously incarcerated at the Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg,
Illinois. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Proceeding pro se, Suarez has filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against a number of corrections officers at Menard, alleging that prison officials violated
his constitutional rights by not giving him a disciplinary ticket fast enough after the underlying
offense occurred and by “falsely imprisoning” him in segregation on a ticket that was ultimately
expunged due to procedural problems. (Id. at 3-5) Suarez seeks money damages. (Id. at 5.)
This matter is now before the Court for a preliminary review of Suarez’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court shall review a “complaint
in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a government entity.” During this preliminary review under § 1915A, the court
“shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if
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the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or
if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
Background
According to Suarez’s complaint and the exhibits attached to it, Suarez was involved in
an altercation with a prisoner at Hill Correctional Center on June 13, 2013. (Doc. 1 at 3.) He
was transferred to Menard shortly after the fight, and he was then issued a disciplinary ticket for
being involved in a “disturbance,” assault, and impeding an investigation–all charges related to
the altercation at Hill. (Doc. 1-1 at 9-10.) On July 4, 2013, prison officials held a hearing related
to the ticket, and the adjustment committee (through Officers Veath and Johnson) found Suarez
guilty. (Id.) As punishment, the committee ordered one year of “C Grade,” one year of
commissary restriction, and one year of segregation. (Id. at 10.) Harrington signed off on the
committee’s ruling on July 8, 2013, and a final report was sent to Suarez on July 12, 2013. (Id.)
On July 1, 2013, the same date that Suarez was served with the disciplinary ticket, Suarez
filed a grievance with the Administrative Review Board, insisting that the ticket was given to
him outside of the time period dictated by the Illinois code and must be expunged. (Id. at 1.)
The grievance was received by the Board on July 22, 2013, and a little under one year later, the
Board recommended that the disciplinary report be expunged and that Suarez’s sanctions be
“restored pending any subsequent discipline.” (Id. at 4.) Suarez was released from segregation
on July 23, 2014, and the ticket was expunged on August 19, 2014. (Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 1-1 at 5.)
On June 8, 2015, Suarez filed a § 1983 action in this Court. (Doc. 1 at 1.)
Discussion
Suarez’s complaint focuses primarily on alleged due process violations related to the July
2013 adjustment committee ruling, so the Court will start there (Count 1). Whether any process
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is due for a sanction of segregated confinement turns on the severity of the confinement: if the
“period of segregated confinement is protracted or the conditions in segregation unusually
harsh,” some process is required; if not, no process is owed to a prisoner. Toston v. Thurmer,
689 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2012). The punishment meted out in Suarez’s case–nearly one year
of time in segregation–is the kind of discipline that might trigger some Fourteenth Amendment
due process requirements, so the question at screening becomes whether the process given
Suarez was sufficient. See Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009)
(noting that a “claim of confinement in segregation for 240 days may implicate a liberty
interest”). Even when a liberty interest is triggered, prisoners should keep in mind that the
process due under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is rather
minimal–“[i]n the prison disciplinary context, due process requires only that the prisoner receive
advance written notice of the charges, an opportunity to present testimony and documentary
evidence to an impartial decision-maker, and a written explanation for the discipline that is
supported by some evidence in the record.” Piggle v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003).
Suarez’s due process claim in this case fails at the gate because he does not allege a
violation of any these requirements. Rather, Suarez only points to a violation of the Illinois
Administrative Code, specifically the section that compels prison officials to serve a ticket to an
offender no more than eight days after the commission of the underlying offense. See ILL. ADMIN
CODE tit. 20, § 504.30(f). But a run-of-the-mill violation of this section is no violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. United States ex rel. Houston v. Warden, Stateville Corr. Ctr., 635 F.2d
656, 659 (7th Cir. 1980). To be sure, the only way that a delay in giving a ticket could possibly
state a Fourteenth Amendment violation is if the delay was so egregious that it “might interfere
with [a prisoner’s] right to marshal the facts and prepare his defense.” See id. (finding no due
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process violation for two-month delay in providing ticket). Because Suarez does not allege
anything like that here, Count 1 must be dismissed without prejudice.
Suarez also hints at a violation of the Eighth Amendment related to his placement in
segregation, stating that he was subject to “false imprisonment” in the prison’s segregation unit
because his disciplinary ticket was ultimately expunged (Count 2). The Seventh Circuit, over
the dissent of Judge Easterbrook, has recognized that the Eighth Amendment could be violated
when prison officials impose disciplinary sanctions against a prisoner that are not proportional to
the conduct at issue, so long as the sanctions are objectively serious. E.g., Pearson v. Ramos,
237 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001); Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22, 28-29 (7th Cir. 1978);
Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 635-36 (7th Cir. 1973). While this Court has its doubts as to
whether this line of cases creates a claim for “false imprisonment” in segregation for a
disciplinary ticket that was ultimately expunged, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the
possibility of such a claim once. In Leslie v. Doyle, 125 F.3d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1997), the
Court said that a prisoner might have a claim when he is placed in segregation for a long period
by officials for “no offense at all”–as a “matter of mathematics,” that would be
“disproportionate.” If all that was required for an Eighth Amendment cause of action was an
allegation of objective harm, then Suarez’s complaint might state a claim (at least at screening).
An objective allegation, however, is not enough on its own to state a constitutional claim;
a prisoner must also “allege . . . that defendant-officials acted with deliberate indifference”
towards the unconstitutional circumstances. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2005).
Deliberate indifference is a robust state of mind requirement: to state a claim, a prisoner must
allege that officials were criminally reckless–that they knew about the risk of harm but ignored
it. See, e.g., Christopher v. Buss, 384 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff “must allege that
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the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk”); Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679,
683 (7th Cir. 2001) (inmate “must allege actual knowledge of impending harm easily
preventable”); Mueller v. Schnick, 210 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal because
plaintiff did not allege that official “knew of and disregarded an excessive risk”). What counts
as indifference in the context of an Eighth Amendment claim like this one, where a prisoner
alleges that he was in segregation longer than he should have been because the ticket was
expunged, is not all that clear. These types of cases are rare, and many of the other circuits do
not join the Seventh Circuit’s view that a proportionality analysis even applies to prison
discipline.
See Pearson, 237 F.3d at 885 (proportionality has been “attenuated in recent
decisions of the Supreme Court”); Chapman v. Pickett, 801 F.2d 912, 922-23 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“It is hard to imagine a rule more enervating than one that allows a
prisoner to collect damages from his keepers on the ground that they should have returned him to
the general population, after an admitted offense, in six months rather than nine, or perhaps in
three weeks rather than four.”). The best analogy might be to cases where a prisoner alleges his
Eighth Amendment rights were violated because he was kept incarcerated after the date he
should have been released; those cases say that indifference might exist when an official “knew
of the prisoner’s problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being inflicted;
that the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances; and
that there was a causal connection between the official’s response to the problem and the
unjustified detention.” Burke v. Johnston, 452 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2006).
Here, Suarez does not allege facts suggesting any indifference. He does not say that he
told any of the defendants of the ticket problem during the hearing or after, nor does he say that
any official took ineffectual action in response. Construing his complaint liberally, the best
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Suarez alleges is that some of the defendants should have known about the problem, but a
“should of” allegation does not make out a claim. See, e.g., Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616,
627 (7th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff “must allege that [official] knew of the risk,” not just that he
“should have known”); Steidl v. Gramley, 151 F.3d 739, 740-41 (7th Cir. 1998) (allegation that
official “knew or should have known” of risk did “not state a claim under the Eighth
Amendment,” as the “Supreme Court expressly rejected the suggestion that a prison official
violates the Eighth Amendment when he might have known of a risk of harm, or in any event
should have known”); Billman v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995)
(affirming dismissal of claim at screening because party did not allege that any of the defendants
“[knew] all the [risks]” and were “responsible for his cell assignment,” and holding that a party
is not “guilty of deliberate indifference even if they should have known about the risk, that is,
even if they were negligent”). Because Suarez has not alleged any indifference by officials
related to his confinement and the ticket problem, Count 2 must be dismissed without prejudice.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should Plaintiff wish to proceed with this case,
Plaintiff shall file his First Amended Complaint on or before August 11, 2015. He should label
the form First Amended Complaint, and he should use the case number for this action. For
Count 1, Plaintiff should include any allegations that infer that the named defendants deprived
him of his federal due process rights in connection with the disciplinary hearing. For Count 2,
Plaintiff should include any allegations that infer that the named defendants acted with deliberate
indifference concerning his allegedly wrongful confinement in segregation.
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An amended complaint supersedes all previous complaints, rendering previous
complaints void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir.
2004).
The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to a complaint; thus, the First
Amended Complaint must stand on its own. Should the First Amended Complaint not conform
to these requirements, it shall be stricken. Plaintiff must also re-file any exhibits he wishes the
Court to consider along with the amended complaint. Failure to file a First Amended Complaint
shall result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice. Such dismissal shall count as one of
Plaintiff’s three allotted “strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). No service shall
be ordered on any Defendant until after the Court completes its § 1915A review of the First
Amended Complaint.
In order to assist Plaintiff in preparing his amended complaint, the
CLERK is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 7, 2015
__________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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