Adams-Suggs v. Coppotelli et al

Filing 35

ORDER denying 21 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 6/20/2016. (rlw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LORRAINE ADAMS-SUGGS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 15-cv-0669-SMY-PMF

JEREMY COPPOTELLI, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Deputy Calvin Savage’s (hereinafter
“Savage”) Motion to Dismiss Count VIII (Doc. 21). Plaintiff responded (Doc. 23). For the
reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
Background
Plaintiff claims that she was deprived of her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution when she was arrested in front of her home on July 10, 2014.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint (Doc. 1) that at approximately 12:31 a.m. on that
date, she heard "something out of the ordinary" and looked out her front door to witness her two
sons being held to the ground at gunpoint by police officers. She then went outside and asked
the arresting officers, identified as Jeremy Coppotelli, Calvin Savage, Xavier Blackburn and
Jesse Carmack, why they were holding her sons at gunpoint. The arresting officers refused to
answer.
Plaintiff then began video-taping the event from her front porch. Without warning, the
arresting officers TASED, physically battered, handcuffed and arrested Plaintiff without
probable cause and without advising her of the charge against her. Plaintiff was held in the St.

Clair County Jail until 11:38 a.m. when she posted a $150 cash bond. She was subsequently
charged with resisting a police officer and obstruction of a peace officer. These charges were
ultimately dismissed on January 20, 2015. Plaintiff further alleges that as a result of the incident,
she suffered mental health and emotional damages and requires medical treatment for posttraumatic stress disorder.
Plaintiff brings claims for false arrest against each of the four arresting officers (Counts IIV), a failure to intervene claim against the arresting officers (Count V), a failure-to-train claim
against the sheriff in his official capacity (Count VI), an indemnification claim (Count VII) and a
malicious prosecution claim against arresting officer Calvin Savage (Count VIII). Defendant
Savage contends that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for malicious prosecution and has only pled
false arrest. He argues that claims of malicious prosecution require allegations of malicious acts
subsequent to the wrongful arrest, including perjured testimony, falsifying evidence or
withholding exculpatory evidence, which are absent from Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Discussion
To state a claim for malicious prosecution under Illinois law, Plaintiff must allege the
following: (1) she was subjected to judicial proceedings; (2) for which there was no probable
cause; (3) the defendant instituted or continued the proceedings maliciously; (4) the proceedings
were terminated in Plaintiff’s favor; and (5) there was an injury. Sneed v. Rybicki, 146 F.3d 478,
481 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Reed v. City of Chi., 77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996)). Here,
Savage draws into question only the third element (malice).
Savage cites Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 n.5 (1994) (Ginsberg, J., concurring))
in which Justice Ginsberg described the plaintiff’s reliance on a malicious prosecution
(substantive due process) theory as opposed to a Fourth Amendment theory in a case arising

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as “anomalous”. However, in Reed, the Seventh Circuit explained that,
despite the anomaly, a wrongful arrest can be the first step towards the survival of a malicious
prosecution claim. “…[T]he chain of causation is broken by an indictment, absent an allegation
of pressure or influence exerted by the police officers, or knowing misstatements made by the
officers to the prosecutor” (See Reed, supra, 77 F.3d at 1053, citing Albright, 510 U.S. at 279
n.5).
Savage asserts that Reed supports his contention that Plaintiff’s allegations are
insufficient under Seventh Circuit case law. However, Illinois law does not require malicious
acts subsequent to the arrest and filing of charges. To the contrary, Illinois appellate courts have
stated that a fact-finder “may infer malice from lack of probable cause if there is no credible
evidence which refutes that inference.” Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills, 784 N.E.2d 258, 270 (Ill.
App. 2002); see also Gauger v. Hendle, 954 N.E.2d 307, 333 (Ill. App. 2011). All that is
required is an indication “that defendant acted maliciously, i. e., that he purposely filed the
criminal complaint for some reason other than to bring plaintiff to justice.” Ritchey v. Maksin,
376 N.E.2d 991, 993 (Ill. Sup. 1978). The Seventh Circuit has recognized and applied this
standard. Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Aguirre v. City of
Chi., 887 N.E.2d 656 (Ill App. 2008) (“[i]t is well established that a jury can infer malice from
an absence of probable cause.”); Aleman v. Vill. of Hanover Park, 662 F.3d 897, 907 (7th Cir.
2011) (“[Illinois appellate cases] permit an inference of malice to be drawn from an absence of
probable cause
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Savage wrongfully arrested her and filed a charge against her
for obstruction of a peace officer without probable cause. Plaintiff further alleges that Savage
harbored malice towards her because she videotaped him during the arrest of her sons. These

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allegations are sufficient to survive Savage’s 12(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, the motion is
denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: June 30, 2016

s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
DISTRICT JUDGE

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