O'Quinn v. Olkoski et al

Filing 13

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 8/24/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHESTER O’QUINN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JASON OLKOSKI,
THOMAS SPILLER,
S.A. GODINEZ,
CHARLES W. HECK,
MARCUS A. MYERS,
VIPIN SHAH,
C/O WANGLER,
C/O HELSLEY,
C/O HICKS,
C/O KRAFT,
C/O BRITTON,
C/O THEIS,
C/O WALTERS,
C/O BOWLES,
C/O FERNANDEZ,
C/O NEWBURY,
C/O BARNES,
C/O DICKERSON,
RANDY ALLEN, and
JOHN DOE #1, 1
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:15-cv-00796-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Plaintiff Chester O’Quinn is currently incarcerated at the Pinckneyville Correctional
Center in Pinckneyville, Illinois. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Proceeding pro se, O’Quinn has filed a civil
rights action against a number of prison officials at Pinckneyville, alleging violations of several
1

In the list of defendants included in O’Quinn’s complaint, O’Quinn indicates that he is pursuing
claims against one unknown party, who he has dubbed John Doe #1. Accordingly, the CLERK
is DIRECTED to remove the Unknown Parties designation and add John Doe #1 instead.
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constitutional amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and various provisions of Illinois law and
the Illinois Constitution. (Id.) O’Quinn says that officials have refused to accommodate his
hand- and back-related disabilities, have engaged in excessive force against him, have failed to
provide him with medical care, have exposed him to improper conditions in his segregation and
post-segregation living arrangements, and have written false tickets against him, among other
claims. (Id. at 7-16.) O’Quinn seeks money damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 17.)
This matter is now before the Court for a preliminary review of O’Quinn’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court shall review a “complaint
in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a government entity.” During this preliminary review under § 1915A, the court
“shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if
the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or
if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
Background
According to O’Quinn’s complaint, on December 12, 2014 at around 5 A.M., Corrections
Officer Hicks refused to allow O’Quinn to take his prescription insulin. (Doc. 1 at 4.) O’Quinn
looked at Hicks’ name tag so that he could record the officer’s name and another guard,
Lieutenant Olkoski, saw O’Quinn scrutinizing Hicks and began questioning O’Quinn. (Id.)
Olkoski thought O’Quinn’s actions constituted threats and intimidation of an officer, so he
ordered O’Quinn to prepare to be placed in handcuffs. (Id.) O’Quinn extended his front arms so
that he could be front-cuffed and told Olkoski that his medical permits required front cuffs due to
O’Quinn’s hand- and back-related disabilities. (Id.) Olkoski replied that O’Quinn’s permits did
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not require front cuffs, and he handcuffed O’Quinn behind his back. (Id.) O’Quinn then heard
“something pop,” and his legs gave out. (Id.) Another officer arrived and both Olkoski and the
other officer dragged O’Quinn to segregation as he was crying out in pain. (Id.)
Once O’Quinn arrived in segregation, O’Quinn says that Olkoski and the other officer
slammed O’Quinn’s head into a wall, knocking O’Quinn unconscious. (Id.) O’Quinn awoke to
a number of officers and medical staff gathered around him, asking him what was wrong. (Id.)
O’Quinn reported that he was having trouble breathing and that his head, back, neck, legs, arms,
and wrists were in pain. (Id.) A nurse was called and twice checked O’Quinn’s blood pressure,
but otherwise no medical treatment was provided. (Id.) Officers then undressed O’Quinn, gave
him a segregation jumpsuit, cuffed him behind his back, and dragged him to a cell without a
mattress or heat. (Id. at 5 & 9.) The next morning, O’Quinn asked an officer named Davis if he
could have a mattress and bedding, and if medical personnel could evaluate his injuries. (Id. at
5.) Davis got O’Quinn a mattress, but he was not given any bedding, and no nurse was sent to
examine him. (Id.) O’Quinn also asked Walters and Colvin to turn the heat on in his cell, but
that did not happen for some time. (Id. at 5 & 9.) That day, O’Quinn wrote a letter to Spiller,
Edwards, and Allen, detailing his false placement in segregation, his lack of accommodations,
and his need for treatment. (Id. at 5 & 9.) He received no response. (Id. at 5 & 9.)
On December 13, 2014, around two days into his placement in segregation, an officer
that O’Quinn has designated John Doe 1 arrived at his cell to bring O’Quinn his bedding. (Id.)
The officer back-cuffed O’Quinn so that he could search O’Quinn’s property before leaving the
cell. (Id.) O’Quinn fell during the search and John Doe 1 called another officer to assist in
getting O’Quinn off the floor; during that effort, O’Quinn says both officers slammed his head

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into a steel bunk, causing him more pain. (Id.) John Doe 1 and the other officer then left
O’Quinn’s cell, without getting him any medical treatment for his injuries. (Id.)
On December 15, 2014, health officials ordered O’Quinn brought to the infirmary for
treatment. (Id.) Officer Wangler was assigned to transport him, and Wangler back-cuffed
O’Quinn for the transfer – again ignoring O’Quinn’s medical permits. (Id.) Wangler allegedly
placed the cuffs on O’Quinn so tight that they cut off his circulation and “damaged his nerves.”
(Id.) As Wangler walked O’Quinn to the prison’s health care unit, he told O’Quinn that he did
not appreciate O’Quinn’s complaints about the other officers on Wangler’s shift, and that he
should stop. (Id. at 6.) Wangler then took O’Quinn to the infirmary for treatment. (Id.)
On December 16, 2015, O’Quinn wrote another letter to Spiller and Edwards, advising
them yet again of his false arrest and his lack of accommodations in segregation. (Id.) He
received no response, so he followed up with another letter on December 18, again telling Spiller
and Edwards that he was not receiving accommodations for his disabilities or treatment for his
injuries. (Id.) He also told Spiller and Edwards that he was not receiving medical care for his
injuries or being provided with his insulin and “snack pack” related to his diabetes. (Id.)
On December 19, 2014, Wangler was present for an appointment that O’Quinn had with
Dr. Shah in the prison’s health care unit. (Id.) During the appointment, Wangler asked Shah
what the x-rays of O’Quinn indicated, and Shah told him that the x-rays indicated a narrowing of
O’Quinn’s discs and severe arthritis, but no broken bones. (Id.) O’Quinn objected to this
exchange while it was happening, saying that his medical records were private. (Id.) That same
day, Officer Fernandez refused to bring O’Quinn food to take with his medications. (Id. at 9.)
For four days, Fernandez also refused to provide O’Quinn with his insulin. (Id.)

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On December 23, 2014, Officer Helsley back-cuffed O’Quinn, again in violation of
O’Quinn’s permits. (Id.) That same day, O’Quinn wrote a letter to Shah and Brown, the
administrator of the health care unit, saying that he was not receiving accommodations for his
disabilities, but neither Shah nor Brown responded. (Id. at 6.) The day after O’Quinn’s letter,
Officer Theis also refused to provide O’Quinn with his snack bag and his insulin. (Id. at 9.)
Several other officers back-cuffed O’Quinn during the remainder of his time in segregation from
December 2014 to February 2015: on December 30, 2015, Britton back-cuffed him; on January
2, 2015, Hicks back-cuffed him; on January 12, 2015, Bowles back-cuffed him; on January 21,
2015, Newbury back-cuffed him; and on January 28, 2015, Kraft back-cuffed him. (Id. at 9.)
On December 27, 2014, O’Quinn wrote to several officials at the prison, including
Lawless, Kellerman, McBride, Adams, Malcomb, Spiller, and Edwards, explaining that he still
was being held falsely because he had not had a hearing before the adjustment committee. (Id. at
6.) O’Quinn encountered Myers, a member of the adjustment committee, shortly after sending
his letter, and Myers told O’Quinn that the hearing occurred and that officers at the hearing said
that O’Quinn declined to appear. (Id. at 7.) Myers said he would attempt to discover what went
wrong, but nothing came of those efforts. (Id.) On December 29, 2014, O’Quinn sent an
emergency grievance to Spiller, complaining that he was being held without process and asking
for an investigation. (Id.) The day after the letter, O’Quinn received a summary from the
adjustment committee saying that he had been found guilty of intimidation related to the
December 12, 2014 exchange with Olkoski, and that he had been sentenced to two months in
segregation. (Id. at 8.) On January 1, 2015, O’Quinn sent a letter to Godinez, detailing the arrest
and his lack of accommodations for his disabilities in segregation. (Id.) On January 12, 2015,
Godinez directed Spiller to conduct an investigation concerning O’Quinn’s issues.
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(Id.)

Twenty-four hours later, Spiller wrote to O’Quinn, saying that he could not substantiate any of
O’Quinn’s allegations concerning the alleged hearing errors or other issues. (Id. at 9.)
O’Quinn was released from segregation on February 2, 2015, and moved to another area
that he characterizes as equally problematic as segregation, despite the prison’s assertion that he
was indeed returned to general population. (Id. at 10.) In the new area, O’Quinn was denied
access to the cafeteria area and was instead forced to eat in his cell; he was not allowed to go to
the law library; he was not allowed to go to the chapel; he was not given a razor; he was not
allowed to go to the gym; he was not allowed to go to the yard; he was not allowed to go to the
day room; and he was not given railings, an attendant, or a shower chair. (Id.) Three days later,
O’Quinn was transferred to the general population, but there he has a long walk to the cafeteria,
law library, and health care unit, and he still has no shower chair or railings for support. (Id.)
Since his return to the general population, O’Quinn says that he has been targeted by
several friends of Olkoski who are trying to return him to segregation. (Id. at 11.) He claims
that Barnes and Dickerson have written him false tickets due to his disabilities in February 2015
and have conspired with Olkoski to get him returned to segregation. (Id.) He also claims that
Dickerson ordered Walters to conduct an improper search of O’Quinn on April 2, 2015, also by
way of a conspiracy with Olkoski. (Id.) O’Quinn pursued an investigation with Furlow at the
prison, but that investigation went nowhere. (Id.) O’Quinn finally alleges that Allen conducted
illegal cavity searches on O’Quinn at some unspecified point, all at Spiller’s direction. (Id.)
Unsatisfied with prison officials’ efforts to deal with O’Quinn’s segregation-related
problems, O’Quinn filed a civil rights action in this Court on July 22, 2015. (Id. at 1.) O’Quinn
also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order with his complaint, along with a motion for
an abeyance, seeking to place the entire case on an indefinite hold due to the demands of
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O’Quinn’s many other lawsuits. (Doc. 5.) On July 24, 2015, the Court denied the motion for a
temporary restraining order and the motion for an abeyance and, given the character of the
abeyance, asked O’Quinn to provide notice to the Court as to whether he wanted to continue
with the case or voluntarily dismiss it. (Doc. 7.) On August 7, 2015, O’Quinn filed a notice with
the Court indicating that he wished to proceed with his case, and filed another motion for a
temporary restraining order or an injunction. (Doc. 9 & 11.) On August 11, 2015, the Court
denied the motion for a restraining order and indicated that it would conduct a screening of the
complaint in due course. (Doc. 12.) It is that task to which the Court will now turn.
Discussion
O’Quinn’s complaint is long, repetitive, and often hard to follow, making it difficult for
the Court to parse his complaint into divisible claims for screening under § 1915A.
Nevertheless, to facilitate the management of future proceedings, and in accordance with the
objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10, the Court will do its best to break the
claims in O’Quinn’s pro se complaint into numbered counts, as shown below. Any claims not
enumerated below should be considered dismissed without prejudice. The parties and the Court
will use these designations in all pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by the Court.
The designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.
COUNT 1:

Hicks prevented O’Quinn from taking his prescription insulin, in violation
of O’Quinn’s Eighth Amendment rights.

COUNT 2:

The Illinois Department of Corrections, through various employees, failed
to accommodate O’Quinn’s disc- and hand-related disabilities prior to his
placement in segregation in December 2014, during his placement in
segregation from December 2014 to February 2015, and after his
placement in segregation from February 2015 to the present, in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.

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COUNT 3:

Olkoski, John Doe 1, Wangler, Helsley, Britton, Hicks, Bowles, Newbury,
Kraft, and other unspecified officers back-cuffed O’Quinn during his time
in segregation, in violation of O’Quinn’s Eighth Amendment rights.

COUNT 4:

Godinez, Spiller, Edwards, Allen, Shah, and Brown were told via
grievances or letters of officers’ failure to abide by his front-cuff needs but
did not intervene, in violation of O’Quinn’s Eighth Amendment rights.

COUNT 5:

Olkoski and an unspecified officer dragged O’Quinn to segregation and
threw him into a shower wall on December 12, 2014, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.

COUNT 6:

Unspecified parties failed to provide adequate treatment for O’Quinn’s
injuries following his encounter with Olkoski on December 12, 2014, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.

COUNT 7:

John Doe 1 and an unspecified officer slammed O’Quinn’s head into the
steel bunk in his segregation cell on December 13, 2014, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.

COUNT 8:

John Doe 1 and an unspecified officer did not obtain treatment for
O’Quinn related to his December 13, 2014 injuries, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.

COUNT 9:

Wangler cuffed O’Quinn so tight that his circulation was cut off and
dragged him by his handcuffs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

COUNT 10: Wangler threatened and intimidated O’Quinn because O’Quinn reported
that other shift officers harmed him, in violation of the First Amendment.
COUNT 11: Shah disclosed to Wangler details about O’Quinn’s x-rays on December
19, 2014, in violation of O’Quinn’s constitutional rights and his rights
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
COUNT 12: Davis, Walters, Colvin, Spiller, Edwards, and Allen failed to provide
O’Quinn with heat, bedding, and medical care for his injuries during his
initial time in segregation, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
COUNT 13: Fernandez and Theis refused to bring O’Quinn a snack bag or insulin for
his diabetic condition during some of O’Quinn’s time in segregation, in
violation of O’Quinn’s Eighth Amendment rights.
COUNT 14: Lawless, Kellerman, McBride, Adams, Malcomb, Spiller, and Edwards
failed to provide O’Quinn with adequate due process prior to his
placement in segregation, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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COUNT 15: Unspecified defendants violated O’Quinn’s rights under Illinois state laws,
Illinois administrative directives, and the Illinois Constitution concerning
his placement in segregation and his conditions in segregation.
COUNT 16: Unspecified defendants denied O’Quinn access to the general population
cafeteria, access to the law library, access to the chapel, access to a razor,
access to the gym, access to the yard, and access to a day room during his
brief tenure in a transition cell in February 2015.
COUNT 17: Barnes, Dickerson, Olkoski and the Department of Corrections have
violated O’Quinn’s Rehabilitation Act and equal protection rights when
Barnes and Dickerson wrote tickets against O’Quinn due to his
disabilities, and Olkoski conspired with Barnes and Dickerson to have
those tickets written and to return Olkoski to segregation.
COUNT 18: Walters sexually assaulted O’Quinn on the orders of Dickerson and
undertook this behavior as a part of a conspiracy to harm O’Quinn with
Olkoski, in violation of O’Quinn’s rights.
COUNT 19: Furlow conducted a shoddy investigation into O’Quinn’s illegal search
incident, in violation of O’Quinn’s rights.
COUNT 20: Under orders from Spiller, Allen conducted body cavity searches on
O’Quinn at three unspecified points, in violation of O’Quinn’s Eighth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
COUNT 21: Walters harassed, threatened, and intimidated O’Quinn and called
O’Quinn a “boy,” in violation of O’Quinn’s rights.
COUNT 22: All of the defendants retaliated against O’Quinn, violated his equal
protection rights, and engaged in a conspiracy against O’Quinn.
O’Quinn first alleges that Hicks prevented him from taking his insulin on December 14,
2014 (Count 1). To state a medical claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must satisfy
a two-part test: he must first show that his condition “was objectively serious,” and must then
demonstrate that named defendants acted with deliberate indifference towards that condition.
Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2000). O’Quinn’s diabetic condition qualifies as
serious, at least for purposes of screening. Egebergh v. Nicholson, 272 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir.

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2001). In addition, the failure to provide a prisoner with prescription medication can, depending
on the circumstances, constitute deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d
1030, 1040 (7th Cir. 2002) (allegation that nurse failed to give prisoner “his prescribed pain
medication” could establish a constitutional claim); Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160, 1162
(7th Cir. 1999) (prison guard's “deliberate refusal” to provide pain medicine prescribed by prison
physician put forth an Eighth Amendment claim). As such, Count 1 may proceed as to Hicks.
O’Quinn next alleges that various officials failed to accommodate his hand- and discrelated disabilities from December 14, 2014 to the present (Count 2). Construing his complaint
broadly, O’Quinn raises claims under both the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act. Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2012). O’Quinn’s claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act is coextensive with his claim under the Rehabilitation
Act, so the Americans with Disabilities Act claim will be dismissed. See Jaros v. Illinois Dep’t
of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012) (dismissal of ADA claim proper given thorny
questions of sovereign immunity that come with those claims). To state a claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege that he is a qualified individual with a disability and
that he was excluded from participating or denied the benefit of a service by reason of his
disability.

Id. at 672.

The Rehabilitation Act requires prisons to provide reasonable

accommodations for disabilities, so a refusal to make a necessary accommodation to allow
access to a service can be tantamount to denying access to that service. See id.
O’Quinn’s complaint is difficult to follow concerning his Rehabilitation Act claim: he
repeatedly states that officials refused to accommodate his hand- and back-related disabilities,
but he does not clearly allege how that conduct deprived him of services. Owing to the Court’s
duty to interpret his complaint liberally, the Court can discern two possible claims linked to
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prison services. First, O’Quinn says that several guards handcuffed him behind his back despite
knowing that he had a permit requiring front cuffs prior to and during his tenure in segregation.
Construing his complaint liberally, those allegations could suggest conduct that deprived
O’Quinn of access to services at the prison, so he has put forth an arguable Rehabilitation Act
claim. E.g., Kiman v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Corrections, 451 F.3d 274, 288-89 (1st Cir.
2006); Bane v. Virginia Dep’t of Corrections, 267 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 (W.D. Va. 2003). In
addition, O’Quinn suggests that officials have placed him in cells from February 15, 2015
onward that, due to his disabilities, preclude him from accessing showers, the cafeteria, the
library, and health services on the same basis as other inmates, and those allegations are also
sufficient to state an arguable claim. Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672-73. So Count 2 will be allowed to
proceed, but only against the Illinois Department of Corrections. 2 Because the Rehabilitation
Act does not allow for individual capacity claims, the officials named in O’Quinn’s complaint
will be dismissed from this count. Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1999).
O’Quinn also alleges that a number of prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his
needs related to his front-cuff permit (Count 3): he says that Olkoski back-cuffed him on
December 12, 2014; that John Doe 1 back-cuffed him on December 13, 2014; that Wangler
back-cuffed him on December 15, 2014; that Helsley back-cuffed him on December 23, 2014;
that Britton back-cuffed him on December 30, 2014; that Hicks back-cuffed him on January 2,
2015; that Bowles back-cuffed him on January 12, 2015; that Newbury back-cuffed him on
January 21, 2015; that Kraft back-cuffed him on January 28, 2015; and that unspecified officers
back-cuffed him at other points in segregation. The failure to abide by a medical permit related
2

O’Quinn has sued all of the prison officials employed at Pinckneyville or the Department of
Corrections in their official capacity, and that is enough to bring a Rehabilitation Act claim
against the Illinois Department of Corrections. Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670 n.2. Accordingly, the
CLERK is DIRECTED to add the Illinois Department of Corrections as a defendant.
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to a disability could constitute interference with “treatment once prescribed,” Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976), and that is enough to state an arguable Eighth Amendment claim.
Accordingly, Count 3 may proceed as to Olkoski, John Doe 1, Wangler, Helsley, Britton, Hicks,
Bowles, Newbury, and Kraft. However, Count 3 must be dismissed as it relates to O’Quinn’s
vague references to other unspecified officers – O’Quinn has not named any other Does in his
caption or his complaint, so the unspecified officers are not parties to this case. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 10(a) (title of the complaint “must name all the parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d
551, 551–52 (7th Cir.2005) (defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”).
O’Quinn also alleges that he wrote to Godinez, Spiller, Edwards, Allen, Shah, and Brown
concerning his front-cuff problems but they did nothing (Count 4).

This could suggest

deliberate indifference on their part. See Perez v. Fenoglio, — F.3d —, 2015 WL 4092294, at *8
(7th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, Count 4 may proceed as to Godinez, Spiller, Allen, and Shah, but
must be dismissed as to Edwards and Brown, as they were not named as defendants in this case.
O’Quinn next claims that Olkoski and an unspecified officer engaged in excessive force
when they dragged O’Quinn to the segregation unit on December 12, 2014 and then threw him
against a shower wall in the segregation area (Count 5). To put forth an excessive force claim, a
prisoner must show that an assault occurred and that it was “carried out maliciously and
sadistically, rather than as part of a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2010). Critically, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard
gives rise to a federal cause of action” – an inmate who complains of a “‘push or shove’ that
causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.” Id.
(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). Here, O’Quinn has alleged that
Olkoski and the unspecified officer pushed him so hard as to knock him unconscious, and that is
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enough to state an arguable claim. As such, Count 5 may proceed as to Olkoski. However,
Count 5 must be dismissed without prejudice as to the other unspecified officer, as O’Quinn has
not designated this party as a Doe defendant and has not named him as a Doe in the caption.
O’Quinn also alleges that unspecified parties who saw him after the incident with
Olkoski failed to provide him with adequate medical care (Count 6). This claim must be
dismissed for the simple reason that the unspecified parties were not named in the narrative or in
the caption, and were not included in O’Quinn’s list of defendants. Accordingly, these parties
are not defendants in this case at this time, and Count 6 must be dismissed without prejudice.
O’Quinn next alleges that John Doe 1 and an unspecified officer slammed O’Quinn’s
head on the bunk in his segregation cell on December 13, 2014 (Count 7). The Court cannot say
at this stage whether the force employed by John Doe 1 and the other officer was de minimis, so
Count 7 may proceed as to John Doe 1. See Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38. However, Count 7
must be dismissed without prejudice as to the other unspecified officer, as he was not named as a
Doe designate in O’Quinn’s complaint and not put forth in O’Quinn’s list of defendants.
O’Quinn also alleges that John Doe 1 and the other unspecified officer failed to obtain
medical care for the injuries O’Quinn sustained during the incident in the cell (Count 8).
O’Quinn’s allegations of head trauma and severe pain are sufficient to allege an objectively
serious medical condition, at least for purposes of screening. See Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914,
916-17 (7th Cir. 1996) (cellmates’ cuts, severe muscular pain, and eye and skin irritation from
beating could qualify as a serious medical condition). In addition, the circumstances of the
failure to treat could suggest deliberate indifference on the part of John Doe 1 and the
unspecified officer. See id. at 917 (“Beating a person in violation of the Constitution should
impose on the assailant a duty of prompt attention to any medical need to which the beating
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might give rise . . . .”). As such, Count 8 may proceed as to John Doe 1, but must be dismissed
as to the unspecified officer, as he is not listed by Doe designation or otherwise in the caption.
O’Quinn next alleges that Wangler placed him in handcuffs so tight that they cut off his
circulation, and also drug him by his handcuffs (Count 9). As was the case with the claim
against John Doe 1, the Court cannot say at this stage whether the force employed was de
minimis, so Count 9 may proceed as to Wangler. See Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38.
O’Quinn also claims that Wangler threatened and intimidated O’Quinn because O’Quinn
reported that other shift officers had harmed him concerning his front-cuff requirements (Count
10). To put forth a retaliation claim, a prisoner must “plausibly allege” that he “engaged in
activity protected by the First Amendment,” that he “suffered an adverse action that would likely
deter future First Amendment activity,” and that the “First Amendment activity was at least a
motivating factor in the defendants' decision to retaliate.” Santana v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review,
679 F.3d 614, 622 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, construing O’Quinn’s complaint liberally, O’Quinn
alleges that Wangler made threats against him, that he engaged in this conduct because O’Quinn
made complaints about other guards, and that this conduct harmed him. That is sufficient to put
forth an arguable claim for screening purposes, so Count 10 may proceed as to Wangler.
O’Quinn next claims that Shah violated his rights by disclosing the results of his x-rays to
Wangler – the x-rays were done to evaluate O’Quinn’s alleged injuries concerning attacks by
officers, and O’Quinn says his constitutional rights and his rights under the Health Information
Portability and Accountability Act were violated (Count 11). This claim must be dismissed at
the gate. For one, there is no private right of action under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability, so O’Quinn’s claim under that statute is meritless. Carpenter v. Phillips, 419 F.
App’x 658, 659 (7th Cir. 2011). In addition, the Seventh Circuit has not explicitly recognized
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the viability of any constitutional medical privacy claim for prisoners. Franklin v. McCaughtry,
110 F. App’x 715, 718-19 (7th Cir. 2004); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 523-24 (7th Cir.
1995). Those circuits that have recognized such a cause of action restrict it to disclosures of
sensitive information by guards to other prisoners, not disclosures of non-sensitive information
to other officials within a prison. See Franklin, 110 F. App’x at 719 (noting other circuit
authority on this point and indicating that viable claims were restricted to dissemination of
“intensely private medical information,” such as HIV status or transsexualism); Moore v. Prevo,
379 F. App’x 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2010) (limiting right of privacy to disclosures of highly private
and sensitive information to “other inmates,” rather than other corrections officers). Here,
O’Quinn does not allege a disclosure of a sensitive piece of medical information (such as HIV
status), nor does he allege that the information at issue was disclosed to prisoners. Accordingly,
he has not stated a constitutional claim, and Count 11 must be dismissed without prejudice.
O’Quinn goes on to claim that he was exposed to inappropriate conditions of
confinement during his initial tenure in segregation (Count 12). To state a conditions claim, a
prisoner must allege facts showing that his conditions were sufficiently serious, and must then
allege that the named defendants were “deliberately indifferent to the adverse conditions.” Rice
ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 664-65 (7th Cir. 2012). As it concerns
the first step of this inquiry, conditions are sufficiently serious where a prisoner is denied “the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir.
2013). Even if certain conditions are not individually serious enough to work constitutional
violations, the Seventh Circuit has observed that “conditions of confinement may violate the
Constitution in combination when they have a ‘mutually enforcing effect that produces the
deprivation of a single, identifiable human need.’” Id. at 842-43 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501
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U.S. 294, 304 (1991)). Applying this standard to O’Quinn’s complaint, O’Quinn’s cumulative
allegations regarding a lack of heat, medical care, and bedding during his initial placement in
segregation are sufficient to allege serious conditions for purposes of screening.
As it concerns the second step of this inquiry, the complaint must suggest that a particular
official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. In other words, a
plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim must allege that each defendant was “personally involved in the
deprivation” of his rights. Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1995). Personal
involvement can be alleged by claiming that the defendant knew “about the conduct and
facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, condone[d] it, or turn[ed] a blind eye for fear of what they might
see.” Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988). O’Quinn says that Walters
was aware of the lack of heat in his cell but did nothing, and that is enough to state an arguable
claim against him. See White v. Monohan, 326 F. App’x 385, 388 (7th Cir. 2009) (allegation that
defendants “were aware of the conditions of [the prisoner’s] cell and did ‘nothing’ to address the
conditions except make them worse” was sufficient). O’Quinn also alleges that he wrote letters
to Spiller and Allen advising of the lack of heat, lack of medical care, and lack of bedding, but
they did not assist, and that too is enough to state an arguable claim. Perez, 2015 WL 4092204,
at *8-9. As such, Count 12 may proceed as to Walters, Spiller, and Allen. That said, Count 12
must be dismissed without prejudice as to Davis, Colvin, Edwards, and any other unspecified
officers, as none of those parties were put forth by name or Doe designation in the caption.
O’Quinn next claims that Fernandez and Theis refused to bring O’Quinn a snack bag or
insulin for his diabetic condition during the early part of his stay in the segregation unit, evincing
deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Count 13).
As before, O’Quinn’s diabetes arguably qualifies as a serious condition for purposes of
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screening, and the failure to provide him with needed treatment and medications could establish
deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Count 13 may proceed as to Fernandez and Theis.
O’Quinn goes on to claim that Lawless, Kellerman, McBride, Adams, Malcomb, Spiller,
and Edwards failed to provide him with due process before placing him in segregation (Count
14). Whether any process is due for a sanction of segregation turns on the severity of the
confinement: “if the length of segregated confinement is substantial and the record reveals that
the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh,” then some process is needed. Marion v.
Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009). When the period of confinement is
lengthy, courts should examine the conditions in segregation and compare those to the conditions
outside of segregation to determine whether process is necessary. See id. (collecting cases and
noting that a year of segregation requires examination of the “factual record”). However, when
the period of confinement is short, the Seventh Circuit has “affirmed dismissal without requiring
a factual inquiry into the conditions of confinement.” Id. (citing cases where prisoner was placed
in segregation for fifty-nine days, sixty days, and seventy days, respectively, and no factual
inquiry into the severity of segregation conditions was necessary); see also Younger v. Hulick,
482 F. App’x 157, 159 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 70 days as an example of a length of time in
segregation that does “not require inquiry into conditions”). Here, O’Quinn was placed in
segregation for sixty-five days, and that kind of short period of confinement is insufficient to
trigger any due process requirements. So Count 14 must be dismissed without prejudice.
O’Quinn has also raised a number of state claims concerning his treatment in segregation,
and he asks the Court to take supplemental jurisdiction over those claims (Count 15). To the
extent he is attempting to raise claims that his treatment in segregation constituted cruel and
unusual punishment under Article I, Section 11 of the Illinois Constitution, those claims must be
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dismissed as duplicative of the claims that have already proceeded through screening – Section
11 of the Illinois Constitution is “coextensive with the cruel-and-unusual punishment clause of
the Eighth Amendment,” People v. Reyes, – N.E. 3d –, 2015 IL App. 2d 120471, at *2 (Ill. App.
Ct. May 6, 2015), and a plaintiff may have only one recovery. The remainder of O’Quinn’s state
law claims must be dismissed at the gate, as none of the statutes and disciplinary provisions he
cites create private causes of action. See, e.g., Jackson v. Randle, 957 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2011) (rejecting any private cause of action for claims brought by a prisoner concerning
conditions of confinement under the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections); Ashley v. Snyder, 739
N.E.2d 897, 902-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“Prison regulations, such as those contained in the
inmate orientation manual relied on here, were never intended to confer rights on inmates or
serve as a basis for constitutional claims. Instead, Illinois DOC regulations, as well as the
Unified Code, were designed to provide guidance to prison officials in the administration of
prisons.”). As such, the claims contained in Count 15 are dismissed without prejudice.
O’Quinn next alleges that unspecified defendants violated his constitutional rights
concerning his brief placement in a housing area in February 2015, as O’Quinn was not given
access to the cafeteria on the same basis as other prisoners, was not given access to the chapel,
was not allowed into the law library, and was precluded from accessing other areas (Count 16).
This count must be dismissed for the simple reason that O’Quinn has not associated this conduct
with any particular defendant. It is critical to remember that § 1983 creates a cause of action
based on personal liability and predicated on fault; thus, “to be liable under § 1983, an individual
defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Vill. of
Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). Because O’Quinn has not said anything about how
the named parties participated in this conduct, Count 16 must be dismissed without prejudice.
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O’Quinn also claims that, following his release from segregation, Barnes and Dickerson
have written him false tickets due to his disabilities (Count 17). To the extent O’Quinn alleges
that this conduct constitutes disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act,
Count 17 will be allowed to proceed against the Illinois Department of Corrections, but not
against Barnes and Dickerson individually. To the extent O’Quinn alleges that this conduct
violates his equal protection rights, he has stated an arguable claim against Barnes and
Dickerson. O’Quinn also alleges that Barnes and Dickerson conspired with Olkoski to undertake
this activity and have engaged in a conspiracy with Olkoski to return him to segregation. While
it is a close case, the Court is of the opinion that these allegations are sufficient to yoke Olkoski
into this claim at screening. So Count 17 may proceed as to Barnes, Dickerson, and Olkoski.
O’Quinn next alleges that Walters, at the direction of Dickerson, engaged in an
inappropriate search of him following the false ticket incidents (Count 18). “An unwanted
touching of a person’s private parts, intended to humiliate the victim or gratify the assailant’s
sexual desires,” can violate the Eighth Amendment, as can excessive force during a search.
Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, O’Quinn alleges that Walters
grabbed his genitals, felt his bottom, and kicked him during a search, all while Dickerson
laughed, and that is sufficient to put forth an arguable Eighth Amendment claim. O’Quinn
further alleges that Dickerson and Walters engaged in this behavior to return O’Quinn to
segregation and conspired with Olkoski towards that end.

As before, the allegations of

conspiracy are brief, but construing O’Quinn’s complaint broadly, they are sufficient to rope

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Olkoski into this claim for purposes of screening review. Accordingly, Count 18 may proceed
through preliminary screening as to Dickerson, Walters, and Olkoski. 3
O’Quinn also claims that Furlow failed to conduct an adequate investigation concerning
his treatment by Dickerson, Walters, and others (Count 19). This claim must be dismissed
without prejudice because Furlow was not named as a defendant. Myles, 416 F.3d at 551-52
O’Quinn next alleges that Spiller directed Allen to conduct several improper cavity
searches on O’Quinn during his nine day tenure in the health care unit, in violation of O’Quinn’s
rights (Count 20). To put forth an illegal strip or cavity search claim, a prisoner must allege
facts tending to show that a search lacked a “valid penological reason” or that the search was
“conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause psychological pain.” Mays v.
Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, O’Quinn alleges that there was no purpose
behind the searches and that one of them occurred in the presence of a female nurse for no reason
whatsoever, and that is sufficient to state an arguable Eighth Amendment claim. Furthermore,
O’Quinn alleges that these types of cavity searches were directed at him and no one else and that
there was no reason for the searches, and that is sufficient to state an arguable class-of-one equal
protection claim. See Swanson v. Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2013) (equal protection
clause “prohibits the singling out of a person for different treatment for no rational reason”). As
such, Count 20 may proceed as to Allen and Spiller. However, Count 20 must be dismissed
without prejudice as to the other defendants, as O’Quinn’s allegations of a conspiracy related to

3

O’Quinn also alleges that Walters had a history of writing other prisoners up in part due to their
race. However, O’Quinn does not allege that Walters was motivated by racial animus for this
claim, so any equal protection claim against Walters must be dismissed without prejudice. See
Herro v. City of Milwaukee, 44 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1995) (a person asserting an equal
protection violation must allege “intentional discrimination against him”).
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the search are conclusory, providing no details on what other defendants were involved or how
they were involved in this claim. Walton v. Walker, 364 F. App’x 256, 258 (7th Cir. 2010).
O’Quinn goes on to allege that Walters recently harassed him, called him a “boy” in a
derogatory fashion, and made unspecified threats against him (Count 21). O’Quinn should
know that “simple verbal harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, deprive a
prisoner of a protected liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal protection of the laws.” DeWalt
v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000). O’Quinn does not offer any details about the
threats made against him, and the specifics he does offer on this claim suggest nothing more than
verbal harassment alone. Accordingly, Count 21 must be dismissed without prejudice.
As his final count, O’Quinn alleges that unspecified defendants retaliated against him,
engaged in equal protection violations, and conspired to deprive him of his civil rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count 22). These catch-all allegations are too conclusory to
state a claim. To put forth a viable claim under the federal rules, a plaintiff must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). The main purpose of this plausibility requirement is notice to defendants: a
complaint passes muster if it includes enough information to provide a defendant with “fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007), but fails if the “factual detail in a complaint” is “so sketchy” that a defendant
cannot discern what he did or how it was objectionable, Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581–82
(7th Cir. 2009). To give a defendant notice, the complaint must lay out what each defendant did
or did not do to violate the constitution; lumping all of the defendants together and making broad
allegations against all of them will not do, “even for allegations of conspiracy.” Bank of
America, N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, O’Quinn has brought discrete
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allegations concerning some of the defendants related to retaliation, equal protection violations,
and conspiracies, and those counts will proceed through screening as laid out above. However,
his effort to pull every defendant into those counts via summary allegations at the end of his
complaint must be rejected, as these conclusory allegations do not provide the defendants with
notice of how they retaliated against O’Quinn, how they conspired against him, or how they
violated his equal protection rights. So Count 22 must be dismissed without prejudice.
One note is in order concerning O’Quinn’s claim against the Doe officer: this party must
be identified with particularity before service of the complaint can occur on him. Where a
prisoner's complaint states specific allegations describing the conduct of unknown staff sufficient
to raise a constitutional claim against them, the prisoner should have the opportunity to engage in
limited discovery in order to ascertain the identity of those defendants. Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, guidelines for discovery aimed
at identifying Doe will be set by the magistrate judge. Once Doe is identified, O’Quinn shall file
a motion to substitute the named individual with the Doe designate.
One closing note is also in order concerning O’Quinn’s request for preliminary injunctive
relief. (Doc. 11.) On August 7, 2015, O’Quinn filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a
motion for a temporary restraining order, asking the Court for an order to transfer him to another
facility or to keep the defendants named in this case one-hundred feet away from him at all
times. On August 11, 2015, the Court denied the request for a temporary restraining order
because O’Quinn did not include specific facts demonstrating a need for such an order and his
previous abeyance request militated against the need for such an order. To the extent O’Quinn
has asked for preliminary injunctive relief, the motion will be referred to United States

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Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams, who shall resolve the request for relief and issue a report
and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c).
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, COUNT 1 shall PROCEED
against HICKS.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Americans with Disabilities Act claim in
COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Rehabilitation Act claim will PROCEED
against the ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. The CLERK is DIRECTED
to add the ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS as a defendant to this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 3 shall PROCEED against OLKOSKI,
JOHN DOE #1, WANGLER, HELSLEY, BRITTON, HICKS, BOWLES, NEWBURY, and
KRAFT. COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice as to all other defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 4 shall PROCEED against GODINEZ,
SPILLER, ALLEN, and SHAH. COUNT 4 is DISMISSED without prejudice as to all other
defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 5 shall PROCEED against OLKOSKI.
COUNT 5 is DISMISSED without prejudice as to all other defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 6 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 7 shall PROCEED against JOHN DOE
#1. COUNT 7 is DISMISSED without prejudice as to all other defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 8 shall PROCEED against JOHN DOE
#1. COUNT 8 is DISMISSED without prejudice as to all other defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 9 shall PROCEED against WANGLER.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 10 shall PROCEED against WANGLER.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 11 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 12 shall PROCEED against WALTERS,
SPILLER, and ALLEN.

COUNT 12 is DISMISSED without prejudice as to all other

defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 13 shall PROCEED against
FERNANDEZ and THEIS.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 14 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Because there are no further claims against them, HECK and MYERS are DISMISSED from
this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 15 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 16 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent COUNT 17 raises a disability
discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act, it shall proceed against the ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. To the extent COUNT 17 raises an equal protection
claim, it shall PROCEED against BARNES, DICKERSON, and OLKOSKI.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 18 shall PROCEED against
DICKERSON, WALTERS, and OLKOSKI.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 19 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 20 shall PROCEED against ALLEN and
SPILLER. COUNT 20 is DISMISSED without prejudice as to all other defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 21 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 22 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, OLKOSKI, SPILLER, GODINEZ,
SHAH, WANGLER, HELSLEY, HICKS, KRAFT, BRITTON, THEIS, WALTERS,
BOWLES, FERNANDEZ, NEWBURY, BARNES, DICKERSON, and ALLEN: (1) Form 5
(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of
Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint,
and this Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.

If a

Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk
within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service,
to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service shall not be made on the John Doe defendant until such time as Plaintiff has
identified him by name in a properly filed amended complaint. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to
provide the Court with the name and service address for this individual.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no longer can be
found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This
information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting
service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address
information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon
defense counsel once an appearance is entered) a copy of every pleading or other document
submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be
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filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of the document was served
on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a judge that has not been filed with the Clerk
or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s pending Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc.
4) is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for consideration.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local
Rule 72.1(c), Plaintiff’s pending request for preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. 11) is hereby
REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams, who shall resolve the request for
injunctive relief and issue a report and recommendation. The period for filing any objections to
Judge Williams’ report and recommendation shall not exceed 14 days from the date of the
report. Any motions filed after the date of this Order that relate to the request for injunctive
relief or seek leave to amend the complaint are also REFERRED to Judge Williams.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for
disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the
parties consent to such a referral.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under § 1915 for leave to
commence this action without being required to prepay fees and costs, the applicant and his or
her attorney were deemed to have entered into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in

Page 26 of 27

the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed
against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1)
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 24, 2015
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan
United States District Judge

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