Jordan v. Welborn et al

Filing 169

ORDER GRANTING 167 Motion for Reconsideration. The June 13, 2017 Order (Doc. 161 ) is VACATED IN PART as to the ruling on the Motion to Withdraw (Doc. 158 ). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to reinstate the motion to withdraw as pending. Signed by Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson on 8/22/2017. (sgp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
STEVEN JORDAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM WELBORN, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:15-cv-822-NJR-DGW

ORDER
WILKERSON, Magistrate Judge:
Now pending before the Court is the motion to reconsider filed by Plaintiff on July 5, 2017
(Doc. 167). The motion is GRANTED. The June 13, 2017 Order (Doc. 161) is VACATED IN
PART as to the ruling on the Motion to Withdraw (Doc. 158).

The Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to reinstate the motion to withdraw as pending.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff filed his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) which only
applies to motions for a new trial and motions to alter or amend judgments – neither a trial nor a
judgment have been rendered in this matter. See Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors
Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995). Rule 60, also dealing with final judgments and orders,
does not apply to Plaintiff’s motion. Indeed, there is no Rule of Civil Procedure that permits a
“motion to reconsider.” See GHSC Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 29
Fed.Appx. 382, 384 (7th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff also has not invoked Rule 72(a) which would signal
review by the District Court.
Nonetheless, a court has inherent authority to reconsider interlocutory orders. See Caine
v. Burge, 897 F.Supp.2d 714, 716 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s
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motion.

This Court now takes this opportunity to correct errors made in the June 13, 2017

Order. See Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191-2 (7th Cir.
1990).
BACKGROUND
On January 13, 2017, Plaintiff served requests to admit upon Defendant Welborn to which
he did not respond within 30 days, the time limit set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36.
On March 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion to deem the matters admitted in light of the lack of
response (Doc. 151). In response to the motion, Defendant sought to have the admissions
withdrawn (Docs. 158, 159). In an Order on the motions, this Court permitted the admissions to
be withdrawn (Doc. 161) but did so erroneously. As set forth below, Defendant may not be
entitled to have the admissions withdrawn.
DISCUSSION
In his memorandum (Doc. 159), Defendant argued that he was not required to respond to
Plaintiff’s request to admit because he did not file them as required by Local Rule 26.1(b)(1).
This argument is not puzzling but it is based on an unresolved conflict between this Court’s Local
Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While this Court can require strict compliance
with Local Rules, even from pro se parties, see Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215,
219 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We have routinely upheld the district court’s discretion in requiring parties to
comply strictly with local rule requirements.”), lack of compliance with the Local Rules should not
have caused Defendant to fail to respond to requests to admit.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) states:
Any paper after the complaint that is required to be served -- together with a
certificate of service – must be filed within a reasonable time after service. But
disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) or (2) and the following discovery requests and
responses must not be filed until they are used in the proceeding or the court orders
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filing: depositions . . . and requests for admission.
(emphasis added)
In contrast, Local Rule 26.1(b)(1) directs parties to file with the Clerk of Court requests to admit
and their responses. The Local Rule appears to directly contradict the Federal Rule and is
contrary to the purposes of Rule 5(d). See Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir.
1991) (“Local Rules are valid only to the extent they are consistent with the national rules.”),
overruled on other grounds by Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2015);
FED.R.CIV.P. 83(a)(1) (Local Rules “must be consistent with – but not duplicate – federal statutes
and rules . . . .”). According to the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendment, “[t]he
rule supersedes and invalidates local rules that forbid, permit, or require filing of these materials
before they are used in the action.” The avowed purpose is to reduce the cost of storing
documents that may be unnecessary in litigation and to provide uniformity among each of the
District Courts. Therefore, Defendant’s reliance on Plaintiff’s failure to file his request to admit,
as an excuse to not timely respond, was in error.
As set forth previously, the failure to timely respond to requests to admit automatically
renders the matters admitted. FED.R.CIV.P. 36(a)(3). Defendants can avoid this harsh result by
moving to withdraw their admissions. Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d 1049, 1059 (7th
Cir. 2000). “A court, in its discretion, may permit a party to rescind admissions when doing so
better serves the presentation of the merits of the case and the party who benefits from the
admissions (usually by relying on them) is not prejudiced.” Banos v. City of Chicago, 398 F.3d
889, 892 (7th Cir. 2005). In their motion to withdraw, Defendants state that Plaintiff would suffer
no prejudice and the interests of justice require that this matter be resolved on the merits (Doc.
158). They state that Plaintiff has neither filed his own motion for summary judgment, “nor has

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Plaintiff relied on these admissions in his response to Defendant Welborn’s Motion for Summary
Judgment” (Doc. 159, p. 3). The Court previously accepted this version of the record on ruling on
Defendant’s motion to withdraw. However, this second statement is inaccurate.
In his response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 157), Plaintiff in fact
attached the requests to admit as Exhibit D and referred to them on pages 12-14 of his brief when
discussing Defendant’s state of mind. Plaintiff has relied on the admissions in arguing that this
matter should go to trial. And, he may now be prejudiced if the admissions are withdrawn at this
late stage of the proceedings. Plaintiff can conduct no further discovery to support his claims (as
set forth in the June 13, 2017 Order), the discovery deadline having expired on March 3, 2017 and
dispositive motions having been filed.
The contents of the request to admit are related to the issue of whether Defendant is entitled
to summary judgment – an issue that is not before the undersigned. And, because the requests are
referred to in response to Defendant’s motion, it is more efficient for their admissibility, relevance,
and weight to be determined by the District Court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to reconsider filed by Plaintiff on July 5, 2017
(Doc. 167) is GRANTED. The June 13, 2017 Order (Doc. 161) is VACATED IN PART as to
the ruling on the Motion to Withdraw (Doc. 158). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to reinstate
the motion to withdraw (Doc. 158) as pending.
DATED: August 22, 2017

DONALD G. WILKERSON
United States Magistrate Judge
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