Smith v. Lakin et al

Filing 45

ORDER. Defendants' motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment is DENIED 25 . Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 5/2/2016. (ceg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTWOINE C. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN LAKIN, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15-CV-860-NJR-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Now pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all Defendants 1 on October 26, 2015 (Doc. 25).
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Antwoine C. Smith, a former pretrial detainee at the Madison County Jail
(“the Jail”), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging his
constitutional rights were violated while he was detained at the Jail. In particular,
Plaintiff brings this action against various personnel at the Jail, including the sheriff,
lieutenants, captains, sergeants, and officers at the Jail, and alleges that these individuals
exposed him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, inadequate nutrition, and
property thefts. Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to an ant infestation, raw
sewage in this cell, small, spoiled, and infrequent meals, and thefts of property from
other inmates.
1

Defendant Tom Schmidt was permitted to join the motion on December 8, 2015 (see Docs. 31, 36)

Page 1 of 5

Following an initial screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, the
Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on the following two counts against all Defendants:
Count 1: Correctional Defendants subjected Plaintiff to unsafe and
unsanitary conditions of confinement in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment when they failed to prevent and/or limit Plaintiff’s exposure
to raw sewage and an ant infestation;
Count 2: Correctional Defendants denied, and continue to deny, Plaintiff
access to reasonable and adequate nutrition in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and
Count 3: Correctional Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his property
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
when they allowed conditions to persist that caused damage to or theft of
Plaintiff’s personal property.
(Doc. 6).
Plaintiff’s claims are against each Defendant in their individual capacity. In
response to the complaint, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, a
motion for summary judgment (Doc. 25). Defendants argue Plaintiff’s complaint should
be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or,
because Defendants attached an affidavit of Gary Bost in support of their arguments,
Defendants request that the motion to dismiss be converted to a motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff filed a pro se response on November 19, 2015 (Doc. 33). Since then, the
Court has recruited counsel to represent Plaintiff (see Doc. 41), and the discovery process
is underway; the discovery deadline is January 6, 2017 (see Doc. 38).
DISCUSSION
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); however,
Defendants attached the affidavit of Defendant Gary Bost in support of their motion and

Page 2 of 5

ask the Court to convert their 12(b)(b) motion into a motion for summary judgment
under Rule 56. Importantly, when a party attaches a document to a motion to dismiss,
Rule 12(d) prescribes that the court must either convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a motion
for summary judgment, or exclude the documents attached to the motion to dismiss and
continue its analysis under Rule 12. Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir.
1998); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). A court may consider documents attached to a motion
to dismiss without converting it to a motion for summary judgment, however, if the
documents are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and if they are central to the
plaintiff’s claim. Levenstein, 164 F.3d at 647 (quoting Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., Inc., 29
F.3d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994)). This narrow exception is “aimed at cases interpreting, for
example, a contract” and “is not intended to grant litigants license to ignore the
distinction between motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.” Id.
Importantly, the district court ultimately has discretion in determining whether to
convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Levenstein, 164 F.3d at
347 (citing Venture Associations Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th
Cir. 1993)).
It is apparent that the affidavit of Gary Bost submitted by Defendants does not fit
the narrow exception articulated by the Seventh Circuit because it was not referred to in
Plaintiff’s complaint. As such, this Court would need to exercise its discretion and
convert Defendants’ motion into a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule
12(d), in order to consider the attached affidavit. The Court declines to exercise its
discretion in such a manner, finding that considering said document would not change

Page 3 of 5

its analysis. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming district
court’s refusal to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment
based on district court’s discretion). Further, allowing Defendants to proceed on a
motion for summary judgment at this juncture is premature, because Plaintiff has not
had the opportunity to complete discovery to provide support for his allegations. As
such, the Court analyzes Defendants’ motion as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts to state a claim for deprivations of his constitutional rights. The standard
used to address a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint is the
same standard used by the Court in screening a pro se complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000). The Court previously
screened Plaintiff’s complaint and determined he had stated a claim for unconstitutional
conditions of confinement against Defendants, finding that Plaintiff had passed the
threshold review on Counts One and Two under the standards set forth in Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (see Doc. 7). As the Court has already conducted a thorough
review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court need not engage in yet another analysis using
the same standards already considered. Such an endeavor would be a waste of judicial
resources at this stage of the litigation.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Defendants (Doc. 25) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court

Page 4 of 5

DIRECTED to correct the docket to reflect the proper spelling of each defendant’s name
as set forth in the first paragraph of the motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 2, 2016

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

Page 5 of 5