Moon v. Walton et al

Filing 6

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 9/3/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DARNELL W. MOON,
Former No. 34077-044, 1
Plaintiff,
vs.
J.S. WALTON,
HENRY RIVAS,
M. NEUMANN,
D. SCHIAVONE,
CHARLES SAMUELS, JR.,
THOMAS R. KANE,
D. SCOTT DODRILL,
BRIAN K. DAVIS,
LESLIE SMITH,
AMBER NELSON,
PAUL M. LAIRD,
WENDY J. ROAL,
R. ROLOFF,
STEVEN CARDONA,
G. BURGESS,
DAN SPROAL,
CALVIN JOHNSON,
JOHN BAIR,
APRIL CRUITT,
WILLIAM FALLS,
J. SIMMONS,
T. CAPALDO,
STEPHEN COLT,
STEVE JULIAN,
JEFF BANEY, and
E. GARCIA,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-00889-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
1

Plaintiff’s prison identification number is included for reference, since all claims pertain to
when he was incarcerated at U.S.P.-Marion.
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Plaintiff Darnell Moon currently resides in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, but was previously
incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois (“Marion”). Proceeding pro se,
Moon has filed a Bivens action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1331, alleging that his First Amendment
rights were violated when he and other Muslims at Marion were prohibited from rolling up the
legs of their pants, which he explains is a tenant of their religion. Moon seeks declaratory relief,
as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court is required to dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money
damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual
allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
According to the complaint, Moon was confined at the United States Penitentiary at
Marion, Illinois, from January 2012 to December 2013. Six months after his arrival at Marion,
Moon became a Muslim, and at that point he learned that there was a policy that forbade

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Muslims from rolling up the legs of their pants. According to Plaintiff, the Prophet Mohammad
stated that a Muslim who drags his pants legs on the ground will be subject to being thrown in
hellfire. That prison policy is attributed to defendants Samuels, Kane, Dodrill, Davis, Smith,
Nelson and Laird at the highest levels of the Bureau of Prisons. The policy further authorized
lower level staff to punish those who violated the policy.
At the institutional level, defendants Neumann, Rivas, Roal, Walton, Burgess, Cardona,
Johnson, Roloff, Sproul, Garcia, Baney, Julian, along with Schiavone, Capaldo, Cruitt, Colt,
Simmons, Falls and Bair approved, condoned the enforcement of, or carried out, the disciplinary
policy against rolled up or cuffed pants. When Plaintiff complained to those Marion officials he
was told, “watch what we’ll do to you.”

The complaint does not make entirely clear whether

Plaintiff was merely threatened with segregation, or actually punished, but Plaintiff indicates that
he was very distressed to be forced to choose between punishment and violating a tenet of his
religion.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts, generally mirroring the Plaintiff’s organization of the claims.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does not
constitute an opinion as to their merit.
Count 1: Defendants Samuels, Kane, Dodrill, Davis, Smith, Nelson, Laird,
Schiavone, Capaldo, Cruitt, Colt, Simmons, Falls and Bair
violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment when they created, approved and condoned a
policy prohibiting Muslims from rolling up or cuffing their pants;

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Count 2: Defendants Neumann, Rivas, Roal, Walton, Burgess, Cardona,
Johnson, Roloff, Sproul, Garcia, Baney and Julian violated
Plaintiff’s rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment when they implemented the policy prohibiting
Muslims from rolling up or cuffing their pants; and
Count 3: Defendants Neumann, Rivas, Roal, Walton, Burgess, Cardona,
Johnson, Roloff, Sproul, Garcia and Julian intentionally inflicted
severe emotional distress upon Plaintiff, in violation of Illinois
law. 2
Discussion
Counts 1 and 2
Relative to Counts 1 and 2, the First Amendment claims, “a prisoner is entitled to
practice his religion insofar as doing so does not unduly burden the administration of the prison.”
Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir 1990). To state a claim under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts to suggest that his “right to practice
[his chosen religion] was burdened in a significant way.” Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d
678, 683 (7th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff Moon asserts that it violates his religion to drag his pants on
the ground, and the policy prohibiting Muslims from rolling up or cuffing their pants placed him
in the position of violating either prison rules or a tenet of his faith—presumably his prisonissued pants would drag the ground if not rolled or cuffed. The allegations that the defendants
created, condoned, implemented and/or enforced such a policy falls within the ambit of the First
Amendment.
Although the complaint offers few details about which defendant did what with respect to
the pants policy, there is just enough pleaded to satisfy the liberal notice pleading standard (see
FED.R.CIV.P. 8) and the only slightly more demanding Twombly pleading standard.

The

complaint generally distinguishes those defendants who were policymakers, from those who
2

Of the 12 defendants who allegedly enforced the pants policy (Count 2), all but defendant
Baney are alleged to have also intentionally inflicted emotional distress (see Doc. 1, p. 10).
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were involved in implementing the policy, either from an administrative position or more
directly. Counts 1 and 2 shall, therefore proceed.
Count 3

Count 3 alleges that all of the defendants are liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under Illinois law. Where a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, as
is the case here, it also has supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a), so long as the state claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”
with the federal claims. Wisconsin v. Ho–Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff’s emotional distress claim concerns the same facts as his Bivens religious claims, so
supplemental jurisdiction over this claim is appropriate.
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress must
allege facts tending to show that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in “extreme
and outrageous conduct” that resulted in severe distress. Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill.,
434 F.3d 1006, 1030 (7th Cir. 2006). An intentional infliction of emotional distress claim has
three components: the conduct involved must be extreme and outrageous; the actor must either
intend that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress or know that there is a high probability
that his conduct will cause severe distress; and the conduct must in fact cause severe distress.
McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988). To be actionable, the defendant's conduct
“must go beyond all bounds of decency and be considered intolerable in a civilized community.”
Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 490 (7th Cir. 2001). Liability for this kind of tort is reserved
for those acts that are “truly outrageous” – that is, an “unwarranted intrusion” that is “calculated
to cause severe emotional distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities.” Id.
The complaint does sufficiently allege that Moon felt extreme emotional distress at the
choice he faced. And, arguably, the policy could have been designed and implemented to inflict
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emotional distress upon all Muslims. Although this claim strikes the Court as being weak and
difficult to establish, at this early juncture the Court cannot rule out the possibility that it could
pan out. Count 3 shall proceed.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, COUNTS 1, 2 and 3 shall
PROCEED against Defendants SAMUELS, KANE, DODRILL, DAVIS, SMITH, NELSON,
LAIRD, SCHIAVONE, CAPALDO, CRUITT, COLT, SIMMONS, FALLS, BAIR,
NEUMANN, RIVAS, ROAL, WALTON, BURGESS, CARDONA, JOHNSON, ROLOFF,
SPROUL, GARCIA, BANEY and JULIAN in their individual capacities (see Doc. 1, pp. 2-3).
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants SAMUELS, KANE, DODRILL,
DAVIS, SMITH, NELSON, LAIRD, SCHIAVONE, CAPALDO, CRUITT, COLT,
SIMMONS, FALLS, BAIR, NEUMANN, RIVAS, ROAL, WALTON, BURGESS,
CARDONA, JOHNSON, ROLOFF, SPROUL, GARCIA, BANEY and JULIAN: (1) Form
5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of
Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint,
and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by
Plaintiff. 3
If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the
Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to
effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full
costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

3

Insofar as defendants are sued in their individual capacities, the waiver procedure is applicable.
See FED.R.CIV.P. 4
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In addition, pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(i)(3), the Clerk shall (1) personally deliver to or
send by registered or certified mail addressed to the civil-process clerk at the office of the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois a copy of the summons, the complaint, and this
Memorandum and Order; and (2) send by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the
United States at Washington, D.C., a copy of the summons, the complaint, and this Memorandum
and Order.

With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to a United States Magistrate for
disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to
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such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis may have been granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 3, 2015
s/ Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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