Harter v. Gold's Gym International, Inc.

Filing 12

ORDER OF REMAND: Case remanded to the Twentieth Judicial District of St. Clair County, Illinois. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 9/16/15. (lmp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PATRICIA HARTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOLD’S GYM INTERNATIONAL INC.,
Defendant.

No. 15-cv-896-DRH
MEMORANDUM and ORDER

HERNDON, District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue before the Court is to determine whether jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332 exists over the case at bar, as the Court is obligated to raise sua

sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See Craig v.
Ontario Corp., 543 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Sadat v. Mertes, 615
F.2d 1176, 1188 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating, “it has been the virtually universally
accepted practice of the federal courts to permit any party to challenge or, indeed,
raise sua sponte the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court at any time and at any
stage of the proceedings”). As the Court distinguishes this case from those cases
cited by defendant and recognizes that the amount in controversy requirement is
not satisfied, it must REMAND this matter to the Twentieth Judicial District of
St. Clair County, Illinois.

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II.

BACKGROUND

On August 13, 2015, defendant removed this case on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to this Court from St. Clair County,
Illinois (Doc. 1). This is a personal injury action resulting from Plaintiff Patricia
Harter’s fall at a pool owned, operated, maintained, and controlled by Defendant
Gold’s Gym International Inc., (hereinafter “Gold’s”) located in O’Fallon, Illinois. 1
(Doc. 1-2 ¶ 2) There is no question that the parties to this action are diverse—
Plaintiff Harter is a citizen of Illinois and Defendant Gold’s is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Texas (Doc. 1, ¶ 2(b)).
However, the Court ordered defendant to brief the subject matter jurisdiction
supporting removal of this cause of action on August 18, 2015, as defendant
failed to properly allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (Doc. 9).
Therefore, defendants filed a jurisdictional memorandum in support of removal
on August 21, 2015 (Doc. 10).
Although defendants’ brief provides slightly more information than its
initial notice of removal, for reasons cited herein, defendants’ jurisdictional
memorandum is still insufficient to demonstrate that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000 affording this Court proper subject matter jurisdiction.
III.

LAW AND APPLICATION

A. Law

1

In its notice of removal, defendant alleges that Gold’s Gym International Inc., is the
incorrect name for the defendant. Instead, the notice states that defendant should in fact
be listed as Gold’s St. Louis, LLC.
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The statute regarding diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires
complete diversity between the parties plus an amount in controversy exceeding
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441,
is construed narrowly and doubts concerning removal are resolved in favor of
remand. Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993).
Defendants bear the burden to present evidence of federal jurisdiction once
the existence of that jurisdiction is fairly cast into doubt. See In re Brand Name

Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997).

“A

defendant meets this burden by supporting [its] allegations of jurisdiction with
‘competent proof,’ which in [the Seventh Circuit] requires the defendant to offer
evidence which proves ‘to a reasonable probability that jurisdiction exists.’”

Chase v. Shop ‘N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir.
1997)(citations omitted). However, if the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the action must be remanded to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c).
It is the duty of the district court to ascertain whether the amount in
controversy meets the jurisdictional amount. Batts Rest., Inc. v. Commercial Ins.

Co. of Newark, 406 F.2d 118, 120 (7th Cir. 1969), abrogation on other grounds
recognized by Hart v. Schering-Plough Corp., 253 F.3d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 2001).
In determining whether the jurisdictional threshold amount has been met, the
Court must evaluate “the controversy described in the plaintiff’s complaint and
the record as a whole, as of the time the case was filed.” Uhl v. Thoroughbred

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Tech. and Telecomm., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Shaw v.
Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993)). The court must conduct
this assessment according to the facts available on the day federal jurisdiction
was invoked. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 510-11 (7th Cir. 2006).
When the court questions the jurisdictional amount on its own initiative, it must
appear to a legal certainty that the sum is for less than the jurisdictional amount.

Batts Rest., 406 F.2d at 120 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)). “[I]f, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a
legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from the
proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled
to recover that amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable for the purpose
of conferring jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed.” St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S.
at 289.
B. Analysis
The question in this case is whether the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000 exclusive of costs and interest to afford this Court jurisdiction over this
matter. To determine the amount in controversy, the Court looks to the face of
plaintiff’s complaint, where the plaintiff indicates the claim value in the request
for relief. Chase, 110 F.3d at 427. Plaintiff’s state court complaint seeks a
judgment “for a sum in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00), plus costs
of this suit” for permanent injuries sustained to her left ankle (Doc 1-2). On its
face, this claim value does not exceed the $75,000 threshold to afford this Court

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subject matter jurisdiction. Additionally, defendant’s notice of removal is
insufficient to establish the requisite amount in controversy by providing evidence
in support. In the notice of removal, defendant simply restated that plaintiff’s
complaint sought damages in excess of $50,000 for her injury. The Court
subsequently directed defendant to file a jurisdictional memorandum to allow
defendant an opportunity to properly allege that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. See e.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135
S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014)(“A defendant's notice of removal need include only a
plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
threshold. Evidence establishing the amount is required by § 1446(c)(2)(B) only
when… the court questions the defendant's allegation.”).
In the jurisdictional memorandum, defendant argues that the amount in
controversy requirement is satisfied because plaintiff’s permanent ankle injury, as
described in the state court complaint, in conjunction with the need for future
medical care, makes it likely that plaintiff’s complaint could reasonable exceed
$75,000. Defendant argues that Seventh Circuit law supports such a finding,
citing specifically to Andrews v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 447 F.3d 510
(7th Cir. 2006) and Chase v. Shop ‘N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424,
426 (7th Cir. 1997) in support of that premise.
Although in Andrews the notice of removal makes reference to the ad

damnum clause seeking “in excess of $50,000” and plaintiff’s allegation of “severe
and permanent” injuries, the injuries alleged in the complaint were to the

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plaintiff’s head, ribs and back resulting claims to cover medical and rehabilitation
expenses, in addition to past and future lost wages and pain and suffering.

Andrews, 447 F.3d at 515. But more importantly Andrews referred to a
discussion between the parties’ attorneys that led defense counsel to believe that
plaintiff’s medical and rehabilitation expenses alone would exceed $75,000. Said
discussion was even referenced in the notice of removal in support of removal and
the amount in controversy requirement. Id.
Likewise in Chase, the notice of removal at issue was actually the second
notice of removal filed in the case following plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal. In fact,
the plaintiff filed two indistinguishable complaints seeking identical relief. Chase,
110 F.3d at 429. The defendant provided evidence in pursuit of its burden to
prove the amount in controversy that the plaintiff had previously made a
settlement demand of $120,000 and had refused to respond to defendant’s
request to admit the case’s worth was less than the jurisdictional amount Id. at
426. This occurred at a time when the amount in controversy requirement was
$50,000, not the $75,000 threshold requirement used today. Furthermore, the
plaintiff alleged serious injuries including “extensive and disabling internal and
external head injuries, past and future pain and suffering and mental anguish,”
that would also result in loss of her future earning potential. Id. at 426.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff Harter alleges in her complaint that she
“suffer[ed] permanent injuries to her left ankle,” and “has in the past and will in
the future become liable for large sums of money for hospital and medical

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treatment” to treat said injuries. As a result, plaintiff’s counsel seeks damages in
excess of $50,000. However, such general allegations do not facially constitute a
dollar amount exceeding the $75,000 threshold, despite description of plaintiff’s
injuries being “permanent”. The ankle injury alleged is distinguishable from those
described in Andrews where plaintiff sustained injuries to his head, ribs and back
and his attorney, while in discussions with defendant’s counsel, alluded to the fact
the medical and rehabilitation expenses would exceed $75,000 without even
looking to the other claims. No such evidence was referenced in this case.
The same can be said for the Chase case, where the plaintiff “alleged a long
list of injuries including extensive and disabling internal and external head
injuries, past and future pain and suffering and mental anguish, disability, lost
wages, and impairment of future earning capacity,” to elaborate on the large sums
of money required to compensate for plaintiff’s losses. Chase, 110 F.3d at 426.
Unlike the cases relied on by defendant, plaintiff’s state court complaint
and the notice of removal provides nothing more than the bare facts surrounding
the demand for “large sums of money for hospital and medical treatment” in
excess of $50,000. (Doc. 1-2). This is an ankle injury. Plaintiff seeks relief for the
“large sums of money” for treatment, but there is nothing to demonstrate what is
meant by large sums of money in the pleadings at the time of removal. To some,
ten thousand dollars may constitute a “large sums of money,” but the number
falls far short of the amount in controversy. There is no reference to any evidence
that suggests why this ankle injury is worth more than $75,000.

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Therefore, despite Defendant Gold’s allegations in the memorandum, the
amount in controversy requirement is not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 441 F.3d at 543. Without supporting evidence to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that this ankle injury is worth more
than $75,000, the Court cannot conclude to a “reasonable probability” that
jurisdiction exists. Chase, 110 F.3d at 427. Accordingly, the Court finds
defendant has failed to carry its burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction, due
to an inadequate allegation of amount in controversy. In light of the fact that
defendant was given an opportunity to supply this Court's subject matter
jurisdiction, but failed to satisfy its burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction,
this case will be remanded forthwith.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court is obligated, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c), to REMAND this case, back to the Twentieth Judicial District of
St. Clair County, Illinois as it does not have proper subject matter jurisdiction
over this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 16th day of September, 2015.

Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2015.09.16
13:27:03 -05'00'
United States District Judge

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