Coleman v. Vinson et al

Filing 17

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 11/7/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DWAINE COLEMAN, #B62923,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LT. VINSON,
LT. MITCHELL,
LT. HARRISON,
and C/O BLESSING,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-00898-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
This matter is now before the Court for consideration of the Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. 16) filed on behalf of Plaintiff Dwaine Coleman by his attorney, Michael J. Hickey.
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center. He brings this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four officials at Vienna Correctional Center
(“Vienna”) who allegedly subjected him to the unauthorized use of excessive force, retaliation
and/or the denial of access to the courts during his incarceration at Vienna in 2014-15 (Doc. 16,
pp. 1-12). These officials include Lieutenant Vinson, Lieutenant Mitchell, Lieutenant Harrison
and C/O Blessing (id.). In connection with these claims, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and
injunctive relief (id. at 11).
Merits Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Second Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to
promptly screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

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The Court is required to dismiss any portion of the Second Amended Complaint that is legally
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or asks for money
damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief must

cross

“the line between

possibility and

plausibility.”

Id.

at

557.

Conversely, a Complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept
factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s claim.

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009).

Additionally,

Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se
Complaint are to be liberally construed.
577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,

The Second Amended Complaint survives preliminary

review under this standard.
Second Amended Complaint
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he has a long history of severe
back pain (Doc. 16, pp. 3-8). More recently, he has begun to experience pain in his genitals as
well (id. at 3). During his incarceration at Vienna in 2014 and 2015, he submitted numerous

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written requests for medical treatment for both conditions. He was consistently told to “eat well
and exercise more” (id.). Occasionally, he was given ibuprofen for pain. Plaintiff considered
this treatment to be inadequate, so he resorted to other tactics for obtaining medical care 1 (id.).
On November 17, 2014, Plaintiff requested crisis intervention and threatened to file a
grievance when prison officials allegedly interfered with his ability to take “some medication”
(id. at 4). Lieutenant Mitchell warned Plaintiff that he would be placed in segregation if he filed
a grievance. Plaintiff ignored this warning and filed one anyway. He was placed in segregation
and his grievance was ignored. As a result, Plaintiff continued to suffer from unrelenting and
untreated pain in his back and genitals (id.).
On December 1, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance to complain of
“excruciating pain” in his back and genitals (id. at 3). He reported being in “extreme pain for
months” (id.). Plaintiff received no response to this grievance until it was denied almost three
months later (id.).
On December 11, 2014, he sent a letter demanding that Lieutenant Harrison respond to
his grievance and his request for medical care. Plaintiff threatened to file a civil rights action
against the lieutenant if he failed to act in accordance with Plaintiff’s demands (id. at 4-5).
In response, Lieutenant Harrison “wrongfully retaliated” against Plaintiff and denied him access
to the courts by placing Plaintiff in segregation and charging him with “making a threat,
engaging in intimidation and acting with insolence” (id. at 5). Plaintiff subsequently filed a
grievance to complain about the incident and it too was denied (id. at 5, n. 3).
Desperate for medical treatment, Plaintiff resorted to more extreme measures.
He flooded his cell on December 31, 2014 (id. at 5). Lieutenant Vinson responded and acted
1

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint mentions no Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. That claim, like any other claim that is not addressed in the Second
Amended Complaint, is considered dismissed without prejudice.

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“viciously and inappropriately” by dumping all of Plaintiff’s personal property on the wet floor,
resulting in the destruction of some of the property and legal paperwork. Lieutenant Vinson then
attempted to assault Plaintiff, but another officer prevented him from doing so. Instead, Plaintiff
was left handcuffed in the prison shower for at least two hours before being isolated from other
inmates in segregation (id.).
The same day, Plaintiff expressed suicidal ideations and was moved to a crisis cell.
During the routine physical assessment that coincided with his placement in the crisis cell,
Lieutenant Vinson again tried to strike Plaintiff (id. at 6). The lieutenant was prevented from
doing so by another officer, who intervened and told him that “[i]t isn’t worth it” (id.).
Nevertheless, the officer made it clear that “they” could do anything they wanted to Plaintiff.
On January 3, 2015, Plaintiff went on a hunger strike (id.). He knew that the prison
followed “certain protocols” for inmates who declared a hunger strike, including a physical
assessment by a heath provider. Defendants Vinson and Blessing escorted Plaintiff to the
location where the physical assessment was to be performed. Plaintiff alleges that Lieutenant
Vinson “interfer[ed],” during the assessment, but he does not explain how. Plaintiff told the
lieutenant that his “present role was to provide security” (id.). Plaintiff’s comment angered the
nurse, who refused to complete the assessment, even after Plaintiff informed the nurse that doing
so violated hunger strike protocol and warranted another grievance (id. at 7).
Lieutenant Vinson became angry when he heard Plaintiff’s comments and dragged
Plaintiff back to his cell by his handcuffs (id.). Once there, the lieutenant “slammed Plaintiff’s
face into the doorway of the cell, which chipped Plaintiff’s tooth and caused a head injury” (id.).
Lieutenant Vinson then “reared back to kick Plaintiff, but another officer stopped Vinson” from
doing so (id.). When the door of the crisis cell closed, Lieutenant Vinson instructed Plaintiff to

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back up to the “chuck hold” so that he could remove Plaintiff’s handcuffs. Plaintiff did so, and
Lieutenant Vinson “violently twisted Plaintiff’s arms causing him to scream in pain” (id.).
Following this incident, Plaintiff attempted to obtain medical treatment for his injuries.
When he requested medical care, C/O Blessing grabbed Plaintiff around the throat and choked
him. Lieutenant Vinson then grabbed Plaintiff’s jaw so hard that Plaintiff could not speak to the
nurse (id.). Plaintiff filed a grievance to complain about the incident. It was denied (id. at 7, n.
4).
On January 4, 2015, Plaintiff was moved to a cell in the prison’s health care unit. The
cell lacked running water and was extremely cold and uncomfortable. He complained and was
interviewed by Warden Hilliard the next day. When the warden asked Plaintiff what he wanted,
Plaintiff said that he wanted to be released from segregation and transferred to another prison.
Plaintiff’s request was granted. He was released from segregation and transferred to Pontiac
Correctional Center ten days later (id. at 8).
At Pontiac, Plaintiff learned that Lieutenant Vinson spread a rumor about Plaintiff before
he was transferred. The lieutenant allegedly told other inmates who were also transferring to
Pontiac that Plaintiff “snitched” on a gang chief in Chicago. When the rumor spread to other
inmates at Pontiac, Plaintiff’s life was threatened and inmates threw urine on him (id.).
Discussion
In connection with the events described above, Plaintiff now brings the following claims
against the defendants:
Count 1:

Defendants Vinson and Blessing subjected Plaintiff to the
unauthorized use of excessive force and/or failed to protect him
from the same in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 16,
pp. 8-9).

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Count 2:

Defendant Mitchell retaliated against Plaintiff for threatening
to and actually filing a grievance against him by placing him in
segregation on or around November 17, 2014 (Doc. 16, pp. 910).

Count 3:

Defendant Harrison retaliated against Plaintiff for writing a
letter in which he threatened to file suit against the defendant
by placing him in segregation for fifteen days on or around
December 11, 2014 (Doc. 16, p. 10).

Count 4:

Defendant Mitchell denied Plaintiff access to the courts by
threatening him with segregation for filing a grievance on or
around November 17, 2014 and then placing him in
segregation after Plaintiff did so (Doc. 16, pp. 10-11).

Count 5:

Lieutenant Harrison denied Plaintiff access to the courts by
issuing a disciplinary report against Plaintiff that resulted in
his placement in segregation on or around December 11, 2014
after Plaintiff sent the defendant a letter threatening to sue him
(Doc. 16, pp. 11-12).

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does not
constitute an opinion regarding their merit. Any claims not addressed herein are considered
dismissed without prejudice.
Count 1
The Eighth Amendment forbids the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain upon
prisoners. A claim arises when a prison official “use[s] force not in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hendrickson v.
Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319
(1986)). See also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749,
757 (7th Cir. 2010). When determining whether the use of force is legitimate or malicious, the
Court considers several factors, including the need for force, the amount of force used, the threat
an officer reasonably perceived, the effort made to temper the severity of the force used and the
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extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Hendrickson, 589 F.3d at
890; Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004).
An Eighth Amendment claim may also arise when a prison official fails to protect a
prisoner from the use of unauthorized force by other officers. See Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6,
11 (7th Cir. 1972); Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994) (collected cases). This duty
to protect inmates extends to the protection of “prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Officials “incur liability for the breach of
that duty when they [a]re ‘aware of a substantial risk of serious injury to [an inmate] but
nevertheless fail[] to take appropriate steps to protect him from a known danger.’” Rice ex rel.
Rice v. Correctional Med. Serv., 675 F.3d 650, 669 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Guzman v. Sheahan,
495 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2002)).
See also Santiago, 599 F.3d at 758-59.
The Second Amended Complaint suggests that Defendants Vinson and Blessing may
have used excessive force against Plaintiff or failed to protect him from its use (Doc. 16, p. 7).
On or around January 3, 2015, Plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when Defendant Vinson
slammed his face in the doorway of a cell. Defendant Blessing allegedly choked Plaintiff during
the same incident (id.). Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Vinson spread a rumor among
inmates who transferred with Plaintiff to Pontiac that he was a “snitch,” thereby endangering his
safety (id. at 8). These allegations suggest that Defendants Vinson and Blessing may have
subjected Plaintiff to the unauthorized use of excessive force or failed to protect him from harm,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
Accordingly, Count 1 is subject to further review against Defendants Vinson and Blessing.
Counts 2 and 3

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A retaliation claim arises under the First Amendment when: (1) a plaintiff engages in
constitutionally protected speech; (2) he suffers a deprivation that would likely deter future First
Amendment activity; and (3) the protected speech is a motivating factor in the defendants’
actions. Harris v. Walls, 604 F. App’x 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Watkins v. Kasper, 599
F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2010); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)). To state a
claim, Plaintiff must allege a “chronology of events from which retaliation can be inferred,” and
show that retaliation was the motivating factor for the actions. Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395,
1399 (7th Cir. 1994); Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 28587 (1977).
The allegations support a claim of retaliation against Defendant Mitchell in Count 2. In
the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mitchell placed him in
segregation in retaliation for filing a grievance to complain about the denial of adequate medical
care on or around November 17, 2014 (Doc. 16, pp. 9-10). Prison officials may not retaliate
against inmates for filing grievances or otherwise complaining about their conditions of
confinement.

See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v.

Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000);
Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988).
The chronology of events set forth in the Second Amended Complaint suggests that
Defendant Mitchell did just that. Accordingly, Count 2 is subject to further review against
Defendant Mitchell.
However, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim in Count 3 against Defendant Harrison does not
survive screening. According to the allegations, Plaintiff was issued a disciplinary ticket for
“making a threat, engaging in intimidation, and acting with insolence,” after he submitted a letter

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threatening to sue the defendant if he did not submit to Plaintiff’s demands for medical care as
described in the letter (Doc. 16, pp. 4-5). Standing alone, threats to file a grievance or lawsuit
provide no basis for a retaliation claim. See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 555. Further, it is not clear
what the letter actually stated, as Plaintiff did not file a copy of it with his Second Amended
Complaint or describe it in any detail. Having failed to establish that Plaintiff’s letter constituted
protected speech, the Court cannot allow Count 3 to proceed against Defendant Harrison and this
claim shall be dismissed without prejudice against this defendant.
Counts 4 and 5
The Seventh Circuit uses a two-part test to decide if prison administrators have violated
the right of access to the courts. Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2004); Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). First, a prisoner must show that prison officials failed “to assist in
the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Jenkins v. Lane, 977 F.2d 266,
268 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828). Second, he must be able to show “some
quantum of detriment caused by the challenged conduct of state officials resulting in the
interruption and/or delay of plaintiff’s pending or contemplated litigation.” Alston v. DeBruyn,
13 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Lehn, 364 F. 3d at 868. A prisoner must show
actual substantial prejudice to specific litigation. Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 603 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1062 (1993).
The allegations offered in support of these claims fail to satisfy either of these
requirements, particularly the second one.

With respect to Count 4, Plaintiff claims that

Defendant Mitchell denied him access to the courts by placing him in segregation when Plaintiff
filed a grievance against him on November 17, 2014. In Count 5, Plaintiff claims that Defendant

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Harrison issued him a disciplinary report and placed him in segregation when he wrote a letter
threatening to sue this defendant on December 11, 2014. In both instances, Plaintiff fails to
explain “the connection between the alleged denial of access to legal materials and an inability to
pursue a legitimate challenge to a conviction, sentence, or prison conditions.” Ortiz v. Downey,
561 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted); accord Guajardo
Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff is required to identify the
underlying claim that was lost and he fails to do so in the Second Amended Complaint.
See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002); Steidl v. Fermon, 494 F.3d 623, 633
(7th Cir. 2007).
To the extent that these claims arise from the defendants’ interference with Plaintiff’s
ability to file grievances and exhaust his administrative remedies, the Second Amended
Complaint still supports no access-to-courts claim. Plaintiff is required to exhaust available
administrative remedies. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008); Dale v. Lappin,
376 F.3d 652, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2004). An officer’s interference with his grievances renders the
process unavailable (id.). Under such circumstances, an inmate is excused from the exhaustion
requirement. Count 4 against Defendant Mitchell and Count 5 against Defendant Harrison are
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 3 and 5 are DISMISSED without prejudice
against Defendant HARRISON and COUNT 4 is DISMISSED without prejudice against
Defendant MITCHELL for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. These
claims are DISMISSED with prejudice against those defendants who are not named in
connection with each claim.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 1 is subject to further review against
Defendants VINSON and BLESSING, and COUNT 2 is subject to further review against
Defendant MITCHELL.

These claims are DISMISSED with prejudice against those

defendants who are not named in connection with each claim.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is DENIED without
prejudice. Plaintiff does not indicate what type of injunctive relief he seeks. However, Plaintiff
is no longer housed at Vienna Correctional Center where all of the defendants are employed,
rendering his request for injunctive relief moot. See Lehn, 364 F.3d at 871 (“[W]hen a prisoner
who seeks injunctive relief for a condition specific to a particular prison is transferred out of that
prison, the need for relief, and hence the prisoner’s claim, become moot.”).
With regard to COUNTS 1 and 2, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants
VINSON, BLESSING and MITCHELL: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to
Waive Service of a Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) and this
Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a
Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk
within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address

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shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and
28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral. Further, this entire matter shall be
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Daly for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.

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Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 7, 2016
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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