Jackson v. Wexford Health Sources et al

Filing 9

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 11/2/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL JACKSON, # M-15131,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES
(Director), et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15-cv-920-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), has brought
this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sues a host of officials at four
different prisons where he has been incarcerated since 2010. Two hospitals are also included
among the Defendants. Plaintiff claims that various Defendants have been deliberately
indifferent to his serious mental health condition, as well as to other medical needs. Further,
several Menard officers physically assaulted Plaintiff in June 2015.
According to the complaint, Plaintiff has suffered from mental illness since childhood.
While he was in prison at Western Illinois Correctional Center (“Western”) in March 2010, he
was having a mental breakdown and got into a fight with his cellmate (Doc. 1, p. 2). He was on
psychotropic medications at the time, but they were not working. He was charged with a
disciplinary infraction; he was found guilty after a hearing where no mental health staff
participated to inform the disciplinary committee that Plaintiff was mentally ill and not
responsible for his actions. He was punished with three months in a small segregation cell.
During Plaintiff’s time in segregation, he received no meaningful mental health
Page 1 of 25

treatment, and his mental breakdown became worse. Because of this, his behavior caused him to
incur several more disciplinary tickets, and his segregation time was extended. Again, no mental
health staff appeared at his hearing, and he got no effective treatment.
On September 9, 2010, when Plaintiff had been in segregation for six months, an
unnamed officer spit in his food tray and cursed him in response to Plaintiff’s “acting out”
(Doc. 1, p. 3). Plaintiff punched the officer, but the disciplinary ticket issued against him was
later thrown out. Unnamed mental health staff frequently put Plaintiff on “watch” for being
homicidal or suicidal, which Plaintiff alleges was done as a form of punishment. Defendant
Warden Williams did nothing to help him. He was repeatedly assaulted by guards at Western.
On October 14, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center
(“Pontiac”), a maximum security prison, where he remained in segregation. Those circumstances
led to a worse mental breakdown, during which Plaintiff repeatedly cut and mutilated himself,
swallowed spoons and sharp metal objects, and inserted ink pens into his penis (Doc. 1, p. 5). He
incurred at least 97 disciplinary charges at Pontiac. Plaintiff sought help from mental health staff,
including Defendants Garland, Marano (or Marono), Moss, Angus (or Agnus), Alice (or Allie),
Duckworth, and Matthews, 1 but they disregarded his need for treatment. They did not evaluate
him or refer him to an outside mental health facility. None of them testified to Plaintiff’s mental
illness at his disciplinary hearings. Plaintiff’s disciplinary infractions earned him indefinite
segregation, which led to further deterioration of his mental health condition.
Pontiac Warden Defendant Beasten had no policy to assist mentally ill prisoners during
disciplinary hearings, and he failed to train his staff to deal with mentally ill inmates. As a result,

1

Plaintiff uses two different spellings in the complaint for the surnames of Defendants Marano/Marono
Angus/Agnus, and Alice/Allie. Defendant Dr. Matthews was inadvertently omitted from the docket sheet;
the Clerk will be directed to add this party.

Page 2 of 25

prison staff punished, assaulted, and retaliated against Plaintiff for his behavior.
Unidentified doctors gave Plaintiff strong medications against his will, such as Haldol
and Thorazine, which made him sleep for days and made him not feel like himself. The
medicines gave him headaches and other serious side effects (Doc. 1, p. 7).
In December 2012, Plaintiff was transferred to Stateville Correctional Center
(“Stateville”), where the above patterns continued. He remained in segregation and again
swallowed harmful objects, mutilated himself, incurred disciplinary tickets for run-ins with staff,
and was assaulted by guards. While at Stateville, he was sent to Defendant St. Joseph Hospital in
Joliet, Illinois, for a blood transfusion. Plaintiff told the doctors there that he was trying to harm
himself, but he was never given a mental health evaluation or examined by any mental health
staff at the hospital. He was sent to this hospital a total of seven times, but was never referred to
a mental health provider because of St. Joseph’s lack of a policy to deal with mentally ill
patients.
Defendants Kelly, Obasis, Larry, and Heart (Stateville mental health staff) did nothing to
treat Plaintiff’s serious mental illness, and they never testified regarding his mental condition at
any of Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearings (Doc. 1, p. 9). They also never referred him to a mental
health specialist. Plaintiff claims that similar to all of the named wardens and Defendants,
Stateville Warden Defendant Limpski had a policy of punishing mentally ill prisoners and
unfairly convicting them at disciplinary hearings (Doc. 1, pp. 10-11).
In June 2013, Plaintiff was transferred back to Pontiac, where he remained until January
2015. He continued to cause bodily harm to himself (Doc. 1, pp. 9, 11). He had spent
approximately five years in disciplinary segregation by the time he was moved to Menard in
January 2015.

Page 3 of 25

After the transfer to Menard, Plaintiff learned that his television had been broken “due to
retaliation” (Doc. 1, p. 11). He began cutting himself and acting out. In June 2015, he began
swallowing razor blades, putting blades into his rectum and inserting other objects into his penis.
He was given an x-ray on June 2, 2015, which showed a blade inside him. Defendants (he does
not specify which individuals) sent Plaintiff to Defendant Memorial Hospital in Chester, Illinois,
for a blood transfusion, without informing the hospital that he had swallowed a razor blade (Doc.
1, pp. 11-12).
On June 7, 2015, Plaintiff returned from the hospital. He had a bowel movement which
expelled the razor blade. Plaintiff showed the blade to Defendants Cox, an unknown Shift
Lieutenant, McClure, Slabens, and Leposky, who asked him to give them the blade. Plaintiff
refused, and he swallowed the blade again. Defendants Cox and the Lieutenant sprayed Plaintiff
with mace and pepper spray, which made him choke and have difficulty breathing. They cuffed
him, grabbed him by the throat, and then took him into another room where they and Defendants
McClure, Slabens, and Leposky beat him for about twenty minutes (Doc. 1, pp. 12-13, 16). They
let him see Defendant Nurse Stephanie, but she did not record his injuries or complaints of pain.
The next day Defendant Dr. Trost authorized Plaintiff to have an x-ray, which again
showed a blade inside him. But Defendant Trost did not examine or treat Plaintiff after this test.
For several months, Plaintiff complained to Defendant Trost, Defendant Dr. Joseph, and other
staff about blood in his urine, and pain in his stomach, side, and back. They ignored his
complaints.
Menard mental health staff Defendants Baige, Sehasian (or Sheasian), Franklin, Dr. G, 2

2

Plaintiff includes “Dr. G” (mental health doctor at Menard CC) in his list of Defendants (Doc. 1, p. 20).
At the time the case was opened, the Clerk designated this individual as one of four Unknown Party
Defendants. Plaintiff may need to identify this Defendant with more specificity in order for service on
him/her to be accomplished.

Page 4 of 25

Ms. Thomas, Ms. Meyers, 3 and Dr. Butler are aware of Plaintiff’s deteriorating mental health
condition, but have failed to treat him and have done nothing to help him get out of segregation.
Menard Warden Butler (who is not named among the Defendants) has hired unqualified mental
health staff (such as Ms. Franklin, Ms. Thomas, and Ms. Meyers) in order to save money. 4 There
is no policy at Menard to support mentally ill prisoners facing disciplinary action. The prison is
understaffed to meet prisoners’ mental health needs, and mentally ill prisoners are not sent to
specialists for evaluation.
The Director and Mental Health Director of Wexford Health Sources, together with
Defendants Godinez and Stolworthy (IDOC Directors), maintain a policy and practice of failing
to treat Plaintiff’s mental illness, punishing him with long-term segregation, loss of good time
and other privileges, and imposing suicide watches; failing to train prison officers and
disciplinary committees to deal with mentally ill prisoners; and failing to have mental health staff
alert officers and other staff to mentally ill prisoners’ lack of control over their misconduct (Doc.
1, p. 16).
Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief, in the form of release from segregation,
restoration of his lost good time, referral for a mental health evaluation, and a transfer to a
medium-security prison that offers better mental health services. He notes that his complaint was
written for him by a jailhouse lawyer.

3

Again, Plaintiff uses two different spellings for the surname of psychiatrist Dr. Sehasian/Sheasian. Ms.
Thomas and Ms. Meyers are described in the body of the complaint as two of the mental health staff
members who failed to treat Plaintiff, but they are not included in Plaintiff’s list of Defendants on pp. 1821 of the complaint. Because it appears that Plaintiff intended to include these individuals as Defendants,
the Clerk shall be directed to add Ms. Thomas and Ms. Meyers as parties to this action.
4
The complaint does not clearly indicate that Plaintiff intended to assert any claim against Menard
Warden Butler, therefore, any such claim should be considered dismissed without prejudice at this time.

Page 5 of 25

Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the
complaint, and to dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if
it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the
line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith
v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or
implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578
F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, courts “should not accept as adequate abstract
recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same
time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all

Page 6 of 25

future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer. The designation of
these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants
Wexford Health Sources (Director and Mental Health Director), Godinez, and
Stolworthy, for maintaining policies and practices, including the failure to train
their employees, that resulted in the denial of mental health treatment to Plaintiff
during his incarceration in Western, Pontiac, Stateville, and Menard; as well as
his continued placement in segregation as punishment for behavior caused by his
mental illness;
Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Wardens Williams,
Beasten, and Limpski, for failing to train staff to deal with mentally ill prisoners
such as Plaintiff, maintaining a policy of punishing Plaintiff and other mentally ill
prisoners for behavior caused by mental illness rather than providing mental
health treatment, and failing to provide adequate mental health services to
Plaintiff while he was in punitive segregation;
Count 3: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant Wardens
Williams, Beasten, and Limpski, for failing to have a policy to assist mentally ill
prisoners facing disciplinary hearings, causing Plaintiff to incur disciplinary
sanctions including long-term segregation for behaviors caused by his mental
illness;
Count 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Pontiac
mental health provider Defendants Garland, Marano/Marono, Moss,
Angus/Agnus, Alice/Allie, Duckworth, and Matthews, for failing to provide
Plaintiff with treatment for his serious mental illness;
Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Stateville
mental health provider Defendants Kelly, Obasis, Larry, and Heart, for failing to
provide Plaintiff with treatment for his serious mental illness;
Count 6: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Menard
mental health provider Defendants Baige, Sheasian/Sehasian, Franklin, Dr. G,
Thomas, Meyers, and Dr. Butler, for failing to provide Plaintiff with treatment for
his serious mental illness;
Count 7: Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against mental health
provider Defendants Garland, Marano/Marono, Moss, Angus/Agnus, Alice/Allie,
Duckworth, Matthews, Kelly, Obasis, Larry, Heart, Baige, Sheasian/Sehasian,
Franklin, Dr. G, Thomas, Meyers, and Dr. Butler, for failing to appear at
Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearings to advise the hearing committees of Plaintiff’s
mental condition;

Page 7 of 25

Count 8: Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Menard correctional
officer Defendants Cox, McClure, Slabens, Leposky, and the Unknown (John
Doe) Lieutenant, for beating Plaintiff on June 7, 2015, and/or failing to intervene
to stop the beating;
Count 9: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Menard
correctional officer Defendants Cox, McClure, Slabens, Leposky, and the
Unknown (John Doe) Lieutenant, for failing to obtain medical treatment for
Plaintiff after the June 7, 2015,beating, and against Defendant nurse Stephanie for
failing to treat Plaintiff or record his injuries and complaints of pain;
Count 10: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Menard
physician Defendants Trost and Joseph, for failing to treat Plaintiff’s complaints
about blood in his urine and pain in his stomach, side, and back, after Plaintiff’s
x-rays showed a razor blade inside his body;
Count 11: Claims against Defendants Chester Memorial Hospital and Joliet St.
Joseph Hospital, for failing to evaluate or treat Plaintiff’s mental condition when
he was sent in for blood transfusions;
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims in Counts
1-6, 8, 9, and 10 may proceed for further review against some of the named Defendants. Counts
7 and 11 fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, however, and they shall be
dismissed at this time.
The complaint makes several brief references to possible additional claims, for example,
retaliation and other incidents of excessive force. But Plaintiff fails to include sufficient facts or
identify the officials who violated his rights in these instances, and for that reason, these
potential claims do not survive review under § 1915A. Any additional claims not included in the
above counts are dismissed at this time without prejudice.
Plaintiff’s claims against officials in Pontiac, Stateville, and Western Illinois Correctional
Centers involve Defendants who are not located within the Southern District of Illinois. Because
Plaintiff asserts that systemic problems and department-wide policies caused some of the
deprivations of his constitutional rights, these claims shall be allowed to proceed together in the

Page 8 of 25

same action in this District at this time. Plaintiff is advised, however, that as the case proceeds,
the Court may determine that severance of some claims and/or a transfer of some claims to
another federal district court may be appropriate. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th
Cir. 2007) (unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits).
The Court notes that a class action raising many of the same claims as Plaintiff brings in
this case is pending in the Central District of Illinois: Rasho v. Walker, Case No. 07-cv-1288MMM (See Third Amended Class Action Complaint, Doc. 260, filed Sept. 9, 2015). On August
14, 2015, the court certified the litigation class in Rasho as follows:
Persons now or in the future in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”) [who] are identified or should have been identified by the
IDOC’s mental health professionals as in need of mental health treatment as
defined in the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association. A diagnosis of alcoholism or
drug addiction, developmental disorders, or any form of sexual disorder shall not,
by itself, render an individual mentally ill for the purposes of this class definition.
(Doc. 252, p. 7, in Rasho).
According to Plaintiff’s allegations, he is a member of this class as defined in Rasho. The
Rasho case seeks injunctive relief only, in order to remedy the alleged problems of inadequate
access to mental health treatment within Illinois prisons, and frequent and extended punishment
of mentally ill inmates with isolation/segregation, which exacerbates their mental health
problems. The court in Rasho has noted that an inmate who wishes to seek damages arising from
deliberate indifference to a mental health condition must do so in an individual action, as
Plaintiff has done here. Should the court order injunctive relief in Rasho, it may overlap with or
render moot some of Plaintiff’s requested relief.
Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical/Mental Health Needs - Overview
In order to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, an inmate

Page 9 of 25

must show that he (1) suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) that the
defendant was deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm from that condition. The Seventh
Circuit has found that “the need for a mental illness to be treated could certainly be considered a
serious medical need.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2001); see also
Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983). “Deliberate indifference is proven by
demonstrating that a prison official knows of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either
acts or fails to act in disregard of that risk. Delaying treatment may constitute deliberate
indifference if such delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.”
Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777-78
(7th Cir. 2015). The Eighth Amendment does not give prisoners entitlement to “demand specific
care” or “the best care possible,” but only requires “reasonable measures to meet a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Further, a defendant’s
inadvertent error, negligence or even ordinary malpractice is insufficient to rise to the level of an
Eighth Amendment constitutional violation. See Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th
Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff’s allegations of his self-harming and other disruptive behavior, as well as his
history of mental illness prior to his incarceration, indicate that he suffers from one or more
serious mental health conditions. At the pleading stage, he has satisfied the objective portion of
an Eighth Amendment claim. The remaining question, as to Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11, is
whether the various Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s need for mental health
and/or medical treatment.

Page 10 of 25

Count 1 – Defendants Wexford Health Sources and Directors of the Illinois Department of
Corrections
Plaintiff’s overarching claim is that the officials who establish the policies of Wexford
Health Sources and the Illinois Department of Corrections failed to maintain adequate mental
health services by which he could obtain necessary treatment for his mental illness; failed to train
their staff to properly handle inmates with mental illness, particularly in the context of
disciplinary proceedings; and had a policy of punishing mentally ill inmates such as himself for
their negative behavior. These policies resulted in Plaintiff being denied mental health treatment
in each of the prisons where he has been confined.
Plaintiff names two top administrators of Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) as
Defendants (the Director and Mental Health Director). The Court construes this as an indication
that Plaintiff seeks to hold Wexford (as a corporate entity) liable for the deprivation of his
constitutional rights. Wexford is a corporation that employs the individual mental health provider
Defendants and provides mental health and medical care at the prison, but it cannot be held liable
solely on that basis. A corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a
policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right. Woodward v. Corr.
Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc.,
300 F.3d 760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (private corporation is treated as though it were a
municipal entity in a § 1983 action). Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that his inability to obtain
mental health treatment from the individual Defendants is, at least in part, the result of an official
policy espoused by Wexford through the Defendant Wexford Director and the Defendant
Wexford Mental Health Director. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 780 (7th Cir. 2015)
(inmate stated a claim against Wexford based on its policy/practice limiting the treatment a nurse
could give in the absence of a doctor, and its practice of not having a doctor available at all
Page 11 of 25

times). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against Wexford, through the Defendant Director and
Defendant Mental Health Director, may proceed at this stage.
Plaintiff cannot sue Defendants Godinez and Stolworthy, who are former Directors of the
Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), for damages in their official capacity. The IDOC is
a state government agency, and the Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001)
(Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money damages); Billman v.
Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (state Department of Corrections is immune
from suit by virtue of Eleventh Amendment). An agency director in his official capacity may be
sued, however, for injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s claims that the Directors’ policies resulted in the
denial of mental health treatment, and his request for injunctive relief (to be evaluated and
treated for his mental health conditions), are cognizable in a civil rights action. For this reason,
the IDOC Director, in his official capacity, shall remain as a party. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman,
663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (proper defendant in a claim for injunctive relief is the
government official responsible for ensuring any injunctive relief is carried out).
Plaintiff’s allegations do not suggest that either Defendant Godinez or Stolworthy was
personally involved in any deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, all claims
against these Defendants in their personal capacity shall be dismissed, and Defendants Godinez
and Stolworthy shall be dismissed from the action.
To summarize, the deliberate indifference claims in Count 1 shall proceed against the
Director and the Mental Health Director of Wexford Health Sources and against the Director of
the Illinois Department of Corrections (in his/her official capacity only).

Page 12 of 25

Count 2 – Deliberate Indifference – Wardens
Plaintiff alleges that Wardens Williams (Western CC), Beasten (Pontiac), and Limpski
(Stateville) failed to train their employees to properly interact with prisoners like himself who
suffer from mental illness. Their policies resulted in Plaintiff incurring disciplinary charges and
sanctions, particularly long-term segregation which isolated him from human contact for long
periods, due to behavior that resulted from his mental illness. The wardens also failed to make
adequate mental health services available to Plaintiff while he was in segregation.
At this stage, Plaintiff’s allegations that the wardens’ policies, practices, and failure to
train staff amounted to deliberate indifference to his serious mental health needs merits further
review. Count 2 shall thus proceed against Defendants Williams, Beasten, and Limpski.
Count 3 – Due Process – Wardens
Plaintiff’s claim that the wardens’ policies allowed and encouraged prison officials to
pursue disciplinary charges against him for behavior caused by his mental illness may also
implicate his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process before he is deprived of a liberty
interest. The prisons’ disciplinary hearing procedures made no provision for the involvement of
the prisons’ mental health professionals, who, Plaintiff suggests, would have been able to
confirm that his disruptive actions were a result of his mental illness, rather than calculated
defiance on his part. Without any assistance from mental health staff, Plaintiff could not
adequately defend himself during the disciplinary hearing process.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court set out the minimal
procedural protections that must be provided to a prisoner in disciplinary proceedings in which
the prisoner loses good time, is confined to a disciplinary segregation, or is otherwise subjected
to some comparable deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id. at 556-572.

Page 13 of 25

Wolff required that inmates facing disciplinary charges for misconduct be
accorded [1] 24 hours’ advance written notice of the charges against them; [2] a
right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, unless doing
so would jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals; [3] the aid of a staff
member or inmate in presenting a defense, provided the inmate is illiterate or the
issues complex; [4] an impartial tribunal; and [5] a written statement of reasons
relied on by the tribunal. 418 U.S. at 563-572.
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 n.3 (1983). Due process also requires that the findings of the
disciplinary tribunal must be supported by some evidence in the record. Superintendent v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s claim
suggests that the wardens’ policies may have improperly denied him the aid of a prison staff
member in presenting a defense that his mental condition caused his behavior. This would
arguably fall within the definition of a “complex” issue as noted in in the authority above.
Prisoners may pursue a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process
only under limited circumstances. See Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98
(7th Cir. 2009). An inmate has a due process liberty interest in being in the general prison
population only if the conditions of his or her disciplinary confinement impose “atypical and
significant hardship[s] . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997) (in
light of Sandin, “the right to litigate disciplinary confinements has become vanishingly small”).
For prisoners whose punishment includes being put in disciplinary segregation, under Sandin,
“the key comparison is between disciplinary segregation and nondisciplinary segregation rather
than between disciplinary segregation and the general prison population.” Wagner, 128 F.3d at
1175.
The Seventh Circuit has elaborated two elements for determining whether disciplinary
segregation conditions impose atypical and significant hardships: “the combined import of the

Page 14 of 25

duration of the segregative confinement and the conditions endured by the prisoner during that
period.” Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in
original). The first prong of this two-part analysis focuses solely on the duration of disciplinary
segregation. For relatively short periods of disciplinary segregation, inquiry into specific
conditions of confinement is unnecessary. See Marion, 559 F.3d at 698; Lekas v. Briley, 405
F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2005) (56 days); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (70
days) (“a relatively short period when one considers his 12 year prison sentence”).
In Plaintiff’s case, he alleges that his confinement in disciplinary segregation has lasted
for over five years. This length of time more than satisfies the “duration” requirement for a
potential due process claim. As to the specific conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement, he claims
that the extended time in isolation has worsened his symptoms of mental illness, leading to selfmutilation and other self-harming behaviors. Further, he has been deprived of any meaningful
mental health treatment during his time in segregation, as a result of policies promulgated by the
Defendant Wardens (See Count 2). These allegations suggest that Plaintiff was subjected to
atypical and significant hardships during his time in disciplinary segregation. At this stage of the
litigation, Plaintiff’s due process claims in Count 3 merit further review, and they shall proceed
against Defendants Williams, Beasten, and Limpski. 5
Count 4 – Deliberate Indifference – Pontiac Mental Health Provider Defendants
Plaintiff was in segregation in Pontiac between October 2010 and December 2012, and

5

The Court notes that Plaintiff refers to having lost good conduct credits as the result of some unspecified
disciplinary action(s). He does not indicate how many of the multitude of disciplinary actions that
prolonged his stay in segregation may have also included a revocation of sentence credit. To the extent
that any individual disciplinary case caused Plaintiff to lose good conduct credits, a civil rights claim
based upon that proceeding would appear to be barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 486-87 (1994), unless and until the disciplinary “conviction” is expunged or invalidated. This is a
matter that can only be resolved after further factual development. At this early stage, the claims in Count
3 shall proceed despite the potential Heck issue.

Page 15 of 25

again between June 2013 and January 2015. He claims that he requested mental health treatment
from Defendants Garland, Marano/Marono, Moss, Angus/Agnus, Alice/Allie, Duckworth, and
Matthews, but they failed to evaluate him or properly treat him. Likewise, they did not transfer
him to the mental health unit at Pontiac or refer him to an outside mental health facility.
Some of the above allegations indicate that one or more of the Pontiac Defendants may
have been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious mental health condition. Other omissions
may not implicate his constitutional rights–for instance, a referral to an outside facility may or
may not have been medically necessary, and if not, would not amount to deliberate indifference.
But Plaintiff’s claims that he received virtually no meaningful mental health treatment from
these Defendants, who were aware of his serious self-harming behavior, merit further review.
Therefore, the deliberate indifference claims in Count 4 against Pontiac Defendants Garland,
Marano/Marono, Moss, Angus/Agnus, Alice/Allie, Duckworth, and Matthews, shall proceed at
this stage.
Plaintiff also alleges that while he was in Pontiac, he was given medications (Haldol and
Thorazine) that caused severe side effects and made his condition worse (Doc. 1, p. 7). He never
identifies the doctors who prescribed these medications, however, and these brief facts do not
suggest deliberate indifference. Therefore, all claims based on the provision of psychotropic
medications to Plaintiff while at Pontiac are dismissed at this time without prejudice.
Count 5 – Deliberate Indifference – Stateville Mental Health Provider Defendants
Plaintiff raises similar allegations of deliberate indifference to his serious mental health
condition against Stateville mental health provider Defendants Kelly, Obasis, Larry, and Heart.
While Plaintiff was in segregation at Stateville between December 2012 and June 2013, he
swallowed harmful objects and mutilated himself. He states that these Stateville mental health

Page 16 of 25

professionals did nothing to treat his serious medical/mental health needs. At this stage,
therefore, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against Stateville Defendants Kelly, Obasis,
Larry, and Heart in Count 5 shall proceed for further review.
Count 6 – Deliberate Indifference – Menard Mental Health Provider Defendants
As with Counts 5 and 6 above, Plaintiff claims that since the time he was transferred to
Menard in January 2015, Defendants Baige, Sheasian/Sehasian, Franklin, Dr. G, Thomas,
Meyers, and Dr. Butler have failed to treat his mental illness. They have been aware of his
deteriorating mental condition and self-harming behavior. The deliberate indifference claims in
Count 6 against Defendants Baige, Sheasian/Sehasian, Franklin, Dr. G, Thomas, Meyers, and
Dr. Butler, shall also receive further consideration.
Dismissal of Count 7 – Due Process – Mental Health Provider Defendants
This count is premised on Plaintiff’s claim that none of the individual mental health
providers listed in Counts 4, 5, and 6 ever testified on his behalf at any of his multiple
disciplinary hearings, and they have done nothing to help him get out of segregation. Based on
the current complaint, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for a
violation of his due process rights by these Defendants.
Plaintiff never indicates that he ever requested any of the mental health providers
(Defendants Garland, Marano/Marono, Moss, Angus/Agnus, Alice/Allie, Duckworth, Matthews,
Kelly, Obasis, Larry, Heart, Baige, Sheasian/Sehasian, Franklin, Dr. G, Thomas, Meyers, and Dr.
Butler) to assist him or testify for him at any disciplinary hearing. Further, the claim designated
as Count 3 asserts that the prisons’ policies, promulgated by the wardens of the respective
institutions, did not provide any mechanism for mental health providers to participate in
disciplinary proceedings involving mentally ill inmates. Section 1983 creates a cause of action

Page 17 of 25

based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under § 1983, the
individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v.
Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Thus, if the mental health provider Defendants were not asked by Plaintiff to assist him
during his disciplinary hearings, and the prevailing policies/practices had no provisions for
involving the mental health providers in the disciplinary hearing process, these individuals
cannot be held liable for depriving Plaintiff of a liberty interest without due process.
For these reasons, the due process claims in Count 7 against Defendants Garland,
Marano/Marono, Moss, Angus/Agnus, Alice/Allie, Duckworth, Matthews, Kelly, Obasis, Larry,
Heart, Baige, Sheasian/Sehasian, Franklin, Dr. G, Thomas, Meyers, and Dr. Butler, shall be
dismissed without prejudice.
Count 8 – Excessive Force – Menard Correctional Officer Defendants
The intentional use of excessive force by prison guards against an inmate without
penological justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and is actionable under § 1983. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); DeWalt
v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). An inmate must show that an assault occurred and
that “it was carried out ‘maliciously and sadistically’ rather than as part of ‘a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline.’” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 40 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,
6 (1992)). An inmate seeking damages for the use of excessive force need not establish serious
bodily injury to make a claim, but not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a
federal cause of action.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38 (the question is whether force was de
minimis, not whether the injury suffered was de minimis); see also Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d
833, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2001). Further, a guard who observes a fellow officer assaulting a prisoner,

Page 18 of 25

yet does nothing to stop the use of excessive force, can be held equally liable for an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972); see also Lanigan v.
Vill. of E. Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1997); Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th
Cir. 1994) (collected cases); Archie v. City of Racine, 826 F.2d 480, 491 (7th Cir. 1987).
Here, Plaintiff states that on June 7, 2015, Defendant Cox and the Unknown Shift
Lieutenant sprayed him with mace or pepper spray, grabbed him by his throat, and beat him.
Defendants McClure, Slabens, and Leposky were also present and either participated in the
attack, or watched the assault without intervening to stop it (Doc. 1, pp. 12, 15-16). Based on
these factual allegations, Plaintiff may proceed with his excessive force claim in Count 8 against
Defendants Cox, McClure, Slabens, Leposky, and the Unknown (John Doe) Shift Lieutenant. Of
course, before the Unknown Defendant can be served, Plaintiff must identify him by name.
Count 9 – Deliberate Indifference – Menard Correctional Officer Defendants
Although Defendants Cox, McClure, Slabens, Leposky, and the Unknown (John Doe)
Shift Lieutenant are not medical providers, the Seventh Circuit has held that a guard who uses
excessive force on a prisoner has “a duty of prompt attention to any medical need to which the
beating might give rise[.]” Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, the
Defendants who perpetrated the assault (as well as those who failed to intervene to stop it) and
then allegedly prevented Plaintiff from getting immediate medical attention for his injuries, may
be found liable for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s need for medical care. Plaintiff does note
that these Defendants allowed him to see Defendant Nurse Stephanie after the attack, but she did
not record any of his injuries or complaints of pain, and did not treat him. These Defendants did
not send Plaintiff to Health Care for any treatment or x-rays, and he received no further medical
attention until the following day, when an x-ray was taken.

Page 19 of 25

At this stage, Plaintiff’s factual allegations suffice to suggest that the actions of
Defendants Cox, McClure, Slabens, Leposky, the Unknown (John Doe) Shift Lieutenant, and
Defendant Nurse Stephanie resulted in the denial and/or delay of medical care for Plaintiff’s
injuries. Plaintiff may thus proceed on his claims in Count 9 against these Defendants for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Count 10 – Deliberate Indifference – Menard Physician Defendants
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Trost ordered an x-ray which showed that Plaintiff had
ingested a razor blade, however, he failed to examine or treat Plaintiff for this condition. For
several months thereafter, Plaintiff complained to Defendants Trost and Joseph about blood in
his urine, and pain in his back, stomach, and side. Both physicians ignored Plaintiff’s pleas for
help. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff may also proceed with his deliberate indifference
claims in Count 10 against Defendants Trost and Joseph.
Dismissal of Count 11 – Hospitals
The claim against St. Joseph Hospital in Joliet, Illinois, is based on Plaintiff’s allegations
that he was sent to that institution on seven different occasions but was never evaluated by a
mental health professional, even though he told doctors that he was trying to harm himself.
Plaintiff was sent to St. Joseph for one or more blood transfusion(s) during the time he was
incarcerated at Stateville. St. Joseph, he asserts, has no policy to deal with mentally ill patients,
thus he was denied needed care.
The complaint does not allege that St. Joseph Hospital or any of its doctors had a
contractual relationship with Stateville or with the IDOC to provide medical care to prisoners.
Whether or not St. Joseph Hospital (or any private physician) can be considered a “state actor” is
a key factor in determining whether Plaintiff can maintain a constitutional claim for deliberate

Page 20 of 25

indifference to a medical/mental health condition against such a Defendant. See Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822-30 (7th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff cannot proceed
with a federal claim under § 1983 against a non-state actor. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999); Gayman v. Principal Fin. Servs., Inc., 311 F.3d 851, 852-53
(7th Cir. 2003). A mere referral of a prisoner for treatment by an outside medical provider does
not transform such a provider into a state actor that may be sued under § 1983; more is required.
Plaintiff does not claim that such a contractual relationship existed here.
Additionally, the facts related by Plaintiff show that he was sent to St. Joseph for a
particular treatment–a blood transfusion–and there is no indication that St. Joseph or any
provider employed there had the authority to evaluate Plaintiff’s mental health condition or
render any other treatment to Plaintiff beyond the specific issue that prompted his referral to the
outside hospital. Considering all these factors, the complaint fails to state a constitutional claim
upon which relief may be granted against Defendant St. Joseph Hospital. This portion of Count
11 shall be dismissed without prejudice.
As to Defendant Chester Memorial Hospital, Plaintiff’s claim is even less clear. He was
sent to Chester Memorial Hospital for a blood transfusion on or about June 2, 2015, after an xray performed at Menard showed he had a razor blade inside him. He states that the Menard
officials who referred him for the blood transfusion did not inform anybody at Chester Memorial
Hospital that Plaintiff had swallowed the razor blade and that it was still there. Plaintiff does not
articulate any claim against this hospital, so the Court cannot discern whether he seeks to hold
Chester Memorial liable for failing to discover the razor blade, failing to treat him for
swallowing the blade, or for failing to provide him with mental health services. And, as
discussed above with reference to St. Joseph Hospital, the complaint does not indicate that

Page 21 of 25

Chester Memorial Hospital was a “state actor” susceptible to a civil rights claim.
Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable civil rights claim against either Defendant St. Joseph
Hospital, or Defendant Chester Memorial Hospital. Count 11, and each of these Defendant
Hospitals shall be dismissed without prejudice.
Other Unknown (John Doe) Defendants
In his list of Defendants, Plaintiff includes an unnamed “doctor/psychiatrist” (Defendant
5) and an unidentified “mental health psychologist” (Defendant 6), both employed at Western
Illinois Correctional Center (Doc. 1, p. 18). He does not, however, refer to these individuals
elsewhere in the complaint, and thus he does not state a cognizable claim against them. These
Unknown Defendants shall be dismissed from the action without prejudice at this time.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) shall be referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson for further consideration.
Disposition
The Clerk is DIRECTED to add Dr. Matthews (psychiatrist at Pontiac C.C.), Ms.
Thomas (mental health worker at Menard C.C.), Ms. Meyers (mental health worker at Menard
C.C.), and the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (official capacity only) as party
Defendants.
COUNTS 7 and 11 are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Defendants GODINEZ, STOLWORTHY, MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL-CHESTER, ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL, and TWO UNKNOWN PARTY
DEFENDANTS (Doctor, Western IL CC; and Mental Health Psychologist, Western IL
CC) are DISMISSED from this action without prejudice.

Page 22 of 25

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES
(Director), WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES (Mental Health Director), WILLIAMS,
GARLAND, MARONO/MARANO, ANGUS/AGNUS, ALLIE/ALICE, DUCKWORTH,
BEASTEN, KELLY, OBASIS, LARRY, HEART, LIMPSKI, BUTLER, BAIGE,
SEHASIAN/SHEASIAN,

FRANKLIN,

TROST,

JOSEPH,

COX,

STEPHANIE,

McCLURE, SLABENS, LEPOSKY, MATTHEWS, THOMAS, MEYERS, DR. G. (Mental
Health Doctor at Menard), and the DIRECTOR of the ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT of
CORRECTIONS (Official Capacity): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant,
and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service shall not be made on the Unknown Defendant (John Doe Shift Lieutenant at
Menard) until such time as Plaintiff has identified him by name in a properly filed amended
complaint. Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the Court with the
name and service address for this individual, and any other Defendant (such as Menard Dr. G)
who cannot be identified based on the information in the complaint.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

Page 23 of 25

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, which shall include a
determination on the pending motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all
parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a

Page 24 of 25

stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 2, 2015

___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

Page 25 of 25