Townsend v. Shah et al

Filing 52

ORDER denying 51 Motion for Reconsideration filed by Willie Townsend: For the reasons explained in the attached Order, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 51) seeking reconsideration of the ruling in the Court's July 8, 2016 Order (Doc. 49). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 7/22/16. (soh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIE TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VIPIN SHAH and
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-1078-MJR-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
Confined in Pinckneyville Correctional Center, Willie Townsend filed a pro se
suit in this Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that two Defendants (Dr. Vipin Shah
and Wexford Health Sources) violated his federally-secured constitutional rights by
their deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

Specifically, Townsend

alleged that Defendants deprived him of adequate medical treatment for a neck lipoma1
and wrongfully refused to order him a soy-free diet. On July 8, 2016, the undersigned
denied Townsend’s motion for preliminary injunction, which asked the Court to order
the immediate surgical removal of Townsend’s lipoma.
On July 21, 2016, Townsend filed “Motion to Reconsider” that denial (Doc. 51).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly provide for motions to
reconsider. Motions in civil actions asking the district court to reconsider final orders or

Lipomas are “benign fatty tumors that form under the skin.” Gallo
v. Sood, -- Fed. App’x --, 2016 WL 3081952 (7th Cir. June 1, 2016).

1

judgments are analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (motions to alter or
amend judgment) or Rule 60(b) (motions for relief from a final judgment or order). See
Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 943 (7th Cir. 2010). Whether a motion is construed
under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on the date the motion was filed (a 28-day
deadline governs Rule 59(e) motions) and the substance of the motion, not the label on
the motion. Banks v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2014); Obriecht v.
Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 953 (2008); Borrero v.
City of Chicago, 456 F.3d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2006). 2
Motions to reconsider interlocutory (non-final) orders invoke the district court’s
broad inherent and discretionary powers, such as the general authority in Rule 54(b) to
revise “at any time before the entry of … judgment” an order that adjudicates fewer
than all claims, rights, and liabilities in a case. See, e.g., Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581,
587 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012). Motions to reconsider non-final orders are appropriately granted
where the court “patently misunderstood a party,” the court decided an issue outside
the boundaries of the controversy presented by the parties, or there is a “controlling or
significant change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the Court.”
Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990).

Rule 59(e) motions serve a limited function – to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Seng-Tiong
Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 505 (7th Cir. 2011); Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762
F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014); Boyd v. Tornier, Inc., 656 F.3d 487, 492 (7th
Cir. 2011). Rule 59(e) motions may not be used to rehash previously
rejected arguments, Vesely, 762 F.3d at 667, citing Oto v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000), or to advance arguments that could
have been made before the district court rendered judgment, Sigsworth v.
City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2007).
2

The Seventh Circuit has noted that these circumstances “rarely arise, and the motion to
reconsider should be equally rare.” Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191.
As to the July 8th denial of preliminary injunctive relief in the case at bar, Plaintiff
Townsend has not shown that the undersigned patently misunderstood the parties, that
the undersigned resolved an issue beyond the boundaries of the controversy presented
in this case, or that any significant change in the law or facts occurred since the Court
ruled. Plaintiff does not really even argue that. Rather, he has gathered and now wants
to submit additional medical records and exhibits (e.g., cumulative counseling
summaries, an affidavit from a cellmate, etc.) to support the argument that he needs
immediate surgery to remove the lipoma.

He also disputes the representation of

Pinckneyville staff that he ever said he had had the lipoma for ten years.
As to the latter, a motion to reconsider is not a vehicle to rehash arguments
previously presented to the Court. As to the additional evidence Plaintiff has compiled,
that conceivably could be presented as a fresh motion or might support his argument
for later injunctive relief, if he prevails on the merits of his claims. But it does not
warrant reversal of the ruling the Court made on the evidence in the record on July 8th.
For all these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 51).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED July 22, 2016.

s/ Michael J. Reagan
Michael J. Reagan
United States District Judge