Graham, Jr v. Watson et al
Filing
49
ORDER DENYING 46 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is to submit a more definite statements no later than October 6, 2017. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 9/18/2017. (jkb2)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TYRONE GRAHAM, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PHILLIP MCLAURIN,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:15-cv-1114-NJR-DGW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
A Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 46) filed by Defendant Phillip McLaurin is pending
before the Court. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Tyrone Graham, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf
of himself and “Block AA” inmates housed at the St. Clair County Jail. (Doc. 1). Graham
alleged the inmates were subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement
starting in August 1, 2015, when they were moved to the gym due to a broken light in
their cellblock. (Doc. 1). After the Court issued a warning about the perils of proceeding
with a joint claim, all other Plaintiffs were dismissed. (Docs. 24, 32). Graham was
permitted to proceed on an individual claim that he was subjected to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement for a three week period beginning on August 19, 2015.
The sole Defendant, Phillip McLaurin, who Graham identified as a
superintendent or major, now seeks dismissal based on qualified immunity. McLaurin
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argues Graham has not set forth any claim that he was personally involved in the
constitutional deprivations and that Graham’s “situation was temporary and localized.”
(Doc. 46, p. 5). Graham did not respond to the motion to dismiss within the 30 day time
period set forth in Local Rule 7.1. When Graham was given an additional opportunity to
respond and warned the failure to respond may result in dismissal, he still did not file a
response. (Doc. 48). Despite Graham’s failure, the Court declines to dismiss the case
because it finds McLaurin’s motion is without merit.
BACKGROUND
Graham’s third amended complaint consists of one paragraph in which he states
he was subjected to conditions that included being housed in the gymnasium with “30
plus offenders,” sleeping on a “boat,” sharing one toilet, and sharing “eating quarters on
the gymnasium floor.” (Doc. 35, p. 5). Graham does not name McLaurin in the body of
his complaint; rather, he is listed as “Defendant #1.” There is no indication in the third
amended complaint of what role McLaurin played in the conditions of Graham’s
confinement. As set forth in this Court’s previous Order, however, by designating
McLaurin as a high ranking official, a superintendent of the St. Clair County Jail,
Graham impliedly asserts that McLaurin directed or condoned the unconstitutional
conditions. (Doc. 38, pp. 3-4).
DISCUSSION
McLaurin presents his motion to dismiss as based on qualified immunity.
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 (2001), the Supreme Court set out a two-part test for
qualified immunity. Specifically, a court must decide whether the facts, when viewed in
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the light most favorable to the plaintiff, indicate: (1) the officer’s conduct violated some
constitutional right of the plaintiff; and (2) the constitutional right violated was “clearly
established” at the time of the alleged violation. Id. The Court notes that while McLaurin
cites the standard for qualified immunity, he fails to explain why Graham’s claims fail
this test. (Doc. 46). Rather, McLaurin’s basic contention is that there is no allegation that
he was involved, personally or otherwise, in the constitutional deprivation. Thus, the
Court will proceed on McLaurin’s more general claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), rather than analyzing whether McLaurin is entitled to qualified
immunity.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6). Dismissal of an action under this rule is warranted where a plaintiff is unable to
prove any set of facts that would entitle them to relief. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease
Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While a
complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, there must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 555. The plaintiff must plead factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)); McReynolds v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012). When reviewing the sufficiency of a
complaint, a court must “accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, but
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‘need not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co.,
709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir.
2009)). Further, allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and are to be liberally construed, Wilson v. Civil
Town of Clayton, Ind., 839 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988).
Here, when liberally construed, Graham has pled sufficient facts to survive a
motion to dismiss. McLaurin is correct that the third amended complaint does not set
forth any specific allegation that McLaurin was personally involved in Graham’s
housing situation—there is no statement that it occurred at his direction or with his
knowledge or consent. (Doc. 35, p. 5). To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must
establish the defendant was personally responsible for deprivation of the constitutional
right. Sheik–Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994). An official satisfies the
personal responsibility requirement of § 1983, however, where the constitutional
deprivation occurs at the direction or with the knowledge and consent of the
official. Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 369 (7th Cir. 1985). Where an official knows of,
facilitates, approves, condones or turns a blind eye to unconstitutional conduct, they can
be held personally responsible. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988).
As this Court previously found, by designating McLaurin as a high ranking official, a
superintendent of the St. Clair County Jail, Graham impliedly asserts that McLaurin
directed or condoned the unconstitutional conditions. (Doc. 38, pp. 3-4).
McLaurin nonetheless argues that because Graham’s situation was “localized”
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and brief, it cannot be assumed McLaurin was aware of the situation. (See Doc. 46, p. 4).
McLaurin relies on Steidl v. Gramley, to argue this situation was an “isolated failure” that
does not create liability in an administrator. Steidl v. Gramley, 151 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir.
1998). Steidl, however, involved a single incident of assault between prisoners. Id. at 740.
The Seventh Circuit found that because wardens are not involved in the day-to-day
operations of the prison, the warden could not be liable for a single isolated failure of
subordinates to protect a prisoner. Id. at 741. Conversely, here the scope of the situation
in Graham’s case—30 or more inmates being housed in the prison’s gym for a three week
period—was sufficiently systematic to allow an inference that the superintendent of the
jail would be aware of, if not directly responsible for, the situation. (Doc. 35, p. 5). Thus,
Graham’s third amended complaint is sufficiently pled to avoid dismissal.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), however, the Court is
ordering Graham to provide a more definite statement of his claim. Graham vaguely
asserts that he was subjected to certain living conditions, housing in a gym, sleeping in a
boat (which the Court assumes is a cot), sharing a toilet, and being compelled to “share
eating quarters on the gymnasium floor.” Each of these individual conditions are, on
their own, unlikely to rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. The Supreme Court
has stated:
Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment
violation “in combination” when each would not do so alone, but only when
they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a
low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1991) (emphasis added).
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Graham’s third amended complaint does not explain how the conditions he
suffered impacted an identifiable human need. Graham is therefore ordered to provide
the Court with a more definite statement addressing the missing information in his
third amended complaint, no later than October 6, 2017. Failure to do so shall result in
the striking of the third amended complaint and dismissal of this suit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Phillip
McLaurin (Doc. 46) is DENIED. Graham is ORDERED to submit a more definite
statement no later than October 6, 2017.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 18, 2017
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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