Jones, Jr. v. IDOC et al

Filing 7

ORDER DISMISSING CASE: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any and all claims against all Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 11/17/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LOUIS T. JONES, JR., N-97972
Plaintiff,
vs.
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENTOF
CORRECTIONS,
BIG MUDDY RIVER
CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
STATEVILLE CORRECTIONAL
CENTER,
ROBINSON CORRECTIONAL
CENTER,
RANDY GROUNDS, and
WILLIAM C. NORTON
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 15-cv-1198-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Louis T. Jones is currently incarcerated at Big Muddy River Correctional Center
(“Big Muddy”). Proceeding pro se, Jones has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
prison officials violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment by detaining him for a period in
excess of the terms of his sentence. (Doc. 1 at 2.) He seeks compensatory, punitive, and specific
relief. (Id. at 6.)
This matter is now before the Court for a preliminary review of Jones’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court shall review a “complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
government entity.” During this preliminary review under § 1915A, the Court “shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if the complaint “is

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frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or if it “seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” For the reasons set forth
below, Jones’s claim does not survive preliminary review.
Background
Jones asserts that he has been held in prison for a time in excess of his original sentence.
According to Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) public records, on August 14, 2004,
Jones was sentenced to ten years for predatory criminal sexual assault and three years for
aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Offender Search, Illinois Department of Corrections,
http://www.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/Pages/InmateSearch.aspx (last accessed Nov. 13, 2015).
The complaint asserts that Jones was only sentenced to eighty-five percent of his ten-year
sentence for sexual assault. (Doc. 1 at 5.) According to Jones, this means that his sentence was
completed on February 14, 2013; however, Jones asserts that Robinson Correctional Center
(“Robinson”) (where he was incarcerated at the time) required him to serve the full ten years,
apparently releasing him on February 14, 2015. (Id. at 2.)
The Court assumes Jones was released on some sort of probationary basis, because the
complaint goes on to state that IDOC “added another 6 months,” and that “[t]hey said they
revoke [sic.] 6 months good time when they never gave me no good time.” (Id.) The complaint
also states that “they” (presumably IDOC) told him he had to serve fifty percent of his three-year
sentence for sexual abuse.
Jones states that he believes he should have finished his entire sentence on August 14,
2014. 1

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Elsewhere in the complaint, however, Jones states Big Muddy and IDOC have held him against his will
since March 10, 2015.

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Discussion
In Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) (per curiam), the Supreme Court recognized
that some prisoner civil rights cases straddle the line between what is actionable under § 1983,
and what should instead be instituted in a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254:
Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its
duration are the province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on
circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action. Some cases
are hybrids, with a prisoner seeking relief unavailable in habeas, notably damages,
but on allegations that not only support a claim for recompense, but imply the
invalidity either of an underlying conviction or of a particular ground for denying
release short of serving the maximum time of confinement.
Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750-51 (citations omitted). Muhammad is based on two related
decisions: Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641
(1997). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 action for damages that “would
necessarily imply the invalidity of [a plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence” is not cognizable until
the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 512 U.S. at 486-87. In Balisok, the Supreme
Court held that claims that “necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of [the prisoner’s]
good-time credits” are not actionable under § 1983 unless the prison disciplinary decision has
been invalidated, even though the restoration of credits is not sought as a remedy. 520 U.S. at
646-68.
Jones claims that he has been held in confinement for longer than his original sentence.
Specifically relevant is his statement that the prison officials allegedly told him they revoked six
months good time credit. A finding in favor of Jones in this § 1983 action would “necessarily
imply” that actions by prison officials affecting the duration of his confinement were invalid, and
therefore would run afoul of Heck and its progeny. Thus his civil rights claim only ripens when

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such actions have been reversed or otherwise invalidated. See Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303,
306-07 (7th Cir. 2006). Therefore, Jones’s due process claim must be dismissed.
The dismissal shall be without prejudice, however, to Jones raising his claim, should he
wish to do so, if and when the actions imposing an extended duration of his confinement are
overturned. Jones may be able to pursue relief in a federal habeas corpus case, after presenting
his claim to the Illinois state courts. This includes appealing any adverse decision to the Illinois
Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court. The Illinois courts, for example, have
recognized mandamus as an appropriate remedy to compel prison officials to award sentence
credit to a prisoner. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-101 et seq.; Turner-El v. West, 811 N.E.2d
728, 733 (Ill. App. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Franzen, 417 N.E.2d 242, 247, aff’d on reh’g, 420
N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. 1981)).
Pending Motion
Jones filed a motion for service of process at government expense. (Doc. 3.) That motion
is DENIED as moot.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any and all claims against all Defendants are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he may file a notice of appeal with this Court
within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. 4(A)(4). If Plaintiff does choose to
appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the
appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724,
725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockish,

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133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). A timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. 2 FED. R. APP. 4(a)(4).
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 17, 2015

__________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of
the judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).

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