McKinnon v. St. Clair County Jail et al

Filing 7

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 12/11/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANDREW McKINNON, #B-89426,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ST. CLAIR COUNTY JAIL,
CAPTAIN TRICE,
and MAJOR McLAUREN,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-01219-SMY

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Andrew McKinnon, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at Big Muddy River
Correctional Center (“Big Muddy”), claims that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement at St. Clair County Jail (“Jail”) for a period of seventeen months that began in
December 2012. In connection with this claim, he now sues the Jail and two of its officials
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 7).
The complaint is subject to preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the complaint that is
legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for
money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b). The complaint survives preliminary review under this standard.
The Complaint
According to the allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff was arrested and detained at
St. Clair County Jail (“Jail”), which is located in St. Clair County, Illinois, on December 5, 2012.
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(Doc. 1, p. 5). For five or six days, he was held in the Jail’s “drunk tank,” where he faced
overcrowded conditions. Plaintiff alleges, rather vaguely, that inmates were “piled on top of one
another.” (Id.).
Around December 11, 2012, Plaintiff transferred to a cell block that was also
overcrowded. Twenty-four inmates were housed in a cell block that was designed to hold
twelve. For ten months, Plaintiff slept on the floor because he had no bed. This sleeping
arrangement exacerbated the pain he suffered in his neck and back as a result of a prior car
accident and surgery.

He complained about this pain to the Jail’s doctor, 1 who ignored

Plaintiff’s complaints and his requests for a mattress.
During the seventeen months that he was housed in the Jail, Plaintiff faced other
allegedly deplorable conditions. In the winter months, cold air streamed into the cell block
through a single glass block window causing Plaintiff to “freeze.” (Id.). In the spring, water
entered the cell through the same window and caused flooding in the back of the cell block.
And in the summer, bugs and spiders entered the cell through the sewage drain. The smell of
raw sewage emanated from the sink and air conditioning vents daily. The water also reeked of
raw sewage. At times, the stench was so bad that Plaintiff could not “see or breathe.” (Id.).
In addition, the food portions were small and served through a dirty chuckhole. (Id. at 6).
The showers were moldy. Plaintiff was not allowed to use the gym for exercise because it was
used for housing. And his “teeth” 2 were lost and never recovered, at a cost to Plaintiff of
$1,200.00.

1

Plaintiff did not name the doctor as a defendant in this action or bring a claim against him. When parties
are not listed in the caption, this Court will not treat them as defendants, and any claims against them
should be considered dismissed without prejudice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (noting that the title of the
complaint “must name all the parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that to be properly considered a party, a defendant must be “specif]ied] in the caption”).
2
The Court assumes that Plaintiff used the term “teeth” to refer to his “denture(s).”
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Plaintiff

complained

about

these

conditions

to

the

(Defendant McLauren) and captain (Defendant Trice), to no avail.

Jail’s

superintendent

He now sues the Jail,

Major McLauren, and Captain Trice for monetary damages.
Discussion
Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with a claim for unconstitutional conditions of
confinement (Count 1) against Defendants McLauren and Trice. The Jail shall be dismissed as a
defendant.
The applicable legal standard for Plaintiff’s claim depends on his status as an arrestee,
pretrial detainee, or prisoner. The Fourth Amendment’s “objectively unreasonable” standard
governs the claims of an arrestee. Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 2006)
(citing Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1992); Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty.,
235 F.3d 1000, 1018 n. 14 (7th Cir. 2000)).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment governs the claims of a pretrial detainee, and the Eighth Amendment applies to
claims of prisoners. See Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 312 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, -- U.S. --, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015); Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842
(7th Cir. 2013)). Although a convicted prisoner is entitled to freedom from conditions that
amount to “cruel and unusual punishment,” a pretrial detainee is entitled to be free from
conditions that constitute “punishment.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
However, there is little practical difference between the standards that are applicable to
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners for claims involving the conditions of confinement.
Claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment are “appropriately analyzed under the Eighth
Amendment. Dart, 803 F.3d at 310 (citing Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2013)

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(“[T]he protection afforded under [the Due Process Clause] is functionally indistinguishable
from the Eighth Amendment’s protection for convicted prisoners.”)). Plaintiff’s claim survives
threshold review under the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments. Because the Eighth
Amendment (and by implication the Fourteenth Amendment) sets the highest standard, the Court
will consider Plaintiff’s claim in light of that standard.
In order to rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation under both the Fourteenth and
Eighth Amendments, the alleged conditions must be objectively serious, and the prison official
must possess a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Dart, 803 F.3d at 309. As for the second,
subjective element, an inmate must “prove that the defendant ‘possess[ed] a purposeful, a
knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind’ with respect to the defendant’s actions
(or inaction) toward the plaintiff.” Id. at 309, n. 2 (citing Davis v. Wessel, 782 F.3d 793, 801
(7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472)). In the case of high-ranking jail staff,
personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation can be inferred where the complaint alleges
“potentially systemic,” as opposed to “clearly localized,” constitutional violations.

Id.

(citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiff challenges the following conditions of his confinement at the Jail:
(1) overcrowding; (2) denial of a bed; (3) exposure to a cold and wet cell; (4) exposure to raw
sewage; (5) exposure to contaminated drinking water; (6) exposure to mold; (7) lack of outdoor
recreation; (8) inadequate nutrition; and (9) a loss of his “teeth.” The Seventh Circuit has held
that conditions of confinement may support a constitutional claim “in combination,” even when
each of the conditions would not do so alone, “but only when they have a mutually enforcing
effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or
exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue

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blankets.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). In the complaint, Plaintiff has identified
numerous conditions that, taken together, support a claim. For example, overcrowding that
deprived Plaintiff of a bed and forced him to sleep on a cold, wet floor are conditions that, when
considered together, could offend constitutional norms. Likewise, the exposure to raw sewage,
contaminated water, and contaminated food present obvious risks to Plaintiff’s health. In fact,
the only two conditions that do not support a claim under Count 1 are the denial of gym access
and the loss of Plaintiff’s “teeth.”
While it is true that the denial of adequate exercise opportunities may violate
constitutional standards, the complaint supports no such claim. See Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1432
(“Lack of exercise may rise to a constitutional violation in extreme prolonged situations where
movement is denied to the point that the inmate’s health is threatened.”); Delaney v. DeTella,
256 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2001); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 764 (7th Cir. 1997).
There is a difference between the denial of access to the gym and an inability to exercise.
See, e.g., Dart, 803 F.3d at 313. Although Plaintiff complains about the denial of gym access, he
says nothing about the denial of other exercise opportunities or negative health consequences he
suffered as a result. The complaint does not suggest that Plaintiff’s movements were restricted,
that he was unable to exercise in his cell block, or that he was denied use of the Jail’s common
areas. Without more, the denial of gym access gives rise to no conditions of confinement claim
under Count 1.
In addition, Plaintiff’s claim that he lost his “teeth” is so vague that the Court is unable to
ascertain what, if any, impact this had on the conditions of his confinement, his medical needs, or
otherwise. To begin with, it is unclear whether Plaintiff literally lost his teeth or misplaced his
denture(s). Plaintiff also fails to draw any connection between this loss and any other conditions

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of his confinement. He does not allege, for example, that he was unable to eat because his
dentures were lost. Although detailed factual allegations are not required to state a claim,
Plaintiff must at least include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

The complaint falls

woefully short of this standard as it relates to the loss of Plaintiff’s “teeth.”
With the exception of Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied gym access and lost his
“teeth,” Count 1 shall proceed against Defendants McLauren and Trice. The complaint suggests
that these defendants were aware of the conditions, but took no action to address the problems
identified by Plaintiff. See also Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1996). Under the
circumstances, their conduct may rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff shall be
allowed to proceed with Count 1 against both defendants.
St. Clair County Jail shall be dismissed. Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on
personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under [Section] 1983, an
individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v.
Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A jail is not a
“person” under § 1983. Smith v. Knox Cnty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012); Powell v.
Cook Cnty. Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993). It is not a legal entity in the first place
and is therefore not amenable to suit. But even if the proper legal entity was named instead, the
case law under § 1983 imposes additional hurdles to actions against governmental agencies that
Plaintiff has not cleared. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 694 (1978). Accordingly, the Jail shall be dismissed.

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Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2), which shall
be addressed in a separate Order of this Court.
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3), which shall be
REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for a decision.
Finally, Plaintiff has filed a motion for service of process at government expense
(Doc. 4), which is hereby GRANTED, in part, as it relates to Defendants McLauren and Trice,
and DENIED, in part, with respect to St. Clair County Jail.
Disposition
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant ST. CLAIR COUNTY JAIL is DISMISSED with
prejudice from this action.
AS TO COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants McLAUREN and
TRICE: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and
(2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will
require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

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the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3). Further, this entire matter shall be
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Frazier for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of whether
his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,

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who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 11, 2015
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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