Williams v. Shah et al

Filing 9

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 12/11/2015. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LEONTE WILLIAMS,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
VIPEN SHAH,
DIRECTOR OF IDOC,
SUZANN BAILEY, and
WARDEN LASHBROOK,
Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 15-cv-1278-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Leonte Williams is currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”), located in Pinckneyville, Illinois. Williams brings this pro se action for
deprivations of his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against several prison officials.
This matter is now before the Court for a preliminary review of Williams’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court shall review a “complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
government entity.” During this preliminary review under § 1915A, the Court “shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if the complaint “is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or if it “seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Upon careful review of the
complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority
under § 1915A.

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Background
According to the complaint, from 2013, when Plaintiff entered prison, to the present, he
has been served a soy-based diet (replacing animal protein), which over time has led to health
problems. More specifically, the complaint alleges that the Director of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), Food Service Administrator Suzann Bailey, Warden Lashbrook, and Dr.
Vipen Shah have conspired to endanger Plaintiff’s health. After arriving at Pinckneyville,
Plaintiff began experiencing the side effects of consuming too much soy, such as constipation,
diarrhea, lethargy, and weight gain. The defendant officials, however, did not alter the soy diet.
Dr. Shah merely instructed Plaintiff to drink more water, and he refused to test Plaintiff’s thyroid
function. Further, Plaintiff’s administrative grievances have gone unanswered. According to the
complaint, in 2009 female inmates successfully sued the IDOC over their soy diet, and they are
no longer served soy-based meals. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has been served a soy-based diet every
day since arriving at Pinckneyville.
Plaintiff also takes issue with the elimination of breakfast at Pinckneyville—“the most
important meal of the day.” Inmates are now served dinner at around 4 p.m., and then eighteen
hours later, at around 10 a.m., they are served lunch. As a result, inmates receive only 1,600
calories per day and must stave off hunger by buying food at the commissary. Plaintiff has
experienced stomach pain, lethargy, headaches, and other injuries. Plaintiff further asserts that
the Defendants have conspired in order to allow unnamed officials to pocket the saving and
commissary profits (estimated at $4,750,000 per year). Plaintiff has written to each of the
Defendants and filed grievances, but has received no answers.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

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Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.
COUNT 1:

Shah, Director, Bailey, and Lashbrook violated Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment rights by serving him soy meals.

COUNT 2:

Shah was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
rights.

COUNT 3:

Shah, Director, Bailey, and Lashbrook violated the Eighth
Amendment by instituting a two-meal-per-day policy.

COUNT 4:

Shah, Director, Bailey, and Lashbrook conspired against Plaintiff
by serving soy food at the prison and by instituting a two-mealper-day policy.
Discussion

Count 1 may proceed against the Director, Bailey, and Lashbrook. The Constitution
mandates that prison officials provide inmates with “nutritionally adequate food that is prepared
and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health and wellbeing of the inmates who consume it.” French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1985).
Construing Plaintiff’s complaint broadly, he alleges that Pinckneyville had a policy of serving
soy-based food to prisoners, that this food has caused a number of side effects, and that highlevel officials were aware of these side effects from a previous suit yet continued to serve soy
food anyway. These allegations are sufficient to state arguable claims concerning the service of
nutritionally inadequate or dangerous food against the Director, Bailey, and Lashbrook. This is
true especially in light of the fact that the food service aspect of the claim concerns systematic
conditions at Pinckneyville and the prison-related defendants appear to be senior level staff
within IDOC. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1996) (personal
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involvement can be assumed at early stage for high-level officials if the conditions alleged are
“potentially systematic”). Accordingly, Count 1 may proceed as to the Director, Bailey, and
Lashbrook. However, as to Dr. Shah, Plaintiff has not alleged that Shah had any involvement in
general food services at Pinckneyville, and he is not the type of prison official where his
involvement in food service can be presumed at the outset of a suit. Accordingly, Count 1 must
be dismissed without prejudice as to Dr. Shah.
Plaintiff may pursue his claim against Dr. Shah, however, as to Count 2. Plaintiff claims
that Dr. Shah refused his request for a thyroid hormone level check and a soy-free diet, despite
his numerous health problems. To state a medical claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff
must show that his condition “was objectively serious,” and that officials acted with the requisite
intent towards that condition. Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2000). For screening
purposes, Plaintiff’s claim passes the objective hurdle—he alleges that he suffered constipation,
diarrhea, lethargy, weight gain, a torn anus, and other symptoms linked to the food at the prison,
and those symptoms can indicate an arguably serious condition at screening. See Gutierrez v.
Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1372 n.7 & 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff’s claim also passes the
subjective hurdle—allegations of a failure to treat can constitute indifference, depending on the
circumstances. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011); McGowan v. Hulick, 612
F.3d 636, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2010). As such, Count 2 may proceed through screening.
Plaintiff next alleges that prison officials violated his constitutional rights by serving only
two meals per day (Count 3). Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials “must take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates and ensure that they receive adequate
food.” Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009). While a prisoner is not entitled to
the food of his choice, he might state a claim if he alleges facts tending to show that officials

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provided food that is “nutritionally deficient” or “well below nutritional value,” depending on the
circumstances. Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 312 (7th Cir. 2015). Construing Plaintiff’s
complaint broadly, he alleges that Shah, the Director, Bailey, and Lashbrook instituted a policy
whereby inmates at Pinckneyville were not given breakfast, that this policy caused Plaintiff to be
fed only 1,600 calories per day, and that this policy has caused Plaintiff to suffer “hunger pains”
and other symptoms related to a lack of nutrition. That is sufficient to state a claim concerning
deficient meals at the preliminary screening stage, and therefore, Count 3 may proceed as to the
Director, Bailey, and Lashbrook. That said, Count 3 must be dismissed as to Shah because, as
previously stated, Plaintiff has not alleged that Shah had any involvement in general food
services at Pinckneyville, and he is not the type of prison official where his involvement in food
service can be presumed at the outset of a suit.
While it is not clear from the complaint, Plaintiff also seems to bring standalone
conspiracy allegations concerning the soy-based diet at the prison and the policy to not serve
breakfasts (Count 4). To the extent this claim is raised against the defendants who already have
claims against them in Count 1 and Count 3, the conspiracy claim is duplicative, and Count 4
must be dismissed without prejudice against them. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992
(7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the “function of conspiracy doctrine” in § 1983 cases “is merely to
yoke particular individuals to the specific torts alleged in the complaint”). To the extent Count 4
is an effort to draw Dr. Shah into Count 1 and Count 3, this is problematic under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8, which requires litigants to provide a minimum level of “factual content” to
state a claim “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Especially for allegations of a “vast, encompassing” conspiracy—like the one Plaintiff seems to
be alleging here—a plaintiff “must meet a high standard of plausibility” to state a claim under

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Rule 8. Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, all Plaintiff puts forth
is a conclusory allegation that the defendants conspired with one another—he does not allege any
details of the alleged agreement between the parties, nor anything else about the purported
conspiracy. Without more developed allegations, Plaintiff has not made out a viable conspiracy
claim, and Count 4 must be dismissed.
Over and above his Eighth Amendment claims, Plaintiff also invokes the Fourteenth
Amendment in his complaint. However, Plaintiff fails to articulate any distinct Fourteenth
Amendment issue, and the Court cannot discern one from the narrative of his complaint. Any
Fourteenth Amendment claim would appear to be redundant, as it is necessarily based on the
same facts underlying the Eighth Amendment claims that were already recognized above. See,
e.g., Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (dismissing equal protection and Eighth
Amendment claims based on same circumstances as religious claim because religious claim
“gains nothing by attracting additional constitutional labels”); Williams v. Snyder, 150 F. App’x
549, 552–53 (7th Cir. 2005) (dismissing equal protection, access to courts, due process, and
Eighth Amendment claims as duplicative of retaliation and religion claims). As such, the
Fourteenth Amendment claims should be considered dismissed without prejudice.
Pending Motions
The same day he filed his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion for recruitment of counsel
(Doc. 3) and a motion for service of process at government expense (Doc. 4). The Court will first
discuss Plaintiff’s motion for counsel. There is no constitutional or statutory right to appointment
of counsel in federal civil cases. Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010).
However, federal district courts have discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) to request counsel
to assist pro se litigants. Id. When presented with a request to appoint counsel, the Court must

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make the following two inquiries: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to
obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of
the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,
654 (7th Cir. 2007).
Concerning the second step of the inquiry, “the difficulty of the case is considered against
the plaintiff’s litigation capabilities, and those capabilities are examined in light of the challenges
specific to the case at hand.” Id. at 655. From a legal standpoint, the litigation of any
constitutional claim falls in the complex range. Even so, Plaintiff’s petition adequately articulates
his claims, and based on this ability, this Court concludes that Plaintiff appears to be competent
to litigate his case on his own at this time. Future developments in this case may alter the Court’s
decision, but at this early stage in the litigation, Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel
will be DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may choose to re-file this motion at a later stage in
the litigation.
Plaintiff’s motion for service of process at government expense is GRANTED. Waivers
of service of summons will be issued and served on Defendants as ordered below. Plaintiff is
advised that it is not necessary for a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis to file a motion
requesting service of process by the United States Marshal Service or other process server. The
Clerk will issue summons and the Court will direct service for any complaint that passes
preliminary review.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, COUNT 1 shall PROCEED
against the DIRECTOR, BAILEY, and LASHBROOK. COUNT 1 is DISMISSED without
prejudice as to SHAH.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2 may PROCEED against SHAH.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 3 shall PROCEED against the
DIRECTOR, BAILEY, and LASHBROOK. COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice as
to SHAH.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 4 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants
SHAH, DIRECTOR, BAILEY, and LASHBROOK: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Order to each
Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service, and the Court will
require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no longer can be
found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This
information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting
service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address
information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon
defense counsel once an appearance is entered) a copy of every pleading or other document
submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed

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a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of the document was served on
Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or
that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to a Magistrate Judge for disposition, as
contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties consent to
such a referral.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the
judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the
full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has
been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under § 1915 for leave to
commence this action without being required to prepay fees and costs, the applicant and his or
her attorney were deemed to have entered into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in
the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed
against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

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cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 11, 2015
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
Staci M. Yandle
United States District Court

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