Garcia v. Wexford Health Sources Inc et al

Filing 6

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 1/15/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JUAN GARCIA, # R-58170,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
DR. TROST, MOLDENHAUER,
AIMEE LANG, DR. GARCIA, and
DR. SHEARING,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15-cv-1369-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Juan Garcia, an inmate at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants denied him
adequate medical treatment for growths and cysts on his testicles, which caused him significant
pain and suffering over the course of at least a year. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
The complaint comes now before the Court for a preliminary review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner complaints
to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss any
portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, some factual allegations may be
so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Smith v.
Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009).
Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of
action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro
se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint
In 2007, Plaintiff became aware of two cysts on his testicles. (Doc. 1, p. 17). Over the
next several years, the cysts caused him intermittent pain. Id. In 2013, Plaintiff’s condition
worsened, and the pain from the testicular growths caused him significant pain and discomfort,
particularly with urination, on an ongoing and persistent basis. Id. at 17.

In addition to pain

with urination, the cysts made it difficult for Plaintiff to sleep, walk, and participate in daily
activities. Id. at 9. In October 2013, Plaintiff reported to Defendant Shearing (a medical doctor)
that the pain was a 9 on a scale of 1-10. Id. at 16.
The complaint recounts Plaintiff’s various and ongoing attempts to secure proper medical
treatment from Defendants Trost, Moldenhauer, Lang, Garcia, and Shearing – all medical
professionals – over a prolonged period of time. 1 Id. at 9-16. Plaintiff repeatedly requested

1

In his statement of claim, Plaintiff focuses primarily on his attempts to secure treatment during August to
November 2013. However, it is clear from a grievance officer’s report attached to the complaint that Plaintiff
continued to complain about testicular pain through at least October 2014. Id. at 22.

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further medical testing, a referral to an outside specialist, and pain medication, but Defendants
denied each of his requests. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the medical Defendants denied his requests
because Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), the private corporation that
contracts with the Illinois Department of Corrections to provide medical care to Illinois inmates,
maintains policies that prioritize cost above patient care. Id. at 6.
Discussion
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the Court must do at this preliminary stage,
the Court finds that the complaint sets forth an actionable claim under the Eighth Amendment for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Plaintiff may proceed on his claim for

monetary damages against each Defendant, in his or her individual capacity.
“The Eighth Amendment safeguards the prisoner against a lack of medical care that ‘may
result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.’”
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). To establish an Eighth
Amendment medical needs claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the medical condition was
objectively serious; and (2) the state officials acted with deliberate indifference to his medical
needs. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011).
The Seventh Circuit has held that a medical need is objectively “serious” where it has
either “been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or ... is so obvious that even a lay
person would perceive the need for a doctor's attention.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653
(7th Cir. 2005). Moreover, “[a] medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious;
rather, it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain if not treated.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011)

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(quoting Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he
had two cysts on his testicles that caused him significant pain and discomfort over several
months. These allegations meet the threshold requirement for a “serious” medical condition.
The question, then, is whether the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference.
To establish deliberate indifference, Plaintiff “must demonstrate that prison officials
acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir.
2005) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). “A delay in treating non-lifethreatening but painful conditions may constitute deliberate indifference if the delay exacerbated
the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate's pain.” Arnett, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir.
2011). See also McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010). But, to be held liable,
officials must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health” by being “‘aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’” and
“‘draw[ing] the inference.’” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994)).
Plaintiff alleges that he personally made Defendants Trost, Moldenhauer, Lang, Garcia,
and Shearing aware of his painful medical condition and repeatedly requested appropriate
treatment and medication to manage his pain, but they each failed to adequately address his
condition, thereby prolonging his pain and suffering. These allegations are sufficient to state an
actionable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Trost,
Moldenhauer, Lang, Garcia, and Shearing.
Likewise, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Wexford should be held liable because
Wexford maintains a policy that places cost considerations above patient care, and that this
policy caused the other Defendants to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right to adequate medical

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care. Defendant Wexford may be held liable for the promulgation of a policy or practice, if the
policy or practice caused the underlying constitutional violation, as alleged here. See Perez v.
Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 780 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc.,
368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). As such, Plaintiff may also proceed on his Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Wexford.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may proceed on his Eighth Amendment
medical care claim against Defendants TROST, MOLDENHAUER, LANG, GARCIA,
SHEARING, and WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants TROST, MOLDENHAUER, LANG,
GARCIA, SHEARING, and WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.: (1) Form 5 (Notice of
a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of
Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this
Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a
Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk
within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file

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or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Williams for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Williams for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties
consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, even though his
application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).

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Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 15, 2016
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge,
United States District Court

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