Tate v. Wexford Health Source Inc. et al

Filing 299

ORDER DENYING 255 Motion to Consolidate Cases filed by Plaintiff. Signed by Chief Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 9/6/2019. (mlp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CARL TATE,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:16-CV-92-NJR-MAB

v.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
LOUIS SHICKER, MELVIN HINTON,
JOHN BALDWIN, MARTINETTE
DOUGLAS, VENERIO SANTOS,
MARK AARON, SHANE REISTER,
MICHAEL DEMPSEY, JEFF
DENNISON, CHRISTOPHER BAILEY,
and DALE CRAWFORD,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Consolidate filed by Plaintiff Carl
“Tay Tay” Tate (Doc. 255). Tate seeks to consolidate this case with Tay Tay v. Baldwin, No.
19-CV-501-NJR-MAB. Although the two cases are based on distinct legal theories, Tate
argues there is a sufficient factual nexus between the claims in that both cases are based
on Defendants’ failure to adequately treat her gender dysphoria and recognize her as a
transgender woman. Accordingly, consolidation is appropriate to avoid unnecessary
costs and delay.
The IDOC Defendants object to consolidation, arguing that the two cases contain
different allegations against different Defendants for actions that occurred years apart
(Doc. 260). Moreover, the cases are in varying stages of litigation, considering discovery
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is complete in this case, and dispositive motions were due August 12, 2019. 1 In contrast,
responsive pleadings in the Tay Tay case are not even due yet. The IDOC Defendants
assert they will be prejudiced if Tate is permitted to conduct further discovery in this case
months after the passage of the fact discovery deadline.
The Wexford Defendants also oppose consolidation (Doc. 262). They argue that
the claims in the two cases are based on separate facts, seek different relief, and are
against different Defendants. In fact, they argue, there are no Wexford Defendants in the
Tay Tay case. Furthermore, while Tate claims that the two cases are at comparable stages
of discovery due to delays in this case, the Wexford Defendants note that Tate adequately
represented herself through summary judgment on exhaustion and was zealously
represented by two appointed attorneys. Any delay in the case is more likely due to
Plaintiff amending the complaint three times—and being denied leave to amend a fourth
and fifth time to add more counts and more parties. Because the Tay Tay case involves
new issues, defendants, and causes of action that are irrelevant to the allegations and time
period in this case, they argue, the cases should not be consolidated.
Under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f actions before the
court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial
any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions, or (3) issue any other
orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). District judges exercise
broad discretion in determining whether cases should be consolidated. Canedy v.

Defendants filed a joint motion for extension of time to file dispositive motions, which is pending as of
the date of this Order (Doc. 283).
1

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Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994). Consolidation of cases may not be appropriate
when the cases involve claims related to different time periods. See King v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
960 F.2d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 1992) (“We conclude, because of the different allegations and
time frames, the district court abused its discretion by consolidating these actions.”).
The Court does not find consolidation of the actions appropriate here. This case
centers on Tate’s claims that Defendants failed to provide adequate medical care with
regard to her gender dysphoria and mental health needs while she was housed at
Western, Centralia, and Shawnee correctional centers. She also alleges Defendants failed
to protect her from harassment and assault by other inmates, as well as Defendants Bailey
and Crawford, while she was incarcerated at Centralia (Doc. 182).
In Tay Tay, however, she alleges a different set of IDOC defendants (with the
exception of Warden Jeff Dennison): violated her constitutional rights and the ADA by
discriminating against her, failing to protect her as a transgender woman in a men’s
prison, and refusing to transfer her to a women’s prison; violated the Due Process Clause
by involuntarily transferring her to Elgin in 2019 without a hearing; retaliated against her
protected First Amendment activity by requiring her to go to Menard in 2019 to appear
at her hearing and by transferring her to Elgin; maintained unconstitutional policies,
practices, and customs related to transgender prisoners; and intentionally inflicted
emotional distress (Doc. 64).
While there is some overlap with regard to the general background of these two
cases, i.e., both are related to Tate’s gender dysphoria, the facts underlying Tate’s actual
claims are different. Moreover, this case was filed more than three years ago against
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Defendants who are not part of the Tay Tay litigation. Prolonging this case against them—
especially the Wexford Defendants—would be prejudicial, cause unfair delay, and
require them to expend additional resources on a case in which they are not involved.
The Court agrees with the Wexford Defendants: “at some point a case must be allowed
to resolve.” (Doc. 262).
For these reasons, the Motion to Consolidate filed by Plaintiff (Doc. 255) is
DENIED. Because both cases generally result from Plaintiff’s gender dysphoria
diagnosis, however, the Court has joined the motion for preliminary injunction pending
in each case for a hearing at 9 a.m. on September 25, 2019.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 6, 2019
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge

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