Strickland v. Taylor

Filing 17

ORDER DISMISSING CASE without prejudice. Plaintiff is advised that this dismissal shall count as one of his allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 3/1/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHARLES STRICKLAND,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
GLADYSE TAYLOR, et al.,
Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 16-cv-00122-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Plaintiff Charles Strickland is currently incarcerated at Big Muddy River Correctional
Center, located in Ina, Illinois. Proceeding pro se, Strickland has filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various constitutional violations committed against himself and his
fellow prisoners. 1
This matter is now before the Court for a preliminary review of Strickland’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court shall review a “complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
government entity.” During this preliminary review under § 1915A, the Court “shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if the complaint “is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or if it “seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
Strickland’s complaint alleges several wrongs, including the confiscation of his personal
legal books and disciplinary transfers ordered under false pretenses. The brunt of the complaint,
however, centers on the denial of his and his fellow inmates’ “pre-sentence jail credits,” an
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Strickland states that he brings this claim on behalf of himself, as well as on behalf of “Alsworth Carter . . .,
Ronshawn Brunt . . ., [and] thousands of other prisoners . . . .” (Doc. 14 at 2.)

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action which is “forcing us to be unlawfully imprisoned beyond our regular Mandatory
Supervised Release . . . dates.” (Id. at 2.) His prayer for relief includes a request that such credits
be reinstated. (Id. at 5.)
In Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) (per curiam), the Supreme Court recognized
that some prisoner civil rights cases straddle the line between what is actionable under § 1983,
and what should instead be instituted in a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its
duration are the province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on
circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action. Some cases
are hybrids, with a prisoner seeking relief unavailable in habeas, notably damages,
but on allegations that not only support a claim for recompense, but imply the
invalidity either of an underlying conviction or of a particular ground for denying
release short of serving the maximum time of confinement.
Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750-51 (citations omitted). Muhammad is based on Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 action that “would
necessarily imply the invalidity of [a plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence” is not cognizable until
the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 486-87. The Seventh Circuit has held
that Heck applies to the denial of a prisoner’s pre-sentence credit. See Beaven v. Roth, 74 F.
App’x 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A state prisoner's suit challenging the computation of his
sentence is a suit challenging the duration of his confinement, and therefore, the appropriate
vehicle to raise such a claim in federal court is a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254, after
exhausting state remedies.”).
Strickland’s civil rights claim only ripens when the decision that led to the denial of presentence credit has been reversed or otherwise invalidated. See Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303,

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306-07 (7th Cir. 2006). Because there is no indication this has occurred, Strickland’s § 1983
claim must be dismissed.
The dismissal shall be without prejudice, however, to Strickland raising his claim, should
he wish to do so, if and when the action imposing an extended duration of his confinement is
overturned. He may be able to pursue relief in a federal habeas corpus case, after presenting his
claim to the Illinois state courts. This includes appealing any adverse decision to the Illinois
Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court. The Illinois courts, for example, have
recognized mandamus as an appropriate remedy to compel prison officials to award sentence
credit to a prisoner. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-101 et seq.; Turner-El v. West, 811 N.E.2d
728, 733 (Ill. App. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Franzen, 417 N.E.2d 242, 247, aff’d on reh’g, 420
N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. 1981)).
Pending Motions
Strickland filed a motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 5) and a motion for service of
process at the Government’s expense (Doc. 6). Those motions are DENIED as MOOT.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any and all claims against Defendants are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
A dismissal without prejudice may count as a strike, so long as the dismissal is made
because the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. See Paul v. Marberry, 658
F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2011); Evans v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr. 150 F.3d 810, 811 (7th Cir. 1998); Smith v.
Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1313 (10th Cir. 2011); O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 115455 (9th Cir. 2008); Day v. Maynard, 200 F.3d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1999); Rivera v. Allin, 144
F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998) (abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199

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(2007)); Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 463-64 (5th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff is advised
that this dismissal shall count as one of his allotted “strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, his notice of appeal must be filed with this
Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff does
choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome
of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d
724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v.
Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be
nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another “strike.” A proper and timely motion filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R.
APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the
entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 1, 2016

s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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