Bell v. Butler et al

Filing 5

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint on or before April 29, 2016. Should Plaintiff fail to file his first amended complaint within the allotted time, dismissal will become with prejudice and a strike will be assessed. (Action due by 4/29/2016). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 3/24/2016. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TEAONE SHASHAWN BELL,
# B-59870,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KIMBERLY S. BUTLER,
DAVID L. EVELSIZER,
and TERRENCE T. JACKSON,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-cv-00201-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Teaone Bell, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional
Center (“Pontiac”), brings this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations
of his constitutional rights at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). (Doc. 1, pp. 1-20).
According to the complaint, Plaintiff received a false disciplinary ticket for sexual misconduct at
Menard on May 10, 2015. (Id. at 5-6, 13). Following an allegedly unfair disciplinary hearing,
he was punished with one year of segregation, demotion to C-grade status, and restrictions on his
commissary privileges. (Id. at 13). In segregation, Plaintiff endured unconstitutional conditions
of confinement and ultimately attempted to commit suicide. (Id. at 5-6). He now sues Kimberly
Butler (warden), David Evelsizer (hearing committee chairperson), and Terrence Jackson
(hearing committee member) for subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, and for denying him due process and equal protection of the law, in
violation of and Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 6.).

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Merits Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner

complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to
dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief must

cross

“the line between

possibility and

plausibility.”

Id.

at

557.

Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept
factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts
“should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed.

See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,

577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The complaint does not survive review under this standard
and shall be dismissed.

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The Complaint
While incarcerated at Menard, Plaintiff was issued a disciplinary ticket for sexual
misconduct on May 10, 2015. (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 13). He was found guilty at an adjustment
committee hearing before David Evelsizer (chairperson) and Terrence Jackson (member) on
May 19, 2015. (Id. at 13). According to the final hearing summary, Officer Nicole Marshall
reported that a “med tech was passing medication on a-wing and inmate Bell had his penis
outside the chuck hole fondling himself.” 1

(Id.).

Plaintiff claims that this was “totally

unsupported by any evidence other than observation of the reporting employee.” (Id. at 5).
Plaintiff was punished with one year of segregation, demotion to C-grade status, and restrictions
on his commissary privileges.

(Id. at 13).

Warden Kimberly Butler approved of this

punishment. (Id.).
In segregation, Plaintiff was allegedly forced to endure unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. He shared a one-person cell with another inmate. (Id. at 5). The cell was “totally
surrounded by concreate [sic], steel and glass.” (Id.). He was denied regular access to the prison
yard, shower, and commissary. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff also objected to the diet, but does not explain
why. Plaintiff went on a hunger strike and, consequently, suffered from hunger pains. He claims
that he ultimately attempted to commit suicide. (Id.).
Plaintiff now sues Warden Butler, Officer Evelsizer, and Officer Jackson for subjecting
him to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and for denying
him due process and equal protection of the law, in violation of and Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.
at 5-6). He seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 6-7).

1

This lawsuit represents the third action that Plaintiff has filed in federal court against prison officials
who issued him disciplinary tickets for sexual misconduct. See Bell v. Hardy, et al., Case No. 15-cv07944 (N.D. Ill., dismissed Feb. 19, 2016); Bell v. Butler, et al., Case No. 16-cv-00175-SMY (S.D. Ill.
2015).
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Discussion
To facilitate the orderly management of future proceedings in this case, and in
accordance with the objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 10(b), the
Court deems it appropriate to organize the claims in Plaintiff’s pro se complaint into the
following four (4) counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
Count 1:

Defendants deprived Plaintiff of a protected liberty interest
without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, when they punished him with one year of
segregation following the issuance of a false disciplinary ticket
and an unfair disciplinary hearing.

Count 2:

Defendants subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, when they
placed him in segregation for one year.

Count 3:

Defendants ignored a known risk of suicide and disregarded it,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Count 4:

Defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to equal protection of the
law under the Fourteenth Amendment, by placing him in
segregation without adequate space, food, exercise, showers, or
commissary.

As discussed in more detail below, none of the above-listed claims survive threshold
review, and they shall be dismissed. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed any further with this action,
he will be required to file an amended complaint. The deadline and instructions for doing so are
set forth in the disposition.
Count 1 – Due Process
With regard to his first claim (Count 1), Plaintiff’s complaint includes insufficient
allegations to support a claim for relief under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Standing alone, the receipt of a false disciplinary ticket does not give rise to a due process

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violation.

“[D]ue process safeguards associated with prison disciplinary proceedings are

sufficient to guard against potential abuses[,] [and a] hearing before a presumably impartial
Adjustment Committee terminates an officer’s possible liability for the filing of an allegedly
false disciplinary report.” Hadley v. Peters, 841 F. Supp. 850, 856 (C.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d, 70
F.3d 117 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
These due process safeguards include: (1) advance written notice of the charges against
the inmate; (2) the opportunity to appear before an impartial hearing body to contest the charges;
(3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in the inmate’s defense
(if prison safety allows and subject to the discretion of correctional officers); and (4) a written
statement summarizing the reasons for the discipline imposed. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 563-69 (1974). In addition, the decision of the adjustment committee must be supported by
“some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395 (7th Cir. 1994). In his complaint, Plaintiff
describes no violations of the due process protections outlined in Wolff.
Further, no right to due process of law is triggered, unless a protected liberty interest is at
stake. An “inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding segregation is limited.” Hardaway v. Meyerhoff,
734 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697
(7th Cir. 2009)).

A protected liberty interest arises only when Plaintiff’s confinement in

segregation “impose[s] an ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Hardaway, 734 F.3d at 743 (citing Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).

Courts generally consider two factors when making this

determination: “the combined import of the duration of the segregative [sic] confinement and the
conditions endured.” Id. at 743 (citing Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98) (emphasis in original).

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A liberty interest may arise if the length of confinement in segregation is substantial and
the record reveals that the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh. Marion, 559 F.3d at
697-98, n. 2. According to the complaint, Plaintiff was punished with one year of segregation,
which is likely long enough to support a due process claim. However, the complaint fails to
describe the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement with the minimum level of detail necessary to
support a claim.

Plaintiff only vaguely alludes to inadequate diet, exercise, showers, and

commissary. If he wishes to pursue this claim any further, the amended complaint will need to
elaborate on the Wolff requirements that were violated at the disciplinary hearing and the
frequency and duration of the deprivations Plaintiff encountered in segregation. Count 1 shall
be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 2 – Conditions of Confinement
With regard to his second claim (Count 2), Plaintiff may be able to support a claim for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment. However, he has not
done so in his complaint. Plaintiff generally complains that he was placed in a small cell made
of concrete, steel, and glass. He was housed with another inmate in a one-person cell, and he
was denied adequate opportunities to shower, eat, exercise, and access commissary.
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment “does not
mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). However, the
conditions of confinement must be at least “humane.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994). To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment based on conditions of confinement,
an inmate must describe: (1) a deprivation that is “objectively, sufficiently serious,” such that he
was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities;” and (2) a “sufficiently culpable
state of mind” on the part of the prison official, such as deliberate indifference to inmate health

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and safety. Id. at 834 (internal quotations marks omitted); see Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840,
842-43 (7th Cir. 2013). In order to determine whether Plaintiff’s experience in segregation gives
rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim, he will need to submit an amended complaint that
provides additional information regarding the nature and duration of each deprivation mentioned
in the complaint, the actual conditions under which he was held, and the individuals he
complained to about these conditions, if anyone. Count 2 shall also be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 3 – Attempted Suicide
With regard to the third claim (Count 3), the complaint supports no Eighth Amendment
claim against the defendants for ignoring a known risk of suicide. Like other Eighth Amendment
claims, this type of claim has both an objective and a subjective element: (1) “the harm that
befell the prisoner must be objectively, sufficiently serious and a substantial risk to his or her
health or safety;” and (2) the individual defendants were “deliberately indifferent to the
substantial risk to the prisoner’s health and safety.” Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760
(7th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that
suicide, or even attempted suicide, qualifies as a serious harm. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d
724, 733 (7th Cir. 2001) (“It goes without saying that ‘suicide is a serious harm.’”).
In the case of an attempted suicide, the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment
claim requires a dual showing that the defendant: (1) subjectively knew the prisoner was at
substantial risk of committing suicide and (2) intentionally disregarded the risk.

Collins,

462 F.3d at 761 (citing Matos ex rel. Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 2003);
Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000) (defendant

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must be aware of the significant likelihood that an inmate may imminently seek to take his own
life and must fail to take reasonable steps to prevent the inmate from performing the act)).
Beyond mentioning his attempt to commit suicide, Plaintiff offers no factual allegations
in support of a related claim against the defendants. If he wishes to proceed with an Eighth
Amendment claim against any of the defendants for intentionally disregarding a known risk of
suicide, he will need to more fully address this claim in his amended complaint. Count 3 is
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 4 – Equal Protection
With regard to his fourth claim (Count 4), the complaint does not indicate how Plaintiff
was denied equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving persons within its
jurisdiction of equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Generally, an equal
protection claim requires a showing of “purposeful discrimination,” or singling out of a
particular group for disparate treatment, and action taken with the intention of causing an adverse
effect on the identifiable group.

Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982).

Such claims often arise in the context of race. In this context, a plaintiff who asserts an equal
protection violation based on race “must establish that a state actor has treated him different[ly]
than persons of a different race and that the state actor did so purposefully.” DeWalt v. Carter,
224 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976);
Indianapolis v. Minority Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Wiley, 187 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 1999)).
In contrast, a “class-of-one” equal protection challenge asserts that an individual has been
irrationally singled out for discriminatory treatment, without regard for any group affiliation.
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).

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The allegations in the complaint fall far short of supporting either type of equal protection
claim. Plaintiff appears to have made little more than passing reference to this claim in a section
heading. Plaintiff does not allege that he was singled out or treated differently than anyone else,
or by whom. Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith,
631 F.3d at 419, the Court is not expected to rely on sketchy or implausible allegations. Brooks,
578 F.3d at 581. In this case, Plaintiff offers no allegations in support of his equal protection
claim. Count 4 shall therefore be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
All four of Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an
amended complaint that more fully develops each claim. If he chooses to do so, Plaintiff will be
bound by the deadline and instructions for doing so in the below disposition.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2), which shall be
addressed in a separate Order of this Court.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint on or before April 29, 2016.
Should Plaintiff fail to file his first amended complaint within the allotted time, dismissal will
become with prejudice and a “strike” will be assessed. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). See generally
Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir.
1994). Further, a “strike” may be assessed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

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Should Plaintiff decide to file an amended complaint, it is strongly recommended that he
use the forms designed for use in this District for such actions. He should be careful to label the
pleading, “First Amended Complaint.” Bell must present each claim in a separate count, and
each count shall specify, by name, each defendant alleged to be liable under the count, as well as
the actions alleged to have been taken by that defendant. Plaintiff should attempt to include the
facts of his case in chronological order, inserting each defendant’s name where necessary to
identify the actors. Plaintiff should refrain from filing unnecessary exhibits. Plaintiff should
include only related claims in his new complaint. Claims found to be unrelated will be severed
into new cases, new case numbers will be assigned, and additional filing fees will be assessed.
To enable Plaintiff to comply with this order, the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank
civil rights complaint form.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall not count as one of his allotted “strikes”
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the
original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n. 1
(7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original complaint.
Thus, the first amended complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any previous
pleading, and Plaintiff must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the
first amended complaint. Finally, the amended complaint is subject to review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was
incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $400.00 2 remains due and payable,
2

Effective May 1, 2013, the filing fee for a civil case increased from $350.00 to $400.00, by the addition
of a new $50.00 administrative fee for filing a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court.
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regardless of whether Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1);
Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 24, 2016
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
United States District Court

See Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees - District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, 28 U.S.C. § 1914,
No. 14. A litigant who is granted in forma pauperis status, however, is exempt from paying the
additional $50.00 fee.
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